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Abstract
This thesis comprises an empirical case study of scientific data production in
oceanography  and  a  philosophical  analysis  of  the  relations  between  newly
created scientific data and the natural world. Based on qualitative interviews
with  researchers,  I  reconstruct  research  practices  that  lead  to  the  ongoing
production  of  digital  data  related  to  long-term  developments  of  plankton
biodiversity in the oceans. My analysis is centred on four themes: materiality,
scientific representing with data, methodological continuity, and the contribution
of non-scientists to epistemic processes. These are critically assessed against
the background of today’s data-intensive sciences and increased automation
and remoteness in oceanographic practices. Sciences of  the world’s oceans
have by and large been disregarded in philosophical scholarship thus far. My
thesis opens this field for philosophical analysis and reveals various conditions
and  constraints  of  data  practices  that  are  largely  uncontrollable  by  ocean
scientists.  I  argue that  the creation of  useful  scientific  data  depends on the
implementation  and  preservation  of  material,  methodological,  and  social
continuities. These allow scientists to repeatedly transform visually perceived
characteristics of research samples into meaningful scientific data stored in a
digital database. In my case study, data are not collected but result from active
intervention  and  subsequent  manipulation  and  processing  of  newly  created
material objects. My discussion of scientific representing with data suggests that
scientists do not extract or read any intrinsic representational relation between
data and a target, but make data gradually more computable and compatible
with already existing representations of natural systems. My arguments shed
light  on  the  epistemological  significance  of  materiality, on  limiting  factors  of
scientific agency, and on an inevitable balance between changing conditions of
concrete research settings and long-term consistency of data practices.
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Chapter One – Introduction: What is “in-between” science 
and the world?
This thesis is about the genesis of digital scientific data. It tracks a variety of
activities and research practices that underpin the creation of data and shape
the  scientific  knowledge  of  natural  systems.  These  activities  and  research
practices  are  not  performed  in  empty  space.  My  thesis  reconstructs  the
conditions  and  constraints  of  data  practices  that  result  from  the  material,
methodological, technological, economic, and social constraints of studying a
dynamic natural system as vast, unexplored, and inaccessible as the world’s
oceans and  the  ecosystems therein.  How scientists  balance  between  these
variously controllable constraints and manage to generate meaningful scientific
data is the leading question of this thesis.
Oceans  cover  seventy  percent  of  the  Earth’s  surface  and  are  crucial
components of its climate system. They are the habitat of innumerable living
organisms, including our planet’s smallest and largest animals. Terrestrial life
and societies are deeply affected by the oceans and depend on the biological,
physical, and chemical conditions of the seas in various ways. For centuries,
thinkers and scientists have made efforts to study oceanic processes, but the
physical  nature  of  the  seas  causes  serious  constraints  for  the  abilities  to
observe and record, let alone understand, these processes. 
Scientific  communities  and  institutions  are  today’s  main  players  in  studying
natural processes and their effects on societies. Observing, tracking, recording,
communicating,  and  making  sense  of  both  natural  and  anthropogenic
processes are among the main activities of these communities and institutions.
Ocean sciences are, as many other sciences, a research field in which groups,
research projects, or even entire institutions have specialised in one of these
activities.  For  this  thesis,  I  have  studied  the  research  practices  of  an
oceanographic institution that has specialised since the middle of the twentieth
century  on  continuously  recording  populations  and  biodiversity  of  oceanic
plankton and communicates these records to ocean scientists, environmental
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monitoring agencies, and policy makers. Oceanic plankton comprise all plants
and animals that passively drift with the ocean currents, produce around half of
the earth’s oxygen by photosynthesis, and underpin the marine food web.
Sciences  that  study  the  natural  environment  rely  heavily  on  the  ongoing
production,  the  dissemination,  and  long-term  storage  of  scientific  data.  I
investigate how plankton populations and biodiversity can be recorded and how
such  records  are  prepared  for  dissemination  so  that  they  can  be  used  by
scientists to advance the understanding of oceanic processes. More specifically,
the subject matter of this thesis is the space in which science and scientific
technologies make physical contact with the natural environment and with the
creatures that populate the oceans, including plankton organisms as well  as
seafarers, who play a crucial role in the production of plankton data in my case
study.
My thesis explores the space “in-between” science and the world and provides
arguments  for  the  epistemological  significance  of  processes,  practices,  and
people that occupy this space. Many of these practices and people are involved
in the creation of scientific data. The term “in-between” may suggest a clear
separation between a world that contains the objects studied by researchers
and  the  scientific  practices  and  knowledge  that  describe  and  explain  these
objects.  However, my thesis  demonstrates  that  the practices and people in-
between are integral parts of sciences, though they are often driven or affected
by  processes  that  are  external  to  science  and  beyond  the  control  of
researchers. 
Today’s  natural  sciences,  ranging  from  astronomy  to  physics,  biology,  and
environmental sciences like oceanography, are embracing technologies which
enable the production of highly standardised data products in unprecedented
volumes. New technologies also make data readily available to global scientific
communities using the world wide web, while the speed at which large volumes
of data can be analysed has steadily increased. Using attributions like “data-
centric”  or “data-intensive”,  many scholars have focused on the “escalating”,
high-volume, and high-speed end of the spectrum of scientific practices and
explain how these developments fundamentally transform scientific practices,
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including modes of scientific collaboration, differentiation of labour, and methods
of scientific reasoning. While some scientific areas such as molecular biology or
particle physics have drawn much attention from scholars, the great diversity of
scientific  data  and  associated  practices  are  still  sparsely  mapped  and
accounted for by empirical and qualitative scholarship in philosophy of science.
In this thesis, the large-scale transformations of science and societies due to
new technologies form part of the context in which researchers create scientific
data for the study of oceanic processes.
Although  new  technologies  have  reconfigured  scientific  practices  on  many
levels  and  changed  the  status  of  data  in  science  and  societies,  the
transformations  and  implications  of  “data-centrism”  unfold  at  the  surface  of
epistemological problems that have been central to philosophy of science for a
very  long  time  and  have  not  disappeared:  How to  observe,  represent,  and
understand the natural world. My thesis addresses these underlying problems
by focusing on the birth and development of digital scientific data. The broad
reconfigurations of scientific practices have frequently made databases, data
banks, and the associated practices of aggregating and re-distributing data the
primary objects of investigation. With my thesis, I intend to shift the focus to
specific, local practices that are required for digital data to come into existence
in the first place. 
Akin to Fleck (1935) elucidating the genesis and development of a scientific
fact,  my thesis is an attempt to unravel the birth and development of  digital
scientific  data,  originating  in  physical  interactions  between  the  seas  and
research  technology,  in  opportunistic  collaborations  with  seafarers,  and  in
various  “hands-on”,  manual  activities  in  the  lab.  Fleck  argued  in  1935  that
scientific facts are not discovered but actively constructed as well as culturally
and  historically  conditioned.  My  thesis  builds  on  the  crucial  insight  that  the
outcomes  of  research  practices,  including  scientific  data,  despite  the
etymological  meaning  of  the  word  “data”  as  something  “given”,  must  be
conceived as products shaped by the context of their creation. I argue that what
scientists  may  perceive  as  resources  today  —  interconnected  digital  data
scattered across a multiplicity of databases — are products of creative practices
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which are  not  conceived by  isolated  creative  minds,  but  the  outcome of  an
assemblage of minds, materials, and technologies. These practices constitute
certain  kinds  of  continuities  —  material,  methodological,  and  social  — that
occupy  the  space  in-between  science  and  the  natural  world  and  nurture
researcher’s databases and our knowledge of the environment. 
The practices  of  making scientific  data  are  driven by  an underlying  tension
which my thesis brings to light and which has occupied philosophers in a variety
of  ways  for  thousands  of  years.  This  is  a  tension  between  change  and
continuity. Change,  in  a  very  general  sense,  is  alteration  of  a  thing  in  time
(Mortensen 2015); continuity is the absence of gaps or jumps (Bell 2013). The
creation of scientific data that are usable for scientific reasoning about long-term
changes of dynamic natural systems requires continuity on a variety of levels:
samples  of  organisms  must  be  preserved,  methods  of  sampling  and
manipulation  must  remain  consistent,  specific  expertise  must  pass  to  new
generations of researchers, resources and funding must be available for lengths
of  time  that  exceed  the  common  life  cycle  of  research  projects.  Long-term
changes in the object of study require these continuities; but at the same time,
research practices themselves are affected by changes that are beyond their
control: decay or wear and tear of materials; technological and methodological
innovations; progress and change of institutional landscapes, economies, and
societies. How to avoid gaps and jumps in a constantly changing environment
while studying a constantly changing part of the environment is a challenging
balancing act that plays out in practices in-between sciences and the natural
world.  The  various  interactions  that  are  part  of  the  balancing  act  between
change and continuity ultimately determine and potentially limit human agency
in creating knowledge about the world.
Though I claim kinship with Fleck’s (1935) equally philosophical and historical
research on the genesis of scientific facts, I primarily pursue philosophical goals
and employ ethnographic research methods, whose results I analyse in light of
contemporary  literature  in  the  philosophy  of  science,  in  the  tradition  of
“philosophy of science in practice”, as I  explain in chapter two. My thesis is
grounded in a detailed case study of the Continuous Plankton Recorder Survey,
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a long-term programme for the creation of physical samples and data related to
plankton distributions of the world’s oceans. The survey’s core business is the
continuous production of research samples and scientific data; its practices are
thus situated precisely in-between the natural world and the scientists that use
the  plankton-related  data  for  scientific  reasoning  about  biodiversity,  marine
ecology, or climate change. Since the middle of the twentieth century, the CPR
Survey equips commercial ships with mechanical sampling devices that retain
plankton organisms by filtering the seawater with bands of silk. The oceans are
sampled and the silk samples analysed with unchanged methods since 1958. I
focus my analysis on a philosophical account of oceanographic data practices
in-between  the  oceans  and  scientific  knowledge  of  the  earth’s  largest
ecosystems.
The term “in-between” can be deceptive: it could be interpreted as facilitating a
conceptual gap between science and the natural world as separate entities and
suggest that sciences bridge a void and extract knowledge from the natural into
the cultural sphere. This is not what I intend when using this notion. I use the
term “in-between” not to separate science from nature, but to make room in
philosophical accounts of science for the real-world conditions and continuities,
for the practices and people, that structure and shape our knowledge of natural
systems. 
1.1 Data-centric, data-intensive, and data-driven research
The importance of data and data practices in the sciences today can hardly be
overestimated. Scientists in almost any field work with data in a multitude of
ways on a daily basis. Data figure as starting points for scientific enquiries, but
also function as evidence for knowledge claims. Observations, recordings, and
data have always been crucial for the production of knowledge, but the rise and
rapid development of digital network technologies have transformed scientific
practices and,  above all,  the activities and procedures that  involve scientific
data in unprecedented ways.
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In  the  view  of  many,  sciences  have  entered  a  new  paradigm  with  the
development and implementation of technologies that enable the production,
manipulation, and analysis of large volumes of data at unprecedented speeds,
the assimilation and integration of data from many different  origins,  and the
worldwide dissemination as well  as long-term storage of scientific data. New
technologies  have  changed  sciences  in  ways  that  allegedly  emphasise
epistemic  practices  related  to  scientific  data  and  diminish  the  relevance  of
theories in knowledge production. These views have peaked in 2008 with a
popularised proclamation of “the end of theory” in science,1 and in 2009 with the
idea of a fourth, ‘data-intensive’, scientific paradigm that was brought forward in
a Microsoft Research publication (Hey, Tansley, and Tolle 2009b) and also in
Science (Bell, Hey, and Szalay 2009). As summarised by Kitchin (2014a: 3), this
version  of  a  new  data-intensive  scientific  paradigm  is  coined  by  statistical
exploration  and  data-mining  and  follows  a  computational,  ‘pre-Big  Data’,
paradigm,  for  which  the  simulation  of  complex  phenomena was exemplary.2
According to this paradigm, the role of theory in the creation of knowledge has
gradually diminished, so that scientific knowledge creation has become ‘purely
inductive’ and empirical,3 based on the abilities of big data practices to capture
phenomena of interest exhaustively and allow data to ‘speak for themselves’
with the application of unbiased analytical tools (Kitchin 2014a: 4). 
Bell,  Hey, and  Szalay  (2009)  emphasise  that  the  data-intensive  paradigm’s
unprecedented  volumes  of  digital  data  are  demanding  and  challenging  for
scientists  in  many different  fields.  Sciences must  quickly  acquire  ‘necessary
expertise  in  database,  workflow  management,  visualization,  and  cloud
1 Anderson (2008) in Wired magazine, quoted in Kitchin (2014a: 3).
2 For the sake of completeness, the first paradigm of these paradigms originated 
thousands of years ago and was experimental science characterised by 
empiricism and the description of natural phenomena. The second paradigm, 
theoretical science characterised by modelling and generalisation, originated a few
hundred years ago and ended with the rise of computer technology (Kitchin 2014a:
3; Hey, Tansley, and Tolle 2009a: xviii).
3 Though induction is a contested philosophical problem, inductive and empirical 
knowledge can be understood here as knowledge derived only on the basis of past
experiences, observations, or records.
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computing  technologies’  (Bell,  Hey,  and  Szalay  2009:  1298).  However,  as
criticism against the purely inductive paradigm suggests, these challenges are
not  just  technical  and  emerging  debates  on  data-intensive  sciences  and
societies should not bypass philosophical scholarship. Many scholars contest or
vehemently oppose the idea of “theory-free”, data-intensive or big data science
(i.e. Callebaut 2012). According to Leonelli (2012), an ‘intuition’ that induction
from existing data is the new primary form of scientific inference is a key feature
of current “data-driven” research methods in biology and biomedical science.
Yet,  given  the  variety  of  ways  in  which  researchers  use  data  for  scientific
reasoning, the specific meaning of “induction” is all but clear and examples from
biological  sciences suggest  that  inductive reasoning does not  mean “free of
hypothesis” (Leonelli 2012: 2). The conception of theory-free science is based
on ‘fallacious thinking’, Kitchin (2014a: 4–5) argues, pointing out that even data
in unprecedented, large volumes remain samples and representations that are
shaped by specific technologies, data ontologies, research environments, and
the conditions under which they were created. All systems and algorithms as
well as any kind of analytics and interpretation of data are based on scientific
reasoning and theoretical thinking (Kitchin 2014a: 4–5). As a consequence, the
various ways in which knowledge is created, recorded, and communicated —
the wide range of  scientific  “memory  practices”  (Bowker  2005)  — inevitably
affect what we know.
As Strasser (2012b: 86) points out, one important novelty of contemporary data-
driven science is the ‘omnipresence of statistical  methods’ in the analysis of
scientific  data.  Quantification  has  been  a  pronounced  feature  of  natural
sciences  for  centuries,  but  the  rise  of  statistical  methods,  which  are  often
viewed as highly objective and free of theory, is a relatively recent development
that contrasts with earlier scientists’ often exercised subjective judgements in
data  analysis  (Strasser  2012b:  87).  From  a  philosophical  perspective,  a
scientist’s choice of statistical algorithms does not appear less theoretical than
the machines and systems that were used to create data.
New data technologies may not have driven theories out of scientific practice.
Nevertheless, developments in digital technology, data analytics, and so-called
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“big  data”  have already transformed science — not  in  an all-encompassing,
paradigmatic  way  but  in  a  variety  of  ways  that  philosophical,  sociological,
historical, and anthropological scholarship attempt to understand. Rheinberger
(2011: 346) sees the role of data shifting as part of a ‘new primacy of data’ in
today’s  science.  As  researchers  increasingly  consult  online  databases  as
starting points for scientific enquiries, data have become a resource rather than
a result.  Epistemologically, this  means  that  data  are  no  longer  created and
analysed to account for certain phenomena, but ‘generated and pooled as data
ponds and streams’ in order to reveal patterns that are still ‘beyond horizon’ at
the time of data creation (Rheinberger 2011: 346). This shift goes along with
data production ‘on an industrial scale’ that requires appropriate software and
computing skills to handle (Rheinberger 2011: 346). 
Leonelli  (2016: 171) suggests that the popularity of  a term like “data-driven”
stems from the fact that consulting available data resources has emerged as an
‘obligatory first step for any research project’. This first step of research hardly
leads to direct inductive reasoning; its value is rather heuristic and its outcomes
certainly shape the directions of the research project (Leonelli 2016: 171–72). In
this sense, data literally take a position of “primacy” in research endeavours.
Data  and  databases  have  become the  standard  starting  points  of  scientific
enquiries,  but as Bowker (2000:  643) points  out,  databases are increasingly
seen  as  ‘an  end  in  itself’.  Bowker  sees  a  disarticulation  between  scientific
knowledge that is published in scientific literature and the data or evidence that
support it. Scientific writings published as papers or books used to be the only
“end product” of research, but they are now complemented by databases and
archives dedicated to the long-term storage of data. Leonelli (2014a: 2) sees
‘the  prominence  and  status  acquired  by  data  as  scientific  commodity  and
recognised output both within and beyond the sciences’ as one key novelty of
big  data  science.  Consequently,  databases  and  archives  as  increasingly
relevant  destinations for  scientific  outputs  create  demands from researchers
that  were  hitherto  less  pronounced  or  even  absent:  Data  must  be  made
reusable, so that they can be accessed and manipulated by other scientists
(Bowker 2000: 644).
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Making data reusable is a major challenge of data-intensive science, as various
scholars have documented (Leonelli 2013, Borgman 2012, Edwards et al. 2011,
Zimmerman 2008). It is a task that is challenging for scientists, but one that is
increasingly dealt with by experts such as database managers or data curators.
The new primacy of data has led to the development of new skills, methods,
and infrastructures,  which  have fostered the  emergence of  new professions
related  to  these  new  infrastructures  (Leonelli  2014a).  Challenges  related  to
aggregating, storing, and making data reusable are addressed through the lens
of data curation or stewardship in new, stand-alone scientific journals (Baker
and Yarmey 2009). This differentiation of tasks is effectively a division of labour
that results in new forms of collaboration and an ‘essentially distributed nature
of  scientific  understanding  as  a  collective  cognitive  achievement’  (Leonelli
2014b: 412–13). This means that more than ever before, scientists from around
the world are able to work collectively towards a common goal, perhaps without
ever  seeing each other  in person or even knowing each other. People who
speak  different  languages  and have  different  educational  backgrounds,  who
work for different institutions or organisations under different conditions, have to
find a common ground to be able to cooperate. In many sciences, including
oceanography  and  other  environmental  sciences,  these  new  forms  of
collaboration are required for further advancing the studies of natural systems. 
Collective cognitive achievements require the movement of information, data,
and knowledge across the globe. Sharing research data and re-using data of
other researchers are challenging practices in many ways. As Leonelli (2016:
169)  puts  it,  ‘data  do  not  easily  flow  along  the  channels  devised  for  their
dissemination and reuse’. For data-centric biology, the efforts of researchers to
make data re-usable in many different contexts have profound epistemological
implications, so that this form of data-centric science is more focused  ‘on the
processes through which research is carried out than on its ultimate outcomes’
(Leonelli 2016: 170).4 This means that sciences more than ever reflect and pay
attention to the ways they produce knowledge — how scientists know about the
natural  world  has  gained  considerable  relevance  in  comparison  to  what
scientists  actually  know.  This  shift  of  focus  encompasses  what  counts  as
4 Emphasis in original.
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scientific data, what is considered as relevant background knowledge and skills
that researchers have “embodied”, and what counts as necessary theoretical
and conceptual commitment (Leonelli 2016: 170). One form in which this new
self-reflection  of  sciences  has  become  manifest,  is  the  integration  of  data,
methods, and explanations, which has become ‘both a practical and normative
requirement’  in  today’s  data-intensive,  large-scale  sciences,  (O’Malley  and
Soyer 2012: 58). Data integration aims at making a huge variety of data from
potentially inconsistent sources comparable and usable in novel combinations.
The integration of data may encompass an array of activities and procedures: 
theorizing and modelling databases, quantifying data accurately, 
developing standardization procedures, cleaning data, and providing 
efficient and user-friendly interfaces to enable data not only to be 
reused, but reanalysed and combined in novel ways. (O’Malley and 
Soyer 2012: 61)
These challenging activities have become ubiquitous in today’s data-intensive
sciences and have been the subject of philosophical, sociological, and historical
scholarship  in  fields  ranging  from astronomy (Hoeppe  2014),  to  climatology
(Edwards  2010),  and  biology  (Leonelli  2013).  Yet,  this  list  pertinent  to  data
integration  provides  only  partial  insight  into  the  variety  of  activities  that  are
performed in data-intensive sciences today.
The fact that sciences undergo fundamental, if not disruptive, changes with the
new primacy of data is widely recognised by scholars. However, some authors
employing historiographic approaches to scientific practices have pointed out
that  not  every  development  that  has  been  proclaimed  as  revolutionary  is
actually  entirely  new. In  particular, scholars  have criticised the  emphasis  on
unprecedented, overwhelming data quantities,  which is often underlined with
metaphorical expressions such as “data deluge” or “data flood” (Leonelli 2012:
3).5 For example, Müller-Wille and Charmantier (2012) argue that natural history
practices of the 17th and 18th century can be regarded as data-driven. The
5 The title of Bell, Hey, and Szalay’s (2009) article in Science is ‘Beyond the data 
deluge’. The Royal Society’s (2012) report Science as an open enterprise uses the
term “data deluge” five times.
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innovative taxonomic systems and rules of nomenclature were developed in
response to an ‘information overload’ that resulted from the rapid discovery of
new plant and animal species worldwide (Müller-Wille and Charmantier 2012:
4).  In  this  sense,  today’s  epistemological  novelties  like  new  forms  of
collaboration  or  scientific  reasoning  are  not  the  first  changes  to  scientific
practices that are fuelled by increasing magnitudes of information. Referring to
the  ‘imperial  drive  to  archive  information’  as  a  means of  exercising  control,
Bowker  (2000:  644)  points  out  that  the  production  of  a  ‘working  archive  of
knowledge’ is not entirely new, only its expansion in scale and scope, which
today ranges from submicroscopic genes to planetary, atmospheric phenomena
and requires technological and methodological innovation to manage. A good
example of this is documented in Aronova, Baker, and Oreskes (2010),  who
reflect on the innovations driven by international “big science” and “big data”
programmes  in  the  decades  following  World  War  II.  Programmes  like  the
International  Geophysical  Year  1957–58,  a  collaboration to  generate  diverse
geophysical data on a global scale, led to new ways of organising, storing, and
disseminating large quantities of data.
Strasser (2012a: 336) claims that today’s digital databases are very similar to
the collections of early natural history, as both are  ‘organized assemblages of
standardized objects’.  These assemblages allow comparative analysis due to
the proximity, mobility, temporary order, and the uniform format of objects inside
them. Most striking to Strasser (2012a: 336) in his comparison between early
natural history and today’s life sciences is that historical collections and digital
databases ‘have been constituted through similar collecting practices and have
been  put  to  use  in  similar  ways  for  the  production  of  knowledge’.  Strasser
(2012a:  337–38)  concludes  that  ‘collecting  and  comparing’  is  a  persistent
research practice that is central to today’s data-driven sciences, but not in a
revolutionary or  paradigmatic way. Rather, collecting and comparing are key
practices in sciences that are concerned with the history of the objects that are
studied:  for  example,  natural  history,  geology,  cosmology,  and  today’s  life
sciences and ecology. Bowker (2000: 644) puts a similar emphasis on collecting
in his study of biodiversity research: ‘In the relatively new science of biodiversity,
this data collection drive assumes its apogee.’ Strasser (2012a: 338) argues
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that  the  historicity  of  objects  in  these  sciences  contrasts  with  sciences  like
physics, chemistry, or mathematics, in which ‘all the entities of one kind … are
believed  to  be  structurally  identical’  and  collecting  of  data,  information,  or
objects is therefore less pronounced.6
Strasser’s conclusions illustrate how the study of data practices may motivate
scholars  to  re-think  traditional  boundaries  of  scientific  disciplines  and
emphasise different kinds of historical continuities between research practices.
New  ways  of  classifying  or  demarcating  scientific  fields  are  sometimes
augmented  by  labelling  practices  as  “data-driven”  or  “big  data”  science.
However,  several  scholars  argue  that  these  broad-brush  categorisations  of
practices are insufficient to grasp the dynamics of today’s research practices.
O’Malley and Soyer (2012), for example, criticise that the common distinction in
“data-driven”  and  “hypothesis-driven”  approaches  in  the  life  sciences  is  too
general and insufficient for any fine-grained account of scientific practice.7 Yet,
scholars have accepted this distinction as idealisation and often point out that
actual  scientific  practices  consist  in  hybrid  forms  in  which  data-driven,
hypothesis-driven, and potentially more approaches complement one another
(O’Malley and Soyer 2012: 59). Strasser (2012b: 87), for example, sees today’s
life  sciences  as  a  combination  of  data-driven  and  hypothesis-driven,
comparative  and  exemplary,  as  well  as  experimental  and  natural  historical
approaches.
The label “big data” seems to be equally problematic, given that various authors
emphasise that large quantities are neither the most fundamental nor the most
impressive characteristic of  data-intensive research and, in some cases,  not
6 The ‘colossal amounts of data’ that are produced by experiments with the Large 
Hadron Collider at CERN near Geneva, Switzerland, are a counterexample from 
contemporary physics; <https://home.cern/about/computing> [accessed 7 June 
2018].
7 O’Malley and Soyer (2012: 58–59) characterise “data-driven” as an approach that 
is primarily guided by the generation, collection, and analysis of data and leads to 
the formulation of new hypothesis. Conversely, “hypothesis-driven” research 
begins with an existing hypothesis that is being tested and subsequently accepted,
rejected or modified.
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even  a  novelty  (Leonelli  2012:  3).  Davies,  Frow,  and  Leonelli  (2013:  393)
question the rhetoric of large-scale biological research and find that the term
“big biology” which may be used to describe practices that involve big data is
‘explicitly  divisive’.  It  automatically  makes  other  practices  appear  small  or
ordinary. The attribute “big” may convey a primarily quantitative shift in research
practices  and  obscure  the  many  innovations  and  epistemological
transformations in data-intensive sciences. 
In this section, I have avoided sharp differentiations between the terms “data-
intensive”, “data-centric”, “data-driven”, “data primacy”, and even “big data”. The
transformations of science that I outlined in relation to these terms are not the
primary object of my research, but rather the context in which my case study is
situated. Scientific  data are central  in research processes through which we
understand the natural world: Data function as a resource and starting point of
investigation,  diverse  data  from different  sources  are  integrated,  data  are  a
distinct  and  recognised  research  output.  The  centrality  of  data  has  driven
transformations of scientific practices: the division of labour and differentiation of
new  professions,  new  ways  of  collaboration  and  collective  reasoning,  new
software and statistical methods that require new skills.
1.2 Conceptions of scientific data
With the term “data” in this thesis, I refer to scientific data. This thesis is about
data  that  are  used  by  scientists  and  figure  in  epistemic  processes.  This
excludes “sense-data” and the like which are, if anything, something like ‘mind-
dependent objects’ of which humans are directly aware upon perception of an
entity  or  event  (Huemer  2011).  Although  the  minds  of  scientists  are  used
extensively in scientific processes, I do not regard images, thoughts, and other
cognitive processes that only happen inside the human brain as scientific data.
My focus on scientific data also excludes data in predominantly commercial or
governmental contexts. Globally operating IT companies as well as government
agencies obtain, store, and analyse huge amounts of data. These companies
and agencies might employ scientists and might carry out analyses that are
similar to those practised by natural scientists at universities. However, there
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are great differences to publicly funded research carried out at universities or
research institutes, starting with the overall incentives of generating economic
profits, fighting crime or terrorism, or exercising control, which rarely align with
the aims of advancing scientific knowledge of the environment or societies.8 I
thus do not contend that this thesis’ findings about data practices apply in the
exact same way to data in the commercial or political sector. I must also clarify
that my empirical cases and the majority of scholarly literature I refer to are
concerned with environmental data or data used in “classic” natural sciences
such as biology or physics. Although similarities with other scientific fields such
as social sciences, economics, or medical research are likely, data practices in
these fields are beyond the scope of this thesis.
Thinking about the role and status of data in science requires some kind of
conception  of  what  data  actually  are.  Although  in  most  sciences  today  the
majority of data are digital and technically stored as sequences of numbers and
letters, scientific data still come in a variety of forms and formats. The diversity
of data practices not only encompasses the activities related to data, but also
the data themselves. Bowker (2000: 643) uses the term “datadiversity” for the
heterogeneity of resources that are used in biodiversity research, which Bowker
characterises as a data-intensive science. 
As scientific  data moved into the focus of  philosophers of science,  scholars
faced the difficult task of defining scientific data or data in general. Data are not
the same kind of thing across all sciences and not even within one scientific
field.  To give  an example  of  data  diversity, Parsons et  al.  (2011)  reflect  on
challenges of managing diverse data created during the International Polar Year
(IPY) 2007–08, a multi-disciplinary research programme with participants from
sixty nations: 
In IPY, scientists collected every possible form and format of data: 
images wide, narrow and panoramic, profiles upward and downward,
hourly to millennial time series, isotope ratios and fractions, energy 
and material fluxes, species identification and distributions, 
8 However, publicly funded research may have economic goals as well, which may 
be secondary or implicit.
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interviews in common and rare languages, disease types and rates, 
genealogies and genetic sequences, samples and artefacts, singular 
events and gradual processes, and so on. (Parsons et al. 2011: 556)
Even those data that can be associated with natural sciences seem to come in
a variety of different types, even if all of these data are digital: images, profiles,
time series, ratios and fractions, fluxes, distributions, sequences, samples. 
To Kitchin (2014b: 4), who begins his book on “The Data Revolution” with a
discussion of how to conceptualise data, ‘it is clear that data are diverse in their
characteristics’. He offers several characteristics by which data broadly vary:
data vary by form (qualitative or quantitative), structure (structured, 
semi-structured or unstructured), source (captured, derived, exhaust,
transient), producer (primary, secondary, tertiary), and type 
(indexical, attribute, metadata). (Kitchin 2014b: 4)
Given the diversity of data, it seems hardly possible to pin down an adequate
definition of  data  by compiling either  a  list  of  types or  an exhaustive set  of
characteristics. 
Leonelli’s (2015) response to the problem of defining data is a framework that
wants to give up on definitions that are based on intrinsic properties such as
structure,  form, source,  or  level  of  manipulation.  According to  the “relational
framework” introduced by Leonelli, what counts as scientific data depends on
relations  to  the  context  and research situation in  which  data are  used.  Any
output  of  research  activity  can  become  data  if  the  output  has  potential
usefulness as evidence in a given research situation and if it serves as a means
of communication (Leonelli 2015: 810–11). These, too, are conditions for what
counts as data, but they are not intrinsic, permanent characteristics of objects.
The  usefulness  of  data  as  evidence  can  change  depending  on  contextual
factors.  Among  these  factors  are  the  applicability  of  adequate  tools  and
technologies,  the  intelligibility  of  data  given  the  background  knowledge  and
skills of a researcher, the availability of information about the provenance of the
data, or the physical coherence and constitution of data. ‘The same objects may
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or may not be functioning as data, depending on which role they are made to
play in scientific inquiry’, Leonelli (2015: 817) clarifies. 
Leonelli  contrasts  her  context-dependent,  relational  framework  to  context-
independent data definitions, such as the following given by the Royal Society
(2012: 12): Data are ‘numbers, characters or images that designate an attribute
of a phenomenon’. Kitchin (2014b: 3), too, maintains that ‘data are inherently
partial, selective and representative’, whereas Leonelli (2015: 811) argues that
‘data do not have truth-value in and of themselves, nor can they be seen as
straightforward  representations  of  given  phenomena’.  Data  are  not  data  by
themselves or  due to  an  intrinsic  power;  specific  actions  and decisions are
necessary  for  objects  to  become  data.  As  Borgman  (2012:  1061)  also
maintains, ‘data may exist only in the eye of the beholder: The recognition that
an observation, artifact, or record constitutes data is itself a scholarly act’. 
The recognition  of  context  as  the  key  to  defining  data  does not  mean that
philosophers  have  no  general  points  to  make  about  scientific  data.  The
following two sections discuss conceptions of data that have emphasised some
of their fundamental characteristics. These do not define data, but need to be
taken into account in philosophical perspectives on data-centric sciences.
1.2.1 Data as physical artefacts
Several scholars have emphasised that scientific data are objects with physical
extensions and weight. Even as digitally stored numbers, data leave a physical
footprint or trace; data consume resources and never float freely or unhindered.
Edwards (2010) follows the history of climatological and meteorological data,
which in their  form and physical  constitution evolved from paper and ink, to
punch  cards,  microfilm,  magnetic  tape,  and  finally  to  hard  disk  drives  and
semiconductor  electronic  devices.  ‘Computing  remains  a  material  process’,
Edwards  (2010:  83)  points  out;  therefore,  scientific  data,  even  if  they  are
considered “born digital” (Bell, Hey, and Szalay 2009: 1297) and can be stored
in digital clouds, far away from potential users, are never purely virtual. 
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In chapter three, I elaborate on the notion of materiality from an epistemological
point of view: How to understand materiality and its significance for the creation
of scientific knowledge. Frequently, scholars have interpreted materiality rather
ontologically, with a focus on the characteristics of the elements and fabric that
an object is actually made of. According to Edwards (2010: 84) data are “things”
with ‘dimensionality, weight, and texture’. Strasser (2012a: 336) also remarks
that the difference between data and things is ‘more a matter of degree than a
matter of kind’.
Leonelli  (2015)  shifts  the  focus  from physical  characteristics  of  data  to  the
epistemological significance of their physicality:
[Data] are, first and foremost, material artifacts; and their physical 
characteristics, including their format and the medium through which 
they are conveyed, are as relevant to understanding their epistemic 
role as their social and conceptual functions. (Leonelli 2015: 811)
Scientific data have physical characteristics which scholars can attempt to trace
in knowledge making practices: dimension, weight, texture, but also the format
and medium, through which data are accessed. All of these physical variables
can change in the course of data-related activities, for example when data in
paper  format  are  digitised,  when  digital  data  are  transferred  to  a  different
storage location, but also when materials that store data decay or decompose
as it  might  happen with  researchers’  old  notebooks if  they are not  properly
stored. This is one instance at which the tension between change and continuity
that is the underlying theme of this thesis is brought to bear: If data change their
physical  characteristics,  for  whatever  reason,  how do scientists  achieve the
continuity that is necessary for scientific reasoning? Due to the importance of
medium, format, dimension, weight, and texture of data, I keep track of physical
characteristics and their implications for the creation of knowledge throughout
my thesis. 
As Leonelli (2015: 811) emphasises in the above quote, data are material and
they are artefacts. The latter implies that they do not occur naturally, but are
created  by  humans  artificially  for  specific  purposes.  This  fundamental
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characteristic seems to somewhat clash with the aforementioned views of data
as a resource and as things that are collected. As Edwards (2010: 109–10)
clarifies, scientific data are not “out there” and waiting to be collected, picked
up,  or  otherwise  obtained  by  scientists  from  a  given  repository.  Even  if  a
researcher is required to go into nature to record a process of interest, such as
changes  of  sea  temperatures  or  sea  level,  the  data  thereby  obtained  are
created by the researcher and usually involve the application of an instrument.
As Rheinberger (2011: 337) notes, the perception of data as being made by
humans seems to have turned the etymological meaning of data — from the
Latin “data”, the nominative plural of “datum”, meaning “what is given” — into
the opposite.  Kitchin (2014b:  2)  points  out  that,  more precisely, data should
have been termed “capta”, meaning “what is taken”. However, even this change
would  not  reflect  that  data  are  artefacts,  only  that  they  are  not  given  to
researchers from nature. If data were only taken, it would suggest the existence
of a repository of potential data from which a distinct number of measurements
are selected and extracted, which is not the same as creating data by means of
observation and recording or intervention into natural systems with a scientific
instrument. My thesis provides strong arguments that support an understanding
of scientific data as artefacts in a sense that is not compatible with the view of
data as collectible items.
The view of data as artificial objects does not require human agency from which
data directly result. In the environmental sciences, a wide range of parameters
related to natural processes are recorded by highly automated systems. These
“machine-born” data count as artificial  because the instruments and systems
used for their production are conceived, designed, constructed, programmed,
and maintained by humans. Hacking (1992: 48), whose work gave considerable
weight  to  the  notion  of  “intervention”  in  research  practices,  defines data  as
uninterpreted ‘marks’ produced by ‘data generators’, which can be both human
and  non-human.9 For  Hacking,  too,  data  result  from  ‘making  and  taking’
9 ‘People or teams who count may be data generators. In more sophisticated 
experiments, there are micrographs, automatic printouts, and the like. There is no 
need to insist on a sharp distinction in all cases between detector and data-
generating device. In the early days a camera taking micrographs from an electron
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measurements (Hacking 1992: 48) — not from taking something that is given,
but from taking something that has been made. 
Yet, the notion of data artificiality leads to even more fundamental and long-
standing  debates  in  philosophy  of  science,  as  I  outline  in  the  following
paragraphs. Accepting a view of data as an artificial output of research activity
means that a wide range of theoretical assumptions and commitments have
contributed to the creation of data. These are necessary to decide what kinds of
data  to  create,  where  and  how  often  a  measurement  is  taken,  which
instruments  to  deploy, and  how  the  data  are  stored.  What  philosophers  of
science have termed the “theory-ladenness” of data contradicts a widely held
view  of  data  as  unambiguous,  “pure”  or  “raw”  manifestations  of  natural
phenomena. The notion of theory-ladenness stems from scepticism against the
possibility  of  objective  observation  of  phenomena.10 ‘The  thesis  of  theory-
ladenness of observations, roughly, is the idea that observations are affected by
theoretical presuppositions’ (Schindler 2013: 89). According to this scepticism,
the resulting bias in observing and perceiving the world and its phenomena is
an unavoidable aspect of human-nature interaction (Bogen 2013). In case of
scientific data that are created by humans, scientific theories, expertise in the
subject  matter,  and  assumptions  about  the  functioning  of  instruments  are
inevitably involved in producing and analysing data (Leonelli 2015: 814). If data
are  theory-laden,  epistemological  problems  that  bear  on  the  usefulness  of
scientific  data  will  require  consideration.  What  if  data  are  produced  under
assumptions, which the very same data are supposed to verify? The notion that
data shall serve as evidence for theories, which have affected the production or
analysis of the same data, jeopardises data’s often proclaimed role as a neutral
arbiter.11 
microscope was a data generator that photographed a visible image for study, 
analysis, or the record. Today the camera is more often the detector; the data 
generator may be a scanner working from the micrograph’ (Hacking 1992: 48).
10 Pierre Duhem, Norwood Hanson, and Thomas Kuhn were among the sceptics of 
objective observation in science. 
11 Schindler (2013: 89–90) mentions this epistemological problem among others with 
respect to the theory-ladenness of observation, not data.
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An important contribution to this debate is the sharp distinction between data
and phenomena introduced by Bogen and Woodward (1988). The distinction is
intended to sidestep the problem of theory-ladenness and show that theory-
ladenness is actually not very relevant  for  understanding scientific  practices.
Scientists ‘straightforwardly’ observe data and not the phenomena of interest,
which  are  in  most  cases  unobservable,  Bogen  and  Woodward  (1988:  305)
argue.  At  the  same  time,  they  claim  that  scientific  theories  serve  as
explanations for phenomena and not for the data that are observed.12 Thus,
there  would  be  no  direct  conflict  between  the  theories  and  assumptions
affecting the data and the theories that explain phenomena. In case of theory-
ladenness  being  applied  to  data,  scientists  make  great  efforts  to  employ
statistical methods and certain experimental practices to establish confidence
and reliability in data. These efforts can be seen as reasonably distinct from the
theories about phenomena, so that theory-ladenness of data is supposedly less
problematic (Schindler 2013: 90).13 A variety of efforts that enhance confidence
and reliability in scientific data are studied and discussed in this thesis. They
play  a  crucial  role  in  the  balancing  act  between  changing  conditions  and
continuities of materials and research methods.
By  separating  unobserved  phenomena  from  observable  data,  Bogen  and
Woodward  rely  on  a  fundamental  evidential  relationship  between  data  and
phenomena: 
Data […] play the role of evidence for claims about phenomena. As a
rough approximation, data are what registers on a measurement or 
recording device in a form which is accessible to the human 
perceptual system, and to public inspection. […] Data are typically 
not viewed as potential objects of explanation by or derivation from 
general theory; indeed, they typically are of no theoretical interest 
12 Woodward (1989: 393) defines phenomena as ‘relatively stable and general 
features of the world which are potential objects of explanation and prediction by 
general theory’.
13 Schindler (2013) does not advocate this view, but aptly summarises the different 
approaches by philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science to deflate 
theory-ladenness.
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except insofar as they constitute evidence for the existence of 
phenomena. (Woodward 1989: 393–94)14
According  to  this  definition,  data  are  observable,  they  are  not  explained by
scientific  theories,  and  they  constitute  evidence  for  the  existence  of
phenomena. The intrinsic evidential relationship between data and phenomena
is  questionable  in  light  of  data  being  produced  without  a  distinctly  targeted
phenomenon or hypothesis. Rheinberger (2011: 346) argues that with today’s
primacy of data in science, large volumes of data are generated without aiming
at specific ‘epistemic phenomena’, but rather in hope of discovering patterns
that  are  yet  unknown.  Leonelli  (2015:  818)  also  notes  that  data  may  be
produced  without  one  specifically  targeted  or  designated  phenomenon.
Moreover, data today are intended to be usable to answer questions in relation
to a variety of different phenomena. More than ever before, data are created
without knowing all the different ways and contexts in which they are going to
be employed (Leonelli 2015). For experimental practices that are not tied to the
testing  of  a  specific  hypothesis,  the  term  “exploratory  experimentation”  has
been  established  in  the  1990s  by  Steinle  (1997)  and  Burian  (1997).  The
exploratory  way  of  experimentation  includes  ‘theoretically  undirected  data
gathering’  and  has  been  contrasted  with  more  traditional,  “theory-driven”
experimentation (O’Malley 2007: 354).15
Finally, the  characteristic  of  data as something made rather  than given has
implications  for  the  objects,  which  scientists  and  philosophers  of  science
sometimes call “raw” data. Hacking (1992: 48) notes that what he defines as
14 The following is a more recent definition of data by Woodward (2010: 792–93): 
‘Data are the individual outcomes of a measurement or detection process, which 
may involve instruments or unaided human perception. By extension, records or 
reports of such outcomes may also be regarded as data. […] Usually data is 
produced in order to serve as evidence for something else—for features of 
phenomena.’
15 Note that theory-driven is not the same as theory-laden. Exploratory 
experimentation or other research practices not aimed at testing hypothesis or 
recording already known aspects of the world are still laden with theoretical 
baggage.
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data  — marks  produced by  generators  — are  sometimes called  “raw data”
because they are uninterpreted.  However, the notion has also been used in
reference  to  data  which  scientists  regard  as  untouched,  unmanipulated,
unprocessed, or unmediated. These views tend to entail a notion of data purity
that  contradicts  with  theory-ladenness  and  neglects  the  mediating  role  of
instruments. After all, if data are artefacts, how could they ever come in a state
that is pure or untouched? Some scholars have consequently referred to the
notion  of  “raw  data”  as  an  oxymoron  (Gitelman  2013)  and  advocate  for
dismissing  the  term  entirely  (Ribes  and  Jackson  2013,  Harris  2003).  Yet,
scientists speak of raw data and usually have an understanding of what the
term “raw” means in their respective context. From a researcher’s point of view,
data  serve  as  a starting  point  that  precedes their  own act  of  interpretation.
Leonelli  (2015:  812),  who  does  not  endorse  the  category  “raw data”  at  all,
understands rawness as an expression to describe those objects that are as
close as possible to ‘documenting aspects of a phenomenon of interest in a way
that can inform further inquiry, without necessarily attempting to reproduce or
represent the phenomenon itself’.  Yet, from an epistemological point of view,
data  are  never  entirely  “raw”  but  always  already  “cooked”  (Gitelman  and
Jackson 2013: 2). Resonating with the idea that any object, in a given context,
can function as data upon recognition and utilisation as such by a researcher,
Gitelman and Jackson (2013: 3) state that ‘data need to be imagined as data to
exist and function as such, and the imagination of data entails an interpretive
base’.16
The physicality and artificiality of data, theory-ladenness, the relation between
data and natural phenomena, and the status of data as “raw” or “cooked” are
aspects that are largely influenced by the practices that contribute to the birth of
scientific data. This thesis’ detailed empirical account of scientific data in the
making has the potential  to  add a valuable perspective  and depth to  these
debates.
16 Emphasis in original.
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1.2.2 Mobility and data journeys
Scientific  data of to the environment are typically produced “in the field”,  as
opposed to “in the lab”. This means that data must be portable in order to be
analysed with devices or instruments that are located at research institutions or
laboratories. Another reason for portability being required is that a researcher’s
output needs assessment, review, and confirmation by peers from the scientific
community, who may live and work in different places all over the world (Leonelli
2015: 818–19). It might sound trivial that data can be moved from one site to
another, but several different types of data movements, each involving specific
restrictions or challenges, are conceivable: from the site of data creation to a
database, from one database to another database or into a data archive, or
from a database to a scientist’s office computer. Scientific data today may be
exchanged and moved between many different actors or sites, each of which
constitute a different context with different interests, expertise, and technological
or  economic  constraints;  and  at  each  site,  data  may  be  the  subject  of
manipulation,  transformation,  or  other  kinds  of  interventions.  How  these
changes of  location  work,  which  factors  are  relevant  for  their  success,  and
whether these changes have an impact on the produced knowledge is not clear
given the diversity of research settings and disciplines. The mobility of data —
and of other objects in science — has thus become an important topic in studies
of data-centric science, if not a defining feature thereof, as Leonelli (2016: 39)
argues. 
Several philosophers, sociologists, and historians of science have focused on
the movement and circulation of objects in science. Latour (1986) influenced
many of these efforts with his study of scientific practice and the mobilisation of
what he called “inscriptions”.  Scientists transform the phenomena they study
into inscriptions, traditionally by using pen and paper and today by employing
various  technical  devices.  According  to  Latour,  the  central  problem  of
inscriptions is concerned with their mobilisation, which is necessary to present
what a scientist has created or observed in one place to an audience of fellow
scientists or the public, who are usually scattered across various other places.
For  this  purpose,  inscriptions  must  be  preserved in  order  to  withstand their
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displacement. ‘In sum, you have to invent objects which have the properties of
being  mobile but also  immutable,  presentable,  readable and  combinable with
one another’ (Latour 1986: 7).17 These objects are what Latour calls “immutable
mobiles”. Among their advantages are that they are usually made “flat” like a
map,  a  list,  or  an  index;  they  are  scalable  without  changing  their  internal
proportions; they can be reproduced at little cost; they can be superimposed;
and they can easily merge with written text, as well as with geometry (Latour
1986:  20–22).  Rheinberger  (2011:  344)  claims that  ‘data are  of  the form of
Latourian  “immutable mobiles”’,  or  ‘traces’ of  an experiment  ‘made durable’.
Immutability and durability enable data to be stored and retrieved and are a
‘prerequisite for their mobility’ (Rheinberger 2011: 344). 
The immutability of mobiles is a central characteristic in Latour’s framework and
is motivated by the preservation of inscriptions during their displacement: 
[Inscriptions] are immutable when they move, or at least everything is
done to obtain this result: specimens are chloroformed, microbian 
colonies are stuck into gelatine, even exploding stars are kept on 
graph papers in each phase of their explosion. (Latour 1986: 21)
Notably,  despite  the  fact  that  every  effort  is  taken  to  make  inscriptions
immutable, this result is not achieved in all cases. As Leonelli (2015: 819) points
out, when data are moved from one place to another, they often change their
medium, which in turn may affect their usability in epistemic processes. Leonelli
(2015: 816) disagrees with Latour’s and Rheinberger’ emphasis on immutability
of data and argues that in the case of biological data being moved from their
site of creation into databases and from there to new contexts of enquiry, data
are ‘anything but stable objects’.  Manipulations, changes of format,  medium,
and shape of data commonly occur at various stages while data are travelling
from one place to another (Leonelli 2015: 816).
Leonelli  (2016: 39) proposes the ‘data journey’ as a notion that captures the
problematic, demanding, and often unpredictable pathways of data. In today’s
data-centric sciences, any set of data has unlimited potential destinations within
17 Emphasis in original.
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and beyond the scientific field in which it was created. The data journey has a
strong  metaphorical  dimension,  beginning  with  the  idea  that  travelling  often
requires  long-term planning,  financial  resources,  and  reliable  infrastructures,
vehicles, and energy supplies; furthermore, ‘travelers may encounter obstacles,
delays, dead ends, and unexpected shortcuts, which in turn shift the timescales,
directions, and destinations of travel’ (Leonelli 2016: 39). Neither humans nor
scientific data travel in empty space. Rather, journeys frequently need to adapt
to the environment,  to changes of terrain,  climate, or other conditions. As a
result,  ‘journeys  can  be interrupted,  disrupted,  and  modified  as  they unfold’
(Leonelli  2016: 39).  Although data are often generated in order to record or
learn about reasonably defined processes or systems, the whole spectrum of
pathways along which data may eventually travel is not yet determined at the
moment data are created.
Another  framework  that  emphasises  the  variety  of  contexts  through  which
objects in science may travel is provided by Star and Griesemer’s (1989) case
study of  research  practices  at  the  Museum of  Vertebrate  Zoology (MVZ)  in
Berkeley, CA, in the early twentieth century. Star and Griesemer (1989: 388–89)
point out that scientific work is ‘heterogeneous’ and involves ‘extremely diverse
groups  of  actors  —  researchers  from  different  disciplines,  amateurs  and
professionals,  humans  and  animals,  functionaries  and  visionaries’,  which  all
inhabit different ‘social worlds’ (Star and Griesemer 1989: 388–89). In order to
explain  the  functionality  of  such  heterogeneous  research  settings,  Star  and
Griesemer  (1989:  393)  introduce ‘boundary  objects’  as  an  analytic  concept.
Boundary objects are ‘a means of translation’ between different local contexts
for which they require a certain degree of plasticity to adapt as well as a certain
degree of robustness to ‘maintain a common identity across sites’ (Star and
Griesemer  1989:  393).  The  meaning  of  boundary  objects  may  change
according  to  context,  but  their  structure  is  ‘common enough’  to  make them
recognisable (Star and Griesemer 1989: 393). The balance between plasticity
and integrity that Star and Griesemer (1989) describe enables boundary objects
to  be  portable;  this  view  resonates  with  the  tension  between  change  and
continuity introduced earlier in this chapter. 
33
The notion of continuity, which allows change and adaptation without jumps or
interruptions, matches with the plasticity and integrity of boundary objects more
than with the immutability of mobiles or the unsteadiness of journeys. However,
my thesis is not primarily concerned with the smoothness or disruption of data
movements between different sites. Rather, I focus on continuities that underpin
scientific practices and enable the creation of data capable of travelling and
being used for scientific reasoning in a variety of research contexts.
Yet, the focus on different concepts of mobility is important, for scientific data
are certainly  not  the only  type of  object  that  scientists  from different  places
frequently exchange. A non-exhaustive list of types and examples of boundary
objects provided by Star and Griesemer (1989: 410–11) includes indexed and
standardised  ‘repositories’  such  as  a  library  itself,  which  is  in  fact  a  rather
immobile  boundary  object  with  respect  to  physical  changes  of  location,  but
nevertheless can be used by actors of various contexts; another is an ‘ideal
type’ such as a diagram or description that is abstracted from contingent, local
objects in order to serve as ‘road maps’ for different actors; yet another type is a
‘standardised form’, allowing communication across contexts without changing
informational content when transported over long distances.18 Morgan (2011)
and  the  contributors  to  How  Well  Do  Facts  Travel?  The  Dissemination  of
Reliable Knowledge (Howlett and Morgan 2011) consider things of ‘many guises
and sizes’, including objects that many would preferably call “data”, as facts that
travel between different contexts (Morgan 2011: 8). In contributions covering a
wide  range  of  scientific  disciplines,  it  becomes  clear  that  facts  travel
independently in many different and unexpected ways and ‘it is in travelling well
that they prove how essential they are to our sciences, humanities and society’
(Morgan 2011: 36). Morgan (2014) explains different strategies to make locally
produced, situated knowledge portable so that knowledge can be “resituated”
for use in other local contexts by different researchers. All strategies ‘rely on
establishing,  or  making  use  of,  some  form  of  comparability  to  prompt  the
resituation  of  specific  local  knowledge’  (Morgan  2014:  1023).  Making  local
18 In their description of the information-preserving standardised form, Star and 
Griesemer (1989: 411) refer to Latour’s immutable mobiles. 
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knowledge usable in other local contexts is the first step to knowledge being
accepted by peers and acquiring a degree of generality, Morgan argues. 
Mobility can be regarded as a feature of many objects that are created or used
in science, not least because in my case, not only data are prepared to travel to
many different contexts but also mechanical sampling devices are sent from an
institution  in  South-West  England  across  the  oceans  and  back.  However,
neither portability  by itself  nor in  combination with  physicality  and artificiality
suffice as an exhaustive definition of scientific data. According to Leonelli (2016:
77)  ‘the value assigned to  data as  prospective evidence’,19 or  the evidential
value, distinguishes data from other types of objects in science.
A  notable  characteristic  that  all  three  concepts  of  mobility  convey  is  that
scientific data are objects, even if these objects are not necessarily immutable
or stable. Digital scientific data in arrays of numbers and letters, stored on hard
disk drives or in digital clouds, do not immediately evoke the image of an object
with boundaries. In the current discourse on data-intensive science, frequent
metaphorical  references  to  data  as  “streams”,  “flows”,  a  “deluge”  or  “flood”
rather suggest an image of open-ended, messy, or even chaotic, uncontrollable
processes. Against these types of naturalising metaphors, the view of a data
journey  as  a  process  anchored  in  human  agency,  with  planning,  artificial
vehicles, designated pathways, and destinations, appears to be an adequate
counterproposal. 
1.3 Thesis overview
My thesis consists of three introductory chapters, four main empirical chapters,
and a conclusion. This chapter has introduced the overall  philosophical arch
and scope of this thesis. Against the background of data-centrism in science,
my  thesis  tracks  the  many  practices  and  processes  that  contribute  to  the
making of digital scientific data in a detailed case study in ocean science. The
chapter has reviewed scholarly literature on the reconfigurations of research
19 Emphasis in original.
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practices  that  are  related  to  data-centrism  in  science  as  well  as  different
conceptualisations of scientific data. 
Chapter two introduces my research methods, reviewing first  how studies of
scientific  practice  figure  in  contemporary  philosophy  of  science.  My  thesis
follows a  development  during  which  the  focus of  philosophy, sociology, and
history  of  science  has  broadened  from  narrow  considerations  of  research
products  to  include  research  practices  and  their  technological,  institutional,
economical,  and social  conditions. For this purpose, philosophers of science
have adopted ethnographic research methods from anthropologists and social
scientists.  This  thesis  is  based  on  ethnographic  fieldwork  in  a  research
institution, complemented by extensive literature and web research. 
Chapter three introduces data practices in oceanography. Compared with other
scientific disciplines, oceanography is still  under-represented in philosophy of
science. The practices of ocean scientists have only recently started to draw
more attention from sociologists, anthropologists, and especially historians. My
introduction of oceanography and its data practices builds on this literature, but
also draws from standard oceanography textbooks and oceanography journals
to portray the discipline. Oceanography is a loosely defined field that includes
traditions and methods from physics, biology, chemistry, and geology. There are
no clear demarcations between these and other oceanographic sub-disciplines.
Ever since studies of the ocean became a science, observations and data have
been fundamental in knowledge making processes and collaborative practices
for data production have quickly emerged. The chapter outlines the impact of
various technological  innovations on how and by whom ocean sciences are
practised.  New technologies  have  enhanced  the  importance  of  data  and  of
continuity in data practices to further advance knowledge of the oceans. Despite
a  long  established  data-centrism  and  high-volume,  large-scale  technologies
such as satellites and autonomous measuring platforms, large areas and crucial
parameters of the oceans remain scarcely sampled due to economic costs, the
challenging nature of the seas, and the sheer size of the oceans. Following my
portrait of data practices in ocean sciences, chapter three briefly introduces this
thesis’ main case study, the Continuous Plankton Recorder (CPR) Survey. 
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My empirical study of the space in-between scientific data and the natural world
is centred on four themes, which have emerged from ethnographic interviews
and  my  visits  of  research  sites.  The  themes  are  materiality,  scientific
representing with data, methodological continuity, and the contribution of non-
scientists to epistemic processes. One main empirical chapter is dedicated to
each  of  these  themes.  The  overview  of  each  chapters’  content  briefly
reconstructs how the theme has emerged from my visits and conversations with
scientists.  I  then  summarise  each  chapter’s  main  content  and  philosophical
argument. This is in an effort to be as open as possible about my own thought
processes and about the genesis of this thesis. 
I have conducted ethnographic interviews with staff members of the Sir Alister
Hardy Foundation for Ocean Science (SAHFOS), the institution that (until April
2018) was responsible for running the plankton survey that is the main case
study of  this  thesis.  The conversations often  revolved around technical  and
methodological details of two main practices carried out routinely by SAHFOS:
the sampling of the oceans and the sample analysis. These involve interactions
between different materials such as the mechanical sampling device, the flow of
seawater through the sampling mechanism, large container ships that tow the
sampling  device,  bands  of  silk  that  filter  the  seawater,  and  the  plankton
organisms themselves. Obviously, the functional details needed to be explained
to me in order to learn how the so-called Continuous Plankton Recorder (CPR)
works. In conversations with various staff members, the importance of physical
interactions and their implications for the entire knowledge production process
quickly came to the fore and made me consider more fundamental questions
regarding materials and materiality in science: How do philosophers of science
understand “materiality” and how do material interactions figure in epistemology
and philosophical accounts of scientific data production? 
Samples that are produced in the CPR Survey are often at the centre of these
physical  interactions.  Hence,  materiality  and  sampling  emerged  from  my
empirical study of practice as the first themes that needed to be addressed in
order to fill the space in-between scientific data and the world. Chapter four, as
the first  of four empirical  chapters, describes the process of sampling in the
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CPR Survey and conceptualises the “materiality” of the samples. Fleshing out
the term “materiality”, I argue that ocean scientists create material samples by
inducing a “material integration” of physical parts of the ocean ecosystems and
physical parts of the sampling technology. The fusion of materials from different
origins is the formation of a novel entity with distinct characteristics that take
shape  in  the  process  of  sampling.  Preserving  the  newly  created  object
throughout  the  epistemic  process  constitutes  “material  continuity”,  which  is
crucial for the creation of data in my case. I argue that samples, despite their
tangibility, are not fixed entities that are collected or extracted from nature into
the  scientific  world;  material  continuity  constitutes  an  ongoing  process  of
embodiment that needs to be maintained and conveys the notion of a material
object with boundaries. The chapter sharpens the understanding of “materiality”
and  “material”,  which  is  a  widely  used  attribution  to  research  objects  and
practices.  It  also  leads  to  a  deeper  understanding  of  samples,  which  have
received much less attention in scholarly literature than scientific data, but are
commonly regarded as representations of a population of similar objects. Based
on my account, I locate the epistemic value of research samples primarily in
their materiality and in the ongoing preservation of material continuity and not in
a representational relation to a group of similar objects.
In chronological order, the mechanical sampling of the oceans is followed by
sample analysis inside a laboratory in Plymouth, UK. As the analysis involves a
variety  of  manually  performed  manipulations  on  the  sample,  materials  and
samples play a central  role in the lab, too: Microscopes, metal tools, plastic
wrapping,  and  preservation  fluids  interact  physically  with  the  samples.
Epistemologically,  however,  the  work  inside  the  laboratory  aims  at  creating
records  of  the  microscopic  analysis  that  can  be  communicated  to  other
scientists and related to plankton populations in the oceans. What interested me
in  this  part  of  the  epistemic  process  is  the  step  from  material  samples  to
quantitative  data,  which  again  prompted  questions  regarding  scientific
representation  and  the  links  between  samples,  data,  and  the  plankton
populations in the oceans. The very first recording of data in the CPR Survey
comes in the form of hand-written tally marks as plankton analysts count the
organisms  they  see  under  the  microscope.  This  is  a  crucial  activity  for
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establishing links between the natural world and digital data products, but as I
elaborate in chapter five, it is not always clear what the initial recordings actually
account for and how the specific ways of counting plankton are motivated.
Chapter  five  reconstructs  the  creation  of  hand-written  tally  marks  and  their
processing into digital scientific data. Following Latour (1999), I view scientific
representing with data as the result of  a series of traceable transformations or
translations  of  perceived qualities  of  objects  into  standardised forms.  These
actions are intended to increase the circulation and computability of data and
enable their integration and comparability with already existing representations
and records of the past. I argue that the scope of representation changes with
each step of transformation and broadens from specific characteristics of an
individual sample to processes of the ocean ecosystem as the data gradually
become computable and comparable to already existing data. The use of data
as  representations  depends  on  the  data’s  immediate  context,  their  physical
state and their relation to other data, implying that representing is a practical
achievement  and  not  an  intrinsic  property  of  data.  Chapter  five  reveals  a
perceivable mismatch between data and the natural world that resonates with
the  work  of  scholars  who  have  tried  to  untie  the  close  coupling  between
scientific representation and models which has dominated recent philosophical
accounts  of  representation  and  suggests  a  fixed  model-target  relationship
(Knuuttila 2010). My chapter shows that the practice of representing does not
link data to targets in the natural world and instead enhances their circulation
and  commensurability  with  already  existing  representations.  Intentional,
traceable  change  rather  than  continuity  is  characteristic  for  the  chains  of
transformations  that  co-occupy  the  space  in-between  the  natural  world  and
scientific knowledge. 
Almost every interviewee emphasised the need for methodological consistency
in  the  plankton  survey.  In  some  cases,  seeking  continuity  served  as  an
explanation  for  why  certain  practices  are  performed  the  way  they  are.
Continuing to create samples and data in the same way for multiple decades
emerged as a key condition for the usability of the data, as the continuity makes
data  from  different  decades  comparable  so  that  long-term  changes  of  the
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ecosystem  become  visible  in  the  data.  Given  the  high  valuation  of
methodological continuity, I started wondering about the dynamics of scientific
change and how a research institution manages the tensions between historical
change, innovation, and continuity: How are the creation of new knowledge and
progress in science and technologies intertwined with standards of practice that
need to remain unchanged for the data to be usable? 
To address this question, chapter six broadens the scope of my research and
accounts  for  the  conditions  of  practices  in  the  CPR Survey and how these
conditions have changed and affected the survey in  the past.  It  also briefly
discusses  an  effort  to  coordinate  and  maintain  various  long-term  marine
ecological  monitoring  programmes  around  the  UK.  Scientific  practices  are
performed in certain settings and researchers face challenges on various levels
— technological, economical, and social — in trying to keep their methodology
unchanged for multiple decades. Applying Caporael, Griesemer, and Wimsatt’s
(2014a)  notion  of  “scaffolding”,  a  conceptual  framework  for  development  in
culture,  evolution,  and  other  domains,  I  argue  that  the  continuity  of  data
practices is achieved by assimilating change and modifying or expanding data
practices, while the core functionality of  the CPR Survey is maintained. The
continuity  of  data  practices  is  not  characterised  by  stasis,  an  absence  of
change,  or  by  endless  repetition  of  old-fashioned practices,  it  is  a  result  of
changes  and  adaptations  of  data  practices.  In  order  to  maintain  continuity,
researchers modify the design of research technologies, expand their scientific
repertoire and the scope of their data, establish reliable audit trails, respond to
the  interests  of  the  scientific  community,  funding  agencies,  and  the  public,
transfer local expertise to young generations of researchers, and even redraw
conceptual boundaries of sciences. These activities contribute to a continuity
that  cuts  across  the  material  continuity  and  the  traceable  series  of
transformations  that  act  between  scientific  data  and  the  natural  world.  The
continuity of data practices constitutes an absence of jumps between scientific
data of the past and scientific data of today. 
The  fourth  theme  encompasses  the  involvement  of  a  variety  of  actors  in
oceanographic  data  practices  who  maintain  professional  or  recreational
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relations to the seas but have no scientific credentials. Seafarers play a central
role  in  my  thesis’  main  case  study, due  to  their  regular  involvement  in  the
sampling process. This dimension of the CPR Survey was revealed to me in an
interview with a member of the survey’s operations team, who made it clear that
a  wide  range  of  continuous  relationships  to  external  collaborators  link  the
research institution with its object of study, the oceans. Since its very beginning,
the CPR Survey has cooperated with a network of volunteers to conduct its
research, which led me to taking a closer look at the epistemic contribution of
these  non-scientists  and  to  considering  the  role  of  volunteers  and  citizen
scientists in oceanographic practices in general. As literally acting “in-between”
scientists and the ocean, how are data practices conceived so that they can be
performed by volunteers? And in turn, how do volunteers as integral parts of
epistemic processes shape our knowledge of the natural environment?
Chapter  seven  accounts  for  the  involvement  of  seafarers  and  other  non-
scientists in the CPR Survey; it also portrays a relatively young citizen science
project  in  which  sailors  are  encouraged to  measure  a  parameter  related  to
ocean  turbidity  and  submit  their  data  through  a  mobile  phone  app  to  a
centralised database. In both cases, ocean scientists exploit the fact that many
different people frequently interact with the oceans on their own account and
that a wide range of oceanographic data can be produced by following relatively
simple  instructions.  These  collaborators  actively  co-produce  data  and
knowledge of the oceans and are not passive collectors of data or samples. I
argue that non-scientists enable sampling conditions and shape the outcomes
of  research  by  contributing  their  particular  skills  and  embodied  knowledge
related to their seafaring activities. Rather than being tools that are deployed in
order to collect data or samples in the name of science, these actors are part of
the constantly changing settings researchers must approach in order to create
knowledge.  The  CPR Survey  continuously  establishes  and  maintains  social
relationships to collaborators from a variety of professions. This social continuity
between science and seafaring  culture  is  crucial  to  maintain  the network  of
volunteers and to ensure that the sampling maintains its spatial and temporal
regularity  over  multiple  decades.  In  this  regard,  social  continuity  is  an
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indispensable part  of  the CPR Survey’s data practices,  which underpins the
practices’ material and methodological continuities.
Chapter  eight  concludes the thesis  by recapitulating  my case study of  data
practices  in  oceanography  and  the  interweaving  continuities,  changing
conditions,  and  various  activities  that  sustain  the  genesis  of  digital
oceanographic data. I draw conclusions in relation to the philosophical study of
data-centric sciences and conceptualisations of data, but also in relation to data
practices in ocean sciences. Finally, the conclusion explores various potential
research avenues that could build on this thesis. 
The thesis further includes several appendices related to my empirical research
and a glossary that includes some oceanographic terms and all acronyms that
appear in the text.
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Chapter Two – Methodology
This  chapter  introduces my research methods,  reviewing first  how empirical
studies of scientific practice figure in contemporary philosophy of science. My
thesis builds on a broadening of the scope of philosophical, sociological, and
historical studies of science in recent decades: from narrow considerations of
research products and idealised preconceptions of making and accumulating
scientific  knowledge  to  including  research  practices  and  their  technological,
institutional, economical, an social conditions. For this purpose, philosophers of
science have adopted ethnographic research methods from anthropologists and
social scientists, including local case studies of research practices. This thesis
is based on qualitative ethnographic fieldwork in an oceanographic research
institution,  complemented  by  extensive  literature  and  web  research,  as  I
elaborate in the second part of this chapter. 
2.1 Following the “practice turn” in philosophy, sociology, and history
of science
My research can be regarded as empirical philosophy based on a qualitative
case  study  of  oceanographic  research  practices.  My  thesis  follows  a
methodological  and  conceptual  shift  in  philosophy, sociology, and  history  of
science towards studying the practices of scientists; this shift has been termed
the “practice turn” by many scholars. Soler et al. (2014) reconstruct the origins
and most important contributors of the practice turn in the tradition of Anglo-
American analytic philosophy of science, which culminated bin the 1980s and
early 1990s with titles like Hacking’s (1983) Representing and Intervening and
Pickering’s (1992) Science as Practice and Culture. Soler et al. (2014: 14–24)
identify several key shifts in the course of this turn which contain almost always
strong criticism of earlier studies of science, accusing them of conceptualising
science in ways that do not reflect what science actually is. I review these shifts
and relate each one to the methods I employed in my own research project. 
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The first shift  is the practice turn’s most fundamental, Soler et al. (2014: 15)
point out:  away from a-priori,  too idealised accounts of  science and passive
scientific  agency, towards more empirically based, activity-oriented accounts.
This shift came in reaction to traditional, deterministic or formulaic notions of a
scientific  method  such  as  verificationism  or  falsificationism,  and  too  linear
notions of scientific development and progress as a cumulation of knowledge.20
Most of these accounts developed in the first half of the twentieth century and
were criticised because they ignored local and historical contexts, the material
aspects  of  practising  science,  the  plurality  of  scientific  approaches,  and
individual  motivations and careers of scientists;  researchers often appear as
overly  rational  and altruistic  minds without  limitations  in  capacities,  skills,  or
background  knowledge.  This  shift  requires  from  philosophers  of  science  a
specific attitude and approach to the object of study: Certain scientific modes of
operation, for example the formulation and testing of hypothesis, as well as the
goals  and  motivations  of  scientists  should  not  be  presupposed  or  expected
before a philosopher engages with a scientific field. Inspired by anthropological
scholarship, Latour and Woolgar’s (1979) seminal  Laboratory Life: The Social
Construction of Scientific Facts tried to approach scientists like an alien tribe
with totally unfamiliar practices and conventions. Scholars should not assume
one ideal mode of operation, but rather recognise that scientific knowledge is
produced in many different ways and contexts and by diverse people driven by
different  scientific  or  personal  goals  and  motivations.  My  most  fundamental
research question is an open-ended question about the formation of knowledge
and the conditions of making scientific data. I neither discuss these topics in
relation to idealised images of science, knowledge making, or scientists,  nor
“test” my case against a blueprint of scientific practice. 
Many  scholars  have  rejected  idealised  accounts  of  science  and  advocate
philosophical doctrines such as the disunity of science, stating that there is not
one kind of knowledge or one kind of scientific method that unifies all scientific
disciplines but a multitude of scientific  cultures (Knorr Cetina 1999:  2–3),  or
20 In particular, this shift is seen as a response to the logical positivism and unified 
views of science advocated by philosophers of the so-called Vienna Circle in the 
early twentieth century.
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scientific  pluralism, stating that  there are multiple  equally  legitimate ways of
knowing about the world (Dupré 1993: 10). Following the practice turn assumes
plurality in relation to the agency of scientists and makes scientific practices the
primary object of study instead of knowledge produced by only one particular
scientific mode of operation.
The second shift of the practice turn encompasses a rather descriptive instead
of  normative  approach to  science.  This  shift  emerged from criticism against
logical  principles  that  aimed  at  demarcating  genuine  science  from  pseudo-
science or non-science and thereby pretended to know exactly what science is
and  how  it  should  be.  However,  normative  approaches  often  failed  in
adequately describing even some of the most prominent examples of scientific
practice.  In  addition, it  was criticised that  normative philosophers of science
assumed a privileged position outside of scientific  practice,  judging over  the
legitimacy  of  scientists’  endeavours.  The  response  was  a  more  modest
approach to science that primarily describes what scientists actually do. Yet,
many scholars quickly saw disadvantages in a purely descriptive perspective on
science and introduced again a normative dimension to their studies, while the
exact kind of normativity remains a topic of debates (Soler et al. 2014: 15–16).
Lynch (2014: 103) explains that the shift  to descriptive perspectives was for
many  scholars  only  a  stage  in  a  development  ‘from  one  normative  era  to
another, better  one’ in  which  criticism and recommendations to  scientists  or
policy-makers  are  grounded  in  empirical  knowledge  of  actual  scientific
practices. 
My own research pursues broadly descriptive goals, in a sense that it aims for a
deeper understanding of the processes and practices by which scientific data
are made. I do not offer recommendations directly to scientists or criticise the
research practices that I have studied. My arguments rather relate primarily to
conceptual notions discussed in contemporary philosophy of science, such as
materiality, scientific representing, or different definitions of scientific data. My
criticism of such notions is not aimed at the ocean scientists but at the ways
their practices have or have not been accounted for in philosophy of science. As
part of a larger body of scholarly literature on the epistemology of data-intensive
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sciences, my research has the potential to underpin critiques of contemporary
sciences  or  recommendations  related  to  the  design  or  valuation  of  specific
research practices. 
The  third  shift  of  the  practice  turn  primarily  relates  to  historical  studies  of
science  and  criticises  present-centred,  rationalised  reconstructions  of  past
scientific  endeavours.  The  practice  turns  entails  a  historically  adequate
perspective on practices that contextualises scientific situations and the agency
of scientists in their historical setting. Present-centred accounts tend to create
the  illusion  that  scientific  knowledge  progresses  rationally  and  linearly
accumulates to the current  state of  affairs (Soler et  al.  2014:  17).  Adequate
contextualisation  is  also  central  in  the  fourth  shift:  ‘From  Decontextualized,
Intellectual,  Explicit,  Individual,  and  “Purely  Cognitive”  to  Contextualized,
Material,  Tacit,  Collective,  and  Psycho-Social  Characterizations  of  Science’
(Soler  et  al.  2014:  17).  This  shift  is  most  clearly  visible  in  the  many ‘finely
contextualized micro-studies of science’ that appeared in philosophy, sociology,
and history of science since the practice turn (Soler et al. 2014: 17). These not
only adopt a smaller, local scale and pay close attention to the context in which
scientists operate, scholars have also shown that science consists of more than
a researcher’s cognitive processes and explicit  statements in official  science
publications. Scholars have revealed the epistemological relevance of aspects
that  were  not  visible  or  neglected  in  earlier  accounts  of  science,  such  as
physical  materials,  unarticulated or “tacit”  knowledge and skills,  economic or
institutional settings, and background values or beliefs of scientists. 
My thesis  aims for  a contextualised view of scientific  practice.  I  account  for
material aspects and associated practices in my study of sampling and sample
analysis (chapter four). I also discuss scientific data situated in the context of
their creation in the lab and in the context of their storage in a digital database
(chapter five) and further consider a variety of external, technological and socio-
economic factors and non-scientific actors that shape the outcomes of research
practices  (chapters  six  and  seven).  In  studying  the  practices  of  creating
scientific data, my thesis also follows the fifth shift suggested by Soler et al.
(2014: 21–22), that is from studying scientific products to scientific processes.
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Certainly, some products of scientific practices such as samples or data play a
central role in my account. Yet, I am not taking these objects as given starting
points of my enquiry, but try to trace their formation processes. Not only material
objects  may  count  as  products  but  any  stabilised  outcome  of  a  research
practice,  including  ‘theories  that  are  taken  for  granted,  experimental  facts,
mathematical theorems’, and the like (Soler et al. 2014: 21). The main shift of
focus is from stabilised objects to unstable entities that are in the making. 
Philosophers  of  science  associated  with  so-called  “New  Experimentalism”
exemplify the shift from products to processes. They no longer accepted the
results  of  scientific  experiments  as  stable,  unproblematic  facts  about
phenomena.  Hacking  (1983)  showed  how  experimental  practices  actually
produce  phenomena  by  intervention.  In  Rheinberger’s  (1997:  15)  words,
experimental  research  practices  constitute  processes  that  do  not  converge
towards  a  stable  equilibrium,  but  progress  like  a  ‘meandering  river’.  My
philosophical analysis of  data practices draws from Hacking’s and especially
from Rheinberger’s contributions in chapters four and five, although I  do not
study a clear case of laboratory experimentation.
Both Hacking’s and Rheinberger’s contributions also exemplify the final shift of
the  practice  turn:  away  from  science  as  contemplation  of  the  world  and
representation towards science as intervention, creation, and transformation of
the world (Soler et al. 2014: 22–24). This shift entails questioning a scientists’
situatedness  and  agency  in  relation  to  the  object  of  research.  It  conceives
scientists not as passive observers who perceive and contemplate what exists,
but  as  active  investigators  who  manipulate  and  probe  by  intervening  with
technical  instruments even when using visual  devices such as microscopes.
This revaluation of research practices led to new understandings of scientific
representations. They no longer were considered as mere  descriptions of the
world but served ‘as means for doing things, tools for intervening, and material
artifacts for transforming the world’ (Soler et al. 2014: 23). I explicitly question
notions of  scientific  representation as adequate descriptions of  the research
practices in my case study in chapters four and five. Furthermore, my entire
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research  project  can  be  regarded  as  an  examination  of  a  scientist’s
situatedness and agency in relation to various contextual factors. 
A shift of interest and approaches as substantial as the practice turn requires
new or modified research methods in order to capture scientific practice as a
new unit of investigation. Chang (2011, 2014), a co-founder of the Society for
Philosophy of Science in Practice, proposes a framework for the description and
analysis of science ‘in terms of activities’ (Chang 2011: 18). In this framework,
researchers are engaged in what he defines as ‘epistemic activities’:
An epistemic activity is a coherent set of mental or physical actions 
(or operations) that are intended to contribute to the production or 
improvement of knowledge in a particular way, in accordance with 
some discernible rules (though the rules may be unarticulated). 
(Chang 2011: 209)
Philosophers have to keep in mind the aims and intentions of scientists when
performing  an  epistemic  activity,  Chang  emphasises.  An  identifiable
intentionality distinguishes epistemic activities from mere events or ‘happenings
involving human bodies’ (Chang 2014: 72). Further, epistemic activities are not
performed in isolation but in relation to other activities that together constitute a
‘system of practice’ (Chang 2014: 72).21 Soler and Catinaud (2014) comment on
Chang’s framework and understand it as a structure with three nested levels: a
system of practice at the upper level, epistemic activities at the intermediate
level, and mental or physical operations at the lowest level. When a philosopher
applies this framework, the aims of the philosophical analysis are important:
The decision to categorize a given reality as, say, a system of 
practice rather than an activity or an operation, depends on the 
project of the analyst. It is not imposed by some inherent property of 
the reality under scrutiny. Consequently, one and the same targeted 
reality might legitimately be categorized as a system of practice, or 
as an activity, or as an operation. (Soler and Catinaud 2014: 82)
21 ‘A system of practice is formed by a coherent set of epistemic activities performed 
with a view to achieve certain aims’ (Chang 2014: 72).
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Additionally, the introduction of three levels is mostly a ‘convenient artifice of
presentation’, since any activity or operation could be decomposed into smaller
units indefinitely without ever reaching any ‘ultimate fundamental level’ (Soler
and  Catinaud  2014:  82).  In  other  words,  what  is  identified  as  a  system of
practice, an activity, or operation depends on the intentions and perspective of
the philosopher and is not an inherent quality of the scientific endeavour under
examination. 
I do not apply Chang’s framework to my case study rigorously. Chang (2011:
218) himself calls his proposal a ‘very broad and abstract outline of how I think
we should be doing our concrete work’ and Soler and Catinaud (2014: 84–86)
point  to  various problematic  issues with  the framework that  still  need to  be
addressed, in particular regarding the individuation of an action or an activity
and the identification of an actor’s or a collaborative group of actors’ motives,
aims, and values. My thesis focuses on data practices that based on Chang’s
framework can be viewed as a system of epistemic activities constituted by a
coherent set of mental or physical actions or operations. These operations are
intended to contribute to the production or processing of data in a particular
way, in accordance with some discernible rules. 
As a guideline for the study of science in terms of activities, Chang (2014: 77–
78)  provides  a  ‘Checklist  for  Activity-Based  Analysis’.22 The  list  contains
questions regarding the exact activity, its aims, its systematic context, agents
and  other  persons  involved,  required  capabilities  and resources,  an  agent’s
freedom of choice, metaphysical principles, and evaluation of the activity. As I
elaborate  below,  I  found  myself  contemplating  many  of  these  aspects  of
scientific  practice during my own ethnographic fieldwork.  Chang (2011:  218)
admits  that  his  framework  is  not  truly  novel  and only  articulates  how many
scholars  have  been  thinking  and  structuring  their  own  research  since  the
practice  turn.  As  a  young  scholar,  I  have  been  inspired  by  many  close-up,
contextualised studies of scientific practice and took Chang’s framework as an
additional support for my focus on research practices. My philosophical analysis
22 Chang presents this list also as a ‘Recipe for the Transformation of Boring 
Philosophical Issues’ (Chang 2014: 77).
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draws on various approaches and concepts employed in philosophy of scientific
experimentation  (Hacking,  Rheinberger),  in  scholarship  that  integrates
philosophy  and  history  of  science  (Knuuttila,  Morgan,  Woodward),  in  social
studies of science and technology (Latour),23 and decisively in scholarship in
which all  three traditions — philosophy, sociology, and history of  science —
intersect (Griesemer, Leonelli).
Finally,  Chang’s  (2014:  76–77)  outline  of  benefits  that  derive  from  activity-
oriented philosophy of science conveys a promising outlook for my research
project:  drawing  attention  to  aspects  of  scientific  practice  that  have  been
overlooked or  deemed unimportant  in  the past;  recognising that  even highly
abstract objects in science are rooted in actions and agency, which may bring
‘all kinds of unexpected things’ into a philosopher’s scope of analysis; providing
a ‘natural basis for normative evaluations’; and recognising ‘more clearly the
continuity between science and the rest of life’ (Chang 2014: 77).
2.2 The benefits of qualitative case studies
In contrast to only focusing on the explicit, propositional, and published output
of research, the study of research practices appears much more problematic.
How  can  scholars  detect  and  analyse  the  unarticulated,  tacit  aspects  of
scientific practice, identify and capture scientific processes rather than products,
or  find  answers  to  the  questions  on  Chang’s checklist  for  an  activity-based
analysis  of  science? As  Wagenknecht,  Nersessian,  and  Andersen  (2015:  5)
explain,  philosophy  of  science  over  the  past  three  decades  has  become
considerably  more  empirical  with  the  introduction  of  qualitative  research
methods.  Osbeck  and  Nersessian  (2015)  identify  three  types  of  empirical
approaches to  enquiry  in  philosophy of  science:  historical,  observational  (or
ethnographic), and experimental (or statistical).24
23 The commonly used acronym “STS” is sometimes used in this thesis to refer to 
scholarship in science and technology studies which view science and technology 
as socially embedded enterprises.
24 Osbeck and Nersessian (2015: 14) have no formula to clearly distinguish empirical
from non-empirical, but emphasise that ‘the empirical is rooted in the instrument 
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The  practice  turn  entailed  an  increased  diversity  of  research  methods  that
scholars applied to sciences. Latour and Woolgar’s (1979)  Laboratory Life or
Knorr  Cetina’s  (1981)  The  Manufacture  of  Knowledge demonstrated  how
ethnographic  and  qualitative  research  methods  could  be  employed  in
sociological  studies  of  science.  Since  the  so-called  “Science  Wars”  of  the
1990s, during which realists and constructivists fiercely debated over the nature
and  authority  of  scientific  enquiry,25 philosophers  of  science have  started  to
incorporate qualitative methods into their repertoire. An important and frequently
employed approach to research practices is an empirical  case study. Burian
(2001:  384)  argues  for  the  virtues  of  using  case  studies  in  history  and
philosophy of science and defines case studies as follows:
Case studies are concerned with scientific work carried out during a 
limited time period and are usually restricted to a specified set of 
scientists, institutions, laboratories, disciplines, or traditions. […] 
Case studies usually deal with relatively narrow topics. And most of 
the case studies that interest philosophers of science are organized 
around a focal issue of broad interest. (Burian 2001: 384–85)
Morgan  (2012a:  668)  emphasises  in  her  own  definition  that  a  case  study
focuses on a ‘bounded whole object of analysis’, but that the boundary between
object of study and context may not be clear from the beginning and remain
variable throughout the process of study. In this sense, case-based research
‘maintains a considerable degree of open-endedness’ (Morgan 2012a: 668). 
and cannot be understood apart from it’ (emphasis in original). Importantly, the 
researchers themselves count as instruments in observational and ethnographic 
research, the main empirical methods of my research project.
25 As Wylie (2000: 228) summarises, scholars of sociological, anthropological, and 
feminist studies of science and technology argued that sciences are inherently 
human, social, and political, while questioning the presumption that ‘the sciences 
are uniquely non-parochial in scope and warrant, that they share a body of 
investigative practices capable of establishing knowledge that decisively 
transcends the contexts of its production’. Defenders of science reacted by 
maintaining a ‘unique integrity and authority of science as a corporate whole’.
51
Case studies gain relevance as a research method when philosophers follow
some of the practice turn’s aforementioned principles, in particular the plurality
and disunity of scientific practices and the rejection of too idealised conceptions
of  scientific  knowledge,  methods,  and  agency.  As  Burian  (2001:  399–400)
points out, ‘science has no essence’, no universal or objective scientific method;
hence,  ‘case  studies  cannot  and  should  not  be  expected  to  yield  universal
methodologies or epistemologies’. More explicitly, Morgan (2012b: xv) states in
the  preface  to  a  book  comprising  a  series  of  case  studies  of  economic
modelling practices: ‘Science is messy’ and ‘the messy details are important’ to
understand and explain both micro- and macroscale aspects of science. Case
studies are the best way to capture the details of scientific practices and ‘to
figure  out  how science goes on’  (Morgan 2012b:  xv).  Case studies  are  the
primary research tool for making the unarticulated and tacit details of scientific
practice visible.
Flyvbjerg (2006) addresses several misunderstandings and simplified views of
case studies. A common misunderstanding is that general, context-independent
knowledge  would  be  more  valuable  than  concrete,  context-dependent
knowledge. Flyvbjerg (2006: 6–9) responds by highlighting the benefits of case-
based  research  for  the  philosopher  or  sociologist:  The  type  of  context-
dependent  learning  with  case  studies  is  essential  for  the  acquirement  of
thorough expertise in a specific field of research. Additionally, any research of
human affairs inevitably leads to context-dependent knowledge, because ‘social
science has not succeeded in producing general, context-independent theory
and, thus, has in the final instance nothing else to offer than concrete, context-
dependent  knowledge’  (Flyvbjerg  2006:  8).  A  related,  frequently  raised
scepticism against case studies is the impossibility to generalise on the basis of
a single case study. Flyvbjerg  (2006:  14)  contends that  the  value of  formal
generalisation is overestimated whereas the force of exemplification and a case
study’s  potential  to  falsify  expectations  and  given  propositions  are
underestimated.  Rather  than confirming a researcher’s subjective bias,  case
studies  more  frequently  make  researchers  question  or  rebut  preconceived
notions (Flyvbjerg 2006: 23). Indeed, as outlined in the thesis overview in the
previous  chapter,  the  closeness  to  concrete  research  situations  made  me
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question my own preconceptions as well as common philosophical conceptions
of specific aspects of research practices. 
I study data practices by conducting an in-depth local case study because I see
case studies as the only way to adequately reconstruct in terms of activities how
scientific  data  are  made.  My  thesis  explicitly  focuses  on  the  contexts  and
conditions of making scientific data and a case-based approach seems well-
suited for this task. The diversity of practices in data-intensive sciences can only
be mapped with more empirical case studies. These are not intended to replace
but  underpin  rather  general,  comparative  perspectives  on  commonalities  or
differences  between  scientific  practices.  My  case  study  consists  of  multiple
visits  to  a  research  institution,  qualitative  interviews  with  researchers,  and
extensive  research  of  scientific  literature  related  directly  to  my  case.
Ethnographic interviews as part of case studies are a powerful research tool in
sociology and find increasing acceptance among philosophers of science.26 I
used ethnographic research methods in order to establish an empirical basis for
my philosophical analysis of scientific practice. The following summary of my
empirical  research  addresses  additional  questions  related  to  the  qualitative
interviews and their analysis. 
2.3 Empirical methods used for this thesis
My approach to ocean sciences during my PhD project was partly shaped by
my own educational background. From 2006 to 2011, I studied geophysics and
physical oceanography at the University of Hamburg, Germany. I worked as a
student assistant at the Institute of Oceanography and was thereby introduced
to a variety of practices, by which oceanographers produce and analyse data. I
also worked as  a student  assistant  on  two research cruises on the Atlantic
Ocean,  during which I  contributed to  the sampling of  ocean waters and the
production  of  scientific  data.  Attending  lectures  in  hydrochemistry,
biogeochemistry,  hydrodynamics,  and  marine  ecology  provided  me  with
26 See for example Osbeck and Nersessian (2015: 26–33) for a detailed description 
of “Empirical Philosophy of Science in Practice” in bio-engineering, including field 
observations, audio-recorded interviews, and the analysis of interview data. 
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additional background knowledge on practices that are not primarily concerned
with ocean physics. Between 2011 and 2014, I studied history and culture of
science and technology at Technical University Berlin and worked as a student
assistant at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in a project on
large-scale data collection programmes in post-World War II natural sciences.
These studies provided me with specific historical perspectives on science that
at  times,  intersected  with  philosophy  of  science,  as  for  example  in  Michel
Foucault’s  (1969)  discourse  analysis  and  archaeological  method  to  analyse
knowledge and scientific cultures.
This scholarly background gave me broad and useful background knowledge
and  practical  experience  in  ocean  sciences,  but  left  me  with  a  lack  of
philosophical  fundamentals,  as  I  learned  in  the  early  stages  of  my  PhD
research.  Such  a  disciplinary  crossover  is  not  uncommon  in  contemporary
academia. Yet, thinking and writing about science in philosophical terms as well
as  learning  about  empirical  research  methods  in  philosophy  of  science
comprised a large part of my learning curve, especially during the early stages
of my research project.  Being a trained oceanographer  certainly  shapes my
understanding of the information I obtain in ethnographic interviews. Laudel and
Gläser  (2007)  reflect  on  interviewing  scientists  and  the  required  level  of
expertise in the science practised by the interviewees. They point out that for in-
depth,  qualitative,  empirical  research,  understanding  the  science  to  some
degree is inevitable. My approach can be considered as  ‘native observation’
using  Laudel  and  Gläser’s  (2007:  96)  words,  because  I  am  a  trained
oceanographer studying oceanography. In some cases of native observation,
researchers  experienced  an  ambiguity  when  studying  the  work  of  former
colleagues or peers. In rare cases, accusations surfaced that in doing native
observation,  researchers  might  too  easily  adopt  false  assumptions  from the
researchers  under  study.  However,  as  Laudel  and  Gläser  (2007:  96–97)
summarise,  the  consequences  of  native  observation  for  the  outcomes  of
empirical studies are actually unknown.
I was not aware of my case studies’ specific data practices prior to beginning
my PhD research. My studies in history and culture of science and technology
54
also provided me with critical distance to ocean sciences in such a way that I
did not feel “native” when I visited research sites in Plymouth. My background
knowledge  of  oceanic  processes  and  practices  certainly  aided  my
understanding of the content of my conversations with oceanographers. I admit
that in discussing my research with other philosophers, I sometimes felt that I
was less surprised by my case study than scholars that were not familiar with
oceanography. Presenting and discussing my research in  workshops and at
international conferences was therefore crucial for my own interpretation of my
empirical data.
My empirical research for this thesis began with a broad literature and online
research into contemporary data practices in oceanography. The aim of this
research  was  to  broaden  my  knowledge  beyond  the  rather  technical  and
methodological knowledge that I obtained during my time as an oceanography
student. In particular, I intended to gain an overview of important oceanographic
data  infrastructures,  including  their  participants,  funding  backgrounds,  their
scientific scope, impact, and their relation to other oceanographic projects and
programmes.  The aim was  finding  oceanographic  programmes and projects
suitable for an empirical case study within the limited time of a three-year PhD
project.27 Large-scale, multi-national  data infrastructures like the International
Argo Project, the ocean chemistry observational programme GEOTRACES, or
the  Global  Ocean  Data  Assimilation  Experiment  (GODAE)  appeared  too
complex and demanding in this regard. My focus therefore shifted to databases
and projects within the UK with a smaller scientific scope and potential access
points for ethnographic fieldwork. Among the projects and locations I identified
were the Marine Biological Association of the UK (MBA), the Data Archive for
Seabed  Species  and  Habitats  (DASSH),  the  Continuous  Plankton  Recorder
(CPR) Survey and the Secchi Disk Project, all based in Plymouth, the National
Oceanography Centre (NOC) in Southampton, and the British Oceanographic
Data Centre (BODC) in Liverpool. 
27 See appendix A for a list of criteria for selecting fieldwork sites. These were 
developed jointly by members of the ERC-funded project “The Epistemology of 
Data-Intensive Science”.
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Towards the end of my first year of research, I started collaborating with people
from the MBA, the CPR Survey, DASSH, and the Secchi Disk Project. I visited
the MBA building in Plymouth several times throughout 2015 and conducted six
ethnographic  interviews  in  a  span  of  six  months.  I  was  shown  around  the
building, the laboratory where CPR samples are analysed, the instrumentation
workshop, and the CPR Survey’s sample archive. The interviews were semi-
structured and usually  lasted  for  around one and a half  hours.  I  based the
interviews  on  individual  sets  of  topics  and  questions  intended  to  guide  the
conversation while also allowing space for deeper discussions of specific topics,
whenever they emerged from the conversation.28 One theme that all interviews
had  in  common was the  scientists’  everyday work.  I  kept  asking  about  the
recurring  activities  and  routines  of  scientific  practice,  in  particular  those
practices relating to data, required technologies and skills, typical problems, and
communication networks related to these activities. On the one hand, I wanted
to learn the facts and the functioning of specific instances of scientific work; on
the other hand, I wanted to gain insight into the individual realities of scientific
work as lived and experienced by people in a specific research setting. One
major  goal  of  semi-structured  interviews  of  this  type  is  to  learn  about
constraints, relations, and interactions involved in scientific work, which cannot
be uncovered by any other method, for example by researching only published
scientific  literature.  At  the same time,  the  interviews retained an exploratory
character because they were also intended to give me deeper knowledge and
insight into the work of scientists from which I would be able to select specific
aspects to address in my thesis. 
During  my visits  to  Plymouth,  I  have  interviewed  the  following  scientists  or
members of staff: a marine ecologist who is now the Deputy Director of the MBA
and  chair  of  the  Marine  Environmental  Change  Network  (MECN),  which
oversees a number of long-term environmental time series of the UK; the data
manager of DASSH; a marine ecologist and micro-biologist who has launched
the Secchi Disk citizen science project; from the Sir Alister Hardy Foundation
28 See appendix B for an interview protocol from which I developed specific 
questionnaires for each interview. The template was developed in the course of the
ERC-funded project “The Epistemology of Data-Intensive Science”. 
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(SAHFOS) I  interviewed the  lab  manager, a  senior  plankton taxonomist;  an
instrumentation technician, plankton taxonomist,  and sample archive curator;
the workshop manager and member of the operations team; and a geneticist
specialised in plankton ecology. All participants agreed to the interviews being
audio-recorded.
Participation in my research was entirely voluntary and only happened after the
scientists signed an ethics consent form in which they were able to choose if the
interview would  be  recorded  and if  their  identity  would  be  disclosed.  I  also
asked  interviewees  to  sign  a  re-use  and  archiving  agreement  to  decide  if
transcripts  of  their  interviews  could  be  archived  and  shared  online  to  be
available for future research projects.29
Most  of  the  second  year  of  my  research  was  spent  with  transcribing  and
analysing  the  interviews,  as  I  describe  below.  During  the  third  year  of  my
research I travelled back to Plymouth for another three interviews which were
less exploratory and rather aimed at answering follow-up questions and filling
gaps in my knowledge of the data practices. By this time, I had settled on the
CPR Survey as my main case study for this thesis. The total number of nine
interviews,  with  only  six  interviewees  working  directly  for  the  CPR  Survey,
leaves me with a relatively small  sample size.  Crouch and McKenzie (2006)
argue that small sample sizes in qualitative research with interviews function
well for studies which aim at capturing the dynamics of social situations. They
further point out that ‘strictly speaking, […] the whole notion of “sample” is not
appropriate here since in research of this kind respondents are not drawn (i.e.
sampled) from a “target population”’ (Crouch and McKenzie 2006: 492). Indeed,
the  case  I  selected  is  a  rather  unique  example  of  ocean  science  and  the
researchers I interviewed were not chosen as representatives of larger groups
of  people.  For  example,  the  lab  manager  of  the  CPR  Survey  or  the  data
manager of  DASSH occupy singular  positions in  relatively  small  institutional
settings. 
29 See appendix C for copy of the ethics consent form and appendix D for the re-use 
and archiving agreement.
57
For analysis of the interview transcripts, I  utilised the data analysis software
Nvivo 10. I used the software’s “coding” function to mark passages with one or
more themes depending on the current topic or question of the conversation.30 A
list  of  forty  different  themes emerged from this  analysis,  which gave me an
overview of which topics have occurred more often than others. The themes
“storing, archiving, curating”, “sample”, “questions of analysis”, “data uses and
re-uses”, “material”, and “funding” emerged as the most frequent topics. The
themes were  not  pre-determined  but  rather  developed  in  the  course  of  the
analysis. In the following weeks, these topics guided my philosophical thinking
and the structuring of my empirical data into potential chapters and papers to
present at philosophy of science conferences and workshops. This means that
the philosophical themes addressed in my thesis’ main chapters emerged from
my empirical data and from the reconstruction of the research practices that I
studied. I was not initially driven by an intention to find out about, say, scientific
representation in ocean sciences.
This thesis is the primary output of my PhD project. It is based on qualitative,
empirical  philosophy  of  science  and  exemplifies  what  Morgan  (2012a:  668)
describes as the outcome of a case study: 
A complex, often narrated, account that typically contains some of 
the raw evidence as well as its analysis and that ties together the 
many different bits of evidence in the study. 
My empirical chapters contain much of the “raw evidence”,  direct quotations
from  researchers,  which  I  inserted  with  the  deliberate  intention  to  let  the
scientists speak for themselves.
30 See Osbeck and Nersessian (2015: 31–32) for an example of coding interview 
data in empirical philosophy of science.
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Chapter Three – Between scarcity and overload: Data 
practices in oceanography
Abstract: This chapter introduces data practices in oceanography and briefly 
introduces this thesis’ main case study, the Continuous Plankton Recorder 
(CPR) Survey. Compared to other scientific disciplines, oceanographic 
practices are still under-represented in philosophy of science; however, 
oceanography has recently started to draw more attention from sociologists, 
anthropologists, and especially historians. My introduction of oceanography 
builds on this scholarship, but also draws from standard oceanography 
textbooks and oceanography journals to portray the discipline. Oceanography is
a loosely defined field that includes traditions and methods from physics, 
biology, chemistry, and geology, but there are no clear demarcations between 
these and other oceanographic sub-disciplines. Ever since studies of the ocean
became a science, observations and the production of data have been 
fundamental in knowledge making processes. Oceanographers have long 
maintained close ties to the seafaring culture and established international 
collaborations to increase the scope and volume of data production. Various 
technological innovations have impacted how and by whom ocean science is 
practised. New technologies have also enhanced the importance of data and of 
continuity in data practices to further advance knowledge of the oceans. 
Despite the long established data-centrism and the implementation of high-
volume, large-scale technologies, large parts and crucial parameters of the 
oceans remain scarcely sampled.
3.1 Introduction
Oceanography is a diverse scientific field and, as I discuss in this chapter, lacks
a clear definition as well as distinct topical or methodological boundaries. This
chapter reviews the diversity of oceanographic data practices and formulates
some cornerstones that characterise the field in view of the following chapter’s
case study. I intend to draw a broad sketch of oceanographic data practices —
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in particular of the practices by which data of the oceans have commonly been
created  —  that  is  informed  by  scientific  literature  and  the  rather  limited
scholarship  on  oceanography  in  philosophy,  sociology,  anthropology,  and
history of science. 
I argue that oceanography is a relatively young scientific field in which “data-
centric”  or  “data-intensive”  approaches  have  been  prominent  from  the  very
beginning.  A  variety  of  new  technologies  have  been  introduced  to  ocean
sciences  since  the  middle  of  the  twentieth  century.  These  have  greatly
increased the capacities of  ocean scientists to  produce oceanographic data.
Yet,  ironically, a characteristic  scarcity  of  data is still  prevalent  today as the
scope of oceanographic research has expanded from exploratory mapping of
ocean phenomena to understanding the oceans’ crucial  role in the planetary
climate system. The expansion of scope occurred gradually over the course of
one century and has transformed the scientific image of the oceans from rather
static  bodies of  water  to  assemblages of  dynamic,  interrelated physical  and
biogeochemical processes. This shift amplified the importance of continuity in
the  data  practices  of  ocean  scientists  and  spawned  a  high  degree  of
collaboration between scientific institutions and research organisations across
the globe.
For a large part of their history, ocean sciences were closely associated with
maritime and seafaring culture, with exploratory voyages and discoveries made
exclusively  by  institutions  and  male  scientists  with  seafaring  capacities  and
experience.  While  new  platforms  for  data  production  like  satellites  and
autonomous  sensing  networks  have  opened  ocean  sciences  to  a  greater
diversity of people, some oceanographic practices still require the skills to bring
research  instruments  or  entire  laboratories  on  ships  right  into  the  adverse
conditions of the world’s oceans.
In general, I understand oceanography as an engagement in the oceans and
seas that involves the collection of samples, the recording of phenomena, the
creation of data, or the production of knowledge from samples, records, or data.
This view includes a wide range of activities performed by scientists as well as
non-scientists.  The  objects  of  study  not  only  encompass  the  ocean’s  and
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adjacent  sea’s  bodies  of  water,  but  also  the  living  organisms  within  them,
organic  and inorganic  compounds floating  with  the  currents,  as  well  as  the
constitution  and  processes  across  their  boundaries,  at  the  sea  floor,  along
coasts, and between oceans and the atmosphere. I do not aim for a general
definition or  demarcation of  oceanography and tend to  use the term “ocean
sciences” frequently throughout this thesis to signal the plurality of approaches,
traditions, and specific objects of study that researchers of the oceans engage
with. My view of oceanography or ocean sciences is derived from research into
the practices and history of the field conducted for the purpose of this thesis and
from  my  experience  as  a  student  and  research  assistant  in  physical
oceanography. 
The  chapter  first  discusses  definitions  of  oceanography  given  in
encyclopaedias,  oceanography  textbooks  and  in  materials  from  public
representatives  of  the  discipline  such  as  journals,  learned  societies,  and
international organisations. The chapter then reviews the limited scholarship on
oceanographic  practices  from  historical,  philosophical,  sociological,  and
anthropological  studies  of  ocean  sciences.  The  main  part  of  the  chapter  is
formed by a historical sketch of data practices in ocean sciences that briefly
introduces the  main  technologies  of  data  production,  research programmes,
and innovations that have shaped how oceanography is practised today. Finally,
before  summarising,  I  briefly  introduce  this  thesis’  main  case  study,  the
Continuous Plankton Recorder (CPR) Survey. 
3.2 Defining oceanography
Several textbook and encyclopaedia definitions of oceanography are two-fold:
They define oceanography first  as all  science of  the oceans and seas and,
second, as being traditionally divided into four sub-disciplines dedicated to the
oceans’  physics,  biology,  chemistry,  and  geology,  respectively.  Sverdrup,
Johnson, and Fleming (1942: 1), for example, write in a classic oceanography
textbook:
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Oceanography embraces all studies pertaining to the sea and 
integrates the knowledge gained in the marine sciences that deal 
with such subjects as the ocean boundaries and bottom topography, 
the physics and chemistry of sea water, the types of currents, and 
the many phases of marine biology.31
In a more recent introductory textbook for oceanography students, Stowe (1996:
5)  claims  that  the  division  in  physical,  biological,  chemical,  and  geological
oceanography  is  ‘customary’  among  oceanographers.  According  to
Encyclopaedia Britannica, oceanography is the ‘scientific discipline concerned
with all  aspects of the world’s oceans and seas, including their physical and
chemical properties, their origin and geologic framework, and the life forms that
inhabit the marine environment’.32 
Most oceanographic research can probably be regarded as falling under one or
more of  the four  traditionally  distinguished sub-disciplines.  Among scientists,
common labels for these sub-disciplines are “physical oceanography”, “marine
biology”  or  “biological  oceanography”,33 “ocean  chemistry”,  and  “marine
geology”.  In  scientific  literature  and  among  oceanographers,  the  term
“oceanography” is often associated only with physical oceanography, especially
31 Although geology is not explicitly mentioned, geological research can be regarded 
as included in ‘subjects such as ocean boundaries and bottom topography’ 
(Sverdrup, Johnson, and Fleming 1942: 1).
32 <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/424573/oceanography> [accessed 19
November 2015].
33 Scientists seem to distinguish between marine biology and biological 
oceanography. A Google search for the “difference between marine biology and 
biological oceanography” leads to some online discussions and disciplinary 
descriptions claiming slight differences in thematic scope and tradition. Marine 
biology is viewed as the study of marine organisms themselves and as a sub-
discipline of biology, whereas biological oceanography is rather associated with the
study of marine organisms within the physical and chemical environment of the 
oceans. The latter, as the name suggests, is viewed closer related to 
oceanography than to biology. In contemporary science, the two fields are closely 
interrelated and often overlap. For the purpose of this thesis, a distinction is not 
necessary.
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since the rapid rise of physics and natural sciences on research and political
agendas during the early Cold War, as I discuss below. Thus, biology, chemistry,
geology,  and  other  disciplines  are  often  excluded  when  the  term  is  used.
Throughout  this  thesis,  I  use  the  term  “physical  oceanography”  when
specifically referring to research in ocean physics. Instead of “oceanography”
and “oceanographers”, I frequently use the term “ocean sciences” and “ocean
scientists” to include all traditions and research practices related to the oceans.
The four subdisciplines associated with physics, biology, chemistry, and geology
of  the  oceans  cover  what  can  be  regarded  as  basic  scientific  research  in
oceanography.34 More applied research fields are also sometimes regarded as
sub-disciplines of oceanography, for example operational oceanography, ocean
engineering, fisheries management,  or marine policy. The goals and interest
groups related to these disciplines differ substantially from more basic ocean
sciences. Operational oceanography, for instance, is concerned with systematic,
routine measurements of ocean parameters combined with rapid interpretation
and dissemination for the purpose of deriving forecasts, as well as ‘nowcasts’
and ‘hindcasts’. Among the outputs of operational oceanography are warnings
against floods, ice and storm damage, harmful algal blooms or contaminants,
and optimised shipping routes.35 
Most oceanographic sub-disciplines are large and autonomous enough to have
journals and learned societies explicitly committed to them, but there are also
“general” oceanographic societies, journals, as well as intergovernmental and
nongovernmental oceanographic organisations,36 which aim at covering multiple
34 I follow the International Council for Science’s (ICSU) definition of ‘basic scientific 
research’, given in 2004 as: ‘fundamental theoretical or experimental investigative 
research to advance knowledge without a specifically envisaged or immediately 
practical application’; <http://www.icsu.org/publications/icsu-position-
statements/value-scientific-research> [accessed 21 November 2015].
35 <http://eurogoos.eu/about-eurogoos/what-is-operational-oceanography/> 
[accessed 21 November 2015].
36 For example The Oceanography Society and its journal Oceanography, Elsevier’s 
Progress in Oceanography, UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Oceanographic 
Commission (IOC), or the nongovernmental Scientific Committee on Oceanic 
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or all different strands of oceanography. The aims and scope of these societies,
journals, and organisations often include more specified focus areas than just
the  traditional  four.  For  example,  the  open-access  journal  Ocean  Science,
published by the European Geosciences Union, covers ocean physics, ocean
chemistry, and biological oceanography, but also ‘air-sea interactions’, ‘ocean
models – physical,  chemical,  biological,  and biochemical’,  ‘coastal  and shelf
edge  processes’,  and  ‘paleooceanography’.37 This  list  is  indicative  of
oceanography’s  intersections  with  other  geosciences  such  as  meteorology,
biogeochemistry, or  palaeontology. In  these fields,  oceanographic  processes
are  highly  relevant  and  many  of  their  studies  may  also  be  regarded  as
oceanographic.  
In  my  personal  experience  as  a  trained  physical  oceanographer  and  when
visiting and speaking with  ocean scientists  during research for  this  thesis,  I
found that oceanography is relatively open and receptive for scientists trained in
other disciplines. Today, in light of the growing variety of teaching programmes,
many universities offer stand-alone courses and degrees in oceanography or
one  of  its  sub-disciplines.  However,  many  senior  oceanographers  were
educated in other disciplines such as biology, zoology, physics, meteorology, or
mathematics and became engaged in studying oceanic processes in the course
of their careers.
In summary, rather than finding a straight to the point and readily adoptable
definition of oceanography, the impression of a highly diverse and dispersed
discipline  emerges that  is  difficult  to  demarcate.  Given the  diversity  of  sub-
disciplines, a wide range of methodological and educational traditions among
ocean scientists is not a surprise. Consequently, it seems difficult to associate
oceanography with a particular label to indicate a preferred methodological or
practical approach such as “laboratory”, “experimental”, “field science”, or the
like. The Ocean Science journal — a title that resonates with my choice of the
Research (SCOR).
37 <http://www.ocean-science.net/about/aims_and_scope.html> [accessed 19 
November 2015]. 
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term “ocean sciences” — is dedicated to reviewing and publishing ‘papers on all
aspects of ocean science: experimental, theoretical, and laboratory’.38
3.3 Scholarly views of oceanographic practices
Scholarship  in  the  philosophy  of  science  is  almost  devoid  of  research  that
focuses explicitly on the practices of ocean scientists. Ocean sciences have not
drawn  interest  from  philosophers  of  scientific  practice  in  magnitudes
comparable to physics or the life sciences including genetics, microbiology, and
medical research. However, given the diverse traditions and practices that can
be counted as ocean science, some philosophical research relate either to the
practices of ocean scientists or their objects of study. For example, in relation to
physics,  philosophers  have  become  increasingly  interested  in  numerical
modelling practices and prediction in climate science (Parker 2011, Steele and
Werndl 2009), which intersect with practices of modelling oceanic currents and
biogeochemical cycles. With respect to biology, some scholarship on research
of microbial life (O’Malley and Dupré 2007, Schrader, 2017) addresses scientific
knowledge  of  bacteria,  microscopic  organisms,  or  viruses  that  inhabit  the
oceans;  however,  the  scientific  practices  by  which  knowledge  of  these
organisms is  produced is  usually  not  the primary  concern  of  these authors.
Camprubí’s (2018) very recent analysis of observation practices related to deep
ocean currents integrates some philosophical reflection on the epistemological
status  of  diagrams  and  drawings  into  a  historical  reconstruction  of
oceanographic practices. Such scholarship might indicate that the interest in
philosophical analysis of ocean sciences is growing.
In  sociology, anthropology, and  especially  history  of  science,  scholars  have
more  explicitly  focused  on  concrete  practices  in  ocean  science  and  on
challenges  of  observing  a  natural  system as  large  and  inaccessible  as  the
oceans.  A growing  field  of  interest  are  the  use  and  implications  of  earth
observing satellites for global observation of the ocean surface (Lehman 2017,
Benson  2012).  Haraway  (2008:  249–63)  discusses  the  relation  between
38 <http://www.ocean-science.net/about/aims_and_scope.html> [accessed 19 
November 2015].
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humans and animals in scenarios where researchers have equipped sea turtles
and humpback whales with cameras. As an anthropologist, Helmreich (2009)
has  accompanied  microbiologists  who  sample  the  oceans  with  remotely
operated vehicles (ROV) from ships to learn about the climate from microbial
DNA, blue-green algae with a potential  use in pharmaceutical biotechnology,
the ecologies at hydrothermal vents, or the origins of life. 
For  the  purpose  of  this  chapter,  the  ‘modest  existing  tradition’  in  historical
studies of oceanography (Rozwadowski 2014: 335) is most useful. Two specific
areas that have drawn attention of historians are, according to Rozwadowski
(2014:  336),  the  role  of  science  in  fisheries  and  the  development  of
oceanography  following  World  War  II,  when  ocean  science  was  heavily
influenced by geopolitical agendas and received substantial political and military
support.  Oreskes  (2014)  even  claims  that  the  oceans  have  been  generally
neglected by historians for a long time. If historians ever paid attention to the
oceans, ‘they saw them as a literal void, devoid of the stuff of which history is
composed:  culture,  politics,  art,  and  sociability’  (Oreskes  2014:  379).  One
reason  for  the  historians’  neglect  of  the  oceans  is  the  fact  that  scientific
practices  related to  the  oceans did  not  exist  for  a  very long time.  Until  the
beginning of the twentieth century, the oceans were mostly not accessible for
scientists  and  only  coastal  phenomena  were  within  reach  to  be  studied
(Oreskes 2014: 381).39 Oceanography became institutionalised throughout the
twentieth century, but, in accord with the observation of the previous section,
oceanography ‘remained and remains fragmented as a discipline’, so that it has
rarely been viewed and studied as a stand-alone, coherent discipline (Oreskes
2014: 382). As Oreskes (2014: 382) clarifies, ‘oceanography as a discipline still,
in some ways, does not quite exist’.
Yet, some historians have engaged in tracing how the oceans or specific parts
of the oceans have become scientific objects and how research practices of the
oceans have developed over time. A collection of essays edited by Benson and
Rozwadowski  (2007)  closely  studies  oceanographic  expeditions  into  the
39 A notable exception to the disinterest of historians in ocean science is Deacon’s 
(1971) monograph on research and knowledge of the seas and oceans from 
ancient philosophy until the late nineteenth century.
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extreme  conditions  of  the  Arctic  and  Antarctic  during  the  nineteenth  and
twentieth  century. Covering  an even  broader  scope,  Mills’  (2009)  The Fluid
Envelope of Our Planet: How the Study of Ocean Currents Became a Science
has emerged as a standard regarding the research of ocean currents from the
middle of the nineteenth century until the 1960s, when a complete theoretical
model  of  the  dynamic  planetary  ocean  circulation  first  emerged.  Covering
roughly  the  same  time  period,  Mills  (2012)  has  also  reconstructed  how
biological  oceanography developed as an independent branch of turn-of-the-
century  ecological  science  at  German,  Scandinavian,  British,  and  North
American research institutions. Mills’ narrative begins with a desire to quantify
the biological production of the seas and ends with a convergence of biology,
chemistry, physics, and mathematics in late 1960s’ numerical plankton models.
The early Cold War period of oceanography and its political dimension are well
documented by Hamblin’s (2005), who focuses in particular on the question of
how international cooperation became one of the most crucial components of
oceanography  as  a  ‘Cold  War  science’  while  being  closely  tied  to  national
governments and military patronage (Hamblin 2005: xviii). With regard to the
definition  and  scope  of  oceanography,  Hamblin  (2005:  xviii)  shows  that
oceanographers  strategically  embraced  broad  disciplinary  understandings  of
oceanography  and  expanded  its  definition  by  including  numerous  other
scientific  fields in  order  to  seek support  for  their  work.  Hamblin  (2014)  also
explores  disciplinary  dynamics  within  oceanography  and  distinguishes
methodological  trends among oceanographers at the middle of the twentieth
century, not along traditional disciplinary boundaries such as biology, physics, or
chemistry  but  along  a  divide  between  “descriptive”  and  “dynamic”
oceanography. This distinction, adopted from Mills (2009), considers different
scientific values among oceanographers, which shape how researchers see the
oceans and design their enquiries. Descriptive oceanography was based in the
tradition of climatology, included long-term data collection, and centred on the
formulation  of  causal  relationships  to  explain  phenomena.  By  contrast,  the
dynamic  values  are  grounded  in  mathematical  and  statistical  methods,
hydrodynamics, and thermodynamics, and saw the oceans as an integral part of
a large-scale climate system.
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Writing  more  from  a  military-historical  perspective,  Weir  (2001)  covers  the
relationship between US Navy and ocean scientists between World War I and
the 1960s. Weir claims that the mutually beneficial connections between military
and science relied on technological and political developments as much as on
interpersonal networks between military officials and oceanographers, many of
whom had served in  the US Navy before seeking professions as scientists.
Rainger  (2000:  370)  shows  how  physical  oceanographers  ‘embedded’  their
interests into military objectives; the scientists ‘knowingly and willingly’ carried
out military work for the Navy, which was the dominant party in the relationship
(Rainger 2000: 369–70). Note that these relations occurred mainly between the
Navy and physical oceanographers, as the oceans’ physical properties were the
most crucial for military operations.
Much of the historiographic writing on the Cold War era of oceanography is US-
centred due to the leading role of American oceanographic institutions and the
country’s superior technological capabilities of the time. Historians who focused
on scientists’ engagement with the oceans during the nineteenth century have
often considered European activities and the role of expanding empires as well.
According to Reidy and Rozwadowski  (2014),  the oceans became culturally,
economically, and politically relevant during the nineteenth century, leading to
sustained attention of scientists on the open oceans for the first time in history.
The cultural and economic role that the oceans assumed during the nineteenth
century, for example in literature, trade, or telegraph communications, and the
resulting efforts of Anglo-American science to measure and map the oceans’
depth, is documented by Rozwadowski  (2005).  Politically, nineteenth century
empires  constructed  the  oceans  as  a  space  open  to  anybody  capable  of
mastering  it.  This  required  reliable  knowledge  of  the  oceans  and  led  to  a
‘mutually sustaining’ relation between the oceans, science, and empires before
oceanography  as  a  science  was  institutionalised  (Reidy  and  Rozwadowski
2014: 338). 
Rozwadowski (1996) also discussed that early practitioners of ocean science in
the nineteenth century shared and identified with experiences of going to sea
more than they shared a body of specialised knowledge or scientific practices.
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Maritime  culture  and  the  production  of  knowledge  of  the  oceans  clearly
overlapped and established a ‘scientific maritime culture [that] became the basis
for the field practices of the new discipline’ (Rozwadowski  1996: 428). Early
oceanographers contributed to a heroic, adventurous, and romanticised image
of  ocean  science  by  publishing  not  only  scientific  works  but  also  personal
accounts of seagoing experiences for popular audiences (Rozwadowski 1996:
429).  The image of  seafaring  scientists  who ‘defined seagoing as  a  central
element of their science’ prevailed far into the twentieth century (Rozwadowski
1996:  428).  Consideration of  the cultural  and social  setting is  crucial  for  an
adequate understanding of oceanography’s history, Rozwadowski argues.
An  adjacent,  but  highly  relevant,  thread  of  historical  literature  focuses  on
disciplines  with  similarities and intersections with  ocean sciences.  Similar  to
oceanography, research on atmospheric weather and regional or global climate
deals with highly complex phenomena of the earth, which are governed by fluid
motions.  These  include  non-linear  behaviour  and  physical,  chemical,  and
biological  feedback loops.  The phenomena are  often  difficult  to  access and
observe, extend from local to planetary spatial scales, and require consistent
recording over long durations. Edwards’ (2010) historical work on data practices
in climatology and meteorology covers practices from the nineteenth century
until  today,  including  the  introduction  of  digital  computing  technologies,
numerical  modelling,  and  earth  observing  satellites.  The  history  of
environmental observation systems has also been studied by Aronova, Baker,
and Oreskes (2010), focusing on “big science” in the early cold war, by Conway
(2006),  discussing an “information overload” in environmental  sciences since
the introduction of earth-observing satellites, and by Benson (2012) who deals
with the diversification and commercialisation of satellite-based data collection
during  the  1980s.  Relating  rather  to  biological  practices,  Devictor  and
Bensaude-Vincent (2016) explore the “datafication” and quantification of global
biodiversity in the 1980s. Benson (2016) describes data practices in movement
ecology, which aim at recording the movement trajectories of various animals
for up to several decades.
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In summary, scholars of sociology, anthropology, and history of science have
not  entirely  neglected  ocean  sciences  and  there  appears  to  be  a  growing
scholarly  interest  in  ocean  sciences.  However,  philosophers  of  science  in
particular  have  yet  to  explore  a  wide  range  of  oceanographic  practices
empirically. My thesis is only one step towards mapping and making sense of
the  variety  of  oceanographic  practices  with  tools  of  analytic  philosophy  of
science. 
3.4 Data practices in ocean sciences
In several oceanography textbooks, the expedition of the Challenger in 1872–76
is considered to mark the beginning of oceanography (Sverdrup, Johnson, and
Fleming  1942:  6;  Lalli  and  Parsons  1997:  7–10).  Reidy  and  Rozwadowski
(2014:  348),  too,  point  out  that  the  Challenger  expedition  established  ‘the
modern  science  of  oceanography  as  the  preferred  way  to  interpret ocean
space’.  Organised by The Royal  Society, the British Navy vessel  Challenger
was  transformed  into  a  dedicated  research  vessel  with  laboratories  and
workrooms  in  order  to  survey  the  open  oceans.  The  Challenger
circumnavigated  the  earth  and  crossed  nearly  all  ocean  basins  within  four
years.  Coinciding  with  the  four  traditional  oceanographic  sub-disciplines
discussed  above,  the  expedition  already  ‘attempted  to  integrate  biology,
chemistry, geology, and physical phenomena’ (Lalli and Parsons 1997: 9). The
voyage spawned empirical material and data of ocean phenomena which took
fifty volumes and nineteen years to get fully analysed and published. Scientists
of  the  Challenger expedition  ‘established  systematic  data  collection  using
standardized  methods’  (Lalli  and  Parsons  1997:  9).  It  seems  that  the  first
instance  of  research  to  be  recognised  by  scientists  and  historians  as
“oceanographic” was primarily driven by the intention to create scientific data
and to establish data practices. 
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3.4.1 Large-scale data practices and internationalism
Almost seven decades after the Challenger expedition, Sverdrup, Johnson, and
Fleming (1942: 6) still emphasise that ‘expeditions are needed for filling in gaps
and for carrying out systematic exploration of regions from which only scattered
data  are  available’.  At  the  middle  of  the  twentieth  century,  large-scale
oceanography sought  to  fill  these  gaps.  The  International  Geophysical  Year
1957–58 (IGY) focused on worldwide data collection across several geophysical
disciplines, including a programme in oceanography. Funded through national
governments and carried out by numerous scientific institutions, sixty thousand
scientists  and  amateurs  from  more  than  67  nations  participated  in  data
collection for the IGY (Aronova, Baker, and Oreskes 2010: 194). The IGY has
drawn interest  from historians partly because scientists  and institutions from
both  Western  countries  and  the  Soviet  bloc  countries  participated.  The
programme was hierarchically structured into different disciplines, into national
IGY committees and programmes, and into thousands of individual measuring
stations. Historians argue that the IGY programme can be regarded as a ‘data-
driven mode of research’ and that it lacked theoretical drivers shared between
different organising committees and programmes (Aronova, Baker, and Oreskes
2010: 185). 
The  oceanographic  programme  of  the  IGY  consisted  of  two  main  parts:
scientific  cruises with  research vessels and a global  network of coastal  tide
gauges to measure the sea level on predetermined dates, the IGY’s so-called
‘World  Days’.  Although  the  participating  nations  planned  and  conducted
oceanographic expeditions mostly on their own, and despite Cold War tensions
overshadowing the entire programme, the IGY gave oceanographers a chance
to connect with ocean scientists from other countries (Hamblin 2005: 59–98).
The IGY further coincided with an era that saw oceanography rapidly gaining
geopolitical relevance and funding by the military. The strategic importance of
submarines during World War II and the early Cold War resulted in a financial
boost  for  physical  oceanography,  in  particular  for  research  regarding  the
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oceans’  density  and  acoustic  properties,  and  for  research  on  the  oceans’
bathymetry (Hamblin 2005).40
A novelty introduced in the course of the IGY were the so-called World Data
Centres  (WDC).  These  centres  were  responsible  for  collecting  and  openly
disseminating data. The designers of the IGY felt from the beginning that full
and  open  access  should  be  granted  to  all  participants.  Three  WDCs  were
established: one in the United States, one in the Soviet Union, and one data
centre spread across several Western European countries and Japan (Korsmo
2010). Like the IGY itself, the WDCs exemplify an aspiration for international
cooperation and openness in science which was characteristic for geosciences
in the 1950s and 1960s. Oceanography certainly featured prominently in these
aspirations.  As Aronova,  Baker, and Oreskes (2010) point  out,  however, the
American  WDC  for  oceanographic  data,  operated  by  Texas  A&M  College,
merged in 1961 into the United States’ National Oceanographic Data Centre
(NODC). As many other WDCs that originated from the IGY, the oceanographic
WDC subsequently lost its international trait and became a national institution.
The  characteristic  as  a  fundamentally  international  discipline,  however,
prevailed in the case of oceanography, as Hamblin (2005: xix) points out:
The lack of national borders at sea, the indiscriminately hostile 
environmental conditions, and the global scope of observations have 
long lent oceanography the reputation of being an inherently 
international endeavor. 
The need of international cooperation due to the oceans’ nature has been an
ongoing theme throughout the history of ocean sciences. On the occasion of the
first International Oceanographic Congress in 1959, the eminent oceanographer
Roger Revelle writes that ‘the marine sciences are peculiarly international’ and it
is only appropriate that the congress was held at the Headquarters of the United
Nations in New York (Revelle 1961: iii). The oceans, according to Revelle (1961:
iii), are ‘the property of no man and no nation but the heritage of every man and
every nation’. 
40 Bathymetry is the study of the ocean floors, or the equivalent to topography in the 
terrestrial sphere.
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Rozwadowski (2004: 128) calls ‘the conviction shared by scientists that fish and
water  masses  could  be  studied  effectively  only  by  means  of  international
collaboration’  an  ‘environmental  necessity’.  Indeed,  most  of  the  large-scale
oceanographic programmes considered successful since the 1950s have been
internationally  coordinated  efforts.  According  to  Rozwadowski  (2004),  the
oceanographic community is among the most successful scientific communities
in realising international cooperation. Collaborations have grown since around
1900,  and  increasingly  since  1945,  into  an  ‘integral  part  of  ocean  science’
(Rozwadowski 2004: 128). Besides environmental necessity, however, national
interests  and the  political  and intellectual  context  must  not  be neglected as
motivating  factors  whenever  governments  decide  to  fund  and  encourage
international oceanography projects (Rozwadowski 2004). The IGY is a prime
example of the way international collaborations in geosciences were subject to
political  agendas  (Hamblin  2005:  59–98).  At  the  same  time,  international
cooperation  served  as  a  common  denominator  for  North  American  and
European oceanographers for launching a wide range of projects and activities
which  ‘might  have  appeared  incongruous  or  even  conflicting’  in  times  of
geopolitical  tension (Hamblin 2005: xxiii).  Since the Cold War, oceanography
has become less relevant to national security and geopolitics; military financing
of oceanographic research only grew until the early 1970s (Conway 2006: 129),
when space travel, science from space, and environmental topics became more
relevant  than the  oceans as  a  strategic  battlefield.  However, with  regard  to
climate  change,  energy  resources,  fisheries,  global  shipping,  and  tourism,
oceanographic research has retained strong political interest until today and has
also gained considerable economic relevance. 
For  ocean scientists  worldwide,  the IGY was a  significant  achievement  with
regard  to  collecting  data  of  oceanic  phenomena.  In  terms  of  methodology,
however,  the  oceanographic  programme  can  be  regarded  as  relatively
unsystematic.  The  subsequent  decades  of  ocean  sciences  were  to  a  great
extent coined by efforts to design and develop data practices into connected
observation systems and to integrate new technologies. 
73
Until  the  1970s,  technological  constraints  restricted  the  production  of
oceanographic data mostly to ‘individual surveys, single time series, or spatial
sampling  with  very  limited  duration’  (Davis  2006:  50).  The 1973 Mid-Ocean
Dynamics Experiment (MODE) was therefore ‘revolutionary’ for oceanography,
as it was ‘the first large-scale observing effort that combined diverse observing
tools  into  a  designed  system’  (Davis  2006:  50–51).  MODE was  specifically
conceived  to  investigate  mid-ocean  phenomena  in  an  area  south-west  of
Bermuda  over  a  period  of  five  months.  The  idea  was  to  bring  enough
instrumentation into  a relatively  small  area of the open ocean to be able to
create maps of current velocity and water density. These data were intended to
cover a time period long enough for an assessment of the dynamical balances
controlling the circulation (Bretherton 2006: 20). MODE exemplifies that by the
1970s, long, coast-to-coast hydrographic surveys typical for the IGY and earlier
ocean  science  had  become  less  popular  among  scientists.  This  was  partly
caused  by  their  limited,  mostly  qualitative  usability,  which  contrasted  with
MODE’s closer  studies  of  processes by means of  new technology. Eminent
oceanographer Carl Wunsch claims that MODE was one of the more “dynamic”
and ‘more scientific-seeming’ process studies (Wunsch 2006: 187–88). 
With  regard  to  new ways  of  creating  data,  MODE included  an  array  of  26
subsurface  moored  current  meters  and  temperature-pressure  recorders.  A
moored measuring platform consists of an anchor, a stack of railroad wheels is
commonly  used,  and  a  steel  wire  with  various  measurement  instruments
attached to it, with buoyancy bodies at the top to keep the wire in an upright
position.  Moorings  often  remain  deployed  for  several  years  until  they  are
recollected. The ability to store data internally until a mooring is picked up was
relatively new when MODE was planned.41 MODE further featured a grid of 77
hydrographic stations that  were each repeated on twelve individual  surveys,
acoustic  and  electromagnetic  profilers,42 and  twenty  neutrally  buoyant  floats
41 Today’s moorings usually transmit data in real-time from surface and sub-surface 
buoys via satellite. Moorings with surface buoys are further capable of recording 
meteorological data and data of air-sea interaction phenomena (Weller et al. 
2000).
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drifting  at  1,500  metres  depth  that  were  tracked  by  acoustic  signals  (Davis
2006: 50–51, MODE Group 1978). 
Apart  from a small  number of German and British scientists and institutions,
MODE, was an experiment dominated by American scientists, institutions, and
funding bodies.  MODE took place within  the International  Decade of  Ocean
Exploration (IDOE), but as Hamblin (2005: 264) shows, the IDOE and other
similar projects ‘sprang forth from the American marine affairs bureaucracy, not
from American scientists, and certainly not from the international community’. 
3.4.2 New technologies against data scarcity
Numerical modelling of the earth’s climate based on mathematical theories was
envisioned  long  before  any  existing  technology  was  able  to  perform  the
complex  mathematical  operations.  Most  notable  are  Richardson’s  (1922)
attempts  at  numerical  weather  forecasting  in  the  1910s  and  1920s.  The
American  Institute  of  Advanced  Study  (IAS)  conducted  pioneering  work  in
numerical  weather  forecasting  during  World  War  II.  After  the  war,  only  few
research  institutions  were  equipped  with  expensive  computers  capable  of
numerical  modelling  of  weather,  climate,  and  oceans;  renowned  American
oceanographic laboratories were not among them. Rather, institutions with a
focus on climate studies were leading in the development of ocean models, for
example the US Weather Bureau General Circulation Laboratory in Princeton,
NJ, or the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in Boulder, CO.
At the Weather Bureau, numerical ocean modelling began in the early 1960s
with two-dimensional models of an ocean basin and simulations of the wind-
42 Oceanographers speak of a “profile” when referring to one-dimensional data of a 
parameter measured in vertical intervals at one geographical location. A 
temperature profile, for example, is a series of temperature values measured 
throughout the  “water column”, that is between the ocean’s surface and a specific 
depth or the ocean floor at one distinct location. Profilers are instruments, which 
record individual profiles of the water column; a series of profiles located along a 
straight horizontal line is commonly termed a “section” and results in two-
dimensional arrays of measured values. 
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driven oceanic  circulation;  three-dimensional  models  appeared in  1969.  The
growing  scope  and  complexity  of  numerical  ocean  models  from  the  1960s
onwards required amounts of data which were not available at the time. The
models needed data from regions, which had never been sampled and spatial
resolutions higher than those of the data available. 
Numerical models were the primary research tool for dynamic oceanographers
who sought to address practical problems of the oceans (Hamblin 2014: 353).
Dynamic approaches gained popularity among oceanographers in the second
half  of  the twentieth century and often included a rather dismissive view on
descriptive  oceanography  as  mere  data  collecting  and  not  real  science
(Hamblin  2014:  360–62).  Ironically, however, the dynamic approach required
the  collection  of  more  and  more  data  and  made  oceanography  for  several
decades ‘more descriptive than ever, flooding it with data, most of which sat
unused’ (Hamblin 2014: 360). 
Early global ocean models were often criticised for being unverifiable due to the
lack of comparable data and for insufficient knowledge to set the models’ initial
conditions,  boundary  conditions,  and  forcing  parameters  (Bryan  2006).  It
appears that the dynamic and descriptive approaches did not come together to
resolve this problem, probably because the development of models outpaced
the  production  of  data  and  always  required  higher  resolutions  and  greater
coverage than those achieved by descriptive oceanographers. Regarding the
scarcity of oceanographic data, Wunsch recounts: 
Anyone who understood models realized [by 1979] that the more 
sophisticated the model, the more demanding the requirements on 
the observations. It was obvious that numerical models of the ocean 
were about to outstrip any observational capability for testing them. 
There was a grave danger that the field would produce sophisticated,
interesting models, without any ability to calibrate them. (Wunsch 
2006: 187)
Today, numerical modelling is an integral part of oceanography and models with
a wide range of characteristics are being used. The scales of models range
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from exemplary process studies, for example vertical  diffusion on a scale of
centimetres  or  sea  ice  formation,  to  three-dimensional  simulations  of  ocean
basins and entire planets. Oceanographic models may or may not be coupled to
models of the atmosphere, the biosphere, or the cryosphere, and they may or
may not include certain chemical, biological, or geological processes. Needless
to say that numerical models produce large amounts of data for scientists to
analyse. However, as was the case with the earliest ocean models in the 1960s,
today’s numerical models still require new data and tend to require more data
the more complex they become.
Alongside electronic computers, earth-observing satellites emerged and rapidly
progressed as a technology in the course of the Cold War and had a substantial
impact  on  earth  sciences.  Instruments  mounted  on  satellites  led  to  the
production of a new type of data, known as “remote sensing” data. Until  the
advent of satellites, almost all oceanographic data were “in-situ”, meaning that a
measuring  instrument’s  sensor  has  been  in  direct  physical  contact  with  the
object or process that is measured, for example when a resistance thermometer
is  lowered  directly  into  sea  water.  By  contrast,  “remote  sensing”  data  are
produced  when  the  sensor  measures  a  parameter  from  a  distance  and
indirectly.
Using radiometry technology, sensors mounted on satellites are able to receive
and measure radiation emitted or reflected by the earth’s and oceans’ surfaces.
NASA’s Seasat 1, launched in 1978, was the first satellite designed for remote
sensing  of  the  world’s  oceans  to  use  synthetic  aperture  radar  (SAR)  which
generates higher  resolutions  than normal  radar  technology by  simulating an
extremely large antenna aperture along the satellite’s flight path. Seasat 1 was
designed to produce data related to sea-surface wind, sea surface temperature
(SST),  wave  height,  internal  waves,  atmospheric  water  content,  sea  ice
features, and ocean topography.43 The mission demonstrated the feasibility of
43 Ocean topography or sea surface height (SSH) is the height of the sea surface 
level relative to the earth’s geoid, which is the shape that the oceans’ surface 
would take only from gravitational and rotational forces and in absence of winds 
and tides. Differences between SSH and the geoid indicate variations in density of 
the underlying sea water.
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oceanographic remote sensing despite transmitting only 42 hours of real-time
data due to a technical failure.44 SST is one of the most important parameters
measured from space. The ocean water’s temperature is relevant for physical,
chemical,  and  biological  phenomena,  not  just  in  oceanographic  but  also  in
meteorological and climatological contexts (Thomson and Emery 2014: 27–35).
Two general  advantages of remote sensing data are the global  coverage of
ocean surfaces, which will never be matched by in-situ measurements, and in
many  cases,  near  real-time  access  to  data  due  to  highly  automated  data
processing.
However, remote sensing data require complex corrections and calibration with
in-situ data, due to the effects of various phenomena such as clouds, winds, or
coastlines. Therefore, much effort and a variety of theoretical assumptions are
needed  to  produce  usable  remote  sensing  data  before  any  data  can  be
analysed. A major drawback of satellite remote sensing data compared to in-situ
measurements from ships is that only phenomena on the ocean’s surface are
visible, such as the surface temperature, salinity, height, roughness, and water
colour. Despite these characteristics, oceanographic remote sensing data have
become invaluable for applied and basic oceanographic purposes.
As Conway  (2006)  shows,  satellite  technology  promised to  provide  strongly
desired spatial data on a global scale, but data volumes were created which
most traditional oceanographic institutions could not handle by themselves. As a
response to this overload of information, NASA created its own oceanographic
data centre for the purpose of validating and distributing data to users in the
scientific community. This marks a notable separation between data producers
and  data  users,  a  division  of  labour  which  is  a  key  characteristic  of  data-
intensive  sciences  and  which  quickly  became a  ‘new normative  practice’  in
oceanography (Conway 2006: 150).
At least partly in response to the inability to calibrate early numerical models
and  satellite  observations  with  in-situ  data,  planning  for  an  international
measuring  programme,  the  World  Ocean  Circulation  Experiment  (WOCE),
began in the late 1970s. The observational phase of WOCE, however, started
44 <http://science.nasa.gov/missions/seasat-1/> [accessed 10 December 2015].
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only in 1990 and ended in 1998.45 One of the main goals of WOCE was to
survey the global  ocean without  spatial  restrictions in  a relatively  short  time
span in order to create a snapshot of the state of the oceans that leaves no
major gaps (WOCE International Project Office 2003: 6). Wunsch (2006: 182),
who chaired WOCE’s International Steering Group, described the programme
retrospectively as the ‘centerpiece’ of oceanographic research during the 1990s.
The core of the international programme, in which around thirty countries were
involved,  was a coordinated ship-based hydrographic measuring programme
spanning the entire globe and producing a global oceanographic dataset.46 31
countries  expressed  their  intention  to  commit  resources  and  contribute  to
WOCE in 1988. 22 countries had been involved by the end of the programme’s
field phase, with more than fifty percent of the contributions coming from the
United States (Thompson, Crease, and Gould 2001: 37).
Until WOCE, the primary mechanism to archive and share data was still through
the World Data Centres first implemented in the 1950s as part of the IGY. For
WOCE, a new system with seven Data Assembly Centres (DACs) supervised
by scientists at research institutions was implemented. The DACs implemented
world wide web communication and links to the datasets from as early as 1994
onwards.  WOCE  achieved  ‘unprecedented  cooperation  of  scientists  in
submitting  the  data’  and  led  to  the  principle  of  data  sharing  being  widely
accepted  in  the  oceanographic  community (Thompson,  Crease,  and  Gould
2001: 39–41). 
45 WOCE was one of three major programmes of the World Climate Research 
Programme (WCRP) between 1980 and 2005. WRCP was established in 1980 
sponsored by ICSU and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). The IOC 
has been a sponsor of WCRP since 1993; <http://www.wcrp-climate.org/about-
history> [accessed 7 December 2015].
46 All of the cruises measured conductivity to calculate salinity, temperature, and 
depth (CTD) by lowering CTD sensors into the water at predetermined stations in 
intervals of not more than fifty kilometres. Additionally, most research vessels 
produced water samples for tracer analysis, meteorological data, bathymetric data,
and current profiles (WOCE International Project Office 2003: 7).
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As Wunsch (2006) notes, oceanography was different after WOCE than it had
been before. Regarding oceanographic data, there were no more completely
blank areas on the map. Even though WOCE could not take measurements
everywhere, oceans were at least covered to an extent that allowed reasonable
estimations  of  remaining  unknowns.  WOCE  is  until  today  the  largest
internationally  coordinated programme in  oceanography ever  conducted and
provided the scientific community with a quantitative snapshot to be used as a
baseline for decades to come. Further, the focus of oceanography shifted during
WOCE and towards its expiration. The main challenge was no longer to gain
any data at all from previously unknown regions. In light of growing concerns
about  climate  change,  the  new  challenge  became  the  implementation  of
sustainable,  long-term  monitoring  networks  that  could  record  changes  over
time. A central research problem in relation to climate change is to find out how
much of the variation in physical, biological, and chemical characteristics of the
oceans is due to natural oscillations and developmental cycles and how much is
caused  by  anthropogenic  influences.  To disentangle  patterns  and  events  in
oceanographic  data  and  distinguish  long-term  responses  to  climate  change
from  local,  high-frequency  noise  and  anomalies  continuous,  long-term
monitoring of the oceans is essential (Hawkins et al. 2013, Sukhotin and Berger
2013).  The  success  of  the  global  WOCE  experiment  thus  also  shifted  the
interest  of  oceanographers  back  to  regional  scales  and  local  variations  of
processes relative to the global picture (Wunsch 2006). To implement consistent
long-term monitoring, the Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS), which is
the  oceanographic  component  of  the  multi-national  Global  Earth  Observing
System  of  Systems  (GEOSS),47 has  been  planned  and  implemented  since
1991. GOOS is designed to monitor the global oceans permanently for basic
scientific  and  applied  purposes  using  a  variety  of  platforms,  such  as
autonomous floats, buoys, embarked systems on commercial ships, research
vessels, launched probes, and moorings.48
47 GEOSS is created by the Group on Earth Observations (GEO), a partnership of 
more than one hundred governments and participating organisations based in 
Geneva, Switzerland; <https://www.earthobservations.org/geo_community.php> 
[accessed 19 June 2018].
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Similar  to  previous large observational  programmes,  WOCE introduced new
technologies,  most  notably  an  array  of  autonomous  measuring  instruments
named Argo floats.  Argo floats  produce hydrographic profiles in  the ocean’s
upper  2,000  metres  by  changing  their  buoyancy  automatically  and  moving
vertically  up  and  down  the  water  column.  Upon  reaching  the  surface,  the
recorded  data  are  transmitted  via  satellites  into  a  database.  A  float  then
descends to its  so-called “parking depth”,  usually around 1,000 metres,  and
drifts with the ocean currents for ten days before starting another measuring
cycle (Argo Science Team 2001). The International Argo Project is responsible
for coordinating the worldwide deployment of Argo floats, which began in 2000.
Today, thirty countries participate in the Argo project;  their  contributions vary
between sponsorship of only one float and up to fifty percent of the entire array,
which  is  the  United  States’  contribution.  The  funding  is  decentralised  and
distributed over more than fifty research and operational agencies which finance
national Argo programmes by a variety of funding mechanisms.49
Initially only aiming at a number of 3,000 Argo floats in constant operation, the
number of floats as of June 2018 is almost 4,000 with a deployment rate of
around 800 floats per year. The permanently drifting Argo floats amount to a
dynamic  array  of  measuring  instruments  covering  nearly  all  areas  of  the
oceans. This includes many locations that are hardly accessible with any other
available and affordable oceanographic method, for example the high latitudes
in the southern hemisphere,  where the world’s most  powerful  ocean current
circles  Antarctica.  With  respect  to  spatial  coverage  and  quantity  of  in-situ
oceanographic  data,  the  Argo  project  is  unprecedented.  In  2012,  the  Argo
project celebrated its one millionth measured profile, which is roughly twice the
amount of profiles obtained by all research vessels during the twentieth century
worldwide  (Argo  Project  Office  2012).  While  all  research  vessels  worldwide
create around 5,000 hydrographic profiles every year, Argo produces more than
a  hundred  thousand,  without  any  bias  caused  by  seasonal  conditions  that
48 GOOS is sponsored by the IOC, WMO, ICSU, and the the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP); <http://www.goosocean.org> [accessed 12 July 
2018].
49 <http://www.argo.ucsd.edu/Organisation.html> [accessed 25 February 2016].
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restrict  the  use  of  ships.50 In  addition  to  the  core  hydrographic  parameters
temperature,  salinity,  and  depth,  Argo  floats  are  increasingly  equipped  with
sensors  for  dissolved  oxygen,  particle  backscattering,  sea  water  turbidity,
chlorophyll a, nitrate, or pH level (Carval et al. 2014). These parameters extend
the  scope  of  Argo  data  from  mostly  physical  oceanography  to  biological
oceanography and ocean chemistry. Furthermore, the fully automated, real-time
quality control and data storage, all within 24 hours of measurement, make Argo
data  a  valuable  resource  not  just  for  basic  scientific,  but  also  for  applied,
operational purposes. 
A major advantage of Argo floats in comparison to ship-based data production is
that  it  reduces  the  costs  of  creating  in-situ  data  significantly.  Operating  a
research vessel on the open ocean can cost $20,000 per day with the salaries
of  researchers  not  included.  The  purchase  of  a  single  Argo  float,  which
produces  data  for  several  years  costs  approximately  $16,000.  This  makes
oceanographic science and data production much more affordable for smaller
organisations or countries without dedicated research vessels (Lehman 2017:
73–74).
Just  as  Argo  floats  with  new  sensors  have  become  increasingly  useful  for
chemical  and  biological  research,  other  technological  developments  have
broadened  the  scope  of  oceanographic  subdisciplines  and  blurred  the
boundaries  between them.  Sonar  technology, for  example,  originated during
World War II and has been employed for physical oceanography in combination
with drifting floats to measure ocean currents. But sonar technology became
also useful for mapping the bathymetry of ocean basins, for finding fish schools,
and detecting and tracking high concentrations of larger zooplankton (Lalli and
Parsons 1997: 13). 
Satellite  remote  sensing  also  produces  data  highly  relevant  for  biological
oceanography and marine biology, thanks to marine organisms’ sensitivity to
temperatures.  Additionally,  plankton  blooms  are  made  visible  via  remote
sensing  of  the  ocean  surface  colour.  Remote  sensing  provides  ‘an
unprecedented  global  time  series  of  satellite-derived  parameters  relevant  to
50 <http://www.argo.ucsd.edu/Novel_Argo.html> [accessed 25 February 2016].
82
algal bloom studies’ (Blondeau-Patissier et al. 2014: 139). NASA first launched
an ocean colour sensor into space aboard Nimbus-7 in 1978, which operated
until 1986. Following a ten-year data gap, several satellite missions since 1996
have  used  a  variety  of  ocean  colour  sensors  and  algorithms,  resulting  in
datasets which allow for the derivation of important ecological baselines (Wilson
2011, Blondeau-Patissier et al. 2014). Viewed from space, ocean colour is also
useful for physical oceanographers, as differences in ocean colour make ocean
fronts,51 horizontal currents, or rotational phenomena such as eddies detectable.
In light of these examples, it is not uncommon at all that one oceanographic
data product is re-used in several research contexts associated with different
sub-disciplines. 
3.4.3 Limitations and opportunities
Despite  earth-observing  satellites  and  other  highly  automated  observing
systems, biological oceanography in particular requires ocean scientists to go to
sea  in  order  to  take  water  and species  samples  or  to  measure  biologically
relevant  parameters  inside  the  oceans.  However, sampling  the  oceans from
ships comes with  ‘many constraints  on what  can be done,  where,  and how
often’  (Widdicombe and  Somerfield  2012:  1).  There  are  unknowns  such  as
weather  conditions  and  the  ships’  and  instruments’  functionality.  The
‘fundamental weakness’ of ship-based observations, however, is the high cost
that is involved in going to sea (Lauro et al. 2014: 1):
A modern ocean research vessel typically costs more than 
US$30,000 per day to operate—excluding the full cost of scientists, 
engineers, and the cost of the research itself. Even an aggressive 
expansion of oceanographic research budgets would not do much to 
improve the precision of our probabilistic models, let alone to quickly 
and more accurately locate missing objects in the huge, moving, 
three-dimensional seascape. (Lauro et al. 2012: 1)
51 Similar to a weather front, an ocean front is a relatively sharp boundary between 
two water masses characterised by different physical properties.
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As a result, the majority of the ocean floors have never been sampled and the
vast majority of marine biodiversity records are from waters not deeper than two
hundred  metres  (Widdicombe  and  Somerfield  2012:  1).  The  deep  pelagic
ocean, that is the open ocean and seas below two hundred metres, away from
the coasts, and above the seabed, ‘remains biodiversity’s big wet secret, as it is
hugely  under-represented  in  global  databases  of  marine  biological  records’
(Webb, Vanden Berghe, and O’Dor 2010: 1). Hydrothermal vent ecosystems of
the deep sea have only been discovered in 1977 by  Alvin, the first deep-sea
submersible capable of carrying passengers.52
By the year 2000, the lack of scientific knowledge about life in the open oceans
led to a decade of coordinated, ship-based exploration, named the Census of
Marine Life (CoML).53 Around 2,700 scientists from more than 80 countries and
associated  with  more  than  670  laboratories  around  the  world  formed  a
community  which  aimed to  create  the  first  systematic  delineation  of  marine
organisms on a global  scale.  The work was organised and implemented by
regional and national committees that coordinated more than 540 expeditions in
total  (Census  of  Marine  Life  2010:  35).  Some  conceptualised  CoML  as  a
‘biological WOCE’ (McGowan 1999: 33) which needed to produce a variety of
different data, covering a wide range of scales. A proposed list of biological,
chemical, and physical parameters to be measured during CoML illustrates the
lack of disciplinary boundaries within ocean sciences:
Micro organisms, phytoplankton and zooplankton, as well as 
temperature, salinity (for comparison to WOCE), nutrients, particulate
organic carbon (for fine scale biomass), acoustics (for coarse grain 
biomass), and optics. (McGowan 1999: 34)
52 In 1974, Alvin also contributed to confirming the theory of sea floor spreading 
along the mid-Atlantic ridge, a fundamental finding in marine geology 
<http://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/technology/subs/alvin/alvin.html> [accessed 8 
December 2015].
53 <http://www.coml.org/> [accessed 10 December 2015].
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An  important  component  of  CoML  was  the  implementation  of  the  Ocean
Biogeographic Information System (OBIS),54 an ‘online, user-friendly system for
absorbing, integrating, and accessing data about life in the oceans’, as no such
thing had existed until  then (Grassle 2000: 5). Furthermore, CoML led to an
unprecedented listing of all marine species ever described in the World Register
of  Marine  Species  (WoRMS).  Today,  WoRMS  features  more  than  220,000
described marine species.55 Yet, results of CoML suggest that around 750,000
species have yet to be described and that over a billion types of microbes live in
the oceans (Widdicombe and Somerfield  2012:  1).  Similar to the inability  to
sample the entire ocean spatially, it seems hardly possible that scientists will
ever be able to map the ocean’s biodiversity completely.
Since the early 1990s, DNA technology and related methods have brought new
data practices and also new types of data to the study of marine organisms. The
ways in which scientists study biodiversity have been transformed by methods
such as the polymerase chain reaction and associated biological data practices.
Around  1990,  biological  oceanographers  and  marine  biologists  began
sequencing genes  of  marine  organisms  which  were  collected  by  ROVs,
plankton  recorders,  or  other  sampling  devices,  in  order  to  build  genetic
ecosystem libraries and to track evolutionary changes. Data are also produced
from organisms kept for years in culture collections of natural history museums
or other institutions. Through gene sequencing and DNA databasing, marine
microbiology  has  experienced  ‘something  of  a  renaissance’,  according  to
Helmreich  (2009:  2).  DNA sequence  data  have  even  further  diversified  the
products  of  scientific  activity  that  can  be  regarded  as  oceanographic  data.
Helmreich (2009: 2) contends that marine microbiologists have developed their
own conception of the oceans as a microbial sea, an ocean that consists of
genes and microbes and is not merely a body of water filled with organisms.
Aside  from exceedingly  expensive  high-technology  and  large-scale  scientific
programmes which sometimes require  decades of planning,  oceanographers
have tackled data scarcity by exploiting infrastructures and actors that already
54 OBIS is a project of IOC; <www.iobis.org> [accessed 10 December 2015].
55 <http://www.marinespecies.org/> [accessed 10 December 2015].
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interact with the oceans on a regular basis. As I will discuss in the introduction
of chapter seven, ocean scientists have high hopes that citizen science projects
can complement today’s integrated observation systems and also reduce the
costs of continuous data production considerably. 
Commercial ship traffic is also involved in today’s efforts to produce more in-situ
data of the oceans. The volunteering ships are often referred to as “ships of
opportunity” by research organisations. In this thesis’ main case study, the CPR
Survey, ships of opportunity have routinely been towing sampling devices on
their regular shipping routes since the middle of the twentieth century. Several
oceanographic  research  organisations  are  collaborating  with  ships  of
opportunity as a part of their observation networks. These may be equipped
with  wired  probes  named expendable  bathythermographs  (XBT).  These  are
dropped into the water to record the temperature on their way down. An XBT
eventually tears off the wire transmitting the data back to the ship and sinks to
the  ocean  floor.  Another  regularly  used  technology  are  thermosalinographs
(TSG) which are mounted at the water intake of ships and measure sea surface
temperature and salinity.56 Implications of these types of collaborations in which
research  technology  is  handled  and  operated  by  a  ships’  crew  and  not  by
scientists are also discussed in chapter seven of this thesis. 
Some unique in-situ data are produced from sensors that are attached to living
animals.  Oceanographers  of  the  UK’s  National  Environmental  Research
Council’s  Sea Mammal  Research  Unit  at  the  University  of  St.  Andrews,  for
example, equip elephant seals with small and inexpensive CTD data loggers. In
addition to tracking the movement of the seals, these recorders create vertical
profiles  whenever  the  seal  dives  and use the  same satellite  system as the
autonomous Argo floats for positioning and sending data in near real-time to a
database.  Such  systems  could  be  complementary  to  existing  sampling
technologies, particularly close to coasts and in regions that are rarely visited by
humans (Boehme et al. 2009, Carse et al. 2015). 
56 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) ship of 
opportunity programme is part of GOOS and features both XBTs and TSGs; 
<http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/phod/soop/index.php> [accessed 13 June 2018]
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For ocean scientists, data production has gradually become more remote with
the  implementation  of  satellite  technologies,  automated  floats,  remotely
operated  vehicles,  moorings,  and  citizen  science  projects.  Lehman  (2017)
reflects  on  the  shift  from ships  to  robots  and the  implications  for  practising
ocean science. The increased remoteness of contemporary sensing networks
keeps many ocean scientists from experiencing embodied encounters with the
oceans. Their object of study seems to become an increasingly abstract field of
data from which scientists have been abstracted away, resulting in ‘the illusion
of  not  only  complete  knowledge  but  also  disembodied  objectivity’  (Lehman
2017:  58).  This  image is  also  reflected  in  the  microbiologists’  picture  of  an
ocean of genes and DNA sequences (Helmreich 2009). However, as Lehman
argues, all practices of producing knowledge are situated, even though remote
technologies might obscure the perspective of humans or machines. Moreover,
it is virtually impossible to encounter the oceans in an unmediated way: ‘The
ocean’s temperature and pressure extremes and lack of light and oxygen mean
that  humans  must  have  relationships  with  machines  to  make  sense  of  it’
(Lehman 2017: 74). The introduction of remote technologies emphasises ‘the
linked  materiality  of  the  ocean  and  the  technologies  necessary  to  sense  it’
(Lehman 2017: 74). Chapter four explores precisely this material link between
oceans and technologies.
Lehman (2017) also makes an important point with regard to those who practice
ocean science. New technologies have made oceanography a more inclusive
scientific  endeavour  since  data  are  accessible  to  any  researchers  almost
anywhere at any time. Traditional ship-based oceanography, Lehman (2017: 73)
points  out,  has  been  surrounded  by  ‘ideologies  of  heroism,  conquest  and
adventure’ and was conducted almost exclusively by white men. The various
new ways of sensing oceanic phenomena defied the romanticised dominance of
the seafaring ocean scientists that was established since the beginnings of the
discipline,  as  Rozwadowski  (1996)  has  described.  New  ocean  sensing
technologies  thereby contributed to  reconfiguring  not  only  relations  between
researchers  and  the  oceans  but  also  the  social  constellations  of  practising
ocean science.
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3.5 The Continuous Plankton Recorder Survey
This  thesis’  main  case  study  is  the  Continuous  Plankton  Recorder  (CPR)
Survey, a long-term programme for creating samples and scientific data that
relate to spatio-temporal plankton distributions in the world’s oceans. Until April
2018, the survey was run by the Sir Alister Hardy Foundation for Ocean Science
(SAHFOS) from Plymouth, UK. 
SAHFOS was an internationally funded charity and employed around 42 people
at the time of my empirical research. Slightly more than a quarter of these were
employed  as  plankton  analysts,  slightly  less  than  a  quarter  as  researchers.
Twenty  percent  were  employed  in  ‘operations’,  eighteen  percent  in
administration, six percent in instrumentation, and four percent in IT (SAHFOS
2016: 4–5). The CPR Survey is funded through grants and contract income from
three  primary  funding  organisations,  the  NERC,  the  UK  Department  of
Environment,  Food,  and Rural  Affairs  (Defra),  and the  US National  Science
Foundation (NSF). Additionally, several specific research activities are funded
by a range of research and academic organisations such as the British Antarctic
Survey, the  Royal  Society, the  European  Union,  the  European  Environment
Agency, the Institute of Marine Research Norway, the Greenland Institute, and
the  Canadian  Department  of  Fisheries  and  Oceans.  The  labs,  offices,  and
facilities of the CPR Survey are housed right above Plymouth Sound inside the
“Citadel  Hill  Laboratory”,57 which  has  a  long  history  in  marine  science.  The
Laboratory has been home to the MBA since its construction in 1887–88. The
MBA has shared the building with the National Marine Biological Library (NMBL)
and since 1993 with SAHFOS as well.58 
During the final months leading up to the completion of this thesis, SAHFOS
has merged with the MBA and from April  2018 onwards, the CPR Survey is
officially run by the MBA. The name “SAHFOS” has now largely disappeared
57 When referring to the “Citadel Hill Laboratory” throughout this thesis, I  use the 
term “Laboratory” capitalised. The actual laboratory of the CPR Survey where 
plankton samples are analysed is referred to as “laboratory” or “lab”, non-
capitalised.
58 <www.mba.ac.uk/nmbl/projects/history/125laboratory> [accessed 13 April 2016].
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from websites and official statements related to the CPR Survey.59 The research
for this thesis was conducted in the three and a half years prior to this merger,
during which SAHFOS was still running the survey. Therefore, in descriptions of
the case I frequently refer to SAHFOS as the institution running the survey and
as the organisation that employs the researchers,  although as this thesis  is
being submitted, the survey and its employees work officially under the banner
of the MBA. 
The CPR Survey has a long history. The mechanical sampling device, which
gave the survey its name, was invented by fisheries ecologist Alister Hardy in
the 1920s for the purpose of monitoring zooplankton, the key food source of
larval fish (McQuatters-Gollop et al. 2015: 2). A ‘pioneer period’ in the 1930s, in
which  the  design  of  the  CPR  and  steps  of  analysis  were  experimentally
developed, was followed by a period of non-activity lasting eight years due to
World War II  (Reid et al.  2003: 130). The survey resumed in 1946 and as I
discuss in  chapter  six,  the  methods  of  sampling  and  sample  analysis  have
remained largely unchanged since the 1950s (Reid et al. 2003: 131–32). With
datasets spanning more than eighty years, the CPR Survey has created some
of  the  longest  running  time  series  in  environmental  and  marine  science
(McQuatters-Gollop et al. 2015: 2). The methodological continuity is one of the
most important aspects of the survey and is vital for its reputation and prestige
in the scientific community.
Despite having already been recording continuously for some thirty years, it was
decided in the 1980s to shut down the CPR survey because politicians did not
see any reason to continue this and other long-term environmental time series.
At the time, ‘monitoring was considered weak science, akin to stamp collecting’
(Reid et al. 2003: 141). Long-term marine monitoring programmes in Europe
were  terminated  at  an  ‘alarming’  rate  with  forty  percent  of  European
programmes  being shut down in the late 1980s, as Duarte, Cebrián, and Marbà
(1992: 190) warned in  Nature. Unlike many other programmes, the projected
closing of the CPR Survey led to an international initiative strongly supported by
59 <https://www.cprsurvey.org/about-us/the-continuous-plankton-recorder-cpr-survey-
has-merged-with-the-marine-biological-association/> [accessed 7 June 2018].
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IOC and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) to form
a rescue fund and establish SAHFOS as a charity organisation in 1990 (Reid et
al.  2003). The survey was conducted until  1950 by the University College of
Hull, until 1976 by the Scottish Marine Biological Association in Edinburgh, and
until 1990 by the Institute for Marine Environmental Research, which is now the
Plymouth Marine Laboratory (PML) located not far from the Laboratory (Reid et
al. 2003: 119). 
According  to  its  Director,  SAHFOS’  core  work  was the  running  of  the  CPR
Survey:
SAHFOS’ core activity is of course the maintenance of the 
Continuous Plankton Recorder (CPR) Survey. The CPR Survey 
started in 1931 and SAHFOS has had the considerable and weighty 
responsibility of continuing the running and safeguarding of the CPR 
Survey since 1990. (Owens 2015: 2)
Many activities that amount to “maintenance” of the survey are described and
discussed in detail  in this  thesis’  empirical  chapters.  In  addition to  this  core
activity, SAHFOS conducted ‘ancillary activities and associated science’ (Owens
2015: 2).  Researchers were involved in the development and testing of new
instruments,  in  policy-driven  work,  or  in  education  and  outreach.  Several
research fellows studied environmental change, marine biodiversity, sustainable
resources,  and  health  and  well-being  of  marine  food  sources.60 A  small
molecular research team received organisms for analysis first-hand from the
CPR  samples  and  other  water  sampling  techniques  that  a  CPR  may  be
equipped with (SAHFOS 2015). 
A CPR is a mechanical sampling device towed by commercial ships on their
regular  shipping routes.  As explained in  detail  in  the following chapters,  the
survey produces hand-sized pieces of silk that have filtered ocean waters and
contain plankton organisms. Sample analysts in Plymouth use microscopes to
identify  and  count  plankton  organisms in  order  to  create  scientific  data.  All
samples are preserved and archived in Plymouth to enable re-analysis in the
60 <https://www.sahfos.ac.uk/research/our-science/> [accessed 23 April 2016].
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future. According to a counter on the survey’s website, as of June 2018, more
than five million nautical miles have been sampled with CPRs in total and the
database contains more than three million taxonomic abundance entries.61 
The CPR Survey  operates  mainly  in  the  North  Atlantic  and the  North  Sea,
where most of the circa twenty-five routes and also the oldest regularly sampled
routes are located. Ships that are regularly  equipped with  CPRs leave from
various ports around the UK and Europe, including ports in Norway, Denmark,
Iceland, the Netherlands, and Ireland. Two regular routes are operated in the
North  Pacific  between  US,  Canadian,  and  Japanese  ports,  and  one  in  the
Southern Ocean between the Falkland Islands and South Georgia (SAHFOS
2016: 12–13). The CPR Survey has several sister surveys in that are run by
local research institutions and focus on seas in their region, for example, in the
North Pacific CPR Survey or the Australian CPR Survey. In 2011, the regional
CPR projects joined to establish the Global Alliance of CPR Surveys (GACS)
which  works  towards  developing  a  global  database  and  ensuring  common
standards. SAHFOS has supported these surveys with equipment and know-
how, organising regular meetings and workshops in Plymouth (SAHFOS 2016:
60–61, SAHFOS 2017: 9).62 In addition to the regular routes, the CPR Survey
seeks  cooperation  with  notable  oceanographic  expeditions  and  ships,  for
example the three-masted clipper  Stad Amsterdam which recreated a famous
voyage  made  by  Charles  Darwin,  or  the  Tara,  a  schooner  dedicated  to
environmental  expeditions  that  towed  a  CPR  through  the  Arctic  Ocean
(DR1960: 4).63
Since the  beginning  of  the  CPR Survey, research based on CPR data  has
significantly  contributed to  the understanding of  spatio-temporal  dynamics of
oceanic plankton and their response to anthropogenic pressures and climate
variability. Today, the data are also used routinely to inform UK and European
marine policy-making and management of the seas (McQuatters-Gollop et al.
2015: 2). 
61 <https://www.cprsurvey.org/> [accessed 7 June 2018]. 
62 <http://www.globalcpr.org> [accessed 23 May 2016].
63 <https://www.impress.com.au/newsroom/50-innovation/336-76m-clipper-arrives-in-
adelaide-on-global-darwin-re-enactment-voyage.html> [accessed 18 June 2018].
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3.6 Summary
Oceanography  is  not  a  clearly  demarcated  or  defined  research  field.  It
encompasses research on the physics, biology, chemistry, and geology of the
oceans, but any science related to the oceans and seas is often counted as
oceanography. In this thesis, I often use the term “ocean sciences” instead of
“oceanography” to emphasise the diversity of  ocean-related research.  I  view
oceanography or ocean science as an engagement in the oceans and seas
which  involves  the  collection  of  samples,  the  observation  or  recording  of
phenomena, the creation of data, or the production of knowledge from samples,
records, or data. My emphasis on the production of records or data reflects that
researchers  only  have  mediated  access  to  almost  every  object  of
oceanographic  study;  scientific  observation  of  oceanic  phenomena  is  only
possible by engaging in the oceans with some kind of technical instrument. 
I  consider four aspects discussed in this chapter as characteristic for  ocean
sciences and as relevant for a contextualisation of this thesis’ main case study.
These are a characteristic scarcity of data, a crucial necessity to create long-
term  data  continuously,  widespread  multi-national  collaborations  in  data
initiatives  and networks,  and a mutual  influence and at  times confluence of
scientific and seafaring cultures with characteristic notions of ocean science as
the exploration or discovery of oceanic phenomena. 
Despite increasingly automated and remote monitoring systems that penetrate
locations  humans  could  hardly  visit,  many  regions  of  the  oceans  remain
scarcely sampled, if sampled at all. According to NOAA, more than 95 percent
of  the  oceans’  interior  ‘remains  unexplored’.64 The  high  costs  involved  in
producing in-situ data of the oceans’ interior, the adverse conditions, and the
plain size of the oceans are the main factors that limit data production in these
areas. Ambitious international efforts like the WOCE or CoML have achieved
something  like  a  global  snapshot  of  the  oceans  and  new technologies  like
satellite remote sensing or Argo floats have caused specific data to be available
at unprecedented volumes. Such projects and developments have yielded great
progress  in  ocean  sciences,  but  the  questions,  research  problems,  and
64 <http://www.noaa.gov/ocean.html> [accessed 28 December 2015].
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numerical models of oceanographers have become increasingly complex and
diversified in ways that require even higher spatial and temporal resolutions or
more parameters to be measured at remote locations. Even if oceanographers
technically know how these data could be produced, the high costs of  ship-
based research limits their capacities. To tackle data scarcity, ocean scientists
need to find efficient ways of bringing a sensor to the most remote areas of the
oceans regularly. 
Several of the most central questions addressed by ocean scientists, as well as
contemporary ocean and climate models, require data to be produced over long
time  periods  with  reasonably  consistent  methods.  Regarding  large-scale
processes, the oceans are a system of slow response with time scales that can
exceed the typical durations of research projects and the lifespans of measuring
instruments by far. The longest continuous oceanographic time series only date
back around one hundred years65 and the CPR Survey has its origin in the
1920s. Most of the contemporary initiatives intended for long-term monitoring
like Argo, GOOS, or several earth observing satellites have been in operation
for only two or three decades. 
Some of the most important current and past oceanographic programmes and
data-related initiatives are coined by international collaboration and joint efforts
to  produce,  store,  and disseminate  data.  Many ocean scientists  realise that
international cooperation in data production and data sharing are beneficial or
necessary  due  to  the  nature  of  the  oceans.  Besides  this  environmental
necessity, international  collaborations  in  the  middle  of  the  twentieth  century
were also often politically motivated. The conviction to collaborate has shaped
oceanographic practices and often encompasses the planning of projects, the
production of data, as well as the storage and dissemination of data through
65 For example, the Western Channel Observatory, currently run by PML and the 
MBA is a sampling location in the Western English Channel visited weekly by a 
research ship since 1903; <www.westernchannelobservatory.org.uk> [accessed 21
June 2018]. The Shore Stations Program of Scripps Institution of Oceanography 
has been measuring temperature and salinity at fixed stations along the Californian
coast since 1916; <https://scripps.ucsd.edu/programs/shorestations/> [accessed 
21 June 2018].
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online data portals such as DACs, OBIS, or WoRMS. The division of labour
prevalent in data-intensive sciences is strongly pronounced in oceanography
with researchers, projects, or even entire institutions being dedicated to either
the production of data, their storage and dissemination, or their analysis.
Ocean scientists not only collaborate with each other, but also with seafarers
and other actors rooted in maritime cultures. There is a mutual influence and
dependency between scientists and seafarers,  as scientist  need the skills  of
seafarers to  conduct  research at  sea and seafarers require  certain  kinds of
knowledge of the seas in order to securely navigate ships. Until  remote and
autonomous  technologies  spread  among  research  institutions,  many  ocean
scientists combined skills of both spheres and ocean science was closely tied to
adventurous seafaring experiences and discoveries of the unknown which were
almost exclusively conducted by white European and North-American men.
Some terminologies used in ocean sciences actually reflect  an emphasis on
exploration and discovery66 that resonates with the adventurous but is also due
to the fact that so many areas of the oceans are still unobserved and scarcely
described.  Exploration  and  discovery  could  also  be  viewed  as  approaches
driven by environmental  necessity. As  the ocean scientists  Widdicombe and
Somerfield (2012: 1) point out, ‘humans are terrestrial creatures, and those with
a  deep  knowledge  of  the  sea  tend  to  be  those  associated  either  with  its
exploitation or exploration.’ According to this view, the nature of humans and the
nature  of  oceans  are  related  either  by  exploitative  or  exploratory  activity.
Exploitation of the oceans may relate to human activities such as fishing, mining
of  raw  materials,  or  trading  —  the  activities  of  non-scientific  seafarers.
Exploration of the oceans relates to scientific activities leading to the creation of
knowledge and  to  recreational  seafarers.  In  any  case,  ocean scientists  can
hardly pick up and take their object of study into a laboratory on land. They
66 For example, see NOAA’s statement that 95 percent of the interior oceans are 
‘unexplored’, <http://www.noaa.gov/ocean.html> [accessed 28 December 2015]. 
The title of the CoML’s review of the programme’s first ten years reads First 
Census of Marine Life 2010. Highlights of a Decade of Discovery (Census of 
Marine Life 2010). The title of Rozwadowski (2005) reads Fathoming the Ocean: 
Discovery and Exploration of the Deep Sea.
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need to actively reach out to the sea by installing research instruments or entire
laboratories on ships that visit and interact with the phenomena. This approach
was  already  implemented  with  the  transformation  of  the  Challenger into  a
research vessel in the 1870s and is also the heart  of this thesis’ main case
study, in which commercial seafarers take scientific equipment along on their
regular shipping routes. 
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Chapter Four – The epistemic value of materiality: 
Integration, continuity, and the creation of samples in the 
CPR Survey
Abstract: This chapter focuses on sampling and on the notion of “materiality”. It 
describes in detail the process of creating hand-sized pieces of silk that contain 
plankton organisms of the oceans and are prepared for microscopic analysis. 
Fleshing out the term “materiality”, I argue that ocean scientists create material 
samples by inducing a “material integration” of physical parts of the ocean 
ecosystems and physical parts of the sampling technology. The fusion of 
materials from different origins constitutes the formation of a novel entity with 
distinct characteristics that take shape in the process of sampling. Preserving 
the newly created object throughout the epistemic process constitutes “material 
continuity” on which the creation of useful data crucially depends. I argue that 
samples, despite their tangibility, are not fixed entities that are collected or 
extracted from a given population in nature into the scientific world; rather, 
material continuity entails an ongoing process of embodiment that needs to be 
maintained and conveys the notion of a material object with clear boundaries. 
The chapter sharpens the understanding of “materiality” and “material”, which 
are a widely used attributions to research objects and practices. It also 
develops a deeper understanding of samples, which have received much less 
attention in scholarly literature than scientific data, but are commonly regarded 
as representations of a population of similar objects. Based on my account, I 
locate the epistemic value of research samples primarily in their materiality and 
in the ongoing preservation of material continuity and not in a representational 
relation to a group of similar objects.
4.1 Introduction
Two kinds of objects play a central role in the research practices of this thesis’
main case study: research samples and scientific data. In short, the oceans are
sampled with mechanical sampling devices that produce bands of silk which
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contain plankton organisms; distinct pieces of silk — research samples — are
then analysed with microscopes to  create scientific  data. In  recent  scholarly
literature, samples have received much less attention than scientific data and
databases due to the data-intensive developments of science and societies that
are outlined in chapter one. While data have risen to new primacy in many
research  fields,  the  epistemological  significance  of  sampling  seems  to  be
overshadowed, if not neglected. 
Traditionally,  samples  are  viewed  as  representations  of  a  larger  group  of
objects,  based  on  a  sample’s  specific  physical  or  statistical  properties,  or
potentially on both. But neither is it clear how samples differ from objects with
similar  characteristics  such  as  certain  forms  of  scientific  data,  nor  have
philosophers of science sufficiently accounted for the epistemological relevance
of the physical constitution and preservation of research samples. Part of this
chapter  is  a  precise reconstruction of  a  sampling process in  which physical
characteristics and materials of different provenance take centre stage. With a
specification of the term “materiality” in relation to objects in science, I anchor
the epistemic value67 of samples primarily in their materiality.
I propose an understanding of materiality as the integration of physical matter
from various sources so as to constitute a new entity. The material integration is
followed by the preservation of the entity throughout several if not all stages of
the epistemic process without a change of medium. Material  integration and
material  continuity  are  a  two-fold  characteristic  applicable  to  objects  that
scientists create and use as well as to scientific practices. This understanding
grounds the notion of “materiality” epistemologically rather than ontologically or
in  dichotomous  opposition  to  attributes  such  as  “nonmaterial”,  “virtual”,  or
“theoretical”. It further sidesteps the close association of samples with concepts
of  scientific  representation,  which  is  problematic  for  several  reasons:  In  the
practices I have studied, sampling in does not involve any form of intentional
selection  or  abstraction of  features  from an original  target  to  an  object  that
67 For the notion of “epistemic value”, I refer to Steel (2010: 18), who defines it as a 
feature promoting the ‘acquisition of true beliefs’. The term “value” is understood 
as a favourable influence on the outcome or direction of researchers’ decisions 
and actions (Steel 2010: 21).
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represents.  Further, the sample lacks similarity with the ocean’s ecosystems
and are not reproducible as many other types of representations. Finally, an
absence of jumps between different physical media, as my account implies with
material  continuity,  clashes  with  the  view  of  samples  as  straightforward
representations that are extracted from nature into the scientific realm. 
Material integration accounts for the origin of material objects in science and are
part of the genesis of scientific data. Material continuity tracks the journey of
these objects and fills part of the conceptual gap between the natural world and
scientific institutions that I opened in chapter one.
This  chapter  begins  with  a  review  of  philosophical  and  STS  literature  on
materiality and samples. An empirical section reconstructs the sampling process
in  the  CPR  Survey  and  how  samples  are  preserved  and  archived.  I
subsequently elaborate on material integration and continuity before discussing
materiality and scientific representation.
4.1.1 Material objects and materialisation
Practices that induce a ‘clash of materials’ (Rheinberger 2011: 344) between
living organisms and research technologies are central to many experimental
practices in the life sciences. Objects of study that are part of such a clash or
result from it may be described as “material” objects. A wide range of material
objects  with  fundamentally  different  formation  processes  and  physical
characteristics  are  used  in  the  life  sciences:  for  example,  anatomical
preparations, model organisms, or species collections in museums. 
Some scholars elaborate in relation to these objects what “materiality” implies
epistemologically, showing that material interactions and knowledge production
processes are often intertwined,  but  in  a  variety  of  ways.  The materiality  of
anatomical preparations, for example, results in an ‘indexicality’ of the object
that points to itself rather than representing something else (Rheinberger 2015:
323).  Model  organisms have standardised material  characteristics that make
them usable as ‘genetic tools’ (Ankeny and Leonelli 2011: 316). The materiality
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of  species  collections  in  a  museum provides  an  epistemological  robustness
against potential changes of theoretical perspective because a material species
can be re-analysed (Griesemer 1990: 83).
While  many  scholars  have  focused  on  specific  kinds  of  material  objects  or
material aspects of their case studies, the terms “material” and “materiality” tend
to remain rather loosely defined. Quite often, it seems that “material” is used to
signal difference or opposition to other classes of objects or processes which
may be labelled “nonmaterial”, “virtual”, “theoretical”, “formal”, “mathematical”,
“ideational”, or the like.68 These oppositions seem to bear on differences in an
entity’s  physical  constitution,  stability,  or  tangibility,  but  also  relate  to  its
ontological status: Mathematical theories or ideas certainly differ ontologically
from a sampled biological species. Coopmans et al. (2014: 5) relate a recent
enthusiasm  about  the  notion  of  materiality  to  scholars  moving  away  from
treating “digitality” as a primarily virtual or non-material notion. This shift from
virtual to material somewhat reflects the dichotomous classifications of practices
or objects, but also opens up the opportunity to flesh out what materiality means
in relation to specific research practices.
According to Coopmans et al. (2014: 5) notions of materiality tend to ‘stress the
embodied nature of scientific work, as well as the tools, objects, technologies,
and environments in and through which science is practiced’. An example of this
emphasis on embodied practices could be Rheinberger’s (1997: 28) definition of
“epistemic things” as the ‘material entities or processes […] that constitute the
objects of inquiry’. In this sense, the attribution “material” seems to relate to the
tangibility  and  the  physicality  of  objects  or  processes  studied  by  scientists.
Tangibility  and  physicality  enable  experimental  intervention  by  means  of
research technologies that could be described as material, too.  Coopmans et
68 For example, Wimsatt and Griesemer (2007: 296): ‘Changing technology—
material or ideational—is never instantaneous.’ Knuuttila (2005: 1267): ‘All objects 
of human culture have both ideal (or virtual, if you like) and material dimensions.’ 
Morgan (2003: 231) attributes experiments different degrees of materiality: 
“material”, “semimaterial”, “pseudo-material”, “nonmaterial”, or “mathematical”.  
Griesemer (2014: 28–29) distinguishes “material” and “formal” ways of 
reproduction.
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al.’s  (2014)  suggestion  still  leaves  room  for  diverging  interpretations  and
descriptions of material practices and objects. In some contexts, the meaning of
materiality has been contested by scholars, for example, Morgan (2003) and
Parker  (2009)  debate  how  to  understand  “materiality”  in  the  context  of
experimental  practices.  Parker  (2009:  492–93)  criticises  that  computer
simulations are often not seen as material experiments, despite the inevitable
physical  manifestation  of  all  computing  processes.  Parker  suggests  that  the
emphasis on “stuff” may be misplaced and that epistemologically, the behaviour
of a system is more important than any kind of ontological classification. 
In STS literature, the meaning of materiality has been discussed in relation to a
growing  scholarly  interest  in  ontology. As  Woolgar  and  Lezaun  (2013:  326)
argue, what qualifies an object as “material” should be treated as a practical
achievement;  “materiality”  should  therefore  be  understood  as  an  ‘upshot  of
practices’  of  a  certain  kind.  Reflecting  on  the  range  of  material  domains
addressed in current STS scholarship, Coopmans et al. (2014: 5) broadly claim
that material domains ‘constitute an infrastructure for scientific engagement with
worldly phenomena’. 
How the engagement with worldly phenomena unfolds in scientific practice is
the  central  subject-matter  of  this  chapter  and  may  provide  classifications
involving “material”, “non-material”, or similar attributes with crucial context and
a more solid grounding. Moreover, my study of infrastructures and practices to
engage  with  natural  systems and  create  material  samples  is  an  attempt  to
reveal and frame the epistemological significance of materiality. 
Several  feminist  perspectives  on  materials  and  bodies  account  for
“materialisation” or the formation and becoming of material  entities. Although
primarily referring to human bodies, feminist  scholars like Judith Butler have
thought of matter as ‘a process of materialisation that stabilises over time to
produce the effect of boundary, fixity … we call matter’ (Butler 1993: 9, cited by
Lennon 2014). This form of materialisation conveys the image of an ongoing
process which, as Lennon (2014) points out, makes it impossible to account for
materials and bodies as concise and fixed entities; reflecting the dynamics of
discursive formations in the sense of Foucault (1969), the ongoing discourse
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creates  its  own  objects.  At  the  same  time,  however,  possible  alternative
formation processes that could produce similar effects of boundary need to be
explored (Lennon 2014). What I  draw from this is the necessity to study the
formation processes of material entities and to take into account the possibility
that boundaries and the stability of objects are the effects of processes which
could  play  out  differently  under  different  conditions,  leading  to  potentially
profound implications on how those bodies are perceived and conceptualised.
The stabilising processes that convey the image of a material body take me
back to the tension between change and continuity that underlie the research
practices I have studied.
4.1.2 Statistical and material samples
Compared to other objects that are frequently generated and used in research
situations,  samples  have  received  relatively  little  explicit  attention  from
philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science.69
The relatively limited philosophical  literature that mentions research samples
suggests a  close relation between data and samples, but leaves room for at
least two possible epistemic constellations involving both types of objects: first,
the creation of a sample from a set of data; and second, the creation of data
from previously obtained samples. Additionally, it is not clear whether samples
and  data  are  to  be  regarded  as  generic  research  objects  which  require
conceptional distinction, or as belonging to the same class or group of objects.
Kitchin  (2014a:  4–5)  contends  that  even  in  research  settings  with
unprecedented amounts  of  data,  data  are  still  ‘both  a  representation  and a
sample’.  This  overall  lack  of  clarity  might  contribute  to  the  scarcity  of
conceptional literature on research samples. 
69 As for objects other than samples, see introductory chapter one for literature on 
data, Morgan (2012) on models, Ankeny and Leonelli (2011) on model organisms, 
de Regt and Parker (2014) on simulations and visualisations, Rheinberger (2010) 
on preparations, Devictor and Bensaude-Vincent (2016) on records.
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Romeijn  (2016),  writing  on the  philosophy of  statistics,  claims that  statistics
focus on the relation between data and hypotheses. In this context, Romeijn
defines data as follows:
The data are recordings of observations or events in a scientific 
study, e.g., a set of measurements of individuals from a population. 
The data actually obtained are variously called the sample, the 
sample data, or simply the data. (Romeijn 2016)70
This definition suggests that there is not much of a difference between samples,
data, and what Romeijn refers to as “sample data”;  speaking of “sample” or
“data” is then perhaps just a matter of terminological preference or disciplinary
convention. A blurring of the two terms “sample” and “data” might be a relatively
recent side-effect of ongoing discussions regarding the impacts of big data on
science.  Leonelli  (2014a:  3)  mentions a  general  disregard of  debates  about
sampling  due  to  the  assumption  that  in  big  data  science,  all  possible  data
relating to a specific phenomenon are always available for analysis. High-speed
digital  technologies  and  enormous  storage  capacities  make  worries  about
sampling appear obsolete. This view is made explicit in best-selling books such
as Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think,
in which Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013: 31) argue that the constraints of
sampling will no longer play a dominant role in the analysis of data: ‘Reaching
for a random sample in the age of big data is like clutching at a horse whip in
the era of the motor car.’ This quote illustrates how sampling and samples are
overshadowed  by  discourses  centred  on  data.  Leonelli  (2014a:  7)  strongly
disagrees with this belittlement of sampling, pointing out that her research on
how biological  data travel  between locations and actors has highlighted ‘the
ever-growing significance of sampling methods’; hence, ‘assuming that Big Data
does away with the need to consider sampling is highly problematic’ (Leonelli
2014a: 7).
Whether or not to distinguish between samples and data has been debated by
Woodward  (2010)  and  Glymour  (2000).  As  introduced  in  chapter  one,
Woodward primarily argues in favour of a sharp distinction between scientific
70 Emphasis in original.
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data and phenomena. Glymour suggests that this distinction is not necessary,
because the relation between data and phenomena is of the same statistical
nature as the relation between samples and a population. Due to the extensive
literature on statistical inference, Woodward’s  ‘terminological reform’ would be
unnecessary and potentially misleading (Glymour 2000: 34). Woodward (2010:
802) responds that not all reasoning from data to phenomena can be viewed as
statistical  and  that  one  cannot  assume  a  single  population  for  different
measurements.  The disagreement in this debate seems to stem from different
understandings of a sample’s relation to a population: Glymour emphasises a
statistical understanding while Woodward suggests that there is more than just
statistical relations.
The  statistical  understanding  of  a  sample  exemplified  in  Glymour’s  and
Romeijn’s works corresponds to one of several meanings of “sample” listed by
the  Oxford English Dictionary (OED): ‘a portion drawn from a population, the
study of which is intended to lead to statistical estimates of the attributes of the
whole population’.71 Romeijn (2016) explains that statistics relate ‘empirical facts
and hypotheses of a particular kind’, more particularly that the empirical facts
must be ‘codified and structured into data sets’ while the hypotheses must take
the form of ‘probability distributions over possible data sets’. It seems that the
statistical understanding of a sample only applies to cases in which a sample is
created  from  a  codified  and  structured  data  set  and  hypotheses  involve
mathematical  equations or tables stating the probabilities of  an experiment’s
potential outcomes. 
Two other meanings given by the OED seem relevant for my case, both suggest
a material rather than a statistical understanding of “sample” and neither seems
to  always  require  structured  data  sets  and  mathematical  probability
distributions: ‘a relatively small quantity of material, or an individual object, from
which the quality of the mass, group, species, etc. which it represents may be
inferred’  and  ‘a  specimen  taken  for  scientific  testing  or  analysis’.72 Leonelli
(2015: 817) seems to allude to these material understandings of “sample” in a
71 OED Online. 2016. ‘sample, n.’ (Oxford University Press), 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/170414?rskey=GL5tpO&result=1> [accessed 13 
May 2016].
103
list of examples compiled for the relational framework to conceptualise scientific
data that I introduced in chapter one. Due to the crucial relations to the context
of their use, data can include ‘experimental results, field observations, samples
of  organic  materials, results  of  simulations  and mathematical  modeling,  and
even specimens’. According to this list, “samples of organic materials” have the
potential to be used as data. In accordance with Leonelli’s (2015) framework,
they are physical, portable artefacts that may potentially serve as evidence for
knowledge claims. Yet, it remains unclear if samples and data are of the same
category, if samples are a specific form or format of data, a sub-category of
data,  or  something entirely  different  which  only  turns into  data  in  a  specific
context.  Notably,  only  a  particular  type  of  sample  is  explicitly  included  by
Leonelli  (2015:  817)  when  referring  to  “samples  of  organic  material”  in  the
context of biological science. Such samples are usually made from substances
taken directly from the target population or manufactured from substances that
imitate the target’s physical constitution.
Bogen and Woodward (1988) also employ the term “sample” with a material
connotation in their discussion of data, phenomena, and theories, but rather as
an actors’  category and without  conceptualising samples in  relation to  data.
Measuring practices to determine the melting point of lead involve a ‘sample of
lead’ (Bogen and Woodward 1988: 308). The motivation to speak of samples is
certainly  due  to  the  material  similarity  that  small  portions  of  lead  in  the
laboratory share with each and every object made of lead. Similarly, Mody and
Lynch  (2010:  423)  refer  throughout  their  study  of  “test  objects”  to  silicon
samples with a specific atomic surface configuration. The emergence of these
samples  as  preferred  test  objects  among scientists  is  grounded primarily  in
similarity  of  physical  characteristics  with  a  range  of  other  materials  used in
science and engineering. Although not clearly focusing on the epistemic role of
samples or their use as representations, Mody and Lynch (2010: 458) count
samples  to  a  ‘“family”  of  objects’  including  ‘model  organisms,  material
standards,  samples  and  so  on’.  These  objects  undergo  historical  shifts
72 OED Online. 2016. ‘sample, n.’ (Oxford University Press), 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/170414?rskey=GL5tpO&result=1> [accessed 13 
May 2016].
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regarding their ‘epistemic status’: They can transform from novel entities into
unsolved problems and into standard practices of an entire scientific community
(Mody and Lynch 2010: 458). This variety of scenarios involving samples and
similar objects suggests that, similar to scientific data, samples can be different
things in  different  contexts.  Consequently, their  value for  knowledge making
processes might be grounded in specific relations to the context of use.
Ribes and Jackson’s (2013) case study of long-term ecological data production
in hydrochemistry cannot be counted to the bulk of scholarly literature that tends
to disregard the role of samples in science. Ribes and Jackson (2013) describe
in detail  how scientists and students create samples of stream waters in an
urban area on a weekly basis and how data are routinely produced from the
samples for long-term monitoring of the water’s chemical structure. The authors
clarify what samples are in their case:
Producing those data means isolating and transporting little bits of 
streams back to labs in ways that preserve meaningful relationships 
to those streams. These bits are called “samples”: a straightforward 
term that belies the work that meaningfully sustains them as 
representing a stream at a particular point in time. (Ribes and 
Jackson 2013: 162)
In this case, material “bits” or portions of the target are obtained in order to
represent the stream based on similarity between the sampled water volumes
and  the  water  that  remains  flowing  in  the  respective  stream.  For  this
representation, a relation between the sample and the stream, together with
information on the context of sampling, must be established and preserved. The
CPR Survey and Ribes and Jackson’s (2013) case are very similar with respect
to the constellation of samples and data in research practice: Data related to a
specific natural system are produced from previously created physical samples.
In summary, scholarly literature indicates that the primary role of samples in
science is  to  function as a representation of  a  larger  group of  objects  or  a
population. Further, scholars seem to allude to one of at least two ways in which
samples are used as representations: either by virtue of statistical relations or
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by  virtue  of  material  similarity.73 The  focus  on  a  sample’s  function  as  a
representation suggests that the samples’ usability as a representation is the
primary reason for its epistemic value. My empirical study of a sampling practice
is intended to reveal if and how this epistemic value is generated and planted
into a sample.
Figure 4.1: External body of a Continuous Plankton Recorder (CPR).
4.2 Creating CPR samples
A Continuous Plankton Recorder (CPR) is a mechanical device designed for the
uptake,  retention,  and  temporary  storage  of  marine  organisms.  Commercial
ships tow CPRs via a steel wire at a depth of seven to ten metres. A CPR is
made of steel and has a shape somewhat similar to a small bobsleigh; it weighs
around ninety kilograms at a length of around one metre. A CPR consists of two
main parts, an external body (fig. 4.1) and an internal cassette (fig. 4.2) that
73 The notion of “similarity” appears in conceptions of scientific representation. Giere 
(2010: 269), for example, views “similarity” as the ‘basic relationship’ between a 
representation and whatever is represented. Hacking (1983: 139) also mentions 
“similarity” but more often uses ‘likeness’ to describe this relation.
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also made of steel and commonly just referred to as the “internal”. As of 2015,
SAHFOS’ fleet of CPRs comprised 54 CPR bodies and 118 internals (SAHFOS
2016: 8). Most of the CPRs’ steel components are laser-cut so that all internal
cassettes  and external  bodies  are  perfectly  compatible  with  each other  and
have exactly identical shapes and edges. Only some of the oldest CPR bodies
and internals that are still in used are hand-made.74
Figure 4.2: An internal cassette of a CPR that is not prepared for despatch.
4.2.1 The sampling process
A CPR gets assembled, set up, and boxed up at the CPR operations workshop
at the ground floor of the Laboratory before a courier company takes the box to
a port and the port logistics transfer it to the ship of opportunity scheduled to
make the tow. The assembly begins with the manual preparation of silk rolls
which are going to be used for filtering the sea water and fixating the organisms.
The  silk  comes  from  a  Chinese  company  in  standardised  rolls  and  is  not
specifically manufactured for use as a plankton filter (DR0533: 9). 
74 The older CPR externals only have a few internal cassettes fitting into them. The 
CPRs are manufactured by a local engineering company (DR2901: 2).
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As a first step, the person preparing the silk inspects the fabric and discards silk
rolls with distortions, big creases, and too excessive curves. For each tow, two
rolls of silk are loaded into the CPR’s internal, a filtering silk that actually filters
the sea water and a covering silk that rolls off on top of the filtering silk and
fixates the organisms. These are prepared differently: The filtering silk is rolled
out on a long workbench and a straight line is drawn every two inches across
the length of the silk with a pen. This divides the silk into one hundred equal
divisions, which is long enough for a tow of five hundred nautical miles. Each
division is stamped by hand with an ascending number. The filtering silk is then
rolled up and stored in a drawer that serves as a clean and dry environment.
The covering silk is rolled out and the edges along the length of the silk roll are
marked at a distance of one inch from each side of the silk band. These edges
are then folded inwards by hand and the roll  runs through a rotary iron. The
purpose of the fold is to avoid plankton organisms to wash out at the sides of
the silk roll.75 To avoid crinkling of the silk when it is rolled up, a triangular area
of silk is removed with scissors from the folds every four inches. The tips of the
remaining folds are glued onto the filtering silk. Staff members preparing the silk
need to be careful with the glue, as big blobs of glue may cause a jam in the
CPR’s internal mechanisms. The covering silk goes through the rotary iron one
more time after gluing and then both silk rolls are ready to be loaded into the
internal (DR1960).
As the preparation of the silk, loading the internal is done with bare hands. A
steel tank is removed from the inside of the internal and filled with small pieces
of cotton wool. Right before despatch of the CPR, the wool is impregnated with
a forty percent formalin solution. During the tow and until the CPR is back in
Plymouth, the cotton wool dilutes the water in the storage tank continuously in
order to preserve the organisms in the tank (Ripley et al. 2008: 120). The silk
rolls are then placed into the internal and the ends of the rolls drawn parallel
through the mechanism into the storage tank, where they are glued onto a spool
and pulled tight. Finally, a mechanisms ‘analogous to that used in a camera’
needs to be charged with a wire that keeps the silk under tension as it is going
75 The covering silk comes from a silk roll that is exactly two inches wider than the 
filtering silk. Once folded, both silk bands are of identical width.
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to be drawn into the storage tank during the tow (DR1960, Reid et al. 2010:
126).  After  putting  in  the  formalin,  the  internal  is  placed  inside  the  CPR’s
external body, which has a shock absorber and steel wire attached to it that can
be connected to a ship’s winch with shackles. Several additional instruments
might be attached to the external body of the CPR but for the purpose of this
chapter, I focus only on the samples and data created from the silk rolls placed
inside the CPR. They are the equipment that the device was originally designed
for and the continued creation and analysis of silk samples are the survey’s core
activities. 
How the internal  CPR mechanism works has been documented very well  in
several  journal  papers,  for  example  in  Reid  et  al.  (2003)  and  Batten  et  al.
(2003). Besides an instructional video that covers preparation, unloading, and
maintenance of a CPR, I have also been shown a video that documents how a
CPR is first lowered into the water from a ship of opportunity and later hauled in.
The transportation of  boxed CPRs between the Laboratory in Plymouth,  the
ports, and the ships is described in chapter six. 
When it  is time to begin towing aboard a ship of  opportunity, the CPR gets
connected to a ship’s winch with the shackle. The CPR is lifted over the bulwark
and  the  wire  is  paid  out  until  a  coloured  mark  settles  on  the  sea  surface,
indicating that the CPR has reached the desired depth between seven and ten
metres. As the ships do not stop or even slow down for this process, the steel
body hits the turbulent wake of the ship at up to twenty knots, putting significant
tension on the wire, the CPR’s body, and the shock absorber. The CPR jumps
on the sea surface for several seconds before submerging (DR1960). Once the
CPR is below the sea surface, the external body’s design causes it to assume a
horizontal position. Sea water enters the external body through a small opening
at its nose. The entrance aperture measures only around one and a half square
centimetres (SAHFOS 2016:  18).76 The tunnel,  through which the water has
76 The exact size of the aperture is stated slightly differently in different publications. 
While SAHFOS’ 2015 annual report states 1.61 square centimetres, the edges 
each measure 1.2 centimetres, according to Reid et al. (2003: 126), resulting in an 
aperture of 1.44 square centimetres. According to Batten et al. (2003: 196), the 
aperture is only 1.27 square centimetres.
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entered, leads into the internal cassette and widens significantly until it reaches
the  filtering  silk  (fig.  4.3).  This  enlargement  of  the  tunnel  to  cross-sectional
dimensions of five by ten centimetres decreases the speed of the water flow by
a factor of around thirty (Batten et al. 2003: 196, Warner and Hays 1994: 238).
The slower speed decreases the impact on the organisms when they collide
with the filtering silk, as SAHFOS technician Rob Camp explains: 
“From the nose of the CPR, water comes in and the hole in the nose 
is of a certain size and it expands, the space inside, which reduces 
the pressure. Therefore it means that the pressure on the silk that is 
collecting is not as high as in the water; because we are towing at 
maybe up to twenty knots or more, which would damage the 
plankton, if we were collecting at that speed.” (DR2901: 2)
Figure 4.3: Schematic view of the CPR, from Hays (1994: 404).
The mechanism to pull the silk into the storage tank is powered by a propeller
which is part of the external body and connected to the internal via a gear box.
The  gearbox  then  rotates  the  storage  spool  in  the  preservation  chamber,
drawing in the filtering silk and the covering silk (Batten et al. 2003: 195–96).
The  covering  silk  meets  the  other  band  right  above  the  water  tunnel  and
ensures that the organisms are kept in place as the silk is wound up.
The silk’s mesh size is 270 micrometres and has a leno weave which is a single
threat in one direction and a double twisted thread in the other direction. This
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type of weave prevents silk distortion and variable mesh sizes under pressure,
as would happen more easily if a plane weave with only one thread in each
direction was used (Batten et al. 2003: 196). Only a share of the organisms that
have entered the CPR’s internal are retained by the silk, covered up by the
second  silk  roll,  and  end  up  in  the  formalin-filled  storage  tank.  Mesh  sizes
typically used for collecting phytoplankton are only up to fifty micrometres; the
mesh size used in CPRs is thus significantly larger with 270 micrometres. This
size was chosen by Alister Hardy almost  a hundred years ago, because he
designed  the  device  for  monitoring  relatively  large  zooplankton  organisms,
which are the primary food source of larval fish.77 Yet, the silk actually retains
organisms that are significantly smaller than the mesh size, thanks to different
physical interactions, as lab manager David Johns explains:
“These are coccolithophores, they are calcareous and they are tiny; 
really, really tiny, ten microns. When you look down there, you can 
see a sample and there is a silk mesh. The gap in the mesh is about 
300 microns across. So it is quite a big gap. And we had people 
saying that there is no way that we can see coccolithophores, they 
said ‘no, it is going to go straight through your mesh, because they 
are only ten microns.’ But they do stay there, so we took photos and 
we published some of it and say ‘actually, we can see these.’” 
(DR0934: 6)
Coccolithophores are a group of unicellular, eukaryotic phytoplankton species
which are around a magnitude smaller than the gap between the silk threads.78
77 Zooplankton are animals living near the surface of the sea that usually drift with the
currents, although some are weak swimmers. Zooplankton are distinguished into 
holoplankton, which remain part of the plankton permanently, and meroplankton, a 
group of temporary plankton consisting mostly of larval forms of crustaceans, sea 
stars, marine worms, and most fish. Like the much smaller phytoplankton, 
zooplankon are a key component of the marine food web; 
<http://marinebio.org/oceans/zooplankton/index.aspx> [accessed 4 January 2017].
78 Phytoplankton are microscopic single-celled plants, protists, or bacteria. They 
consume carbon dioxide by photosynthesis and require sunlight and nutrients like 
terrestrial plants. The uptake of carbon and subsequent transfer to the deep ocean
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Yet,  a  constant  share  of  phytoplankton  species  is  retained,  due to  different
physical interactions during sampling, as Johns explains:
“[They do not go through] probably because of the other 
phytoplankton that are there. So you get spiny bits sticking out; the 
mesh is made of silk, which is spinous as well, so they get stuck to 
that.” (DR0934: 6)
Physical  interactions  between  organisms  of  different  sizes,  shapes,  and
constitution and between organisms and the silk’s double-twisted leno weave
are  responsible  for  capturing  organisms significantly  smaller  than  the  mesh
size. By contrast, most other plankton samplers use a plain weave of nylon that
is heat-fused at each crossing. This results in a much smoother mesh without
any rough threads or narrow gaps in the twisted silk that small organisms could
get caught in. 
For several reasons, however, the ratio between small and large species and
the composition of species on the silk differ from the ratios and composition of
species  in  the  open  ocean.  The  filter  efficiency  is  much  smaller  for  tiny
organisms than  for  larger  ones,  as  several  experiments  have  shown (Hays
1994).79 Additionally,  some  large zooplankton  species  capable  of  swimming
sometimes manage to actively avoid entering the small aperture at the nose of
the CPR. This is not the case with typical plankton nets that have diameters of
fifty centimetres or more (Richardson et al. 2006: 61). The CPR is also not a
perfectly  sealed instrument and it  is  assumed that  some leakage can occur
around the edges of the silk roll despite the folded edges, so that organisms
make phytoplankton a crucial component of the global carbon cycle and climate 
system. As the primary food of zooplankton, many fish species, and whales, 
phytoplankton are the foundation of the aquatic food web; 
<http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/Phytoplankton/> [accessed 1 
December 2016].
79 The lower retention rates for smaller species becomes important when the silk 
samples are being analysed after they have been returned to Plymouth, as I 
explain in chapter five.
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actually might be able to escape the silk. This effect, however, is estimated to
be insignificant (Batten et al. 2003: 206). 
An important process affecting not only the retention rates but also the volume
of filtered sea water is silk clogging (Hunt and Hosie 2006). In areas with high
plankton abundances, the silk might get clogged with organisms, in particular if
gelatinous species happen to  enter  the CPR and stick to  the silk.  Clogging
varies seasonally and occurs more often in summer than in winter due to higher
plankton abundances (Hays 1994: 409). The effects of silk clogging have been
examined in experiments and show that with a growing amount of plankton on
the silk, the filter efficiency tends to increase:
As more and more organisms are filtered onto the mesh the open 
apertures are progressively clogged and reduce the effective mesh 
size. So as more large organisms are retained, smaller organisms, 
which at the start of the sampling would have been extruded, will be 
retained progressively more effectively (Batten et al. 2003: 206).
Such higher-order effects make the evaluation of retention rates very difficult
and illustrate the complexity of interaction between organisms of different sizes
and texture and the silk. Batten et al. (2003: 206) highlight another obstacle in
this regard:
The effect is hard to quantify since the ambient concentrations of 
organisms (needed to determine the true proportion retained) will 
never be known for a specific patch of sea water at a specific time.
Even  the  immediate  area  surrounding  a  CPR  is  affected  by  the  sampling
procedure, due to the CPR being towed behind a large ship, which creates a
turbulent wake and mixes the upper  layer of  water. All  of  these interactions
between water, plankton organisms, ships of opportunity, and sampling device
influence exactly what species are retained at which quantity by the silk. As a
result,  the relative quantities of different species on the silk are not equal to
those in the ocean water or as they would be if ocean water was being removed
with a large bucket or a glass bottle. 
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The sampling  method also  has effects on the level  of  individual  organisms.
Certain groups of plankton organisms frequently get damaged and deformed
during the sampling process. They may collide with the steel walls of the CPR
or with other organisms that are already retained by the silk. Although the water
pressure decreases inside the tunnel, the bodies of plankton species may get
pressed severely against each other or against the silk. The biggest cause of
deformation is, however, the sandwiching of organisms between the two silk
layers  before  the  silk  enters  the  formalin-filled  storage tank.  With  regard  to
some  of  the  larger  zooplankton  species,  Johns  explains  that  “the  stuff  is
squashed” and “it is very, very flat”, when it arrives in Plymouth (DR0934: 19).
This process can make the identification of some plankton species very difficult,
as  I  explain  in  chapter  five.  No  plankton  organism  survives  the  sampling
process but the formalin solution in storage tank prevents the organism’s decay.
4.2.2 From continuous silk rolls to discrete samples
After the CPR has been hauled in by the ship’s crew, it is placed back into the
box as it is and shipped back to Plymouth from the ship’s destination port. At the
Laboratory, the internal cassette is unloaded and the silk roll is removed from
the  preservation  chamber.  For  temporary  storage,  the  silk  roll  is  put  into  a
plastic pot with a four percent formalin solution (DR1960). 
Before the silk can be analysed, the entire silk of one tow is rolled out, with the
silk “sandwich” of filtering and covering silk matching as accurately as possible.
The silk bands are cut into individual pieces in such a way that the distance
between each cut corresponds to ten nautical miles of the tow. Depending on
how fast the ship has been sailing during the tow, the cut pieces are slightly
more  or  less  than  ten  centimetres  long.  A software  produces  the  so-called
cutting point sheet, which shows where the silk needs to be cut relative to the
two inch divisions marked and stamped onto the silk prior to despatch. Due to
the tunnel width of ten centimetres inside the internal cassette, the area of the
cut silk that has filtered sea water is roughly square. It is such an individual pair
of silk pieces, one filtering silk and one covering silk, that the CPR Survey staff
regard as a “sample”. Johns explains:
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“That is one sample, yeah. So it is ten nautical miles of the CPR 
going through sea water. And it filters around three cubic metre of 
sea water. So it represents three cubic metres of sea water.” 
(DR0934: 1)
For the survey’s staff, a sample represents a distance that a CPR has travelled
and the volume of water flowing through the CPR along that section of the tow.80
One has  to  keep  in  mind,  though,  that  the  silk  is  drawn  through  the  CPR
mechanism continuously and not in discrete steps. The silk is not exchanged
every ten nautical  miles so that  only  the water  and organisms of  those ten
nautical miles would make contact with one ten by ten centimetre area of silk.
The  continuous  advancement  of  the  silk,  as  opposed  to  a  step-wise
advancement, results in an overlap or “smear”, as Johns calls it (DR0533: 10),
between adjacent samples. To illustrate this, an organism that enters the CPR
at a moment when a future cutting point — a boundary between two adjacent
samples — is at the centre of the water tunnel could end up on either of the two
adjacent samples. Effectively, each sample has filtered seawater along fifteen
nautical miles, with five miles on both ends of the sample overlapping with the
previous and the following sample, respectively. As Richardson et al. (2006: 32–
33) explain, ‘of the plankton on the cut samples, 50% comes from the central 5-
mile section of tow, and 25% from each of the preceding and following 5-mile
sections’.
Each sample is labelled with a single letter or letter combination to indicate the
route of the tow, with an ascending tow number pertaining to that route, with a
“block number” indicating the position of the sample in the length of the tow, and
with a sample analyst number that indicates to whom the sample is allocated for
analysis (SAHFOS 2016). The silk samples, again soaked with a four percent
formalin  solution to  stay moist,  are folded in  a  standard way on a sheet  of
80 A similar phrasing regarding the representational relation of the sample can be 
found in an oceanographic paper about a plankton colour dataset, which is also 
created from the silk samples: ‘CPRs were towed across the English Channel from
Roscoff to Plymouth consecutively for each of 8 months producing 76 standard 
CPR samples, each representing 10 nautical miles of tow’ (Raitsos et al. 2013: 
158).
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transparent plastic so that the plastic forms an envelope containing the sample.
The label, a white slip of paper, is placed inside the envelope so that it is easily
readable  when  the  folded  sample  is  stored.  The  envelopes  are  placed  on
formalin-soaked cotton wool inside plastic boxes which contain all samples of
one or more tows in consecutive order. The boxes are stored in a cabinet until a
sample is taken into the lab for microscopic analysis (DR8112: 11).81
There  is  no  guarantee  that  the  process  of  producing  a  usable  sample  is
successful.  For recent years, the survey claims an overall  sampling success
rate  above  ninety  percent  (SAHFOS,  2015,  2016,  2017).  In  cases  of
unsuccessful  sampling,  mechanical  failures  may  have  occurred,  as  Camp
explains:
“You do sometimes get jams, occasionally the mechanism fails, 
damage might happen to the CPR, or something has not worked 
quite right and the silk has not moved on or not properly and 
therefore you are not filtering it at the correct rate, and therefore you 
can’t be sure where things are.” (DR2901: 9)
Other cases of samples being unusable have to do with failed preservation or
interference of other materials:
“And then some samples are maybe rotten, they have not preserved 
properly. That very rarely happens, but sometimes they have not 
preserved. Sometimes, because it is so much material, it 
overwhelmed the amount of formalin we put in. So it has not 
preserved and it is very mushy and smelly. And then we had 
examples in the past where there have been really high amounts of 
fungus in the water, which coloured it black and makes it very difficult
to see things. Or through patches of sewage or blobs of oil or other 
things like that, which just make it very difficult to analyse.” (DR2901:
9)
81 The first step of analysis, a visual assessment of the silk colour, that I describe in 
the following chapter, actually happens right when the silk is cut and before the 
samples are folded into plastic envelopes.
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Cases like these are rare, however, as Camp estimates that only one sample in
a hundred tows is completely unusable (DR2901: 9–10). The sample analysts
will work with such samples as much as they can or, if necessary, make a note
that the sample is just not analysable.
On almost every tow, the samples labelled with an odd number are analysed by
a taxonomist in order to create data, while all samples with an even number are
moved directly into the sample archive for long-term storage. Effectively, only
every  other  sample  is  analysed  in  the  laboratory  (Batten  et  al.  2003:  196).
Camp, who is also charge of curating the archive, explains this practice:
“We only analyse the odd samples, not the even ones. The even 
ones are cut and then preserved and put into the store, so that if for 
any reason we needed to look at a completely unanalysed sample 
with no effect, we can look at that one. Also of course, if anyone 
wants to maybe use the samples for any other reason, if anyone 
wanted to do analysis on the actual samples or maybe try a different 
technology that has not even been brought up yet, something that 
you could do with them, there are preserved samples that have been
untouched by us, apart from just cutting them and storing them, that 
can be looked at by the people.” (DR2901: 7)
This rule of analysing alternate samples applies to almost every tow. Only if the
towing  distance  is  shorter  than  180  kilometres  or  if  higher  detailed  data  of
specific areas are desired, the plankton taxonomists will analyse every sample
of a tow (Batten et al. 2010: 196). Camp describes the even-numbered samples
as the survey’s “pristine untouched samples” (DR2904: 2), despite the manual
unloading, cutting, and folding. 
After microscopic analysis,  the samples are put  back into plastic boxes and
stored  in  the  survey’s  sample  archive,  which  contains  approximately  half  a
million individual samples dating back to the 1950s (SAHFOS 2016: 25). One
box  contains  the  samples  from  around  five  to  eight  individual  tows.  The
preservation of samples is not always successful and some samples might get
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contaminated and start rotting. Camp, who is in charge of the sample archive,
explains: 
“Of course the boxes are not completely airtight; otherwise there 
would not be any formalin in the air. So over time, there is some 
evaporation and once they start to dry out, the formalin level will drop
and the opportunity is there for bacteria and fungus to start growing.” 
(DR2903: 1–2)
Every time Camp enters the sample archive, he measures the formalin level in
the  air.  The  archive  comprises  several  long  shelves  with  boxes of  samples
inside  a  warehouse  of  PML  several  hundred  metres  away  from  the  CPR
Survey’s labs and offices.
Camp spends as little time as possible in the archive because the formalin in
the air and the slight smell make it “not the most pleasant of environments to be
in”  (DR2903:  1).  The condition  of  a  sample  can worsen at  different  speeds
because  some  organisms  preserve  better  than  others  and  because
contamination can spread within one box of samples quite easily once a single
sample is contaminated. Yet, early signs of bacteria and fungus only show as a
slight discolouration that makes only the rather “faint” organisms invisible, while
more solid, larger organisms are still identifiable with a microscope (DR2901: 2–
3).  A list  of  all  boxes with a colour code indicating the quality of  the box is
attached at the head of each aisle in the archive, with five gradations from “very
poor”  to  “excellent”.  Once degradation  of  a  sample  has set  in,  the  process
cannot be reversed, as Camp explains:
“You could add more formalin and at least stop it getting worse, but it
is probably unlikely that you will ever make it better. So you might 
just decide, well at some point, this is in such a poor condition that 
they throw it out.” (DR2903: 2)
Camp also points out that checking on the condition of samples is an ongoing
process that aims at keeping a record of the sample conditions. If necessary,
cotton wool soaked in formalin is added to the boxes:
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“So you basically start at the beginning and work your way through. 
And once you get to the end, you start back at the beginning again 
and you go through and you would just […] maybe look at the box. Is
it still moist? Has it completely dried out? Does the formalin level 
need any topping up? Some will maybe look wetter than others.” 
(DR2903: 3)
With the ongoing record keeping, Camp and his colleagues can give advice as
to which samples’ re-analysis could be more or less promising. Camp further
remarked that the storage space in the warehouse will most likely reach a limit
within circa two years and the survey is already looking for a new place that is
more  adequate  for  the  storage  of  CPR  samples.  A  facility  with  room  for
workbenches,  microscopes,  and  computers  would  make  curation  of  the
samples much easier (DR2903: 4).
4.3 Material integration and continuity
It  is  beyond  question  that  materials  and  physicality  are  central  in  the  CPR
Survey’s sampling practice. The silk samples could be regarded as “material”
objects  simply  because  they  consist  of  a  combination  of  fabric  and  other
substances. They are also tangible, they can be moved around in the lab, and
they can be stored and retrieved. With their standardised spatial dimensions
and plastic wrapping, they seem to have clear boundaries. This chapter has
reconstructed the formation processes — the materialisation or embodiment —
that evokes the somewhat stable image of a material object. 
This process begins with what I  call  “material  integration”.  The motivation to
speak of integration stems from the fact that materials of the target system and
of the technology, the ocean and the silk, are integrated over a distinct period of
time along a distinct spatial distance. A novel, unified object, the silk roll with
plankton organisms, is constituted during the process of material integration.82
82 In the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the first meaning of “to integrate” is ‘to form, 
coordinate, or blend into a functioning or unified whole’; <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/integrating> [accessed 31 May 2018].
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The  process  of  integration  takes  place  in  the  course  of  an  “intersection”
between  the  CPR  and  the  ocean  ecosystem.  Rheinberger  (2010:  217–18)
describes an ‘intersection’ as a ‘surface’, ‘plane’, or ‘point of contact’ between a
‘technical  object’  and  an  ‘epistemic  thing’,  leading  to  a  ‘fertile  analytical
constellation’ of instrument and target. Epistemic things are ‘material entities or
processes […] that constitute the objects of  inquiry’ (Rheinberger 1997: 28).
Technical objects, or experimental conditions, ‘embed’ epistemic things, while
they also restrict  and contain them (Rheinberger 1997: 29). In my case, the
plankton organisms are quite literally embedded into the silk and at the same
time, restricted and contained by it.
The process of integration as the constitution of something new can also be
regarded in Harré’s (2003: 28–31) words as an ‘apparatus-world complex’. A
technical device is capable of being ‘integrated into a unitary entity by fusion
with nature’ (Harré 2003: 28). And further:
An apparatus is not something transcendent to the world, outside it, 
interacting casually with nature. […] The apparatus and the 
neighbouring part of the world in which it is embedded constitute one
thing. (Harré 2003: 29). 
What I intend to emphasise is that the material integration, the intersection or
apparatus-world complex, realised in case of the CPR Survey is a constellation
that results in the constitution of a new thing or a new research object. The
sample is literally created rather than drawn or collected from a pre-existing
population.  Moreover, the samples are created in  a very specific  way, even
though  a  variety  of  interactions  of  materials  during  integration  cannot  be
controlled  or  even  observed  by  any  researcher.  However,  each  sampling
process is meticulously prepared for it to progress in a certain way. Besides the
unloading,  cutting,  and  labelling  of  samples,  the  preparation  of  each  tow
constitutes much of the researchers’ agency in the sample creation process. 
The novel character of the sample that results from integration is manifest in the
various effects of physical interactions between the technology and the object of
research: the more effective retention of larger organisms due to the silk’s mesh
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size, smaller plankton sticking to larger organisms or being caught in between
fibrous and twisted silk threads, clogging of the filtering, the flattened bodies of
some zooplankton species, and the overlap between adjacent samples caused
by  the  continuous  rather  than  discrete  character  of  the  mechanism.  These
effects of physical interactions are part of the material integration process and
shape the resulting object. 
What the CPR Survey treats as a research sample consists  not  only of  the
plankton organisms that have been retained during the filtering process. The
organisms  are  inextricably  connected  to  two  pieces  of  silk  by  virtue  of  the
constitutive interactions of various materials during integration. For the survey’s
main  purposes,  researchers  never  handle  individual  or  distinct  groups  of
organisms, but always the two labelled and archivable pieces of silk, soaked in
formalin  and  wrapped  in  plastic.  Silk,  label,  preservative,  and  wrapping  are
integral  parts  of  a  sample.  Asked whether  he  or  other  SAHFOS employees
would agree with this view, Johns explains that most would probably view the
silk  as  the  filtering  mechanism  and  the  actual  organisms  as  the  sample,
however, Johns immediately admits that “of course you couldn’t really have the
sample without [the silk]” (DR0533: 9). 
Despite  the  clear  spatial  dimensions  and  the  portability  of  a  sample,  its
boundaries are actually not that clear. The overlap or “smear” between adjacent
samples  somewhat  undermines  their  separation  and  association  with  two
distinctly  different  geographic  locations.  Additionally,  when  samples  are  first
folded, then opened and re-folded for analysis, preservation fluid may be added
or leak out. Even properly handled samples may happen to be contaminated
and initiate or accelerate a process of decay. In this sense, materiality resonates
with Butler’s (1993) account of materialisation as a multitude of stabilising or de-
stabilising processes that generate the image of a material object.
Material integration ends when the CPR is hauled in. An indispensable second
but not secondary aspect of materiality is what I call “material continuity”. The
very materials that were integrated during a tow are preserved in form of a
sample for the purpose of analysis and indefinite storage in the survey’s sample
archive. Unloading the CPR, cutting the silk, and subsequent labelling, folding,
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analysing,  and  archiving  of  samples  are  activities  performed  with  high
confidence  or  even  certainty  regarding  the  origin  of  the  sample  and  with
awareness  of  the  various  effects  and  potential  interactions  during  material
integration. Besides preparing samples for analysis, storage, or re-analysis, the
activities  aim  at  preserving  continuity  in  a  sense  that  there  are  no  jumps,
interruptions,  or  breaking  points  between  the  sample’s  material  and  the
sample’s origin. 
I use the term “origin” with caution, in particular in relation to material objects.
With  respect  to  “traces”  which  are  ‘material  manifestations’  in  experimental
settings before they are turned into data, Rheinberger (2011: 338–39) argues
that an origin does not exist and has never existed. With “origin” I refer here to
an individual  sample’s process of material  integration which has shaped the
sample  in  the  various  ways  described  above.  The  silk,  the  steel,  and  the
plankton organisms, as separated materials that become integrated, have their
respective origins in factories, plankton life cycles,  or in times and locations
even further back. 
In his account  of  biological  reproduction,  Griesemer (2014:  26–27) uses the
term ‘material continuity’ to describe a material  ‘overlap’ between parent and
offspring when ‘organized material parts’ are transferred between the two. Form
or information are transferred materially and not by any kind of impression or
translation to a different medium. In my case, although being pressed severely
into the silk, the plankton organisms usually remain sufficiently organised for the
sample  analyst  to  identify  and count  the  organisms using  certain  tools  and
methods of  manipulation,  as I  discuss in chapter  five. Important  here is the
absence of jumps or breaking points between the plankton populations in the
oceans and the organisms on silk samples in CPR Survey’s sample archive. In
case of the CPR samples, a translation or jump to a different medium is hardly
possible.  Although the sample is  not self-sufficient and actively  needs to be
preserved, everything about the sample is an integral part of it, including the
silk, formalin, the wrapping, and the label. 
Preservation is a key aspect of material continuity. The certainty regarding a
sample’s connection to a distinct origin is grounded in various practices in which
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the labelling is instrumental. Just from looking at a sample and being aware of
effects of material integration, nobody could connect one particular sample with
the time and the location of this particular sample’s integration. The connection
is  represented by the label  given to  the sample upon cutting the silk roll.  It
contains the route’s ID, the tow number, and the position of the sample along
the  length  of  the  tow.  This  contextual  information  is  indispensable  for  a
meaningful  analysis  of  the  sample.  Other  practices  that  underpin  material
continuity  are  the  adding  of  preservation  fluid  and  the  airtight  folding  and
storage. This is why the label, the formalin, and even the wrapping are integral
parts of the sample. They preserve the effect of boundary that constitutes the
material object, but they also preserve material continuity and the usability of
the sample. 
The epistemic value of a sample, the feature promoting the ‘acquisition of true
beliefs’ (Steel  2010:  18),  stems  from  materiality,  understood  as  material
integration  and continuity. This  two-fold  characteristic  initiates and maintains
both the connection between a sample and nature, as well as the usability of a
sample for the creation of meaningful scientific data. Material continuity means
that whatever may become interesting to a researcher during a sample analysis
has  always  been  and  will  remain  attached  to  the  very  material  that  was
physically integrated out in the oceans. In this sense, material continuity may be
regarded as an intrinsic characteristic of the samples in my case. As long as a
sample exists in its material form, it is linked to a specific origin. Even if the
connection was for whatever reason no longer traceable, a sense of continuity
would remain. In this case, however, the silk and the organisms could no longer
be used for the creation of meaningful data. If a CPR sample lost traceability, it
would inevitably lose its status as a research sample in that particular context.
In fact,  a sample that has become unusable or is no longer traceable to its
origin may be used for training purposes in the lab, but this would be a context
different from the routine sample analysis and creation of scientific data. In this
sense, the status of an object as a research sample depends on the context,
much like scientific data in Leonelli’s (2015) relational framework.
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4.4 Materiality versus representation
This chapter introduced the common view of samples in science as being used
as representations that are grounded in either material similarity or statistical
relations.  Although  within  the  CPR Survey, a  silk  sample  is  regarded  as  a
representation of “around three cubic metres of [filtered] sea water” or as “ten
nautical miles of the CPR going through sea water” (DR0934: 1), pinning down
what  target  a  CPR sample  may  represent  and  what  the  grounding  for  this
representation may be is  not  straightforward.  The above quotation relates a
sample neither to any aspect or segment of the ocean ecosystem, nor to any
organisms or populations in the sea water; instead, there seems to be a relation
between  a  silk  sample  and  a  section  of  a  tow  or  a  volume  of  water  that
interacted with a CPR. Establishing this relation is obviously motivated by the
sample’s  physical  characteristics:  The  sample  is  actually  made  of  the  very
materials  that  have  been  physically  involved  in  the  interactions  between
technology and the research object, between the silk, the steel, and all kinds of
materials that are part of the ecosystem and have flowed through the CPR’s
internal water tunnel. 
However, as I have argued above, sampling in my case involves the constitution
of  a  novel  research  object,  one  that  is  shaped  by  the  variety  of  physical
interactions during integration. As a result, despite continuity of materials, new
physical characteristics are constituted: plankton organisms sticking together,
organisms being deformed, and at a later stage, contamination and decay may
change  the  physical  characteristics  even  more  drastically  while  material
continuity remains. This continuity despite potential change is a manifestation
on the material level of the tension between change and continuity that I have
introduced in chapter one.
Due to the integration into a novel research object there is no straightforward
material similarity that justifies a representational relation, neither with a volume
of filtered seawater nor with a specific section of a tow. Further, because of the
smear between adjacent samples and the different retention rates depending on
organism  size  and  other  factors,  the  sample  is  also  not  a  straightforward
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representation of a plankton population. As I will argue in the following chapter,
not the sample itself, but rather the data obtained from sample analysis could
serve as a quantitative representation of a plankton population, but even this
representational relation turns out to be problematic.
Following the path of material continuity as I have done in this chapter does not
suggest  any  kind  of  representational  relation  between  the  sample  and
something else. In fact, material continuity rather suggests the opposite: The
process of sample creation involves continuity — the absence of jumps — and
no kind of translation, creation of an image, or impression onto a new medium.
The  very  material  that  was  integrated  during  a  CPR  tow  is  packaged,
transported,  and  divided  into  new  research  objects.  Further,  unlike  many
images or abstractions, which are established and used as representations of
other  entities,  it  is  obvious  that  a  CPR sample  is  not  reproducible  by  any
means.83 
Rheinberger (2015: 323–25) assigns preparations a materiality and durability
that is similar to that of the research samples in the CPR Survey. Preparations
‘participate in, are part of, the very materiality of the object under scrutiny’. Their
‘configuration’  is  expressed  in  physical,  biological,  and  chemical  properties
(Rheinberger 2015: 323). Similarly, and in addition to the terminological affinity
to the meticulous preparation process before each tow, a CPR silk sample has
assumed a specific configuration that makes it analysable. This configuration is
preserved  by  material  continuity.  Rheinberger  (2015:  323)  argues  that
‘preparations are renderings,  not  representations’;  they possess a ‘particular
indexicality’ that points to themselves and not to something that is represented
by the  preparation.  If  anything,  the  material  characteristics  of  a  silk  sample
seem to point to the processes involved in their formation, they point back to the
process of the material integration rather than to a target of a representational
relation.
83 Although not all representations may be reproducible, the reproducibility of 
research components like model organisms or the silicon samples in Mody and 
Lynch’s (2010) case is a fundamental feature of at least some kinds of 
representations.
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Reconsidering the bottles filled with stream water that constitute the samples in
Ribes  and  Jackson’s  (2013)  case  study  leads  to  similar  conclusions.  Their
samples are isolated ‘little bits of streams’ that are transported ‘back to labs in
ways  that  preserve  meaningful  relationships  to  those  streams’  (Ribes  and
Jackson 2013: 162). Both material integration and continuity are hidden in this
description. “Isolating” entails bottles and the creation of samples by integration.
The preservation of meaningful relationships to a stream is material continuity
and the preservation of its traceability. Although Ribes and Jackson (2013: 162)
claim that the samples are capable of ‘representing a stream at a particular
point  in  time’,  and  it  is  clear  that  this  association  is  motivated  by  material
characteristics of the sample, the epistemic value stems, as in my case, directly
from the sample’s material integration and continuity. 
4.5 Conclusion
On the basis of an empirical case study of a long-standing sampling practice in
ocean  science,  this  chapter  fleshed  out  how the  “materiality”  of  a  research
object is constituted and how the epistemic value of a sample is grounded in
materiality.  In  my  account,  materiality  consists  of  two  fundamental,
complementary  aspects:  material  integration  and  material  continuity.  While
material integration is the formation of novel research objects by entanglement
and fusion of materials from both the research technology and the research
target, material continuity refers to the handling, processing, and preservation of
the very material that was integrated. Meticulous preparation is necessary for
the material integration to proceed in a very specific, desired way; but still, the
various  physical  interactions  between  research  technology  and  parts  of  the
natural system during integration shape the newly created research object in
largely uncontrollable ways. 
The materiality of an object is not “finalised” after physical matter from various
sources  has  been  integrated.  Material  continuity  extends  the  process  of
materialisation and must actively be preserved to maintain a sample’s epistemic
value. In the conceptual void between science and nature that I have sketched
in chapter one, material continuity encompasses one important assemblage of
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practices and processes that fills this gap. By the same token, representation,
as a relation that supposedly connects science with nature by producing truthful
or  at  least  similar  images or  abstractions  of  natural  processes is  no  longer
required  to  account  for  the  epistemic  value  and  for  the  crucial  connection
between samples and natural phenomena. 
Based  on  my  view  of  samples  as  newly  constituted  research  objects,  I
challenge the view of samples as entities that are collected from a population of
the  same  or  a  similar  kind.  Samples  result  from  creation  (integration)  and
ongoing processes of embodiment (continuity) and are not extracted from the
natural into the cultural sphere as a representation of the former. However, the
question of representing natural systems is only suspended for now, because
this chapter has not even touched upon the creation of actual scientific data and
their potential  to be used as representations of natural systems. This is why
chapter five begins with a more elaborate review of philosophical accounts of
scientific representation. 
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Chapter Five – Targets of scientific representing: The 
creation of data in the CPR Survey
Abstract: This chapter reconstructs the analysis of CPR samples and the 
processing of hand-written tally marks into digital scientific data. Building on the
work of Hacking (1983), Latour (1999), and Rheinberger (1995), I view scientific
representing with data as the result of a series of transformations or translations
of perceived qualities of objects into standardised forms. These actions are 
intended to increase the circulation and computability of data and enable their 
integration and comparability with already existing representations. I argue that 
the scope of representation changes with each transformation and broadens 
from specific characteristics of an individual sample to processes of the ocean 
ecosystem as the data gradually become more compatible with already existing
data. The use of data as representations depends on the data’s immediate 
context, their physical state and their relation to other data, implying that 
representing is a context-dependent, practical achievement and not an intrinsic 
property of data. My empirical research reveals a perceivable mismatch 
between data and the natural world that resonates with attempts to untie the 
close coupling between scientific representation and models which has recently
dominated philosophical accounts of representation and suggests a fixed 
representational relation between a model and a target object or system 
(Knuuttila 2010). 
5.1 Introduction
This chapter is about the creation of scientific data and their relation to objects
or processes of real-world systems84 such as the ocean ecosystem. In many
84 The terms “real-world target” and “real-world system” are used in this thesis to 
refer to phenomena and processes of the natural environment, which ocean 
scientists ultimately intend to study and create knowledge of. I do not imply that 
objects in laboratories or other artificial environments are not part of the real world.
My usage of the term “real world” is not intended as a philosophical stance on 
scientific realism.
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sciences, data are used as representations of such systems, but how scientific
representation actually works is a controversial topic in philosophy of science.
Discussions and accounts of scientific representation have seemingly narrowed
down to representation with models. Many of these accounts are based on a
view of representing that assumes relatively stable or even permanent relations
between  a  model  and  a  target.  This  chapter’s  account  of  scientific
representation takes the activity of data creation and not scientific modelling as
a starting point.
The CPR Survey’s data practices exemplify that scientific representation with
data occurs at different stages of an epistemic process in which the ability and
purposes of representing with data depend on the data’s immediate context and
format. In my case study, the difference is apparent in the stages before and
after  data  which  have  been  created  with  microscopes  in  a  laboratory  are
transcribed from hand-written notebooks into digital databases. A consequence
of the dependency on context is that representational relations — intentionally
established  denotations  of  a  target  with  an  object  —  are  not  intrinsic  or
permanent qualities of data. Scientific data and their representational functions
are practical achievements that depend on a variety of conditions. They are not
given qualities or intrinsic to an object in a way that allows scientists to simply
extract or read them.
The practice of data creation studied for this thesis suggests that representing
functions as a series of transformations or translations of perceived qualities of
objects into  standardised forms.  These actions are intended to  increase the
circulation  and  computability  of  data  and  enable  their  integration  with  other
existing representations. Hacking’s (1983) view of scientific representing as well
as  Latour’s  (1999)  and  Rheinberger’s  (1995)  studies  of  scientific  practice
suggest  that  assuming  straightforward  and  truthful  relations  between
representations  and  the  world  is  problematic.  Some  of  the  terminology  I
encountered during my empirical research indicate a sort of mismatch and an
uncertainty regarding correspondence between data and real-world systems. I
thus  follow  Hacking’s,  Latour’s  and  Rheinberger’s  accounts  and  argue  that
representing is not about establishing correspondence between data and an
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origin  that  is  part  of  a  real-world  system.  Rather,  representing  makes  data
gradually more compatible and usable with already existing representations. 
This chapter continues the in-depth empirical study of the CPR Survey, focusing
now on  the  creation  of  scientific  data  in  the  lab.  CPR data  are  created  in
successive  steps  of  analysing  pieces  of  silk  which  have  retained  plankton
organisms during a CPR tow, as I have described in the previous chapter. A
crucial change of context is achieved when hand-written data that have been
recorded on paper during the sample analysis turn into digitised quantities in the
survey’s database.  The paper-based data  are created as representations of
characteristics of an individual sample or tow. The majority of these data are in
the form of tally marks in a sample analyst’s personal notebook. This context
limits the ability to circulate or integrate the data with other existing data. In the
context  of  a  digital  database,  the  CPR data  are  processed into  spatial  and
temporal averages before they are circulated to external scientists and used for
reasoning about real-world systems. The key for inferring scientific claims is not
the establishing of permanent representational relations between data and the
real world. The key is making data compatible and integrable with other data.
These include the CPR Survey’s own records of  the past  which have been
created using the same methodology. The paper-based data have a narrow
representational  scope  that  only  encompasses  the  individual  sample  or  the
individual  tow  from  which  they  originate.  By  contrast,  the  digital  data’s
representational  scope  encompasses  parts  or  processes  of  the  actual
environment by virtue of transient, context-dependent relations between data
and other existing representations. 
This  chapter  focuses  on  scientific  representation  while  deliberately  side-
stepping  a  deeper  discussion  of  scientific  modelling.  As  Knuuttila  (2011)
remarks,  philosophical  accounts  of  scientific  representation  have  ‘focused
almost  exclusively  on  modelling’,  resulting  in  a  rather  limited  view  of  both
scientific representation and modelling. Grounded in my empirical research, this
chapter discusses the creation and the handling of data as representations, not
as models, even if some philosophers might argue that this distinction is not
needed.  The  chapter  concludes  with  thoughts  on  a  conceptual  distinction
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between  data  and  samples,  taking  into  account  the  previous  chapter’s
conclusions  regarding  a  sample’s  materiality  and  this  chapter’s  account  of
representing with data. I suggest that samples are primarily characterised by a
material relation to a real-world target, while data are characterised by transient
representational relations. It is important that neither of these relations can be
viewed as intrinsic but rather as practically achieved by a variety of epistemic
activities. 
The following two sections review some of the extensive scholarly literature on
scientific  representation.  I  focus  first  on  intentionality  and  the  relation  to
scientific models, I then review several accounts of representation in scientific
practice  and  discuss  the  notion  of  representational  scope.  This  chapter’s
empirical part accounts for analysis of CPR samples and discusses the context,
format, and representational scope of data created at different stages of the
analysis. My description roughly follows the survey’s workflow chronologically,
beginning with the very first step of analysis, a visual assessment of an entire
sample’s degree of greenness, followed by three steps of microscopic analysis
performed on the samples. 
5.1.1 Scientific representation, models, and data
Representation  is  one  of  the  most  central  topics  of  philosophy, bearing  on
countless scholarly debates throughout the history of philosophical study. Yet,
as Elgin (2010: 2) notes, ‘the term “representation” is irritatingly imprecise’. In
many research fields, scientists create, handle, and reason on the basis of a
variety of objects or things which they use as representations in many different
ways and for a wide range of purposes: Among these objects are data or data
sets,  models,  samples,  records,  simulations,  model  organisms,  preparations,
and visualisations. Representations of parts or processes of the real world, but
also of  imagined or  fictional  entities,  are crucial  for  scientific  reasoning and
philosophers have put much effort into understanding how scientists create and
use representations in practice. 
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A few  main  problems  have  emerged  in  philosophical  accounts  of  scientific
representation,  including  problems  of  style,  ontology,  accuracy,  how  to
demarcate scientific from non-scientific representation, and what constitutes an
object as a scientific representation in the first place (Frigg and Nguyen 2016).
The  latter  question  regarding  the  creation  or  establishing  of  scientific
representation,  the  “constitutive  problem”,  is  addressed  in  this  chapter’s
empirical account. This chapter’s analysis is grounded in a very distinct case of
practice  in  which  one  specific  style  of  representing  dominates.  This  style
involves  numerical,  quantitative  data,  even  though  these  data  may  later  be
processed into objects of different styles, for example plotted graphs or maps.
Certain  steps  of  data  processing  also  relate  to  questions  of  accuracy  and
ontology, but these issues are not central to my argument about the context-
dependency of data.
Callender and Cohen (2006: 75) take a strong position towards the constitutive
problem by arguing that a scientific representation is constituted ‘by virtue of the
mental  states  of  their  makers/users’.85 Most  conceptions  of  scientific
representation indeed share the idea that representation requires an agent and
an intentional act of establishing a representational relation (Frigg and Nguyen
2016).  For  example,  Giere’s  (2010:  269)  ‘intentional  conception  of  scientific
representation’ proposes that scientific representation requires four elements: a
model that represents, a target that is represented, the intention of an actor, and
a specific purpose. Because of the intentional character of representation, I aim
to  avoid  the  impression  that  objects  or  things  can  be  regarded  as
representations per se and I also argue for this view on the basis of my own
case  study. However,  this  is  sometimes  complicated by  the  convenience  of
stating that  “this object  represents something else” instead of  “this object is
intentionally used as a representation of something else by this person”. Even if
not explicitly formulated like the latter expression, my view of representation
implies the presence of an agent who is actively establishing a representational
relation. 
85 In Frigg and Nguyen (2016), the line of thinking about scientific representation 
based on this ‘radical’ view is called ‘General Griceanism and Stipulative Fiat’.
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Including actors and intentions into conceptions of scientific representation is a
change  of  viewpoint  that  is  potentially  beneficial  for  the  study  of  scientific
practice.  As  Chang  (2011:  208)  suggests  in  his  ‘philosophical  grammar  of
scientific  practice’,  the ‘simple linguistic  trick’  of  using  verb  forms instead of
common  nouns  —  “representing”  instead  of  “representation”  —  structures
philosophers’  thinking  differently. Consequently, ‘a  whole  range  of  questions
regarding  actions  emerge  naturally, almost  without  any  effort:  who  is  doing
what, why, how, and in what context?’ (Chang 2011: 208). 
Given that representing is realised by a variety of people using a wide range of
objects  and  in  a  variety  of  scientific  and  non-scientific  contexts,  Knuuttila’s
(2010,  2011)  observation  that  philosophical  discussions  of  scientific
representation  have  almost  exclusively  elaborated  on  modelling  may  be
worrisome.  Knuuttila  (2010:  142)  has  identified  a  ‘model-target  dyad’,  a
representational relation between a single model and a target system that is
represented,  as  the  ‘basic  unit’  of  many  current  philosophical  accounts  of
scientific representation. Giere’s (2010) conception, for example, does include
an actor’s intention and a purpose but also contains the dyad between a model
that represents and a represented target. Frigg and Nguyen (2016) remark, too,
that  the  majority  of  philosophical  literature  on  scientific  representation  is
‘predominantly concerned with scientific models’. This is presumably a result of
philosophers  having  recognised  the  role  of  scientific  models  as  ‘principal
instruments  of  modern  science’  (Frigg  and  Hartmann  2017).  The  numerous
objects which scientists use as representations, tend to be subsumed by the
notion of models in this view. Yet, despite the growing importance of scientific
models, environmental sciences such as oceanography heavily rely on the use
of scientific data as representations. Arguably, scientists in those fields tend to
maintain  sharp  distinctions  between  scientific  models,  data  resulting  from
modelling practices, and empirical, observational data.
The notion of “data models” merges the two terms and accounts for scientific
representation  with  data  by  explicitly  employing  an interpretation  of  data  as
models. This move is motivated by the idea that in scientific practice, data used
by  scientists  for  representing  are  always  processed  and  manipulated  to  an
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extent that makes them a model of the originally acquired data, which are often
termed “raw data” (Harris 2003). Data models ‘impose order’,  they ‘regiment
and  streamline  data’,  explains  Elgin  (2010:  12).  Thereby,  processed  data
incorporate decisions driven by theories, background knowledge, and research
goals.  Harris  (2003:  1515)  argues,  however,  that  even  the  data  created  or
acquired  at  the  lowest,  least  manipulated  level  have  embodied  theoretical
principles and commitments of scientists.86 Therefore even these low-level data
should be viewed as models ‘that involve interpretation from the start’ (Harris
2003: 1515). The data are not copies of a real-world target, but models that
‘represent inexactly’ (Harris 2003: 1509). Harris comes to the conclusion that
data creation or acquisition in most scientific cases cannot readily be viewed in
separation from data manipulation and processing. The two activities are not
independent  of  each  other  (Harris  2003:  1516).  My  chapter  follows  this
suggestion and studies empirically how scientists create and process data for
the purpose of representing real-world targets. 
Data models as a concept emphasise the constructed, manipulated, and theory-
laden  character  of  scientific  data.  However,  they  introduce  the  danger  of
conflating  the  two  categories  and  their  associated  practices  from  the  start.
Despite  some common features,  data  and models  are arguably products of
different  epistemic  practices:  data  practices  which  include  sampling  and
modelling.  These are  associated  with  different  roles  and meanings in  many
scientific disciplines. Further, there is no reason to assume that any given type
of data created and used by scientists fits into existing modelling conceptions
because they are manipulated and have inaccuracies.  If  that  was the case,
philosophers could abandon the notion of data altogether. I thus do not rely on
the concept of data models for my account of representing with data.
That  representations  used  by  scientists  are  inexact  or  inaccurate  has  been
emphasised by a variety of scholars. It needs to be clear that  the idea of an
absolutely  truthful  or  perfectly  accurate  scientific  representation  is  a
misconception. Scientific representations are not mirror images, copies, and in
most cases not even imitations of what they are supposed to represent (Frigg
86 See my discussion of “theory-ladenness” of data in chapter one.
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and Nguyen 2016). Even the idea of similarity between a representation and its
target,  which  has  often  been  put  forward  as  the  key  to  constituting  a
representation, should be considered only as one of many specific styles of
representing or as a normative criterion for accurate representation, as Frigg
and Nguyen (2016) note.87 Ian Hacking (1983: 145) already pointed out with
regard to the variety of elaborate and often competing representations of targets
in physics that ‘there is no final truth of the matter, only a barrage of more or
less instructive representations’.88
5.1.2 Specifying representation in studies of scientific practice
Examples of concrete practices of representing shed light on how instructive or
useless scientific representations may be. In Leonelli’s (2016: 811) view, the
‘prospective usefulness as evidence’ for ‘knowledge claims of interest to the
researchers involved’ is a defining aspect of  data. Further, data can only be
identified with respect to specific research situations and contexts of enquiry in
which  they  may  be  useful  (Leonelli  2016:  818).  I  follow  this  emphasis  on
concrete research situations by focusing on the local context of newly created
data and examining their prospective usefulness for scientific claims. 
To consider  the  “prospective  usefulness”  of  a  given  set  of  data  is  not  a
straightforward  task,  because  it  requires  taking  into  account  claims  and
reasoning based on the potential of data to represent certain targets. Of course,
philosophers study scientific practice and examine how representing with data
figures in concrete epistemic processes which have led to the formulation of
scientific claims or theories. However, the possibilities of a given set of data to
87 As Elgin (2010: 1) clarifies, ‘mimetic accounts of representation fail to do justice to 
our representational practices. Many seemingly powerful and effective 
representations turn out on a mimetic account to be at best flawed, at worst 
unintelligible.’
88 Note that inaccuracy and misrepresentation are qualities that theories of scientific 
representation need to account for, according to Frigg and Nguyen (2016). Though
inaccurate, an object can still be used to denote or stand for a target without losing
its status as a representation.
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function as evidence for claims can never be exhaustively known at any point in
time. This gap between known data applications and potential use as evidence
is particularly salient in data-intensive sciences in which many types of data are
generated  without  clearly  formulated  purposes  or  specific  representational
targets  and  in  which  data  are  stored,  made  accessible,  manipulated,  re-
purposed, or integrated with other data multiple times. 
Despite this  gap,  philosophers have made an effort  towards conceptualising
scientific representing of specific targets. Morgan (2003) argues that there is a
difference  between  an  object  being  “representative  of”  a  target  and
“representative for” a target. Taking the example of a laboratory mouse which is
a  typical  model  organism,  Morgan  (2003:  228)  explains  that  the  mouse  is
representative of other mice but can also be representative for other types of
organisms, humans, for example. Being “representative of” a target involves a
relation similar to the one between a sample and a population: being ‘of the
same  case’  or  ‘the  same  type  and  the  same  stuff’  (Morgan  2003:  228).
Establishing an object as a representation for targets of different types usually
relies  on  additional  evidence  and  similarity  reasoning  (Morgan  2003:  228).
Ankeny  and  Leonelli  (2011:  315)  claim  that  the  “representative  of”-type  of
representing  encompasses  a  narrow,  endogenous  scope,  while  the
“representative for”-type of representing encompasses a broader, exogenous
scope. They advocate a specification of representing that operates one level
above Morgan’s. The endogenous/exogenous distinction applies to a model’s
“representational  scope”,  but  not  to its “representational  target”  (Ankeny and
Leonelli 2011: 315). Although arguing as Morgan with regard to representation
with models and model organisms in particular, Ankeny and Leonelli claim that
the representational scope refers to the spectrum of potential applications and
scenarios  in  which  a  model  could  produce  evidence  for  claims.  The
representational target, however, refers to a specific type of entity or feature that
is represented by the model in each scenario. 
A set of temperature data measured in a cooling body of water will always have
a water body’s temperature as its representational target, yet the scope of such
data can vary: The data could potentially be used as evidence for knowledge
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claims related to physical, chemical, or biological processes in the very body of
water in which the temperature was measured but also in bodies of water with
comparable conditions. The latter could include artificial water basins, natural
lakes,  oceans,  or  even  fictional  scenarios  realised  in  numerical  models  or
thought experiments.  These distinctions are certainly helpful tools to describe
and conceptualise scientific representation in concrete research situations. Yet,
an  uneasy  feeling  remains  with  regard  to  both  the  gap  between  known
applications and potential data uses and also with regard to the dyad of model
and target. The identification of endogenous or exogenous and representative
scopes and targets might actually reinforce the model-target dyad. 
In his study of creating soil samples in the Amazon Forest, Latour (1999: 69–73)
criticises  the  ‘canonical  view’  which  puts  the  world  and  representations  in
opposition and thereby creates the ‘radical gap that must be reduced through
the search for correspondence, for reference, between words and the world’
(Latour 1999: 69). Latour proposes instead a chain of transformations which
translate or convert matter into a certain form. This chain grows from a starting
point towards two extremities: Through reduction towards local and particular
research  contexts  on  one  end  and  through  amplification  towards
standardisation,  circulation,  and  increased  compatibility  on  the  other  end
(Latour 1999: 71). In this view, a chain of adequate transformations could turn
temperature data from a distinct body of water into data that are capable of
representing  ocean  phenomena.  The  scope  of  the  data  is  thus  amplified.
Latour’s chain also allows for reduction towards the particular: The data could
be transformed and used as a representation of phenomena that have occurred
in  the  very  body  of  water  that  was  part  of  the  experiment.  An  important
requirement  for  moving  along  the  chain  either  direction  is  traceability  of  all
transformations (Latour 1999: 69). 
Data can ‘easily be construed as a starting point for scientific reasoning about a
variety of phenomena’ (Leonelli 2015: 811–12), but in Latour’s framework, there
is no pre-determined direction for the creation of the chain. Moving towards a
rather  narrow, localised scope via steps of  reduction and moving towards a
broader  scope  via  steps  of  amplification  are  equally  possible.  In  principle,
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Latour’s chain of reference extends infinitely into both directions. It thus conveys
a similar perspective on representation as Rheinberger’s (1995: 51) claim that
‘the activity of scientific representation is to be conceived as a process without
“referent” and without “origins”’:
There is no such thing as a representation of an object in science’. 
Basically, my argument is that anything “represented,” any referent, 
upon closer inspection and as soon as we try to get hold of it, is 
turned itself into a representation. (Rheinberger 1995: 51)89
There  is  no  real  world  filled  with  potential  targets  that  is  external  to  the
representations a scientist  creates. Each transformation creates a real  entity
that can, again, be brought into a certain form for specific epistemic purposes. 
It becomes clear from Latour’s chain of transformations that something specific
happens at each stage of the epistemic process. Each transformation either
functions as a way of amplifying or reducing the representational scope of data.
Morgan  (2012:  322–28)  points  out  in  reference  to  Hacking’s  (1983)
Representing and Intervening  that scientists interfere rather than represent by
using a microscope. Such an interference has a “scoping” effect which ‘enables
us to see and investigate hidden things’ (Morgan 2012: 322).90 Making features
visible  that  are  otherwise  obscured  can  be  achieved  by  amplifying  specific
features  or  by  reducing  noise  but  a  variety  of  epistemic  activities  may  be
involved  in  these  steps.  Elgin  (2010)  elaborates  on  representations  as
exemplification: Scientific experiments exemplify because ‘they select, highlight,
control and manipulate things so that features of interest are brought to the fore
and their relevant characteristics and interactions made manifest’ (Elgin 2010:
6). 
The empirical part of this chapter tracks epistemic actions with a scoping effect
in an example of scientific data creation. I intend to employ two understandings
of the term “scope”.  The first  is  motivated by the representational  scope as
explained  by  Ankeny  and  Leonelli  (2016).  Although  I  am  not  interested  in
89 Emphasis in original.
90 Emphasis in original.
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distinguishing between a scope and a target of a representation, scientists who
create data undeniably have a certain spectrum of applications and scenarios in
mind in which created data are expected to serve as starting points for scientific
reasoning.  The  second  understanding  is  motivated  by  the  scoping  effect  of
interventions  that  act  on  an  object  and  amplify  or  reduce  only  some  of  its
characteristics. Since microscopes are crucial for the data creation in my case
study, this understanding works quite literally. 
5.2 The creation of CPR data
The process of sample analysis in the CPR Survey has been documented and
published  in  several  marine  biological  and  oceanographic  journals.91 My
description of the sample analysis is informed by these papers but is also firmly
grounded  in  observations  I  made  in  the  survey’s  lab  and  in  ethnographic
interviews with the lab manager and sample analysts. 
After  the  silk  rolls  have  been  unloaded  from  the  CPR,  cut  into  individual
samples, and labelled as described in chapter four, they are stored in a cabinet
between the survey’s operations workshop area and the laboratory. The sample
analysis consists of four steps which are performed in a strict order: The first
step, an assessment of the silk colour, already happens right when the silk is
cut  into  individual  samples.  The  other  three  steps  are  performed  with
microscopes after the silk has been cut into samples and after the sample has
been allocated to an analyst. The three microscopic steps are then performed in
immediate succession so that a sample will  be unpacked from its temporary
storage in the cabinet only once.
5.2.1 Visual assessment of the silk colour
The very first of the four steps is performed when the entire band of silk is rolled
out by the cutter. After the positions of individual samples have been marked on
the silk, the overall colour of each sample is assessed by the cutter using the
91 See for example Reid et al. (2003), Batten et al. (2003), Richardson et al. (2006), 
and Raitsos et al. (2013).
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naked eye (Richardson et al. 2006: 67). This step of analysis is conducted as
early as possible after the CPR has returned to Plymouth because the plankton
organisms lose their colour in the formalin solution as time progresses (Raitsos
et  al.  2013:  162).  This  also  means  that  the  colour  analysis  can  only  be
performed  once  with  each  sample.  From  the  colour  assessment,  scientists
derive a ‘proxy of the phytoplankton biomass’ that has been used widely ‘to
describe  major  temporal  and  spatial  patterns  of  phytoplankton  in  the  North
Atlantic’ since 1931 (Raitsos et al. 2013: 159).
Figure 5.1: Cutting point sheet of tow 650SA (650th tow on the SA route). From left to
right column: sections of the silk band marked prior to deployment, actual cutting point
in accordance with the ship’s speed, handwritten ID number of the analyst to whom a
sample  is  allocated,  colour  assessment  (PCI),  and  cutter’s  ID  number  and  date
(DR8112).
In order to assess the colour, a daylight bulb is turned on and a black-out blind
in the room has to be closed for proper visual assessment of the silk colour. A
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white background is slid behind the silk and the colour impression of the filtering
silk  is  evaluated in  reference  to  a  four-category  colour  chart.  The colour  is
categorised as either ‘Nil – no colour’, ‘VPG – very pale green/brown’, ‘PG –
pale  green/brown’  ,  or  ‘G  –  green/brown’.92 As  an  additional  reference,  the
analyst cutting the silk may look at “tram lines” along the silk’s two opposite
sides, where the silk has run through the internal CPR mechanism. These lines
are not covered with plankton and the silk has therefore largely retained its
original colour. According to the survey’s standard procedures, the cutter also
needs to make sure that the greenness of the sample is not obscured by certain
zooplankton organisms of rather brown colour. The cutter therefore needs to lift
the covering silk and look for the presence of zooplankton. On the so-called
cutting point sheet, where the exact cutting points of the silk band are noted, the
cutter records the impression. A typical recording of the sample colour on the
sheet  would  be  “VPG  1–24”  and  “PG  24–end”,  indicating  that  the  first  24
samples of that tow look very pale green and the remaining samples look pale
green (fig 5.1). 
At the moment of noting the colour impression on the cutting point sheet, the
sample cutter creates scientific data. These data are physical artefacts, created
by the cutter as representations of a characteristic of the sample, specifically,
the sample’s colour impression. Data creation involves a new medium: a paper
sheet on which a sample characteristic that has been assessed and categorised
by a data generator, the cutter of the silk, is inscribed. The paper and writing
provide  portability  and  readability  and  thereby  enable  communication  and
circulation  of  the  sample’s  recorded property. Furthermore,  the  cutting  point
sheet containing the data can also be stored and retrieved. While the colour of
the  silk  fades  during  storage  of  the  sample,  the  data  creation  captures  a
sample’s temporary characteristic and inscribes it onto a more durable medium.
What  makes  these  data  physical  artefacts  is  not  just  the  inscription  on  a
physical  piece  of  paper  with  a  pen or  pencil.  The data  are  also  generated
intentionally in a certain way, under specific, artificial conditions, using a specific
colour  chart  for  reference,  and  as  one  of  four  possible  values.  While  the
92 Quoted from an excerpt of the survey’s standard procedures that explains the 
plankton colour analysis.
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greenness of the sample is a given for the person who is cutting the sample, the
data on the cutting point sheet are clearly artefacts.
The  previous  paragraph  contains  several  terminological  “pointers”  to  other
scholarship on scientific data.93 I am not interested in comparing or testing the
data in my case against these accounts, instead, I intend to draw attention to
the context of the hand-written data, to their representational scope, which the
context at least partly determines, and to the scoping effect achieved by the
data creation.
The cutting point sheet is stapled together with several other sheets that relate
to one specific tow and contain a variety of metadata: The original ship’s log
form that is returned from the ship contains locations and times of the beginning
and the end of the tow as well as course alterations; an additional tow log form
generated after the tow which matches the ship’s tow log but contains additional
information  on the  ship’s  speed,  the  tow length,  the  numbers  of  the  CPR’s
internal cassette and propeller, and additional instruments that were attached to
the CPR; the sample positions sheet which matches each sample’s position
along the silk band with geographic locations and the time of sampling; and
lastly, a sheet added by the workshop team after checking the CPR’s technical
components  following  a  tow.  Claire  Taylor,  deputy  lab  manager  and  an
experienced sample analyst, says that some of the sheets are not really used,
but ‘everything that pertains to this route is held together’ (DR8112: 7–8). While
the sheets enable communication of data and metadata relating to one tow,
they  only  circulate  within  SAHFOS.  One  of  their  main  purposes  is  being  a
reference  for  ‘cross-comparing  everything’,  Taylor  explains  (DR8112:  7).  A
majority of data and metadata on the sheets shown to me were ticked off by a
person making sure that every bit of information relating to one tow is consistent
and double-checked (fig. 5.1).
The data in this format and context are closely attached to an individual tow. On
the basis of the data as they are on the cutting point sheets, no scientific claims
93 Portability, communication, and physical artefact (Leonelli 2015); inscription 
(Latour 1986); data generator (Hacking 1992); storing, retrieving, and durability 
(Rheinberger 2011).
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about the phytoplankton population in the oceans are made. The data are not
used  as  representations  of  a  real-world  system’s  parts  or  processes.  Data
inscribed  as  “VPG  1–24”  relate  primarily  to  qualitative  characteristics  of  a
specific  tow’s samples.  The representational  scope,  the  range of  objects  or
processes these data represent in the context of the cutting procedure and the
stapled sheets, is thus relatively narrow. It is restricted to a tow’s samples and
does  not  encompass  any  aspect  of  the  real-world  ecosystem.  Despite  this
relatively narrow scope, the data generation is a step towards standardisation
and circulation of a sample’s characteristics. Transient qualities of matter are
transformed  into  form  in  a  very  specific,  standardised  way  so  that  the
information  can  circulate  and  be  traced  back  if  necessary.  In  Latour’s
terminology, the creation of data on the cutting point sheets is an amplification
and a first step away from the particular. 
Another amplification is achieved through further processing and moving of the
data into a digital database. The colour values are entered manually into the
CPR Survey’s database, but not as qualitative values expressing a degree of
greenness: The four categories are converted to numerical values, according to
the so-called Phytoplankton Colour Index (PCI). Since the 1960s, the values “no
colour”, “very pale green/brown”, “pale green/brown”, and “green/brown” have
been converted into the numerical values 0, 1, 2, and 6.5, respectively. These
quantities indicate the relative mass of chlorophyll a on a sample. For example,
a sample identified as “pale green” is estimated to contain double the amount of
phytoplankton biomass than a sample identified as “very pale green”. A “green”
sample is estimated to contain 6.5 times the phytoplankton biomass of a “very
pale green” sample. Experiments involving extractions of chlorophyll  a from a
sample were conducted in the 1960s to derive the four PCI values (Raitsos et
al. 2013: 159–60). 
The digitisation and conversion of the qualitative colour data to quantitative PCI
values  open  up  a  wide  range  of  potential  data  uses  and  increase  the
representational  scope  of  the  data.  The  database  contains  all  previously
created PCI data, which allows for comparisons and, most importantly, for the
computation of spatial  and temporal  averages. At least since the 1970s, the
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CPR Survey has been using 41 pre-defined standard areas routinely for spatial
averaging of their data (fig. 5.2). The North Atlantic and the North Sea, where
the majority of CPRs are towed, are divided into 41 areas. Many of these follow
the edge of the continental shelf which is defined at the one hundred fathom
contour, equivalent to a depth of circa two hundred metres. The size of the
boxes on the shelf are smaller than those on the open ocean ‘to reflect the more
dynamic  physical  environment,  larger  biological  variability’  and  the  higher
number  of  CPR  samples  from  these  areas  (Richardson  et  al.  2006:  63).
Transformations of this kind clearly aim at increasing the scope to a level that
encompasses  the  natural  system,  because  the  system’s  dynamics  and
topography are taken into account.
Figure 5.2: The CPR Survey’s 41 standard areas in the North Atlantic and the North
Sea which are routinely used to average data spatially (Barton et al. 2003: 339).
In an example of data use, Barton et al. (2003: 340) have taken the PCI data as
‘qualitative  monthly  measures  of  relative  phytoplankton  abundance’.94 They
relate the data to multi-decadal physical processes of the oceans, such as the
North Atlantic Oscillation95 (Barton et al. 2003: 340), for which monthly means of
94 “Qualitative” indicates here that the data are based on a qualitative assessment. 
The authors have certainly used quantities to calculate monthly means.
95 The North Atlantic Oscillation describes cyclical anomalies in sea surface air 
pressure between pressure centres near Iceland and above the Azores. The 
anomalies influence temperatures and precipitation in the Northern hemisphere; 
<http://climate.ncsu.edu/climate/patterns/NAO.html> [accessed 1 December 2016].
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the PCI values for the 41 standard areas have been calculated for the years
1948 to 2000.
Lab manager David Johns explains that the general scientific purpose of the
colour  assessment  is  to  be  able  to  reason about  changes in  phytoplankton
biomass in the oceans:
“The whole idea of that is, it gives you a very broad indicator of 
phytoplankton biomass, just by visual assessment. And I would think 
that sounds like really woolly science, you know, ‘It’s kind of dark 
green, it’s kind of pretty green.’ But it actually matches up. We have 
got sixty or seventy years and it actually matches up with satellite 
data really well. So if we say ‘This is a really green sample in this 
area,’ it represents high biomass and then we would check satellite 
records and they recorded high chlorophyll levels as well. So it is a 
good initial assessment.” (DR0934: 1–2)
An assessment using the naked eye may sound “woolly”  and Raitsos et al.
(2013: 162) admit as well that the colour assessment ‘could be characterized as
a crude approach’. However, the method’s ‘strength lies in a time series that
extends over sixty years for much of the western European shelf collected and
assessed in a consistent manner’ (Raitsos et al. 2013: 162). The relative PCI
values of previous decades have been confirmed by extracting the chlorophyll
from the  samples  and  measuring  its  mass  per  sample  with  a  much  larger
sample size than the original experiments of the 1960s (Raitsos et al. 2013).
It may not be surprising that the very first data recordings from a silk sample,
the hand-written, qualitative colour values, are not yet ready to be used as a
basis for scientific claims about the ocean ecosystem. In order to be used as
evidence  for  claims,  data  in  almost  every  scientific  field  usually  require
calibration, cleaning, averaging, digital storing and accessibility, and other steps
of processing. My analysis emphasises that the requirement of these epistemic
activities  makes  the  status  of  scientific  data  as  representations  a  context-
dependent  practical  achievement.  Data have no representational  power built
into them. The use of data as representations of real-world systems such as
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parts or processes of an ocean’s ecosystem is only possible after moving data
into a new context and translating them to a new medium: from the stapled
sheets pertinent to an individual tow to a digital database where all data the
survey  has  created  in  the  past  are  linked  together  and  computable.  In  the
course of this transition, the representational scope of the data broadens from
an individual tow to processes of the real-world ecosystem.
5.2.2 Microscopic analysis of sub-samples
Unlike the colour assessment and the PCI data, the three steps of microscopic
sample analysis aim at the creation of data related to distinct taxonomic entities.
The  CPR  Survey  distinguishes  around  800  different  taxa  routinely  in  their
identification and counting practice.96 
In this section, I argue that scientific representation with the data created in the
microscopic analysis is realised in a procedure analogue to the PCI data I have
described in the previous section. However, hand-written data that are created
during  the  microscopic  analysis  have  a  representational  scope  that  is  even
more narrow and only relates to one individual sample and not to an individual
tow. Using the data for representation of real-world targets is only possible after
the data have been further processed and moved into a new context.
For  the  microscopic  analysis,  individual  samples  are  allocated  to  a  sample
analyst, also frequently called a plankton taxonomist, who retrieves the sample
from the  temporary  storage.  The  microscopic  analysis  is  divided  into  three
steps,  which  relate  to  organisms of  different  size  ranges:  the  phytoplankton
stage  which  accounts  for  the  ocean’s  smallest  organisms,  the  “zooplankton
traverse”  which  accounts  for  zooplankton  organisms  with  sizes  up  to  two
millimetres, and the “zooplankton eyecount” which focuses on all zooplankton
larger than two millimetres. All three steps involve identification and counting of
96 Individual samples certainly never contain this huge number of different taxa. The 
composition of plankton species on one sample depends on the regional 
ecosystem through which the CPR has been towed. 
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plankton  organisms.  The  method,  however,  by  which  the  samples  and  the
organisms are examined and counted varies with each step.
Figure 5.3: Parts of the silk analysed in the phytoplankton and zooplankton traverse
stages.  Top:  small  circles  along  the  filtering  silk’s  diagonals  indicate  the  twenty
microscopic  fields  of  view that  a  taxonomist  examines  in  the  phytoplankton  stage.
Bottom:  staggered  horizontal  lines  on  the  filtering  and  covering  silk  indicate  the
traverses along which organisms are identified and counted in the zooplankton traverse
(Richardson et al. 2006: 34).
An important  aspect  of  steps one and two  is  that  not  the  entire  sample  is
analysed  but  instead,  the  two  pieces  of  silk  are  sub-sampled.  In  the
phytoplankton stage, a taxonomist only looks at twenty microscopic fields of
view along the filtering silk’s two diagonals (fig. 5.3). The sampled area amounts
to only 1/15,000 of the filtering silk’s total area, according to Johns (DR0934:
2).97 At 625x magnification, the field of view has a diameter of 295 micrometres,
which is just slightly larger than the silk’s mesh size of 270 micrometres. Johns
explains that a taxonomist always focuses the field of view on one single mesh
for phytoplankton identification (DR0934: 2). 
97 According to Richardson et al. (2006: 33), the twenty fields of view amount to 
1/10,000 of a sample. According to Batten et al. (2003: 198) the analysed area 
amounts to only 1/8,000 of a sample.
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In the second stage, the zooplankton traverse, the microscope is set to 62.5x
magnification, resulting in a field of view with a diameter of 2.06 millimetres,
circa ten times larger than in the phytoplankton analysis. This stage is named
the  ‘zooplankton  traverse’  because  the  taxonomist  moves  the  field  of  view
stepwise across the silk, creating a horizontal traverse along which organisms
are identified (Batten et al. 2003: 198, Reid et al. 2003: 127). The area analysed
during the traverse is ‘staggered’ in a way that each piece of silk is crossed
along five horizontal lines (Batten et al. 2003: 198).98 The traverses on both the
filtering and the covering silk result in circa 1/50 part of the whole sample being
analysed with the microscope (Richardson et al. 2006: 35–36).99
Figure 5.4: Silk sample with a green pile of zooplankton scraped together for removal
from the filtering silk. The horizontal lines are the two-inch divisions on the filtering silk
that are marked in preparation of the silk. The curves along the lines are a sign of silk
distortion during the sampling process.
98 The zooplankton traverse is performed on the filtering and the covering silk in this 
way, because although retained by the silk, the plankton may not stay firmly fixed 
on the filtering silk and ‘planktonic material may be transferred to the covering silk 
during sampling or processing’ (Batten et al. 2003: 198).
99 Again, this number is slightly different in other publications. In Reid et al. (2003: 
127) the zooplankton traverse is stated to result in 1/40 of the sample being sub-
sampled, while Batten et al. (2003: 198) claim that the ‘traverse represents a 
subsample of about 1/49 of the sample’.
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In step three, the zooplankton eyecount, the sample is not sub-sampled but the
taxonomist removes the zooplankton organisms from the silk and puts them into
a Bogorov tray, which makes their identification much easier. Using a so-called
“cranesbill forceps”, an analyst scrapes the larger organisms on the filtering silk
together to form a little green pile in the middle of the sample (fig. 5.4). The pile
is removed from the silk and spread out evenly in the Bogorov tray. The tray is
put  under  another  microscope  set  at  the  same  magnification  as  in  the
zooplankton traverse. The removal  of  organisms is necessary because,  as I
have described in the previous chapter, especially the large zooplankton are
severely  deformed  during  the  sampling  stage.  Additionally,  the  two  most
important large zooplankton species of the North Atlantic and the North Sea,
Calanus  finmarchicus and  Calanus  helgolandicus,  look  very  similar  and are
identified primarily by the shape of their fifth pair of swimming legs (Richardson
et al. 2006: 47). Johns explains:
“There are a couple of species that are very, very similar, for example
the Calanus species. And they co-occur, they are like three 
millimetres, and the only way to tell them apart is to look at their tiny 
little last leg and the teeth on the tiny little last leg.” (DR0533: 3)
Making this distinction is much easier with the organisms not sticking to the
fibrous silk between the other plankton, but rather floating freely in a transparent
tray. Johns continues:
“It is just so much easier to identify them. You can’t do it on the silk 
very easily. It is so much easier, you take them off, put them into that 
tray, add some fluid and then you can manipulate them easily, flip 
them around. Because a lot of them, depending on how they are 
lying, they can hide their identification features, so you need to kind 
of manipulate them 360.” (DR0533: 6)
Plankton organisms are identified and counted according to a list of taxonomic
entities that  contains more than 800 species or species groups, as I  further
explain in chapter six. The counting procedure differs between the three steps
of analysis. In the phytoplankton stage, only the presence of a taxonomic entity
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in  one  of  the  twenty  microscopic  fields  of  view  is  relevant,  not  how  many
organisms are actually visible in the field. For each microscopic field of view in
which a taxonomic entity has been identified the taxonomist writes down the
name of the taxon in a hand-written notebook and a tally mark is added next to
the name. The analyst proceeds from one field to the next and adds tally marks
for  each  field  in  which  a  specific  organism  has  been  encountered.  After
examining  all  twenty  fields  across  the  filtering  silk,  a  hand-written  list  of
taxonomic entities with tally marks has been created (fig. 5.5). 
Figure 5.5:  A page in  a plankton taxonomist’s notebook with data created during a
sample analysis organised in three columns. From left to right: phytoplankton stage,
zooplankton traverse, and zooplankton eyecount (DR8112).
The  tally  marks  do  not  correspond  to  the  total  number  of  organisms  of  a
taxonomic entity that the analyst has actually encountered but only to the fields
of view in which they were present. The maximum value for each taxonomic
entity in the phytoplankton stage is thus twenty, because only twenty fields of
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view are analysed per sample. By contrast, in the two zooplankton stages, the
organisms identified by a taxonomist are counted numerically. In both cases, the
analyst writes down the name of the identified organism but this time adds a
tally mark for each individual of that taxon along the entire traverse or in the
Bogorov tray, respectively.
It  may  occur  during  the  traverse  and  the  eyecount  that  organisms  are
encountered that were not detected at an earlier analysis stage, although they
should have been detected then. A small zooplankton organism, for example,
may not have been located in the area of the traverse sub-sample, but it might
end  up  in  a  Bogorov  tray  during  the  eyecount.  Instead  of  counting  these
organisms numerically, the taxonomist records a “+” in the notebook, as can be
seen for several taxonomic entities in figure 5.5, indicating that this taxonomic
entity  was  present.  Some  taxa  are  also  quite  difficult  to  count  numerically
because  the  organism  has  been  damaged  during  sampling  or  because
organisms are significantly larger than the field of view so that one and the
same individual might be visible in multiple fields. Only the presence is recorded
in these cases as well (Richardson et al. 2006: 58, DR8112: 7).
Quite literally, the tally marks in a taxonomist’s notebook are ‘marks’ that are
recorded by human ‘data generators’ (Hacking 1992: 48) and they should thus
be regarded as data just like the hand-written colour data on the cutting point
sheets.  Further,  similar  to  the  colour  assessment,  the  data  are  created  as
representations of characteristics of a sample: The tally marks do not denote or
refer to any plankton population in the oceans but rather translate an individual
sample’s specific qualities to a standardised form. These qualities result from
the  very  particular  examination  procedure  in  which  the  configuration  of  the
microscopes,  the  selection  of  a  sub-sample,  and  the  manual  removal  of
plankton from the silk play a decisive role. As can be seen in figure 5.5, the
hand-written data of the microscopic analysis,  also referred to  as “notebook
data” for the remainder of this chapter, are organised in three columns, one for
each stage of analysis. A tally mark in column one, however, represents not just
a different species than a tally mark in columns two or three but a different kind
of property, due to the different counting procedures in each stage. The tally
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marks  in  the  notebook,  as  they  are  recorded  by  a  taxonomist,  represent
characteristics of a sample that is embedded in the laboratory context with all of
its instruments and practices, including different sub-samples, magnifications,
and microscopes.
Figure 5.6: Index page of a taxonomist’s notebook. Each box is associated with one of
the  CPR  routes  and  contains  entries  in  the  form  “tow  number  –  page  number”
(DR8112).
Each sample analyst uses a personal notebook, but the same notation system
is  employed  by  all  analysts.  This  allows  for  quality  checking  of  another
taxonomist’s record, even if that person is absent. Lab manager Johns, who is
also analysing samples regularly, explains that all analysts employ “kind of” the
same system of notation:
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“Everybody is supposed to. We have a standardised procedure 
written for how you are meant to write it in. But it is meant to be one 
sample per page, which I never do. That’s kind of how I write mine 
down. Most of them are fairly readable, but …” (DR0533: 3)
Like the stapled paper sheets described in the previous section are pertinent to
one individual tow, one page in a sample analyst’s notebook is supposed to be
pertinent to one individual sample. As a taxonomist is never allocated adjacent
samples of one tow in order to avoid a potential taxonomist bias,100 the data on
the previous and following pages of the notebook are created from samples of
different routes and different tows. In order to be able to find the data of one
particular  sample,  each  notebook  features  an  index,  which  the  taxonomists
need to keep up to date (fig. 5.6). Plankton taxonomist Taylor comments on the
indexing of notebooks: 
“It’s the most boring thing in the world, but if you don’t have it, it will 
be a pain in the bum trying to sit there and go back through books.” 
(DR8112: 4)
Taylor has been analysing samples for fourteen years and is currently working
with her thirteenth notebook. She continues:
“Some people have been here double the amount of time. So we do 
keep all of these as well in one central place. In theory you can go 
back through and check.” (DR8112: 4) 
Rather than being the basis for claims about phenomena in the oceans, the
notebooks  provide  space  for  the  quantification  of  a  sample’s  qualities  and
function  as  a  medium for  storing  and  communicating  the  quantities.  As  the
stapled  sheets  that  relate  to  a  tow,  the  notebooks  never  circulate  beyond
SAHFOS. From the above quotations, it seems that they are rarely retrieved to
re-examine what exactly a taxonomist has recorded. Yet they serve as a backup
of data so that a person can potentially track down notebook data that have
been created by a different taxonomist many years ago.
100 See the ID numbers of various taxonomists on the cutting point sheet in figure 5.1.
153
The representational  scope of the notebook data encompasses only specific
qualities  of  one  individual  sample.  The  organisms  are  made  visible  and
identifiable  by  virtue  of  microscopes  and  a  scoping  effect  literally  amplifies
certain areas of the silk in a way that the amplified matter can be transformed
into standardised data that can circulate within SAHFOS.
5.2.3 Transcription and processing to broaden the scope
Much like the PCI data, the notebook data undergo a change of medium and
context from a paper-based form into the digital  database. This transfer and
subsequent data processing widen the data’s representational scope, enable
the use of computation and visualisation tools, and thereby enable scientists to
make inferences about the real-world ecosystem. As I explain in this section,
the processing involves a category system and a statistical conversion which
transform the tally marks from representations of specific qualities of only a sub-
sample into estimated quantities of organisms of a taxonomic entity on an entire
sample.
For the transcription of the notebook data, two analysts sit together in an office
room and enter the data from the notebooks into the digital database. Using a
“buddy-buddy system” (DR8112: 7), two analysts check on each other in order
to avoid transcription errors (DR0533: 1–2). The number of tally marks in the
notebook are entered but once digitised, the recorded value is processed: In the
phytoplankton  stage,  the  number  of  fields  in  which  a  taxonomic  entity  was
present is converted into an ‘accepted value, representing the total number of
cells of that taxon present in those twenty fields’ (Richardson et al. 2006: 35).
This conversion is based on the Poisson distribution under the assumption that
‘organisms are randomly distributed on the silk’ (Richardson et al. 2006: 34).101 
According to the survey’s conversion rules, if a taxon is present in only one of
the twenty analysed fields of view, the accepted value will also be one. Four
101 Random distribution here means that an organism that has entered the internal 
tunnel of the CPR ends up in a spot that is randomly located on the silk area that is
exposed to the water flow in that moment.
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fields of view in which a taxon is present lead to an accepted value of four. Five
fields of view, however, lead to an accepted value of six. This means that if the
taxon is identified in five fields, a total of six individuals of that taxon will  be
estimated to  be present  in  the twenty analysed fields.  The accepted values
increase further with each step: Ten fields of view are converted to an accepted
value of fourteen, fifteen fields are converted to twenty-eight, and twenty fields
are  converted  to  ninety.  Thus,  if  a  species  is  present  in  all  twenty  of  the
analysed fields of view, a total quantity of ninety individuals of this species will
be estimated for all twenty examined fields. The accepted value is subsequently
multiplied  by  ten  thousand  to  obtain  an  estimate  of  the  total  quantity  of
organisms of a taxonomic entity on one entire silk sample (Richardson et al.
2006: 35). 
A  similar  system  of  conversion  is  used  for  the  data  from  the  zooplankton
traverse and the zooplankton eyecount.  Here, the numbers resulting from the
tally  marks  are  assigned  one  of  twelve  abundance  categories:  Exactly  one
counted organism on the sample corresponds to category one. Analogous to
the conversion in the phytoplankton stage, each category also has an accepted
value,  which  is  one  in  case  of  category  one.  The  accepted  value  is  then
multiplied by fifty  in order to estimate the total  number of  organisms of one
taxon  on  the  whole  sample.  Two  counted  organisms  along  the  traverse
correspond  to  category  two  and  an  accepted  value  of  two.  Through
multiplication by fifty, this leads to an estimate of one hundred organisms of this
taxon on the entire sample. Beginning with the fourth category, the range of
number  counts  covered  by  each  category  increases.  Category  four  is  for
recorded values between four and eleven. In this case, the accepted value is six
and the estimated abundance per sample is three hundred for all data in this
range. The higher the category, the broader is the covered range of counts.
Category  seven  already  covers  quantities  between  51  and  125  with  an
accepted  value  of  75  and  an  estimated  abundance  per  sample  of  3,750.
Category twelve is the highest category and corresponds to counts between
2,001 and 4,000: The accepted value is 2,690 and the estimated abundance
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per sample is thus 134,500 (Richardson et al. 2006: 36).102 As Richardson et al.
(2006:  36)  explain,  this  ‘category counting system’ is  used to  speed up the
analysis  while  it  makes  the  abundance  estimates  for  each  sample  ‘semi-
quantitative’. 
In higher categories, the accepted value is closer to the lower bound of the
category’s  range  than  to  the  higher.  For  example,  the  accepted  value  of
category seven is 75, which is much closer to 51 than to 125. This takes into
account that ‘the abundance values are not uniformly distributed, but instead
low abundances predominate’ (Warner and Hays 1994: 240). To illustrate this, if
a taxonomist comes to the conclusion that  the number of  organisms on the
traverse is somewhere between 51 and 125, it will be more likely that the exact
quantity is closer to 51 than to 125. 
Although the category system is a ‘tradeoff’ that effectively causes a ‘loss of
information’ (Richardson et al. 2006: 36), it enables taxonomists to say that a
sample  is,  say,  category  seven  as  soon  as  it  becomes  apparent  that  the
sampled  area  contains  more  than  50  but  less  than  125  organisms.  Taylor
explains that these judgements are also a matter of experience and younger
taxonomists, who tend to be relatively slow with their analysis, sometimes have
to be reminded not to count everything they see but only what is required to
infer the category. Taylor says that it takes some time to find the “balance of
efficiency and accuracy” (DR8112: 5). 
One more step of processing is applied in the phytoplankton stage: What is
called the ‘recorded abundance per sample’ is an averaged value of every two
possible abundance values:
Unfortunately, because of historical data storage limitations before 
computers were used, these 20 abundance values are compressed 
into 10 by averaging. (Richardson et al. 2006: 34–35)
102 Such high quantities which would require drawing hundreds of tally marks are quite
rare and only occur during strong plankton blooms. In these cases, the sample 
analysts estimate the number of organisms instead of counting exactly or the sub-
sample is divided into even smaller sub-samples.
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For example, if a species is present in nine fields of view, the accepted value
will be twelve and the abundance per sample will be 120,000. If a taxonomic
entity is present in ten fields of view, the accepted value will be fourteen and the
abundance per sample will be 140,000. Yet, the two resulting abundances are
compressed by  averaging and in  both cases,  130,000 will  be  the ‘recorded
abundance per sample’ (Richardson et al.  2006: 35).  This method has been
employed  since  1958,  when  the  number  of  analysed  fields  of  view  was
increased from five on both the filtering and the covering silk to twenty analysed
fields on only the filtering silk (Richardson et al. 2006: 37). Johns comments:
“I am never really clear why [the compression] was done. I think it 
was computer limitations. So yeah, people would look in twenty fields
and then actually, if it is seen in only one or two, it becomes a one. If 
it is three or four it becomes a two.” (DR0533: 4)
With  today’s  computers,  handling  twenty  abundance  categories  would  be
unproblematic,  but  the  method  remains  unchanged.  Johns  explains  that  a
change would be “too difficult” and risky in light of potential uncertainties that a
change  of  method  would  introduce  (DR0533:  4).  The  category  system
employed in the zooplankton traverse is based on comparisons with raw counts
of individuals conducted in the very early stages of CPR development in the late
1930s  (Richardson  et  al.  2006:  36).  The  traverse  method  has  remained
unchanged since 1948 (Warner and Hays 1994: 240). 
The same category system as in the zooplankton traverse is employed in the
eyecount, only without the final multiplication because the sample is not sub-
sampled for this stage of analysis. In this case, the accepted value is equal to
the estimated abundance on the entire sample (Richardson et al. 2006: 36).
Only if the sample is very densely filled with organisms, the taxonomist may
sub-sample it as well by only looking at half or a quarter of the zooplankton laid
out in the Bogorov tray.103
103 In fact, a mixture of fully numerical and sub-sampling may be applied. If a sample 
is filled with zooplankton very densely, usually just one or two plankton species will
be highly abundant. The sub-sampling is then only applied to these taxa. As Johns 
explains, “then we would pick through the remainder for the larger things that you 
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Despite all  data being in numerical form in the database, the data are often
referred  to  in  the  literature  and by  survey employees  as  “semi-quantitative”
(Richardson et al. 2006: 36, DR2901: 6). The main reason for using this term is
because the numbers stored in the database would not match up with actual
abundances in  the ocean.  As I  have described in  the previous chapter, the
sampling method causes differences in the silk’s filter efficiency, depending on
the size, shape, or activity of different organisms. Further, the sub-sampling,
identification, and counting procedures described in this chapter make the CPR
data only an estimate of the distribution of organisms on a sample. As a result, it
is extremely difficult to infer estimates of total quantities of a plankton population
in  the  ocean  from  CPR  data  alone.  CPR  data  are  therefore  usually  not
expressed in units such as organisms per cubic metre of sea water, but instead
remain expressed in the unit ‘numbers per sample’, as they have been derived
from the hand-written records with the category system and conversion factors
(Richardson et al. 2006: 62).104 
With the standard unit of CPR data being “numbers per sample”, it seems that
the data still primarily represent characteristics of individual samples. The key to
representing aspects of the actual ocean ecosystem with semi-quantitative data
lies in the fact that the survey has accumulated data over several decades with
consistent methodology and that these data are already linked and computable
artefacts in the database. As Richardson et al. (2006: 61) explain, 
there is considerable evidence that [CPR sampling] captures a 
roughly consistent fraction of the in situ abundance of each taxon 
and thus reflects the major patterns observed in the plankton.
could pick out easily, but you don’t need to sub-sample, because there are not so 
many there” (DR0533: 6).
104 As roughly three cubic metres of sea water have run through the CPR in the same 
period of time that silk of the length of one sample has been exposed to the flow, 
one could convert to per cubic metre values by dividing the estimate per sample by
three. However, ‘abundance estimates are seldom converted to per m3 estimates 
in practice’ (Richardson et al. 2006: 62). 
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Inter-annual  as  well  as  seasonal  changes  are  reflected  in  CPR  data
(Richardson et al.  2006: 61) and the continuity and length of the survey are
mainly responsible for the usability of the data. Johns elaborates:
“We want to keep that consistent time series. And there are a lot of 
potential sort of foibles in the dataset. But the fact [is] that it has 
always been done in the same way. […] You get lots of people who, 
it’s not an accuse, but who would say ‘well you under-count certain 
things’. Well yeah, we do, but they have been consistently under-
counted for sixty years. So you can just ignore the abundance values
and just look at the trend to see what is happening. So yeah, if you 
were starting it from scratch, you would do it completely differently.” 
(DR0533: 4)
A major part of the CPR data’s value and relevance stem from the continuity of
the methods described in this chapter. In fact, not every part of the process may
seem reasonable from today’s perspective, as Taylor comments:
“Sometimes there is no logic in how you record it, it is just the way 
we have always done it. So we keep the continuity going of how we 
have recorded that before.” (DR8112: 7) 
The continuity  as well  as the spatial  coverage of  the CPR Survey allow for
averaging data over large geographic areas of interest and time intervals of
months,  years,  or  decades.  This  reduces many of  the imprecisions that  are
introduced in the analysis of a single sample and alleviates the “foibles” of the
methods:
Abundance estimates from individual plankton samples are 
inherently imprecise because of variable zooplankton behaviour such
as diel vertical migration and local weather conditions that can 
concentrate or disperse fine-scale patches […], as well as the 
“broad-brush” counting procedures. To subsume much of this fine-
scale variability, CPR data are commonly averaged spatially in 
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geographic areas of interest and temporally as monthly or annual 
means. (Richardson et al. 2006: 63)
SAHFOS thus commonly provides researchers with averaged data and not with
data from individual  samples.  Asked if  the unprocessed plankton counts are
ever requested, Johns explains: “No, that is sort of raw data. Most people don’t
want that. They normally want monthly means by a given area” (DR0533: 4).
The broadening of the data’s representational scope with the change of context
from paper to the digital database is also indicated by the final step of quality
checking before data are “finalised” and are ready for use. In this step, one of
three senior taxonomists,  including Johns and Taylor, checks the data of an
entire tow in the digital database. At this point, the taxonomist looks for unusual
records or gaps which seem unreasonable with respect  to  the actual  ocean
ecosystem. Taylor explains:
“The three of us will go through the actual route looking for gaps. […]
We can pick up a particular weakness in an area and we might have 
a look at that a bit more thoroughly. Or we’ll identify things that we 
don’t think are in that area. So any regional things we would say 
‘hang on a minute’; but that only comes with time. So once you have 
been here for a time, you start to get a feel for what you should see 
in each area.” (DR8112: 7)
With  “area”,  Taylor  refers  to  a  distinct  region  of  the  ocean  and  the  local
ecosystem through which the CPR has been towed. The data are thus actively
related to a real-world ecosystem and the close relation to an individual tow or
sample somewhat fades into the background. Taylor admits that “it is all a bit
subjective” and the senior analysts checking the data frequently consult each
other for their opinion if a certain record should be scrutinised by re-analysis
(DR8112:  9).105 The  subjectivity  of  these  decisions  is  a  display  of  the
intentionality  of  scientific  representation:  Scientists  actively  establish  the
105 If data seem unreasonable, a sample will be re-analysed for the questionable 
taxonomic entity by a different taxonomist than the one who conducted the original 
analysis (DR0934: 19).
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relations between data and real-world systems and these relations are rooted in
subjective  practices  and  artificial  objects,  not  in  intrinsic  properties  that  are
extracted identically by every taxonomist.
5.3 Scientific representing: Increasing compatibility and circulation
The previous section draws attention to changes of context and format which
influence the representational scope of scientific data. In paper form, restricted
to circulation within SAHFOS, and without practical links to previously created
data, the representational scope of the CPR data is relatively narrow. It  only
encompasses the very entity of which qualities have been recorded as data in a
specific kind of laboratory practice. The shift to a digital format links the data of
an individual tow or sample with all other data the CPR Survey has produced
using the same methods over several decades. Further, the shift  makes the
data tangible with computing and visualisation tools. In this context, the data’s
representational  scope  encompasses  parts  or  processes  of  the  real-world
ocean  ecosystem.  Table  5.1  summarises  the  different  contexts,  the
corresponding representational scope of data, and the scoping effect achieved
by creating the respective representation.
Context Representational scope Scoping effect
Cutting point 
sheet
Samples of one individual
tow
Amplification, standardisation and 
circulation within institution, 
potential re-examination by a 
different taxonomistPersonal 
notebooks
One individual sample
Digital 
database
Parts or processes of 
real-world ecosystems
Amplification, computability and 
visualisation, circulation beyond 
institution
Table  5.1:  Different  data  contexts  and  corresponding  representational  scope  and
scoping effect in the CPR Survey.
161
What I call the representational scope is a contextual quality. The scope is not
pre-determined by the geographic location and the time of  sampling.  These
metadata  are  indispensable  to  use the  data,  but  my analysis  shows that  a
variety of local conditions under which data are created, processed, and stored
shape the scope of scientific data as well. The representational scope, which is
crucial for the usability of data, is thus neither an intrinsic nor an independent
quality of data. Scientists intentionally perform transformations and translations
in order to  amplify  specific  qualities of  matter in a standardised way. These
epistemic activities shape the spectrum of potential  data applications. Latour
(1999: 34) calls the sample of an Amazon forest plant a  ‘silent witness’ for a
scientific claim. The materials in Latour’s and in my case are indeed silent: They
do not speak for themselves and they neither contain nor carry claims about
real world systems that scientists only need to extract or read. 
A  number  of  wordings  I  encountered  in  my  interviews  and  in  research
publications suggest that the relations between data and the real world are not
straightforward and clearly defined: Data are termed “semi-quantitative”, they
contain  “foibles”,  “tradeoffs”,  a  “loss  of  information”,  and  are  “inherently
imprecise”, because the methods are somewhat “woolly”, “crude”, and “broad-
brush”.  These  expressions may characterise  the  scraping  of  the  silk  with  a
metal  tool,  the  broad  categorisation  of  plankton  counts,  and  the  colour
assessment with the naked eye,  but  they further  hint  at  a certain  mismatch
between the representations scientists create and real-world systems scientists
intend  to  create  knowledge  of.  These  “foibles”  neither  compromise  nor
invalidate this practice,106 but indicate that creating reference and finding exact
correspondence between representations and the world are indeed problematic
conceptions of scientific representing. 
As Latour (1999: 30) notes,  ‘sciences do not speak of the world but, rather,
construct representations that seem always to push it away, but also to bring it
closer’. Each step of representing is a move away from particular and complex
106 The term “foible” seems very fitting, as it indicates a ‘minor flaw or shortcoming’, 
but not a complete fault or failure. Persons or things with foibles are still valued 
and useful, despite minor shortcomings; <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/foible> [accessed 24 August 2017].
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local  conditions  in  which  sciences  operate  and  constitutes  a  step  towards
compatibility  and computability  for  the integration of  data with other, already
existing  representations  of  real-world  systems.  As  Porter  (1995:  viii–ix)
contends,  quantified  data  are  a  ‘technology  of  distance’  and  a  ‘strategy  of
communication’.107 Representing is a possibility to generate distance between
complex  matter  and  data  packages  that  are  made  for  circulation  and
communication.  Barton et al. (2003) compared the PCI data to representations
of the North Atlantic Oscillation and newly created CPR data are examined with
respect to already existing data before their final release into the database. The
gaps that scientists have to close by comparing, integrating, or calibrating newly
created data are thus not between representations and fixed targets of the real
world, but between representations and other representations.
The methodological  continuity  which  has been exercised over  decades is  a
crucial condition for the practice of representing in the CPR Survey. Data could
not  be  compared  to  historical  records  and  temporal  averages  could  not  be
calculated without the strict adherence to methods that might seem outdated in
today’s scientific landscape. The continuity allows data that are created today to
be checked for their plausibility by experienced analysts. They have gained their
knowledge and developed their reference for the examination during years of
practising  sample  analysis  and  working  with  CPR  data,  as  well  as  other
resources.  The analyst’s expectation has formed by interacting with  multiple
already existing representations of a natural system. Rheinberger’s (1995) view
of  representation  involves  interventions  which  create  difference,  but  not  in
comparison to an original or true value. Experimental practices, Rheinberger
(1995: 88) writes, have ‘no ultimate perspective, no vanishing point at which the
research movement could come to a rest’. Similarly, the continuous creation of
CPR data is an ongoing and never finalised generation of differences to existing
representations, not to a distinct origin. The following chapter further elaborates
on the longitudinal dimension of the CPR Survey and the efforts that assure
methodological continuity.
107 Leonelli (2015: 810) also characterises data as ‘tools for communication’.
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5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has tracked the creation of scientific data from their first recording
during  the  analysis  of  a  material  sample,  through  changes  of  medium and
stages of processing, to their provisional destination in a digital database. My
account reveals that data are used as representations for different targets at
different stages of their genesis, depending on their immediate context and the
intention  of  a  researcher.  I  argue  that  the  primary  purpose  of  creating  and
processing data is to enhance the data’s function as a means of communication
within and beyond their  site  of  creation.  Further, representing is intended to
make  data  compatible  and  integrable  with  other,  already  existing
representations. Scientific representing is constituted by successive epistemic
activities — steps of transformations in which data are digitised, processed, and
linked to historical records in order to make data usable for scientific reasoning
about real-world systems. This view implies that scientific representation is a
practical achievement and not an intrinsic property of data.
My empirical research suggests a mismatch between the digital data and real-
world  targets  that  resonates  with  scepticism  against  straightforward  model-
target relationships as the basic unit of scientific representation. I argue that the
series of transformations actually move data away from the local conditions of
research practice and away from the real-world systems that scientists aim to
observe. At the same time,  by means of standardising and broadening their
scope,  practices of  representing move the data into  a space where already
existing  records  are  available  to  compare,  calibrate,  or  integrate  the  data.
Rather than establishing a relation between data and a real-world target, the
processing and representing enables or actually establishes possible links to
already existing representations. 
Is scientific representing consequently an infinite regress towards other existing
representations in which truthful correspondence with real-world targets is never
achieved? Taking into account the previous chapter’s conclusion, the “truthful”
link to real-world targets exists in the material continuity from the sample’s origin
in the sampling device and in the ocean throughout the epistemic process until
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the  sample  is  archived.  Additionally,  the  series  of  transformations  that
provisionally end with the release of data into the digital database must remain
traceable all the way back to each individual act of species identification and
counting. Intentional, traceable change rather than continuity is characteristic for
the chains of transformations that co-occupy the space in-between the natural
world and scientific knowledge. 
This chapter’s view of representing thus adds a new dimension to my account
of the genesis of scientific data. The focus has shifted from data-world relations
to data-data relations. Given that data are generated in diverse contexts, this
shift  raises  the  problem  of  data  commensurability  and  comparability,  in
particular if data from different decades are involved. This issue is addressed in
the following chapter on the continuity of data practices.
Chapters four and five have shown that both samples and data are portable
artefacts that can be moved and used far away from the site and context of their
creation. While material samples close this distance with the achievement of
material integration and continuity, scientific data are part of a traceable chain
that connects them with the sample and the context of data creation. Samples
are material ‘renderings’ (Rheinberger 2015) with a primary purpose of making
materials movable in an analysable form. Representations in the form of data
serve as a means of communication. They enable computation (Porter 1995)
and  they  serve  as  a  starting  point  for  scientific  reasoning  due  to  their
compatibility and comparability to existing representations. 
Enhanced compatibility does not necessarily make data more accurate. As my
analysis shows, the more steps of analysis and transformation are involved, the
more uncertainties and “foibles” are introduced. Data creation is associated with
an inevitable “loss of information”, whereas no information is to be lost in the
creation of CPR samples. Rather, the silk samples could be conceived as the
first  integration of materials in a way that allows a scientist  to perceive and
record  relevant  qualities  as  information.  These  divergent  characteristics  of
samples  and  data  shed  light  on  an  issue  introduced  in  chapter  four:  that
samples and data are hardly distinguished in some literature and whether or not
a conceptual  distinction is  justified. However, this issue is  not  central  to  my
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argument and becomes less relevant in  light  of  the relational  character and
context-dependency of both samples and data.
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Chapter Six – Dynamic adaptation and reliable audit trails: 
Scaffolding the continuity of data practices
Abstract: This chapter accounts for the conditions under which the CPR Survey 
creates data and how these conditions have changed and affected the survey 
in the past. It also briefly discusses an effort to coordinate and maintain various 
long-term marine ecological monitoring programmes around the UK. Due to 
historically changing technological, economical, and social conditions, 
researchers face challenges in trying to keep their research practices 
unchanged for multiple decades. Applying Caporael, Griesemer, and Wimsatt’s 
(2014a) notion of “scaffolding”, a conceptual framework for development in 
culture, evolution, and other domains, I argue that the continuity of data 
practices is achieved by assimilating change and modifying or expanding data 
practices, while the core functionality of the CPR Survey is maintained. The 
continuity of data practices is not characterised by stasis, an absence of 
change, or by repetitive application of an old-fashioned method. Rather, it is a 
result of changes and adaptations of data practices. In order to maintain 
continuity, researchers modify the design of research technologies, expand their
scientific repertoire and the scope of their data, establish reliable audit trails, 
respond to the interests of the scientific community, funding agencies, and the 
public, transfer local expertise to younger generations of researchers, and even
redraw conceptual boundaries of sciences. These activities contribute to a 
continuity that constitutes an absence of jumps between scientific data of the 
past and scientific data of today. 
6.1 Introduction
This chapter aims at a deeper understanding of the dynamics of change and
continuity  of  scientific  practices.  Environmental  sciences  often  study  natural
processes and systems that change very slowly compared to the typical time
frames of research projects. The ocean is a prime example of such a system, as
the ocean’s physical, chemical, or biological characteristics may respond to a
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change of conditions in the course of centuries or even millennia. This kind of
inertia requires methodologically consistent observations over very long time
frames in order to make claims about the dynamics and long-term changes in
such systems.
But how are scientists capable of performing practices consistently over multiple
decades or  even centuries? Research technologies,  background knowledge,
and  scientific  theories  advance  permanently,  research  staff  is  constantly
replaced,  and  the  political,  institutional,  and  economic  settings  of  research
practice can take unpredicted turns. The empirical part of this chapter tracks
how research methods in this thesis’ main case study, the CPR Survey, as well
as  the  operation  of  the  survey  itself,  have  been  maintained  despite
technological progress and historical changes of conditions that scientists are
unable  to  control.  The  CPR  Survey  is  committed  to  strict  methodological
continuity  and  to  keeping  their  decades-old  time  series  running  indefinitely.
Since  the  late  1950s,  the  methods  of  sampling  and  sample  analysis  have
remained stable so that data which have been created up to seventy years
apart  are commensurable and form a concise, yet  growing,  body of  records
without any gaps. 
In this chapter, I argue that the stability of practices in the CPR Survey and the
usefulness of data created over the course of  decades are “scaffolded” and
remain  stable  due  to  adaptation  and  development  of  data  practices.
“Scaffolding”  has been advocated as  a  concept  and metaphor  for  artefacts,
infrastructures, and people that support and enhance developmental processes
in  culture,  cognition,  and  biological  evolution  (Caporael,  Griesemer,  and
Wimsatt 2014a). In my case study, a variety of conditions for practising research
are beyond the control of the researchers and challenge the continuity of the
time series and the usability of created data. In order to adapt to the changing
context and conditions and to support methodological continuity, different types
of scaffolds become temporary components of the survey. 
Some  of  the  most  important  scaffolds  are  rooted  in  focused  experimental
research  of  the  survey’s  technical  details  and  uncertainties.  These
investigations lead to development of the survey in different forms: as physical
168
modifications  of  research  technology  which  preserve  functionality,  as  new
knowledge  that  enhances  confidence  in  the  data’s  consistency,  or  as  an
expansion of the survey’s research capacities and scope that attracts funding
and the  interest  of  research communities.  Other  important  scaffolds  are the
implementation of comprehensible audit trails that document data practices of
the past and the informal and “on-the-job” transfer of local ecological expertise
to younger researchers. Ultimately, these various small-scale developments and
modifications of the survey’s data practices preserve the long-term continuity
and the existence of the survey.
This chapter shows how scientific practices are situated in a web of relations
shaped by technological, scientific, and socio-economic developments. These
external  developments  have  a  profound  impact  on  data  practices  by
engendering various forms of adaptation. Continuity and consistency of data
practices and data are thus not  solely determined from within the traditional
boundaries  of  scientific  research.  A wide  range of  scholars,  especially  from
STS,  feminist,  and  anthropological  studies  of  science,  have  shown  that
research is  not  performed “inside  a vacuum” and that  research outputs  are
influenced by external conditions and dynamics (Knorr Cetina 1981, Longino
1990).  My  case  illustrates  that  scientific  practices  are  affected  by  external
developments and inevitably change, even in an effort to maintain continuity
and  regularity  of  practices.  Methodological  continuity  in  science  is  not
characterised by stasis  or  the repeated execution of  research methods that
quickly become “old-fashioned” as science, technology, and societies progress.
The  key  to  successful  maintenance  and  continuity  of  practices  lies  in
adaptability and the dynamic development of data practices.
The  chapter  first  reviews  scholarly  literature  on  scientific  change  and
standardisation  in  scientific  fields  with  diverse  data  practices.  Another
introductory section focuses on scaffolds, scientific repertoires, and how these
could figure in accounts of achieving continuity in research. The empirical part
of  this  chapter focuses first  on the challenges of re-creating and preserving
marine biological surveys in the UK before analysing in detail how continuity is
achieved in the CPR Survey.
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6.1.1 Standardising data and working with diversity
Various scholars have studied and analysed scientific change, often trying to
conceptualise  what  constitutes  scientific  progress  or  advancement  (Kitcher
1995).  This chapter is not asking questions regarding scientific  progress but
examines activities and responses to historical change which are not directly
driven  by  classical  “enlightenment”  motifs  such  as  rationality  and  the
accumulation of truthful knowledge. I focus on a particular balancing act that
researchers may face if they want to continue producing outputs that are usable
and valuable for the scientific community. This is a balance between on the one
hand, achieving and maintaining the highest possible consistency and reliability
within a body of data that has grown for multiple decades, and on the other
hand,  adjusting  to  new  technologies  and  to  shifting  interests  of  research
communities, the public, and funding agencies. 
Ankeny and Leonelli’s (2016) proposed “post-Kuhnian” way of tracking scientific
change, supported by their notion of “repertoires”, aligns well with this chapter’s
goals. Kuhn’s (1962) central concept of research “paradigms” can hardly reflect
the dynamics of today’s science and gives preference to theoretical knowledge
in  its  description  of  scientific  change.108 By  contrast,  Ankeny  and  Leonelli’s
(2016: 26) framework allows for a view of scientific change that accounts for
‘administrative,  material,  technological,  and  institutional  innovations’  and  the
‘non-conceptual  aspects  of  scientific  practice  [that]  are  not  often  discussed
within  scholarly  publications’.  I  consider  these  innovations  and  aspects  as
essential parts of the context in which research practices are performed.
Ocean sciences are not the only scientific field that faces challenges regarding
the  commensurability  of  data  that  have  been  created  many  years  apart.
Scientists across many disciplines compare or integrate data created at different
times,  under  different  conditions,  and  sometimes  for  different  epistemic
purposes. In his historical study of meteorology and climate science, Edwards
108 See for example Galison (1997) for an account of scientific change in twentieth 
century physics that is driven by technology. Andersen (2010) discusses scientific 
change in light of distributed cognition, heterogeneous expertise, and joint 
acceptance of scientific claims.
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(2010) describes the great efforts that are necessary in order to make data of
the past consistent and comparable with new data and vice-versa. The methods
and technologies to create environmental data have rapidly developed and, at
times,  have  been  replaced  rather  quickly  throughout  the  history  of
environmental  sciences.  Not  to  mention  the  fact  that  even  for  fundamental
environmental  parameters  such  as  temperature,  a  variety  of  practices  have
been employed across observational  sites around the world.  Edwards et  al.
(2011:  669)  explain  that  any  kind  of  “interface”  between  organisations,
machines,  or  people  is  ‘a  point  of  resistance  where  data  can  be  garbled,
misinterpreted,  or  lost’.  Edwards et  al.  (2011)  use the term “friction”  for  this
phenomenon,  motivated  by  the  image  of  two  surfaces  that  touch  at  their
interface and create friction when moved against each other. Data friction may
cause ‘conflicts, disagreements, and inexact, unruly processes’ and scientific
institutions might be forced to spend ‘enormous expenditures of time, energy,
and attention’ to resolve these conflicts (Edwards et al. 2011: 669–70). 
With regard to long-term observation of the environment, Edwards claims that
‘in climatology, time itself is an interface between two data surfaces: the present
and  the  past’  (Edwards  2010:  98).  Scientific  methods,  technologies,  and
societies change over years and the more decades pass between the creation
of two or more records, the more challenging the integration of those records
tends  to  be.  Shavit  and  Griesemer  (2009,  2011)  document  the  attempt  of
researchers at the Museum of Vertebrate Zoology at Berkeley to replicate a
survey of animal distribution in California after one hundred years. A species’
locality, one of the most basic ecological parameters to be recorded, turned out
to be difficult to replicate for the researchers, even with the use of fine-grained
latitude-longitude data and GPS technology. Shavit and Griesemer find species
locality to involve an ambiguous concept of space, but one that only became
problematic  when museum staff  tried to  integrate practices of  the  past  with
today’s digital databases and GPS technology:
We do not see a secular shift over the twentieth century from 
theoretical projects and programs to technology-driven applied 
research, but rather theoretical research that moves into a world 
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transformed by GPS-technology and thus science taking place within
a changed context of application. (Shavit and Griesemer 2011: 189)
The study of the MVZ’s data practices illustrates the friction and challenges
caused by historical changes of context if  a scientific practice is intended to
remain unchanged. 
The struggle to make data from different contexts commensurable has been
encountered  by  many  scholars  studying  practices  of  various  scientific
disciplines.  In  biology  and  biomedical  research,  animals,  patients,  or  entire
communities  are  often  observed  or  repeatedly  surveyed  longitudinally  for
extended time periods. These sciences are also prime examples of research
fields in which data have typically been created in complex, highly variable, and
non-standardised ways, and which may have undergone lengthy processes of
standardisation (Leonelli 2012; Aronova, von Oertzen, and Sepkoski 2017).
In order to minimise the potential for data friction, many sciences aiming for the
study  of  global  phenomena,  including  climatology  and  ecology,  have  gone
through processes of standardisation which involve not only technical but also
political and conceptional challenges (Edwards 2010, Devictor and Bensaude-
Vincent 2016). Focusing on rather local research settings, Star and Griesemer
(1989) have described the role of standardising methods for creating a common
ground  between  actors  from  different  social  and  professional  backgrounds.
Zimmerman (2008) claims that standardisation is a way to transport scientific
knowledge from local to public spheres, but warns that local context, which may
be crucial for data re-use, is often ‘left behind’.109
With respect to biodiversity, Bowker (2000: 675) expects that the construction of
a truly global, consistent, long-term database that is able to track life forms on
earth coherently will result in an ‘unholy mess’, due to the great diversity of data
practices in biodiversity research. In most cases, Bowker contends, more than
just measurement standards need to be known about the data in a database in
109 The previous chapter introduced Latour’s (1999) account of data creation, which 
involves chains of transformations that also “amplify” standardisation but increase 
the distance to local conditions of research practice.
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order  to  be  able  to  use  them.  Bowker  (2000:  645)  strongly  argues  for  an
engagement of philosophers and STS scholars in developing ways to manage
and  store  diverse  data,  so  that  databases  become  flexible  and  the  ‘social,
political  and organizational  context is interwoven with statistics,  classification
systems and observational results in a generative fashion’. 
Leonelli  (2013)  and  Hoeppe  (2014)  have  studied  cases  which  suggest  that
pushing standardisation is not the only possible answer to methodological and
data  diversity.  In  her  assessment  of  biological  data  infrastructures,  Leonelli
(2013: 450) finds that databases face an ambiguous challenge: They need to
maximise  the  global  circulation  of  data,  which  requires  common  standards,
while at the same time, the data must be adoptable in local research contexts.
As a result, the databases studied by Leonelli do not rigorously standardise and
homogenise knowledge, data, terminologies, and methods, but rather attempt to
make  the  diversity  along  these  dimensions  visible  for  users.  Incorporating
diversity  is,  however,  ‘the  most  complex  and  labour-intensive  task’  in  the
development of the databases. 
Studying the field of astronomy, Hoeppe (2014: 264) observes how astronomers
themselves are ‘working data together’ by ‘sequentially and reflexively engaging
diverse evidential contexts as contexts of accountability’. This practice seems to
maintain the diversity of practices and contexts, since the working together of
data  is  a  local  achievement  by  astronomers,  who  want  to  address  certain
phenomena of the sky. Hoeppe (2014: 264) points out that data in astronomy
are viewed as ‘malleable’ objects, whereas the sky itself functions as a stable
reference.  However,  this  stability  of  the  research  object  is  a  specific
characteristic of astronomy, so that the strategy of reflexive and sequential work
on data accountability is likely more pronounced in astronomy than in sciences
focusing on more dynamic systems such as biodiversity. 
Challenges to make data of different times and contexts commensurable and
comparable with each other are a key characteristic of today’s data-intensive
sciences. This is a common problem in sciences that focus on distinct systems
or populations for long time periods during which the context and conditions of
practice  —  technology,  background  knowledge,  institutional  landscape,  and
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society — progresses in ways that affect the continuous operation of research
programmes  and  require  additional  efforts  from  scientists  and  research
organisations. Scholarly work suggests that answers to these challenges are
complex and cannot be reduced to standardising research methods. 
6.1.2 “Scaffolding” as a concept of development and maintenance
Scientists  engage  in  a  variety  of  activities  to  resolve  or  work  around  the
challenges  caused  by  the  integration  of  data  from various  contexts.  These
activities  can  be  viewed  as  a  development  of  a  scientist’s  or  research
institution’s practices and capacities to work successfully with diverse data. In
this chapter, I  discuss developments of  the CPR Survey’s practices using a
concept of development that is grounded in the notion of “scaffolding” as utilised
in Caporael, Griesemer, and Wimsatt (2014b). Scaffolding can be understood
as  using  dynamic  structures  of  conceptualisations,  practices,  theories,
technologies, or personal relationships that facilitate the development of specific
capacities or skills of the entity to which a scaffold is applied. Metaphorically,
scaffolding alludes to a painter’s or construction worker’s scaffold that becomes
an integral  yet transient physical  component of a building during a phase in
which  a  new  quality  or  capacity  is  acquired.  Following  this  phase  of
development,  the  scaffold  may  be  removed  and  discarded,  but  it  is  also
possible  that  scaffolds  are  ‘internalized  as  system  parts  or  assimilated  as
symbionts’  so  that  ‘features  of  environments  become features  of  systems’
(Griesemer, Caporael, and Wimsatt 2014: 367).110
Wimsatt and Griesemer (2007) have coined the scaffolding concept in relation
to  the  development  of  culture  and  it  has  since  been  employed  in  various
domains, including scientific practice (Wylie 2016). The rich collection of essays
edited by Caporael, Griesemer, and Wimsatt (2014b) demonstrates its usability
for developmental processes in three very broad domains: evolution, culture,
and cognition. A central concern of the book is to provide an alternative to the
employment of  neo-Darwinian,  evolutionary models of  development to  other,
110 Emphasis in original.
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non-biological  domains  (Caporael,  Griesemer,  and  Wimsatt  2014a).111 An
appeal  of  the  scaffolding  framework  is  that  ‘there  is  nothing  intrinsically
biological  about  scaffolding  or  the  general  concept  of  development’,  as
Griesemer  (2014:  47)  clarifies.  The  framework  is  not  theoretically  rooted  in
models derived from certain practices in experimental biology and is applicable
to dynamic developmental processes that are not specifically biological.
Caporael,  Griesemer,  and  Wimsatt  (2014a)  introduce  scaffolding  as  a
widespread feature which facilitates or supports development in those scenarios
in which growth or the acquisition of new capacities would be much more costly
or even impossible without a supporting structure or process. Processes that
lack  any  kind  of  ‘productive  resistance  or  challenge’  are  not  scaffolding
(Caporael, Griesemer, and Wimsatt  2014a: 15). Three types of scaffolds are
proposed: artefacts such as tools or vehicles that are typically used temporarily
by agents, more persistent infrastructures such as buildings or institutions, and
cooperative  developmental  agents  such  as  teachers  or  mentors.  These
scaffolds  are  capable  of  supporting  or  enabling  maintenance,  growth,  or
development  by  interacting  with  certain  actors  (Caporael,  Griesemer,  and
Wimsatt 2014a: 15). 
In relation to the challenges of data commensurability over several decades,
maintaining a research practice is a central goal and a strategy to reduce data
friction. It seems counter-intuitive to think of development when the goal is to
keep a practice unchanged. However, as Caporael,  Griesemer, and Wimsatt
(2014a: 16) remark, maintenance and development seem more different from
each other than they actually are. Maintenance in a dynamic system ‘preserves
organization in the face of stress, deterioration, and change’ and is hence as
much a ‘change operation’ as development (Caporael, Griesemer, and Wimsatt
2014a: 16). Buildings, vehicles, or computers are systems in which maintaining
consistent  functionality  is  a  dynamic  activity:  Buildings  and  vehicles  need
maintenance in the face of external stress such as extreme weather, rust, or
wear  and  tear.  Computers  need  regular  updates  to  maintain  the  system’s
111 Several points of criticism against the extrapolation of neo-Darwinian models of 
development to other domains such as culture are put forward in contributions to 
Caporael, Griesemer, and Wimsatt (2014b), but I do not focus on this issue here.
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functionality  against  external  threats  such  as  viruses  or  malware  and  to
maintain its compatibility with new systems. At the same time, preserving an
“old-fashioned” system might become increasingly difficult, because spare parts
and people with very specific know-how for vintage cars or computer systems
can get scarce.
Wylie  (2016)  argues  that  scaffolding  is  crucially  involved  in  archaeology  to
determine how material traces of the past can be interpreted as evidence. She
points  out  some  important  epistemological  consequences  of  scaffolding  by
emphasising  that  scaffolds  are  always  provisional  and  new  ways  of  data
interpretation, driven by technological or conceptional innovation, are capable of
calling  assumptions  based  on  established  scaffolds  into  question.  Wylie  is
concerned  with  methodological  innovations  that  could  affect  established
interpretations  of  data.  By  contrast,  this  chapter  focuses  on  methodological
stability  in  order  to  maintain  the  value  and  usability  of  established  data
interpretations.  Yet,  both  cases  show how deeply  the  development  of  data
practices and changes of historical context are intertwined. 
Ankeny and Leonelli (2016: 19) propose a framework for the study of scientific
change  that  can  be  linked  with  the  notion  of  scaffolding:  They  define
“repertoires”  as ‘the  material,  social,  and  epistemic  conditions  under  which
individuals are able to join together to perform projects and achieve common
goals’.  The  notion  carries  a  distinct  performative  quality  and  encompasses
material  and  conceptual  elements  in  addition  to  the  social  structures  and
knowledge how to perform activities in an intended way (Ankeny and Leonelli
2016:  20–21).  A repertoire  is  not  a  necessary  condition  to  create  scientific
knowledge, but  it  makes ways of  performing research ‘relatively  robust  over
time  despite  environmental  and  other  types  of  changes’.  Additionally,  a
repertoire ‘can be transferred to and learnt by other groups interested in similar
goals’ (Ankeny and Leonelli 2016: 19). 
Robustness  and  transferability  make  the  tracking  of  a  research  group’s
repertoires  particularly  interesting  with  respect  to  the  dynamics  of
methodological  stability  and  scientific  change.  If  repertoires  support  the
robustness  of  research  practices  against  historical  changes  of  context,  the
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adoption and internalisation of a new instrument and an associated method may
scaffold the continuity and preservation of data practices.112 This chapter intends
to track how a research group’s capacities are developed internally in order to
adapt to historical changes of research conditions, but without the primary goal
of collaborating with other groups and achieving a common goal.113
6.2 Scaffolding long-term marine biology in the UK
Maintenance  and  standardisation  of  data  practices  are  core  issues  in  the
following examples of marine biological surveys around the UK which illustrate
the complex interplay between scaffolds and repertoires as well as the context
in  which  the  CPR  Survey’s  development  takes  place.  In  2007,  the  MBA
conducted  a  benthic  ecology  re-survey  of  the  Eddystone  reef,114 a  rock
formation located approximately twelve miles south-west of Plymouth Sound in
the Western English Channel. This took place 112 years after researchers from
Plymouth had first sampled the area in the late nineteenth century (Capasso et
al.  2010).  Matthew Frost,  deputy  director  of  the  MBA,  explains  why the  re-
survey was successful:
“We did a lot of projects repeating that work to look at comparisons 
and that was great because we had all the original notebooks, so […]
we were able to transcribe all the notebooks and do the work to 
interpret what they meant in their notebooks. We could then compare
those notebooks to the papers they actually published and the 
112 An example put forward by Ankeny and Leonelli (2016: 21) is the proliferating use 
of a small group of model organisms, which now dominate experimental molecular 
biology, because the repertoire has been adopted by many research groups 
across the world. This repertoire not only includes specific research practices and 
a shared conceptualisation of certain organisms as models but an entire 
infrastructure and set of norms around sharing data and acquiring funding.
113 Keep in mind that scaffolding can happen on an individual level and without 
collaboration between people or common goals. By contrast, repertoires are 
characterised by collaborative performance, not just by an ability to do something.
114 The benthic zone comprises the lowest level of a body of water including several 
layers of sediments.
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reports, and not only that, the actual specimens and stuff they 
collected was all in the natural history museum. So […] we logged all
the species that they had collected, which are all in jars there and all 
labelled. What we found is this phenomenally good audit trail that we 
have got. Not only that, but […] the actual dredges they used were 
still here. So we could go back and look at the dredge and say ‘can 
we rebuild this in the same way?’ All of those things make life much, 
much easier, if you have got all of that, really good audit trails.” 
(DR6427: 16–17)
An infrastructure with “really good audit trails”, including museums and archives,
scaffolded the re-survey of the Eddystone reef after an extensive hiatus during
which  technology,  institutions,  and  research  practices  have  changed
significantly. As Capasso et al. (2010: 1163–64) state in their publication of the
survey’s results,  ‘aims, efforts, methods, taxonomic expertise and the state of
scientific  art  have  changed  over  the  course  of  time  […]  and  this  makes
achieving proper comparisons difficult’. Besides utilising original notebooks, the
researchers had to superimpose the original survey’s taxonomic structure on
the newly created data and adapt to the original data’s semi-quantitative nature.
The audit trails enabled the MBA to acquire and re-enact data practices that
were first performed more than a hundred years ago in a very different context.
The  scaffolding  by  comprehensible  audit  trails  leads  to  certain  forms  of
maintenance  and  growth:  maintenance  of  the  historical  data’s  value  and
usability  for  current  research  questions  and  growth  of  data  volume  and
knowledge about  ecosystem change.  Both of  these developments  could not
have been achieved without the scaffolding by audit trails.
Frost headed the Marine Environmental Change Network (MECN) which was
an attempt to coordinate and preserve the UK’s long-term marine environmental
surveys. According to Frost, the MECN was set up in recognition of “the whole
other area of monitoring” (DR6427: 11), which refers to practices that were not
initiated for statutory monitoring that the UK is legally required to do.115 In a
115 Frost mentions the UK’s Bathing Water Directive, the Habitats Directive and 
various European directives (DR6427: 11).
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series of workshops, the MECN compiled an overview of long-term surveys in
UK seas which have been going on for years before today’s legal directives
were  issued.  These  “other”  time  series,  which  are  not  used  day-by-day  for
statutory monitoring, include the Eddystone reef surveys, the CPR Survey, as
well as twelve other surveys conducted by various institutions for a variety of
reasons. Since many of these surveys were threatened to run out of funding
and,  as  Frost  says,  “there  was  a  danger  that  they  were  just  disappearing”
(DR6427: 12),  the MECN acted as a  ‘knowledge transfer  mechanism’ which
attempted to show how the long-term data could be used strategically by policy
bodies and organisations for the management and monitoring of the UK seas
(Frost, Jefferson, and Hawkins 2006: 7). 
Frost further explains that “when we started the MECN, there was a real push”
to  make all  the surveys’ methods consistent  (DR6427:  17).  However, as he
continues,
“you can’t always do that, because if you have been doing that the 
same way for fifty years, you can’t just change it overnight. I mean, 
you can change it, so you might be able to add stuff […] but you can’t
stop some of the stuff you have been doing. If you have been 
monitoring every summer for fifty years it is pretty hard to say ‘well, 
would you mind doing it in the winter instead?’ You can say ‘I’ll do it 
in the winter as well,’ that’s great. SAHFOS has this issue all the time
with the Continuous Plankton Recorder. They are developing the 
whole time, ‘we want to add more equipment to our tows.’ That’s just 
the way it is, you can’t go back and change things.” (DR6427: 17)
Frost expresses here how “developing the whole time” is an almost inevitable
process for research practices, in particular when different institutions intend to
collaborate  to  form  a  “transfer  mechanism”  for  their  data.  Obviously,  data
practices  that  have  been  performed  for  decades  cannot  be  changed
retrospectively.  In  this  case  and  if  standardising  practices  is  not  an  option
because it causes discontinuities in the time series, researchers can only try to
calibrate data with the help of external resources. As Frost explains, some data
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of MECN time series have been calibrated with sea surface temperature data
produced by earth observing satellites (DR6427: 16).
The brief examples of the Eddystone reef survey and the MECN illustrate some
of the problems that may occur when data practices are re-performed in altered
contexts.  The institutional  landscape,  funding,  research methods,  as well  as
research  priorities  may  have  changed  substantially  and  without  efforts  to
preserve certain practices, including the preservation of comprehensible audit
trails,116 valuable  environmental  time  series  are  potentially  discontinued  and
lost.  Frost’s  reflection  of  the  conditions  for  long-term  marine  environmental
surveys in the late 1980s, when the majority of programmes were funded by
NERC, illustrates how quickly the context may change:
“NERC closed down a lot of them. They just said ‘we don’t see why 
we’re doing this.’ Within about five years, climate change shot up the 
agenda and everybody said ‘what we really need are people to go 
out and collect data over decades.’ So very quickly, everybody was 
scrambling to get all these things ready again.” (DR6427: 10)
Yet,  in  order  to  survive,  the  time  series  overseen by  the  MECN had  to  be
transformed,  or  developed,  from  individual,  not  widely-known  observation
routines with specific methods into visible and valuable contributions to long-
term,  nationwide,  or  even  global  monitoring  programmes.  The  goal  was
apparently the transformation of individual, diverse data practices that were unfit
for collaborative practices into a repertoire of practices that institutions perform
collectively to achieve a common goal, hence the initial push for standardisation
or data calibration and the attempt to make the time series usable for statutory
monitoring  of  UK seas.  This  transformation  has been successful  with  some
reservations,  as  Frost  explains:  While  the  importance  of  the  long-term
116 For clarification, the ambiguity about species location in the MVZ survey in Shavit 
and Griesemer’s (2011) case was not due to bad audit trails but because two 
different concepts of space were employed that became problematic when the 
survey was replicated after one hundred years. Compare these conceptions of 
species location on land with the ways species locations have been recorded in 
marine ecological practices would be an interesting research opportunity.
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observations has been widely recognised, it is still unclear who is going to pay
for the continuous operation of many of the surveys in the future (DR6427).
Frost further reflects on the diversity of practices in ocean sciences from his
experience with the MECN:
“There is also, of course, that different organisations have different 
drivers and this is the problem we had with the long-term monitoring 
group. People were saying ‘we do it for our own reasons’ and they 
can’t always just change it. […] It might be done opportunistically. 
They might do it, because that’s when the boats are available, you 
know, that sort of thing.” (DR6437: 17)
From  the  perspective  of  the  MECN,  many  of  these  somewhat  contingent
drivers, and similarly, the contexts of funding, public interest or political agenda,
cannot be controlled. Yet, these are factors that researchers have to deal with,
especially if they collide with shared goals such as long-term continuity of data
practices. 
Challenge Scaffold Development
Replication of the 
Eddystone reef survey
after a 112-year gap
Comprehensible audit 
trails including 
museums and 
archives
Maintaining the value and 
usability of historical data, 
contribution to a consistent 
dataset and knowledge of the 
reef’s ecosystem
Preservation and 
continuation of diverse
long-term marine 
biological time series 
in the UK 
Knowledge transfer 
and collaboration to 
develop a shared 
scientific repertoire
Maintaining of historical data 
practices, development of 
diverse data practices into 
strategically relevant 
environmental monitoring
Table  6.1:  Challenges,  scaffolds,  and  developments  involved  in  replicating  and
maintaining long-term marine biological time series in the UK.
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Table  6.1  summarises  two  distinct  challenges  that  can  be  identified  in  this
section’s empirical examples: first, the replication of a specific survey after an
extensive  hiatus  and  second,  the  preservation  and  continuous  operation  of
diverse data practices.117 The former was scaffolded by an infrastructure and
artefacts that amount to comprehensible audit trails, the latter was scaffolded by
an infrastructure acting as a “knowledge transfer mechanism” that involved the
development of individual data practices into a shared repertoire, even though
the originally performed practices need to remain unchanged.
6.3 Changes of context and development of the CPR Survey
For  the  in-depth  study  of  maintaining  continuity  in  the  CPR Survey, I  have
organised the survey’s development in two sub-sections: the first on technology,
the second on scientific background knowledge and socio-economic aspects.
Several of my ethnographic interviews were centred on technical aspects of the
CPR. Hence, I am able to discuss some technological developments in detail,
whereas the scientific background knowledge on oceanic ecosystems as well
as  the  socio-economic  context  of  research  are  far  too  complex  for  an
exhaustive  elaboration.  However,  sketching  a  few  important  developments,
some  of  which  are  not  exclusive  to  the  CPR Survey, serves  my argument
regarding the maintenance of a scientific practice in light of historical changes of
research conditions. 
Discussing certain developments as technological, scientific, or socio-economic
is  not  meant  to  categorise  them exclusively  under  one  of  these  labels.  All
developments are somewhat interrelated: There is always an economic aspect
to technological progress and new technology may foster progress in scientific
knowledge. Further, research technologies and scientific knowledge cannot be
117 Frost remarks that the former, picking up an abandoned survey after a long hiatus, 
is much more difficult and requires more work than the latter, adopting or 
continuing an ongoing practice from a different institution or research group 
(DR6427: 15–16). The difficulties caused by long gaps are visible in the Eddystone
reef survey and in the MVZ’s re-survey of California.
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detached from social aspects of science. Neither science nor the development
of specific aspects of scientific practices happen in isolation but within dynamic
relations  to  contexts,  artefacts,  infrastructures,  and  people,  as  many
contributions in Caporael, Griesemer, and Wimsatt (2014b) highlight.
6.3.1 The technological context
The CPR Survey is a case of ecological research with similarities to the MVZ’s
practice that Shavit and Griesemer (2011) have analysed. In both examples, the
location of a species in the natural environment and the time of its recording are
arguably the most fundamental information contained in the recorded data.118
Today, CPR samples are localised by virtue of the Global Positioning System
(GPS) track of the ship of opportunity that conducts the tow. Members of the
ship’s crew fill in a tow log form where the starting and end location of the tow
as well as course alterations are noted. The crew members refer to the real-time
GPS tracking of the ship. Occasionally, a plankton taxonomists who enters data
into the CPR Survey’s digital database checks the data in the log form against
the actual  GPS track. The tracks of ships are viewable online thanks to the
Automatic Identification System (AIS) for marine entities. 
AIS is a ‘maritime technical standard’ required for all  internationally voyaging
ships  by  the  International  Maritime  Organisation  (IMO).119 AIS  combines
dynamic GPS data, a ship’s course, position, and speed, with information such
as ship identity, size, and destination. The data are exchanged between nearby
ships, AIS base stations on land, and satellites. Ships use AIS to monitor the
traffic in their vicinity, while the data can also be used to create global real-time
maps of ship traffic.120 Obviously, this tracking infrastructure was not available
when the CPR Survey started operating in the middle of the twentieth century.
118 To illustrate the centrality of time and location, consider Baker and Yarmey (2009: 
13) on the origin of data: ‘A point in time and a geographic location together 
typically define the origin of a field measurement which, when recorded, becomes 
data.’
119 <http://www.allaboutais.com> [accessed 23 April 2016]. 
120 <http://www.marinetraffic.com/> [accessed 23 April 2016].
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Data practices and research outcomes depend on the technologies that  are
available at the time, as Lance Thomas, a member of CPR Survey’s workshop
and operations team, explains:
“The CPR is a great instrument for large areas and the large 
amounts of time that we sampled in. We are making it more accurate
as the technology allows us. We have been going for 86 years now, 
so the first ones didn’t have GPS. They didn’t have Decca. So some 
of our original tow logs would have been done by sun sights and star 
sights, because that is how the people navigated. But that was great 
and it has slightly improved all the time. That is not to say that what 
happened before was wrong.” (DR1960: 13)
While the technology of marine navigation has developed from sun and star
sights to the Decca Navigator System121 and on to GPS, SAHFOS has treated
the information about the ship’s track the same way throughout the years. As
Camp explains:
“Because each sample is effectively a ten nautical mile area, a 
deviation by maybe a minute or two in the time that they shot it or 
hauled it does not matter for what we do with the data. And the same
with exactly its position; it does not matter whether or not it may be a 
nautical mile or two off from where it is reported. We are not making 
those claims that this plankton is from this exact spot. It is ‘This is the
plankton collected within this sea area.’ And therefore those slight 
differences don’t make a difference.” (DR2901: 5)
It is not necessary for SAHFOS to name an exact spot that is the location of a
sample. Additionally, the “smear” (DR0533: 10) between adjacent samples that
results from the continuity of the sampling mechanism, as I have described in
chapter four, has always offset the inaccuracy of recorded sampling locations. It
121 Decca was a hyperbolic radio navigation system that was first used in World War 
II. Adoption peaked in the 1970s but Decca was replaced by GPS in the 1990s and
finally shut down in 2001; <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decca_Navigator_System>
[accessed 02 April 2018].
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is thus impossible to name an exact spot as the origin of a sampled organism
because the organism could have entered the nose of the CPR anywhere along
a ten to fifteen mile section of a tow. The CPR is a “macro-scale” method, says
Johns, who relates this characteristic to the natural patchiness of plankton:
“Plankton by their nature are patchy. […] There was a paper here 
lying around on plankton patchiness, basically saying that actually if 
you took a sample here on one side of the boat and took a sample 
here on the other side of the boat, they would be totally different, like,
nine times out of ten, because plankton is just in these discrete 
patches around.” (DR0533: 10)
The continuous mechanism of the CPR is the reason why CPR data cannot
resolve the plankton patches, thus restricting the use of  the data,  as Johns
further explains:
“I never say to anybody ‘actually, you could use our data to look at 
frontal zones’. They quite often think that. A frontal zone is an area of
convergence and it might be high productivity, but our samples are 
almost useless there, because it is a ten-nautical mile smear. You 
might pick it up, but it's not a fine enough resolution for that.” 
(DR0533: 11)
The  large-scale  spatial  averaging  that  is  commonly  applied  when  data  are
processed and prepared for use is an additional  step to  enlarge the spatial
scope of the data so that organisms are associated with a geographical area
rather than an exact spot. 
Given this relation between data and species location, the change of context
from  less  accurate  positioning  systems  to  GPS  technology  is  relatively
unproblematic  for  the  CPR  Survey.  The  increased  precision  of  GPS  and
scientific questions that could be asked about fine-grained locations are at odds
with the CPR method’s “smear” and averaging. This form of friction remains
somewhat unresolved, as the survey continues its handling of location data the
way it  has  done for  decades,  although with  the  same restrictions regarding
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scientific questions that can be addressed with the data. Unless the locations
derived from the tow logs seem unreasonable due to  transcription errors or
mistakes by the crew, a sample analyst will not make an effort to look up the
exact  GPS  track  of  the  ship.  Nevertheless,  the  survey  has  been  working
towards creating  a tow log  automatically. Thomas assumes that  reliance on
GPS and the automated tow log are the “logical progression”, although the CPR
Survey seems to be “a long way from that at the moment” (DR1960: 13). 
The development of GPS has not caused a productive resistance that would
require scaffolding in order to maintain its methodological  continuity. For the
way the survey processes and uses location data, it is not relevant how the
geographic locations from which a ship’s track is derived have been produced.
Although they are not a direct response to productive resistance, GPS and AIS
for the tracking and identification of ships can be viewed as an infrastructural
scaffold that develops the sample analysts’ ability to verify the location data and
minimise  errors.  Eventually,  reducing  errors  would  be  the  main  reason  for
automating  the  entire  process.  For  the  same  reason,  CPRs  have  been
equipped  for  several  years  now with  an  electronic  instrument  package  that
records the shoot and haul times of a tow automatically. These times mark the
exact beginning and the end of a tow and can be compared to the times that
have been noted in the hand-written tow log. Together with the GPS track, these
data form the basis of the electronic tow log.
An electronic instrument package to record the shoot and haul times of a tow
automatically is only one example of a number of devices that can be attached
to the external body of the CPR. Advances in micro-electronics have resulted in
a wide range of oceanographic instruments which are small and light enough to
be fitted onto the steel body of the CPR. Among these are small CTD units and
instruments  that  measure  chlorophyll  a,  fluorescence,  ambient  light,  and
orientation in three dimensions. As of 2017, a gas sensor for carbon dioxide is
under development (SAHFOS 2017: 6–7).
The instruments are relatively small  and light-weight,  but as Johns explains,
when deploying a new instrument, SAHFOS needs to make sure that the flight
position of the CPR is not affected by the new piece of equipment:
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“There is a whole aspect of, you know, if you stick something on a 
CPR, what is it going to do to the CPR? So at the moment, there is 
actually a boat out today that is towing a CPR with a pitch and roll 
sensor on it. So they bolted some new piece of instrumentation on it 
and they have a pitch and roll sensor on it to make sure that it is not 
weighing it down, so if it is flying like this or going to the side. So that 
sort of aspect is taken into consideration. If they have a new piece of 
kit, how is it going to affect the flight of the CPR.” (DR0934: 23–24)
These  types  of  experiments  are  a  response  to  advancements  in  micro-
electronics and small-scale sensor design. At the same time, on a larger scale
of technological development, commercial ships have become more powerful
and  faster  due  to  advancements  in  marine  engineering.  Hays  (1994:  404)
remarks that ‘CPRs are deployed from ships of opportunity and consequently
there is no active control of towing speed’. An assessment of the effects caused
by  different  ship  speeds  has  been  required  several  times  throughout  the
survey’s history. 
The ships of opportunity usually do not change their speed significantly during
one route, but the average speed tends to decrease during the months of winter
due to bad weather conditions and rougher seas. At the same time, the average
speed of commercial ships has increased from around ten knots in the 1950s to
around twenty knots today. This had a negative effect on the towing stability
(Batten et al. 2003: 200–01). By 1970, the average towing speed was higher
than seventeen knots, which caused more and more CPRs to destabilise and
an  increased  number  of  CPRs  were  torn  off  and  lost.  As  a  consequence,
stronger and more flexible steel wires with a diameter of ten instead of eight
millimetres were installed from 1976 onwards (Batten et al.  2003: 199).  The
design  of  the  CPR’s  external  body  was  also  modified  to  increase  towing
stability: Diving planes at the front were removed and a box-shaped tails at the
rear end were installed since 1977. By the end of 1980, most CPRs had been
modified to feature the box-tail and the stronger wire. The removal of the diving
plane had a secondary effect: It increased towing stability but also reduced the
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average towing depth from around ten to five metres and conversely, the length
of the towing wire needed to be increased (Reid et al. 2003: 123–24, 152–53).
Experiments from 2015 on the survey’s most regularly towed route between
Plymouth and Roscoff suggest that higher towing speeds also cause the CPR to
submerge to greater depth, with the nose pointing slightly upwards. The angle
of orientation, in turn, affects the volume of water entering the internal of the
CPR — a parameter that researchers want to keep unchanged for comparability
of the resulting data. Experiments have shown that a pitch of twenty degrees
upwards causes a seven percent decrease of water volume entering the CPR, if
the CPR is oriented perfectly level (SAHFOS 2016: 19). In general, though, the
effect  of  the  towing speed  on  the  actual  depth  of  the  CPR is  still  not  fully
understood, as the 2015 experiments showed greater depth with higher towing
speeds, but earlier studies suggested a constant towing depth independent of
speed (SAHFOS 2016: 19, Batten et al. 2003: 201–02).122
Experimental  studies on the performance, technology, or design of the CPR
directly scaffold the long-term continuity and commensurability of the CPR data.
Developmental agents using a research infrastructure work towards increasing
the  confidence  in  the  data  and  enable  their  comparison  across  multiple
decades. The pressure to adapt is caused by external factors: the increased
speed  of  ships,  which  is  a  parameter  that  the  survey  is  unable  to  control.
Continuity  and  data  consistency  are  thus  not  determined  solely  within  the
researchers’ controllable, institutional spaces. The weather conditions at sea as
well as the tight scheduling of the commercial shipping industry are part of a
setting to which the survey’s data practices need to adapt by development. In
some cases, a physical adjustment or assimilation is necessary, as with the
design of the CPR’s exterior body. This modification develops the instrument’s
capacities to withstand greater stress in the water. In other cases, more detailed
knowledge of the technical functioning under certain conditions is internalised
122 Batten et al. (2003: 202) admit that the effects of different towing depths are hard 
to quantify; they also point out that due to the CPR being towed behind a relatively 
large and fast-moving vessel, the water in its track is likely well mixed and 
homogenised, so that differences in towing depth of a few metres are likely 
insignificant.
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so  that  the  gained  knowledge  and  experience  can  be  used  in  subsequent
experiments as a platform for further scaffolds to develop the survey. 
The  silk  is  another  external  source  of  uncertainty  that  required  closer
examination. The silk that is used as a filter and becomes an integral part of a
CPR sample is obtained in standardised rolls from a Chinese company, it is not
manufactured specifically for oceanic sampling (DR0533: 9). Batten et al. (2003:
200) remark that the silk has been obtained from different suppliers throughout
the survey’s history. In 1996, fibre and mesh diameters of silk batches from
different suppliers were compared under dry and wet conditions. Although the
mesh diameters varied with different batches of silk from the same suppliers,
this variability was similar between all suppliers and it was concluded that the
filtering  characteristics  have remained  relatively  stable  despite  changing silk
suppliers. Continuity with respect to the silk specifications is thus scaffolded by
temporary experimental  practices.  Switching silk  suppliers has not  caused a
productive resistance in a sense that the survey was required to change its
supplier, to re-assess or calibrate historical data, or even modify the CPR. Yet,
the knowledge that SAHFOS has gained is a development that leads to more
confidence regarding the comparability of the data and the consistency of data
practices.
How can experimental research be understood as scaffolds? It could be argued
that  a  research  study is  not  exactly  a  structure  that  is  applied  to  an  entity
temporarily  and  afterwards  discarded.  I  consider  experimental  studies  as  a
mixture  of  artefact,  infrastructure,  and  developmental  agent  scaffolding.
Studying  the  effect  of  increased ship  speed requires  artefacts:  sensors  and
instruments  to  measure  the  orientation  and volume of  filtered  water. It  also
requires  infrastructures:  work  spaces,  computers,  technical  workshops,  and
resources.  It  further  requires  developmental  agents  who  conduct  the
experiments,  analyse  results,  and  draw  conclusions  about  the  instrument’s
performance.123 
123 In their categorisation of scaffolds, Caporael, Griesemer, and Wimsatt (2014a: 15) 
make clear that artefact scaffolding always requires agents: ‘Of course, to count as
artifacts, objects must be made or taken as such by agents. No agency, no 
artifacts.’
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When experimental research acts as a scaffold for the CPR Survey, it means
that an entire research capacity, including artefacts, infrastructure, and people,
become a temporary component of the survey and aid its development. With
respect to pitch and roll sensors that are attached to a CPR on the Plymouth-
Roscoff  route,  two  operations  literally  merge  like  a  painter’s  scaffold  and  a
building. And like the painter’s scaffold, the experiment on the CPR maintains a
different  time  scale  than  the  overall  plankton  survey:  Once  a  project  for
experimental development has run out, a specific insight has been gained, and
researchers  can  decide  whether  or  not  modifications  are  necessary,  the
research  capacity  is  removed  from  the  survey  and  is  free  to  operate
elsewhere.124 As Wylie (2016) has shown for archaeological research, methods
of  interpreting  material  traces  of  the  past  act  as  scaffolds  for  evidential
reasoning. Wylie (2016: 204) counts  ‘assumptions, knowledge, and resources
collectively  as  “scaffolding”,  conceptual  and  technical’.  In  a  similar  way,
experimental  studies  that  function  as  scaffolding  in  my  case  encompass
conceptual and technical resources but also assumptions and the knowledge of
developmental agents that may be obtained from scientific publications.
Adaptation  to  technological  progress  has  played  out  slightly  differently  with
regard  to  the  microscopes inside  the  survey’s  lab.  New microscope models
have been introduced in  1995 and most  recently  in  2004.  While  the  actual
magnification of the microscope has slightly changed with different models, the
size of the field of view at each stage of analysis has remained constant at least
since 1958.  The exact  models and configurations before 1958 are unknown
(Richardson et al. 2006: 35). The size of the sample area that the microscope
makes visible to a taxonomist has to remain unchanged since sample analysts
count the organisms they see in their field of view, as described in the previous
chapter. The major innovations introduced by the new microscopes are a mobile
glass stage upon which the sample is laid out and an ergonomic head which
makes the sample analysis easier and more comfortable for the analyst,  as
Johns elaborates:
124 A painter’s scaffold is eventually deconstructed and disappears from a building. 
Yet, it is not discarded but re-used to scaffold development and maintenance of 
other buildings.
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“To actually use [the newer microscopes] compared to this … this is 
horrible. When you sit down, everything is really tight, whereas these
have been designed much more ergonomically and you can rest your
arm on the thing here, you can move this stage. When you are 
analysing, you have to physically move it around like this, whereas 
[the newer] one, you can see there is a little wheel there to move it 
along, it is minimum movement.” (DR0934: 5)
The newer microscopes, were custom made for the survey to “mimic” the older
microscopes. Johns immediately relates this to the survey’s overall ambition to
keep the methodology consistent:
“[The newest microscopes] are custom made so they kind of mimic 
[the old ones]. So the field of view and the magnification are all the 
same. The whole idea is that you keep the methodology the same. 
You don't want to make any mistakes with methodology, it has got to 
be the same. We pride ourselves on our 70-year time series, that’s 
what we want.” (DR0934: 5)
This quote is a display of how highly the methodological continuity has been
valued  and  protected  at  SAHFOS.  However,  as  the  statement  is  related  to
developments  in  microscope  technology,  the  continuity  does  not  exclude
occasional  upgrades  or  the  replacement  of  parts.  Core  functionality  —  the
performance of the microscopes in the lab, but also of the silk and the CPR in
the water — is the central aspect that needs to be maintained. 
Similar  to  the  introduction  of  GPS,  the  new microscopes  are  not  directly  a
response to  a  productive  resistance.  The CPR Survey probably  could  have
continued using the old models; a challenge only arises when new instruments
are introduced that are less demanding to operate. In this case, the continuity of
methods is scaffolded by the purchase of custom-made microscopes that mimic
the old ones.
Table 6.2 summarises the challenges, scaffolds, and developments that relate
to  technologies  used  in  the  CPR  Survey.  Whereas  several  changes  of
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technological context have required scaffolds in order to maintain continuity and
assure commensurability of CPR data, the transition to GPS navigation seemed
to  be  a  minor  challenge  and  is  therefore  omitted  in  the  table.  Due  to  the
plankton patchiness, the “smear” between samples, and large-scale averaging,
the increased precision of GPS has no effect on the data’s consistency. The
transition  exemplifies,  however,  how  much  the  overall  technological
environment  in  which  marine  sciences  operate  has  evolved  in  less  than  a
hundred  years,  going  from  sun  and  star  sights  to  fully  automated  ship
identification  and  tracking  systems.  Furthermore,  automated  and  highly
accurate location data are easier to use in combination with data from additional
equipment such as sea temperature or salinity. For these data, highly accurate
geographical  locations might  be more useful  than for  the spatially  averaged
plankton distributions.
Challenge Scaffold Development
Adding instruments to 
the CPR’s exterior body
Experimental research
on CPR performance
Increased certainty regarding 
CPR performance
Adapting to higher 
towing speeds
Experimental research
on CPR performance
Physical modifications of the 
CPR’s external body and 
steel wire
Changing silk suppliers Comparisons of silk 
batches under 
different conditions
Higher confidence in the 
consistency of silk 
specifications
Introduction of new 
microscopes
Mimicking of previous 
models’ functionality
Maintaining the microscopic 
field of view’s dimensions
Table 6.2: Challenges, scaffolds, and development of some technological aspects of
the CPR Survey.
In summary, it is important to realise that the technologies of the CPR Survey
are all but static, despite the long-term methodological continuity of the survey.
In  fact,  it  is  the  high  value  placed  on  continuity  over  multiple  decades  of
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historical  change that  requires  technology to  be  adaptable  or  perhaps even
“malleable” like an astronomer’s digital data, as Hoeppe (2014) has argued. In
some  cases,  maintaining  methodological  continuity  required  certain
components of the CPR Survey to become the object of experimental research.
This conversion is grasped by Rheinberger’s (1997: 29) account of ‘nontrivial
interplay,  intercalation,  and  interconversion’  between  epistemic  things  and
technical objects in experimental sciences. Rheinberger (1997: 30) maintains
that there can be no final distinctions between objects of scientific enquiry and
the instruments that scientists use to study them. They are two extremes with
‘all  possible  degrees  of  gradation’  between them and ‘room for  all  possible
hybrids’ (Rheinberger 1997: 30).  A CPR, with sensors attached to record its
behaviour under various conditions, but still regularly sampling the oceans, is a
hybrid that is simultaneously research technology and the focus of research. A
similar shift has been found by Shavit and Griesemer (2011: 189) in their study
of  the  MVZ’s  two  biodiversity  surveys:  The  technical  category  of  ‘specimen
location’ became a distinctive new scientific problem ‘in the face of theoretical
and  technological  change  as  well  as  changing  public  priorities  for  science’.
Likewise, in my case, the CPR technology has repeatedly become a scientific
problem due to historically changing factors such as increasing ship speed, new
scientific equipment, or changing silk suppliers. 
6.3.2 The scientific and socio-economic context
Knowledge of the oceans, their ecosystems, as well as the processes that effect
oceanic plankton has progressed substantially since the beginning of the CPR
Survey.  How  has  this  progress  affected  the  survey?  The  list  of  taxonomic
entities that is used for identification of plankton organisms is a key indicator in
this regard.
The microscopic analysis and the count of a specific taxonomic entity on the
sample are performed with a variable degree of detail. According to Richardson
et al. (2006: 37), the CPR survey records 437 different taxa in the North Atlantic.
Accounting for all regions where CPRs are deployed, the number of taxonomic
entities recorded is even higher, as Johns explains:
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“If you are talking about taxonomic entities, so not species, not 
genus, we probably count over 800. A lot of these will be to species, 
but for certain taxa, the calanoids, the copepods that people are very
interested in, we would say ‘Not only is it genus this and species this,
but it is also a male or a female or it is in a stage where it is a 
juvenile or it is an adult.’ So that is information that is captured as 
well. But only for things that people are really interested in, otherwise
it just adds to the workload. […] Some of the things we are looking 
at, we cannot take them any further. We can only say that it is a 
decapod larva, which is the larva of a crab or a lobster. It would just 
take forever if you wanted to identify exactly to the species. So some 
things that we look at are quite coarse, we just stop and say ‘That is 
good enough. That is what we need to know.’” (DR0934: 3)
In the sample analysis, the question of interest is not always just for the quantity
of a given species. The taxonomic list is designed to capture different life stages
of some organisms or the abundance of several species together as a single
group  and  not  individually.  For  example,  Atlanta is  a  genus  of  the  phylum
mollusca that consists of around twenty different species, but all of them are
counted  together  during  the  zooplankton  eyecount  stage,  recorded  as  the
taxonomic entity  Atlanta spp. without  distinguishing on the species level.  By
contrast, some species are counted individually but are also recorded as part of
one or more species groups, as in an example of some  Dinophysis’ species
explained  further  below.125 In  another  example,  the  two  copepod  species
Undeuchaeta major and  Undeuchaeta plumosa are recorded separately, but
Undeuchaeta specimens which are ‘identifiable to genus but not species’ level
125 In combination with the category counting system explained in chapter four, the 
individual and group counting of the same species may occasionally lead to an 
‘undesirable consequence’ (Richardson et al. 2006: 37): The conversion of 
counted values to accepted values and to estimated abundances may result in 
final values for individual species which should sum up perfectly on a higher 
taxonomic level, but not always do so. In such cases, data users are advised to 
use the combined taxonomic entity rather than adding up the individual 
abundances themselves (Richardson et al. 2006: 37).
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are  counted  as  a  separate  taxonomic  entity  named  Undeuchaeta spp.
(Richardson et al. 2006: 52–54).
The reasons for applying different depths of analysis often lie in the specific
dynamics  of  the  ecosystem under  investigation  and  the  processes  that  the
oceanographic  community  is  interested  in.  Johns  illustrates  this  with  an
example: Most of the zooplankton research of the North Atlantic and North Sea
focuses on distributions of the two species Calanus finmarchicus and Calanus
helgolandicus.  Both  species’  abundances  follow  the  seasonal  cycle  of
phytoplankton which are eaten up by the two  Calanus species. The seasonal
cycle always features a strong spring bloom and an occasional, smaller autumn
bloom. Calanus finmarchicus and Calanus helgolandicus prefer different water
temperatures, so that a shift in distributions of the two may indicate a shift of
temperature regimes inside the oceans. In this case, it is only important for most
researchers to know whether it is one species or the other.126 By contrast, in
parts  of  the  Pacific  Ocean,  an  ecosystem  with  fundamentally  different
characteristics,  Neocalanus species fill a similar role in the food chain as the
two  Calanus species  do  in  the  North  Atlantic,  but  in  an  ecosystem without
strong spring blooms and with constantly low phytoplankton abundances. The
ecosystem and food chain are much more sensitive to small disturbances and
in these cases, researchers are interested not only in species, but also in the
stage  of  development  of  the  organisms,  whether  they  are  juvenile  or  adult
(DR0934: 10–11). The list of taxonomic entities is adaptable depending on what
the  scientific  community  values  as  important  regional  characteristics  of  a
specific ecosystem. 
The previous quote by Johns also hints  at  a relation to  the socio-economic
context of the survey: As the lab manager, Johns, has to keep an eye on the
workload  and  make  sure  that  the  analyses  are  performed  in  a  reasonable
amount of time. The sample analysis is “the most expensive part of the entire
process”, says Camp (DR2901: 11). If the CPR Survey had more funding for
analysis it would “happily double the amount of routes tomorrow” (DR2901: 11).
126 However, the CPR Survey actually distinguishes between juvenile and adult life 
stages of Calanus species.
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The duration of an analysis is thus an important factor in the workflow and is
determined by the methods of sub-sampling and the category system that  I
have described in the previous chapter, but also by the list of taxonomic entities
and the level of detail that are applied in each analysis. Johns needs to find a
balance between a reasonable workload for the taxonomists to avoid a growing
backlog of unanalysed samples, the constraint of having a limited number of
taxonomists available, and serving the interests of the scientific community.
While the sub-sampling and the category system for counting organisms have
remained unchanged since the 1950s, some taxonomic entities as well as the
detail of analysis have been adjusted in the course of the survey. As Richardson
et al. (2006: 59) explain, ‘the Survey is responsive to changes in research focus
and  marine  management  imperatives’.  New  taxa  have  been  added  to  the
survey throughout its history, which means that a new ‘Taxon ID’ in the CPR
database is issued and taxonomists are trained to identify the new taxon. In a
relatively recent example, the genus Dinophysis has only been identified to the
genus level until 2004. Since many of Dinophysis’ species are associated with
harmful  algal  blooms  which  create  toxic  effects  for  other  organisms,  seven
different  species  of  Dinophysis have  been  recorded  individually  since  then.
However, the group  Dinophysis spp. has been recorded since 1958 and also
remains as a taxonomic entity by itself so that the almost 60-year time series of
Dinophysis spp. continues (Richardson et al. 2006: 59). Similar to the additional
equipment bolted on the exterior body of the CPR and the standardisation of the
MECN  time  series,  practices  with  a  history  spanning  multiple  decades  are
intended to remain untouched. If  existing time-series are unaffected and the
analysis remains economically feasible, a new research capacity in form of a
new entity may be added. 
As Bowker (2000) explains, taxonomists who record biodiversity data decide for
a variety of reasons what they record, how they record, and what they do not
record. These decisions are mirrored in the databases taxonomists construct
and they shape our knowledge of the natural world. Histories and context such
as  the  relations  between  the  two  Calanus species,  the  association  of
Dinophysis species  with  harmful  algal  blooms,  but  also  SAHFOS’ economic
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constraints  are written or  “folded”  into  biodiversity  databases (Bowker  2000:
675). 
Another  example  of  a  new  taxonomic  entity  that  has  been  added  due  to
scientific as well  as public interest are plastics (Richardson et al.  2006: 59).
Even before its addition to the list of taxonomic entities, sample analysts have
frequently  encountered  microscopic  pieces  of  plastic  on  the  samples.
Thompson et  al.  (2004)  have  re-examined archived samples  from the  CPR
routes  between  Sule  Skerry  and  Iceland  and  between  Aberdeen  and  the
Shetlands. They found plastics on samples from the 1960s and their abundance
has significantly increased in the following decades. In 2004, a taxonomic ID
was issued and plastics have been recorded routinely since then. Richardson et
al.’s  (2016:  56)  list  of  taxonomic entities of  the  North Atlantic  lists  ‘Plastics’
under  ‘Miscellaneous taxa’ right  between ‘Pinus pollen’,  pollen grain  of  pine
trees, and ‘Stellate bodies’, hairs of land plants, which are of terrestrial origin
like  plastics  but  of  course  biological  entities.  In  response  to  the  lack  of
quantitative data on microplastics pollution, the practice was further developed
in 2016 from just recording the presence to documenting particle size, type, and
abundance (SAHFOS 2017: 21). This new, non-biological taxonomic entity has
been  created  and  further  developed  in  response  to  historical  changes  of
context:  increasing  pollution  of  the  seas,  increased  global  production  of
synthetic fibres, as well as public and scientific interest in the matter.
The straightforward addition of a non-biological entity to a list of biological taxa
may  appear  puzzling  or  even  audacious.127 Yet,  from  the  CPR  Survey’s
perspective, it is a reasonable step to adapt to the interests and demands of
science  and  societies.  An  equally  important  fact  is  that  the  survey  utilises
proven data practices that allow this move with relatively little additional efforts.
A major worry about the growing pollution of the oceans with plastics concerns
the  uptake  of  microscopic  plastic  particles  by  plankton  organisms.  This
127 Note, however, that etymological origin of the term “plankton”, coming from the 
Greek “planktos”, meaning ‘that which is passively drifting or wandering’ (Lalli and 
Parsons, 1997: 3–4) does not indicate living entities explicitly. Microplastics are not
biological organisms, but they are entities that passively drift with the currents just 
like organic plankton.
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introduction of plastics into global food webs is a process that the CPR Survey
seems  to  be  predestined  to  study  with  its  data  practices,  its  research
infrastructure, and the geographical and temporal scope of the CPR Survey. 
However, this development of the survey has led to a new challenge, as Johns
explains: 
“Over the last ten years or so there was more interest in microplastic 
pollution. So we started to ask the analysts if they see any. […] We 
have been counting microplastics as a possible indicator of pollution 
for about ten years. We have not really got our heads around exactly 
how much of that could be contamination. Because when these silks 
are laid out and cut, they are exposed to the air and all sorts of stuff 
could fall onto the silk. So it is quite difficult to say when it comes 
back and you look under the microscope, if it is actual pollution from 
the sea or if it is just a form of cloth. So we have got some ongoing 
work trying to get that.” (DR0934: 5)
In order to distinguish between plastic pollution of the seas and contamination,
the  survey  needs  to  develop  an  entirely  new  skill.  This  requires  specific
investigation of the survey’s methods, workflow, and lab environments.
Batten et al.  (2003:  204)  point  out  that  taxonomy is an ‘evolving discipline’:
Since the CPR survey started, ‘new species have been discovered, and old
ones  have  been  split  or  even  merged,  as  new  information  comes  to  light’
(Batten et al. 2003: 204). For example, the aforementioned genus Calanus has
been split  into  Calanus and  Neocalanus only in 1974.  A total  number of  28
changes to the ‘taxonomic resolution’ are listed in Batten et al.  (2003: 205),
which covers the first sixty years of the CPR survey. The majority of these are
counting  species  separately  which  were  only  counted  as  part  of  another
taxonomic entity until then and counting a taxonomic entity numerically instead
of just recording it as present. Both changes are associated with an increase in
taxonomic  resolution  (Batten  et  al.  2003:  203–04).  Research  in  plankton
taxonomy provides SAHFOS with a structure to build an ontology for the CPR
Survey. The ontology reflects  the  current  scientific  consensus regarding  the
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spectrum of species known to exist in the oceans, but it can also be used as an
adjustable scaffold  not  only  to  create  data,  but  to  keep the  survey relevant
despite  shifting  interests  of  researchers  and  societies.  As  summarised  in
chapter three, the CPR Survey was conceived in the 1920s by Alister Hardy in
the context of fisheries ecology in order to create data on zooplankton, the main
food source of larval fish. Since then, the survey has developed into ‘a platform
for Integrated Ocean Observing’ (SAHFOS 2017: 6), offering a wide variety of
specifically processed data products which are particularly useful for the study
of  the  oceans  as  part  of  a  changing  climate  system  and  to  assess
anthropogenic impacts such as pollution. 
Frost  hints  at  certain  pressures for  traditional  marine ecological  practices to
transform themselves and appeal to funding organisations. As he explains, the
classic methods of ecology are “being slightly overlooked” and are sometimes
seen  as  “slightly  old-fashioned”  (DR6427:  18).  Describing  the  contrast  to
physical oceanography, Frost states:
“When you are going for a meeting and somebody is showing how 
they got this ship and satellite and AUV and they have got these 
systems measuring how the ocean circulations change […]. That is 
something which your average funder and policy-maker will think 
‘yeah, I can see that.’” (DR6427: 18)128
Whereas Frost describes an ecological survey he has participated in as follows:
“It is people going out, I did it with PML a couple of years ago. We did
the classic thing, we drove out, we dug stuff up, we put stuff in 
buckets, we measured stuff, we sat on the microscopes, and it is a 
lot harder to say that it is really, really important.” (DR6427: 18)
The “classic thing” is “a lot harder to sell”, Frost explains (DR6427: 15). The
development of new capacities by deploying new instruments that widen the
spectrum of potential data users is thus an activity that scaffolds the continuous
128 An AUV is an autonomous underwater vehicle, a robot that travels and operates 
without requiring input.
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operation of the CPR Survey as a whole. Similar to the MECN’s intentions, the
CPR  Survey  develops  a  repertoire  that  facilitates  cooperation  with  external
researchers and attracts funding. In relation to the difficulty of funding long-term
monitoring programmes, Brandner et al. (2003: 177) make clear that ‘to survive
for seven decades, the CPR dataset must have had some continuing utility for
marine resource management or policy’.
As  the  previous section  has shown,  good audit  trails  and a comprehensive
documentation  of  practices  also  support  the  continuity  of  long-term
environmental time series. With numerous publications describing the survey’s
methods, extensive documentation, and internal standards of practice, the CPR
Survey has managed to build an extensive written audit trail. However, crucial
knowledge and plankton expertise are also preserved and passed on through
the training of new sample analysts and the regular organisation of courses and
workshops for internal and external scientists.129 Still, specific expertise on local
marine ecosystems, which individual researchers have gained and developed
over decades, is in danger of being lost in the course of staff fluctuation and
ageing of key experts. Esther Hughes, manager of DASSH, gives an example:
“For example pycnogonids, which are little sea spiders … A lot of 
knowledgable marine biologists are able to put the species down to a
family or a group, but they are not able to assign any sort of certainty
to that record. And the guy who was the pycnogonid expert in the UK
died in 2010. So we now have a lack in that expertise. That is a little 
bit of a problem for that group.” (DR4783: 14)
Reid et al. (2003: 159) also remark that besides financial reasons, many marine
environmental time-series are in danger ‘because key trained staff are not being
replaced’. 
Some marine ecologists struggle to attract other people and funding because
many of their research methods and objects of study are less “charismatic” than
129 In 2016, SAHFOS organised a Harmful Algae Taxonomy and Identification 
Workshop, a Fish Larvae Identification Workshop (SAHFOS 2017: 20–21), and 
three technical courses with the operations team (SAHFOS 2017: 13).
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those of other oceanographic or biological research areas. Bowker (2000: 655–
56) points out that the term “charismatic” has been used in biodiversity literature
to describe species that attract more attention from the public, policy-makers,
and funders than others: 
Many more care about the fate of the cuddly panda, the fierce tiger 
or indeed the frequently drunk and scratchy koala bear, than about 
the fate of a given species of seaweed. (Bowker 2000: 655)
Attention is also biased towards  ‘the exotic other’ (Bowker 2000: 655), to the
detriment  of  many  leading  research  organisations’  and  funders’  domestic
ecosystems and species. Technologies are more or less charismatic as well, as
Frost’s juxtaposition of the physical oceanographers’ satellites and AUVs with
the marine ecologists’ buckets and microscopes illustrates. Bowker (2000: 656)
summarises that across all sciences, ‘the activity of naming’, which is the core
of  taxonomic  and  biodiversity  research,  ‘is  mundane  and  low  status,  even
though it  is an activity central  to the development of good databases’.  More
charismatic species and technologies not only draw more attention from the
public, policy-makers, and funders, but also attract a larger number of young
researchers  (Bowker  2000:  655).  These  kinds  of  feedback  loops  gradually
reinforce the low status of taxonomic and biodiversity research and they are not
controllable by the CPR Survey but rather an aspect of the context and setting
in  which  research  practices  are  performed.  The  feedback  loops  cause
productive resistance from the perspective of marine ecologists who specialise
in seaweeds, sea spiders, or a relatively uncharismatic ecosystem on a rock
formation  in  the  Western  English  Channel.  Although  oceanic  plankton
populations have received increased public attention due to their crucial role in
the  climate  system,  most  of  the  research  methods  to  study  macro-scale
processes remain rather “old-fashioned”, like the CPR Survey’s core activity that
is  based  on  mechanical  sampling  devices,  pieces  of  silk,  and  hands-on
microscopic analysis.  Sukhotin and Berger  (2013:  2),  two marine ecologists,
maintain that
carrying out the monitoring studies is a thankless job. It is time and 
effort consuming and does not provide immediate scientific 
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gratification. Usually, the data produced by the monitoring become 
valuable only when accumulated over a long period of time 
(sometimes decades).
The  CPR  Survey’s  data  practices  are  characterised  by  the  flexibility  to  be
responsive to the interests and attention of societies and research communities,
by the ability to add charismatic entities such as microplastics to their taxonomic
spectrum, and by the ability  to add new instrumentation.  These abilities are
scaffolds  that  support  the  CPR  Survey’s  continuous  operation.  In  light  of
numerous uncontrollable, external conditions, the survey is required to adapt
and develop its scientific repertoire in order to preserve the continuity of its core
activities.
Part  of  maintaining a data practice is  maintaining the specific expertise and
knowledge of the people performing the research. The expertise required for the
analysis of CPR samples is quite special and passed on to new generations of
sample analysts inside the lab. As the lab manager, Johns is in charge of hiring
new sample analysts; he explains that it is difficult to find people who already
have some sort of expertise in plankton. Johns’ description gives the impression
that  indeed  not  many  young  biologists  are  pursuing  specific  expertise  in
plankton. Therefore, Johns would be looking for people “to have some sort of
knowledge of natural history, to be interested in natural history”, so that the new
team member is likely to gain experience and specific expertise quickly. Johns
compares this way of hiring to before he was appointed the lab manager:
Before I was doing that, we had somebody else, who was taking 
people on. They just wanted people who would stay and treat it like a
factory and do their work. So that is great from a work perspective, 
but it means that they have got no interest in the biology or the 
ecology of what they are looking at. So they don’t tell you if they see 
anything different. They don’t think ‘Actually, you know what, that is 
really weird at this time of the year.’ So you kind of lose that. […] One
of the last ones we took on, she was interested in bats. […] So she 
actually has got a license to look at bats, and I was thinking ‘That’s 
what we want.’ You want somebody who is interested in nature, to 
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say ‘Actually, this is quite unusual.’ Otherwise it becomes a bit of a 
conveyor belt of churning out samples.” (DR0934: 18)
A newly hired plankton taxonomist receives several months of training, which is
“one to one training for most of the time with one person who leads the training”,
Johns explains (DR0934: 17). In the beginning, trainees only receive samples
which  have  already  been  analysed  by  established  taxonomists  so  that  it  is
possible to compare the results, Camp explains:
“So there is quite a lot of training involved, because we have to 
recognise an awful lot of taxa, over five hundred different taxa. So 
there is a lot of training required, you are not really fully released 
without supervision until maybe after two years of analysis; and that 
is still only North Sea and North Atlantic samples. It might be some 
time after that until you would be looking at Pacific samples or South 
Atlantic, Antarctic samples, because the communities are different, 
there is additional training on that.” (DR2901: 8)
Analysing samples from different regions requires knowledge of the respective
ecosystem and familiarity with the local organisms. A shelf filled with textbooks
and other resources is kept in the lab in addition to every taxonomists’ personal
notes, as Johns explains:
“For most of the phytoplankton in that North Sea area or anywhere 
near the UK, most analysts here would not need to look that up. […] 
Some are rare things and there are a couple of things that look fairly 
similar, some of the zooplankton, people would look at that more 
often, even after years.” (DR0934: 6)
However,  asked  whether  the  skills  to  be  a  plankton  taxonomist  are  rather
learned via textbooks or from experience, Johns laughs and explains:
“Probably most of it is informal and on-the-job stuff, yeah. Textbooks 
are obviously really useful, but it is not the same as looking down 
and actually seeing a physical specimen there.” (DR0934: 18–19)
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Taylor, an experienced sample analyst, describes the interaction in the lab by
which specific expertise is gained:
“We are always looking at each other’s samples all the time. It’s not 
that a day goes past where you are not going to go a look at 
someone else’s stuff.” (DR8112: 10)
The main  reason that  taxonomists  learn  most  effectively  “on-the-job”  is  that
many organisms on CPR samples do not look the same as in the images of
textbooks. The organisms on the silk are “squashed” between the two silk layers
and are often hit by the CPR’s steel body at considerable speeds before they
get caught in the silk. The organisms hence tend to be “very, very flat”, as Johns
explains (DR0934: 19). Occasionally, though, a comparison with organisms as
they appear in the oceans as well as in textbooks is helpful and may adds an
analyst’s expertise:
“Guys who work in this building have got a regular sampling point 
right out there, the Eddystone. And they use a net to catch their 
zooplankton. So their zooplankton looks lovely. They are not 
squashed, so we also give people that to look at as well. So we can 
say ‘Here is the book, this is what it looks like in the book. This is 
what a real one looks like, it is nice. And this is what ours look like.’ 
So you get a nice broad understanding. You can start identify things 
at weird squished angles, which you would not pick out from a book.”
(DR0934: 19) 
The on-the-job development of capacities and preserving of expertise exemplify
scaffolding  by  developmental  agents,  with  interaction,  cooperation,  and
exchanges between agents and their targets rather than just by application of
an artefact or structure. These scaffolds are anything but permanent, as people
in  the  lab  are  not  constantly  assisting  each other. They may be utilised as
needed, either if new analysts receive basic training, if a special expertise is
going to be acquired, or if an analyst is simply in doubt about an organism’s
taxonomic identity.
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The majority of a plankton analyst’s expertise is gained by becoming part of the
group  of  taxonomists  and  by  interacting  and  practising  together  with
experienced  taxonomists.  This  way  of  learning  by  practice  and  interaction
scaffolds the maintenance of the survey by preserving the plankton- and CPR-
specific expertise. Collins and Evans’ (2007: 3) account of acquiring expertise
as a ‘social process—a matter of socialization into the practices of an expert
group’ is an adequate description of the training process in the CPR Survey.
The  skills  and  expertise  required  to  identify  severely  deformed  plankton
organisms  is  exactly  the  kind  of  “tacit  knowledge”  that  ‘one  can  only  gain
through social immersion in groups who possess it’ (Collins and Evans 2007: 6).
Challenge Scaffold Development
Acquiring funding for 
“old-fashioned” data 
practices on 
“uncharismatic” species
Flexible and adaptable list of 
taxonomic entities, ability to 
add new instruments 
Development of a 
scientific repertoire to 
enhance collaboration
Staff fluctuation and 
ageing of key experts
Social immersion in an 
expert group, “on-the-job” 
training of new taxonomists 
by developmental agents
Maintaining specific 
marine biological 
expertise
Table 6.3: Challenges, scaffolds, and developments that relate to historical changes of
scientific knowledge and the socio-economic context of the CPR Survey.
Table 6.3 summarises scaffolds that  relate to  historical  changes of  scientific
knowledge and the socio-economic context of the CPR Survey. Whereas most
of the challenges and scaffolds related to technology were specifically dealing
with  aspects  and  details  of  the  CPR  Survey,  the  productive  resistances
discussed  in  this  section  are  problems  faced  by  researchers  in  many
disciplines:  Acquiring  research  funding  is  extremely  competitive  so  that
researchers  in  many  fields  may  experience  a  pressure  to  come  up  with
innovative research projects to “sell” their science to funding agencies and to
the wider public. Naturally, all scientific disciplines experience staff fluctuation
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and  the  retirement  of  key  figures.  However,  ecology  and  biodiversity  are
research fields with a high diversity of practices and in some cases, an intimate
relatedness to local conditions. Losing an expert of local species populations
like  sea  spiders  in  the  UK therefore  amounts  to  a  serious  problem for  the
creation of continuous data related to these species. 
6.4 Dynamic development underpins continuity
The empirical sections of this chapter portray the CPR Survey as a developing
entity. Instead of a static tool that is applied to a natural system in strictly the
same  way  for  decades,  I  have  encountered  lively,  growing,  and  dynamic
research  practices.  Hacking  (1983:  150)  and  Rheinberger  (1997:  81)  have
characterised experimental systems as having a ‘life cycle’ and ‘a life of its own’,
respectively.  I  suggest  expanding  this  description  to  include  long-standing
ecological  monitoring  practices,  even  if  these  are  characterised  by  strong
methodological continuity. 
The CPR Survey has grown and developed: Individuals who are part  of the
survey have gained knowledge and expertise, the purpose and scope of the
survey have expanded, and new instruments have been internalised into routine
research practices. Over seven decades, the survey has gained new capacities
and developed a scientific repertoire, all  the while it  has maintained its core
functionality:  the  “old-fashioned”  mode  of  creating  plankton  data.  The
methodology of the survey has been maintained not despite, but because of its
ability to adapt data practices to historical changes of context.
The  continuity  of  data  practices  and  the  commensurability  of  data  are
underpinned by a variety  of  dynamic processes and activities,  which I  have
discussed  as  scaffolds:  The  development  of  a  scientific  repertoire,  which
increases the scope of data and the potential for collaborations, scaffolds the
preservation of practices in which the core functionality cannot be changed. The
implementation and preservation  of  comprehensible  audit  trails  amount  to  a
scaffold  that  enables  researchers  to  continue  established  data  practices,  to
replicate  data  practices  of  the  past,  or  to  re-establish  a  practice  after  an
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extensive  hiatus.  Further,  researchers  respond  to  changing  conditions  with
experiments that turn the research technology into the object of research and
thereby scaffold physical modifications of the technology or increased certainty
in the performance of instruments. 
The  data  ontology, implemented  as  an  adaptable  list  of  taxonomic  entities,
provides a level  of  flexibility  that even allows for the crossing of disciplinary
boundaries by addition of non-biological and purely anthropogenic entities like
plastics.  Such additions or refinements may lead to new capacities that can
scaffold  the  continuous  operation  of  a  research  practice.  Further,  informal,
social immersion of younger researchers into a group of experts scaffolds the
preservation of local expertise that is often required in ecological research.
All of these scaffolding activities are integral parts of the CPR Survey and they
help managing the impacts of a variety of external processes that are beyond
SAHFOS’s  control:  long-term  progress  in  sensor  technology,  marine
engineering  and  navigation;  shifting  interests  and  focus  areas  of  scientists,
science  funders,  policy-makers,  and  the  public;  progress  in  taxonomic
knowledge  and  the  discovery  of  new  species;  the  progression  of  personal
careers and biographies and the resulting personnel turnover.
The dynamics  of  these processes are  visible  in  an  example  of  an  intricate
interplay between the external drivers and scaffolds: In order to attract funding
and continue long-term operation of the survey, new instruments are added to
the CPRs. The new devices and the resulting data scaffold the continuation of
the  survey  as  a  whole.  However,  new  devices  may  affect  the  CPR’s
performance  during  a  tow,  so  the  continuity  needs  to  be  scaffolded  by
experimental research of the CPR’s performance under different conditions. 
The examples  in  this  chapter  also  disclose an  interaction  between different
scales of scaffolds and developed entities. Many developments discussed in the
empirical parts of this chapter can be viewed as “small-scale”: the modifications
of  the  CPR’s  design  based  on  studies  of  very  specific  components  of  the
sampling technology, the addition of a small piece of equipment to the exterior
body of  the CPR,  or  the individual  training of  a  junior  sample  analyst.  This
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variety  of  small-scale  developments  scaffolds  “large-scale”  continuity:  the
continuous operation of the survey for multiple decades, the comparability of
newly created data with historical records, and the transfer of local ecological
expertise from one generation of researchers to the next.
A scientific repertoire, Ankeny and Leonelli (2016: 19) remark, makes research
practices  ‘relatively robust over time despite environmental and other types of
changes’. Scaffolds, too, enhance the robustness of practices, but the kind of
robustness that is achieved is not characterised by being unaffected by external
factors  and  changing  conditions.  Robustness  here  consists  in  the  ability  to
adapt  and  develop  practices  so  that  core  functionalities  are  maintained.
Griesemer, Caporael, and Wimsatt (2014: 307) explain that what biologists call
robustness can be found in both biological and cultural developmental systems:
the ability to  ‘assimilate changes and adjust to them’. Systems with this ability
‘manifest  a  great  deal  of  stability’  (Griesemer, Caporael,  and Wimsatt  2014:
307).  This  analogy  has  received  relatively  little  attention  from  scholars,
compared to ‘the assumption that  preexisting genetic predispositions explain
the  most  important  aspects  of  human  culture’  (Griesemer,  Caporael,  and
Wimsatt 2014: 307). My case study exemplifies the dynamic development of
cultural  practices  that  is  necessary  for  assimilating  historical  changes  of
conditions and it contradicts an image of development that is determined by a
given set of predispositions.
6.5 Conclusion
Consistency of data and data practices is crucial for the recording and study of
long-term  changes  of  ocean  ecosystems.  This  chapter  shows  that  the
commensurability  of  data  that  were  created  decades  apart  is  achieved  by
developments  of  scientific  practices  which  preserve  core  functionality.  The
continuity  of  data  practices  is  not  characterised by  rigorously  adhering  to  a
single method that is repeated over and over again. Instead, researchers have
to find and maintain a balance between on the one hand, achieving the highest
possible consistency and reliability within a growing body of data and on the
other hand, adapting to processes that researchers are unable to control, such
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as technological progress, shifting interests of research communities, the public,
and funding agencies, staff fluctuation, and ageing of key experts.
Striving  for  continuity, but  at  the  same time,  competing  for  limited  research
funding, researchers need to develop and transform data practices. In the case
of marine biodiversity and ecology, scientists are driven towards broadening the
scope  of  their  research  by  adding  new  instruments  or  expanding  their
taxonomic range to include even non-biological entities. Researchers continue
their  long-standing  ecological  time  series  while  balancing  between  their
valuable commitment to a legacy and openness to innovation. 
I have interpreted scientific change and the development of scientific practice in
terms  of  “scaffolding”:  Artefacts,  infrastructures,  and  developmental  agents
temporarily contribute to the acquisition of new capacities or to the maintenance
and continuity of practices. The concept of scaffolding emphasises the dynamic
character of a developmental process which is not pre-determined by a set of
starting conditions, but rather plays out in response to external, historical drivers
and  the  scientific,  technological,  and  socio-economic  conditions  of  research
practices. With regard to the tension between change and continuity, scaffolding
processes seem to reconcile what was initially perceived as an opposition: The
continuity  of  data practices is not achieved despite changing conditions,  but
because of the ability to assimilate changes and adjust practices accordingly.
Unlike the material continuity introduced in chapter four and the traceable series
of transformations introduced in chapter five, the continuity of data practices
relates  only  indirectly  to  the  space  in-between  science  and  nature.
Methodological continuity constitutes a lack of jumps between data of the past
and data of today and thereby cuts across, somewhat perpendicularly, to the
individual  links  between  data  and  the  natural  world.  These  continuities  and
changes are interwoven in the CPR Survey’s data practices to form a flexible
and yet  robust  layer  of  practices  from which scientific  knowledge of  natural
systems grows.
However, a crucial thread that is part of the setting in which the CPR Survey
operates is still missing from the picture and was not mentioned in this chapter.
The  survey  depends  on  collaboration  with  commercial  ships,  shipping
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companies, port authorities, and logistics companies to reliably deploy CPRs
year after year. The next chapter is dedicated to describing cooperation with a
variety  of  non-scientific  agents,  which  also  scaffolds  the  survey’s  reliable
operation and has profound epistemological consequences.
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Chapter Seven – Co-production and social continuity: How 
seafarers contribute to ocean sciences
Abstract: This chapter accounts for the involvement of seafarers and other non-
scientific actors in the CPR Survey and in a relatively young citizen science 
project. In the latter, sailors are encouraged to measure a parameter related to 
ocean turbidity and phytoplankton biomass and submit their data with a mobile 
phone app to a centralised database. In both cases, ocean scientists exploit the
fact that many different people frequently interact with the oceans on their own 
terms and that a wide range of oceanographic data can be produced by 
following relatively simple instructions. I argue that these collaborators actively 
co-produce data and knowledge of the oceans and are not passive collectors of
data or samples. Non-scientists enable sampling conditions and shape the 
outcomes of research by using their particular skills and embodied knowledge 
related to their seafaring activities. Rather than being tools that are deployed by
scientists in order to collect data or samples, these actors are firmly embedded 
in the constantly changing setting that researchers must approach in order to 
create knowledge. The CPR Survey’s operations team continuously maintains 
social relationships to collaborators from a variety of professions. This social 
continuity between science and seafaring culture is crucial for maintaining the 
network of volunteers and for ensuring that the spatial and temporal regularity 
of sampling are sustained indefinitely. In this regard, social continuity is an 
indispensable component of the CPR Survey that underpins the practices’ 
material and methodological continuity.
7.1 Introduction
In  chapter  three  of  this  thesis,  I  have  discussed  the  difficulty  of  defining
oceanography or ocean sciences as a distinct scientific discipline. I settled on
an understanding of ocean sciences as an engagement in the oceans and seas
involving  practices  of  sampling,  observing,  or  recording  of  phenomena,  the
creation of  data and models,  or  the production of knowledge from samples,
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records,  data,  or  models.  This  understanding  deliberately  entails  epistemic
activities  performed by  non-scientists.  Several  oceanographic  data  practices
researched for this thesis rely heavily on activities performed by seafarers and
other  people  without  scientific  credentials  or  formal  affiliation  with  research
institutions. This chapter analyses how these crucial actors are involved in data
practices and how this involvement and their individual agency enable epistemic
processes in  two cases of  ocean science:  the CPR Survey and a relatively
young project  named the  Secchi  Disk Study (SDS) which  claims to  be  ‘the
world’s largest marine citizen science study’ (Kirby 2016). 
Scholarly literature offers numerous terms for actors who are crucially involved
in epistemic processes but  are not  scientists:  Among them are “volunteers”,
“amateurs”,  “the  public”,  or  “citizen  scientists”.130 Scholars  have  also  made
efforts  to  classify  and  distinguish  different  forms  of  involvement  of  non-
scientists,  in  particular  different  modes of  “citizen science”,  a  term that  has
gained currency among scientists and politicians since the mid-1990s (Wiggins
and Crowston 2011, Bonney et al. 2009). Many of these accounts highlight the
role of non-scientists especially in the environmental sciences as a means to
collecting data or samples and as a platform scientists can use or deploy to
establish new sources of data. This chapter focuses primarily on the practice of
collaboration and the agency of the participants, since the resulting product has
already been discussed at length in the previous chapters. 
I argue that non-scientists enable sampling conditions by using particular skills
and embodied knowledge related to their seafaring activities. Unlike sampling
tools  that  are  deployed  in  order  to  collect  data  or  samples  in  the  name of
science, these actors are firmly embedded in the environment that scientists
intend to study. Researchers are thus required to reach out, build, and maintain
long-term social relationships for a successful collaboration with seafarers. The
collaborative data practices studied for this chapter entail  a social  continuity
between  the  scientific  domain  and  the  seafaring  culture  that  underpins  the
130 Engineers or administrative staff may also be crucially involved in epistemic 
processes and lack scientific credentials as well, but they are usually employed by 
the research institution carrying out the scientific endeavour. These actors are not 
referred to when I use the term “non-scientists” throughout this chapter.
212
material and methodological continuities that I introduced in chapters four and
six. In particular, my empirical research exposes the ongoing efforts that are
necessary to maintain the CPR Survey’s network of volunteers and to ensure
that  the  sampling  maintains  its  spatial  and temporal  regularity  over  multiple
decades.
My view of collaboration highlights aspects that have also been emphasised in
recent scholarship which conceptualises participation in scientific processes as
emergent,  co-productive,  and  always  “in-the-making”  (Chilvers  and  Kearnes
2016b).  Both  the  scientists  and  the  seafarers  make  significant  epistemic
contributions  to  the  scientific  process:  The  actual  sampling  of  the  ocean  is
conducted  partly  on  the  scientists’  terms,  as  they  provide  instructions  and
equipment, and partly on the seafarers’ terms, as they interpret the instructions
and despatch or use the technology. By contrast, the seafarers enable sampling
conditions largely on their  own terms and with respect to their  environment.
When,  where,  and  how  the  sampling  can  be  realised  depends  on  the
participants’ agency and their interaction with the seas.
The kind of collaboration discussed in this chapter can be mutually beneficial. In
relation to the variety of datasets that scientists are capable of producing by
themselves, the outcomes of collaborations with seafarers are unique and may
fill specific niches that scientists are unable to address due to a lack of skills,
knowledge,  or  resources.  Conversely,  from collaborating  with  scientists,  the
participating seafarers may identify with a global scientific effort, gain knowledge
of  the  local  environment  and  of  scientific  processes,  or  simply  experience
enjoyment while they are at sea.
The  two  following  introductory  sections  focus  on  recent  advocacy  and
discussions of non-scientists’ participation in ocean sciences and on scholarship
in on citizen scientists, amateurs, and volunteers. The empirical part focuses
first on the SDS and then on the participation of commercial ships, their crews,
and many other people in the CPR Survey.
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7.1.1 Outsourcing data production with citizen oceanography
In 2014, a group of ocean scientists published a call to ‘make a place’ for citizen
scientists  in  the  oceanographic  community, proposing  a  ‘worldwide  effort  to
empower sailors’ to  contribute to  ocean science (Lauro et  al.  2014:  2).  The
authors  demand  action  that  facilitates ‘crowdsourcing  the  collection  of
oceanographic data’ in light of the still prevalent data scarcity in ocean sciences:
Notwithstanding satellite constellations, autonomous vehicles, and 
more than 300 research vessels worldwide […] we lack fundamental 
data relating to our oceans. (Lauro et al. 2014: 1)
As illustrated in chapter three, the enormous size of the oceans, the wide range
of  temporal  and spatial  scales of  oceanic processes,  and the high costs  of
running research vessels are the main reasons for the data scarcity. However,
ocean sciences use many types of data that are relatively simple to create:
Some of the most important types of observations require only that 
one be in the right place at the right time with simple instrumentation 
or sampling equipment. Important data can be gathered by anyone 
who can follow basic instructions. (Lauro et al. 2014: 2)
Among the activities non-scientists could perform are the collection of biological
samples,  measuring  basic  physical  parameters  such  as  temperature  and
salinity, documenting surface weather conditions, or reporting debris sightings.
Simplicity  of  activities  and  contributions  is  the  ‘premise’  of  citizen  science,
explain  Lauro  et  al.  (2014:  2–3),  who  go  on  describing  a  basic  mode  of
operation for citizen science in oceanography:
Rather than dispatching scientists into the environment to collect 
data, scientists may instead train people who already interact with 
the environment to apply the scientific method to phenomena they 
already observe. (Lauro et al. 2014: 2)
The  idea  is  to  seize  opportunities  presented  by  people  or  infrastructures
interacting  regularly  with  the  oceans.  Seizing  these  opportunities  means
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providing  simple  instructions  and  sampling  equipment  so  that  people  who
already interact with the oceans are able to create oceanographic data in the
course of their interaction. 
The primary motivation for scientists to seek collaboration with non-scientists is
the lack of oceanographic data and the relatively low cost of many types of
collaborations. Regarding the seafarers,  ‘citizen oceanography’ can also have
positive  effects:  It  may  ‘empower  civilian  scientists  with  the  pride  of  data
contribution to science’ (Lauro et al. 2014: 3). Further, claiming a benefit for both
the  scientists  and  the  non-scientists,  citizen  oceanography  is  seen  as  an
‘incredible  opportunity for outreach’, as it may enhance science education as
well as public awareness (Lauro et al. 2014: 3). 
Oceanographic literature offers several cases of collaboration that illustrate the
ideas  of  Lauro  et  al.  (2014).  Brewin  et  al.  (2015),  for  example,  show  that
recreational surfers, equipped with low-cost temperature sensors, can acquire
high-quality  SST  data  all  year  long  and  may  help  in  monitoring  coastal
ecosystems.  Coastal  zones  are  particularly  rich  in  biodiversity  but  also
particularly threatened by processes such as overfishing, climate change, and
harmful eutrophication. Although these zones tend to be more accessible than
the  open  oceans,  the  sampling  coverage  of  these  vulnerable  areas  is  still
insufficient (Brewin et al. 2012: 2). 
Brewin et al. (2012: 1–2) conceptualise the surfers as a ‘platform to improve
sampling coverage of environmental indicators in the coastal zone’ and citizen
science as the ‘outsourcing of a task once performed by a set of professionals
to a large network of voluntary citizens’. This outsourcing could ‘tackle costly,
intractable  and  laborious  research  problems’  such  as  insufficient  sampling
coverage  (Brewin  et  al.  2012:  2).  Citizen  science  can  promote  the  public
understanding of science and recreational surfers are a ‘good target audience’
due to the surfing community’s strong advocacy of environmental issues and
their  ‘intrinsic  interest  in  the  functioning  and  the  state  of  the  environment’,
Brewin et al. (2012: 2–3) maintain. 
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In another example, Schnetzer et al. (2016) review participation in the Ocean
Sampling  Day (OSD) 2014,  which  took place on 21 June 2014 and was a
simultaneous sampling campaign of the oceans organised by an international
group  of  scientists  as  part  of  an  EU-funded  research  project  on  microbial
biodiversity.131 The OSD was designed to study the microbial diversity of marine
surface waters worldwide on a single day with help of citizen scientists using a
smart phone app to submit  various oceanographic data. The submitted data
showed that seventy-nine percent of the participants’ sea surface temperature
measurements came from locations that neither traditional in-situ measurement
systems nor satellite remote sensing systems are able to cover (Schnetzer et al.
2016: 169). This figure shows that there is indeed potential for non-scientists to
make contributions to epistemic processes which scientists would be unable to
obtain or realise without them. Given that seafaring citizen scientists tend to
make their contributions rather from or close to coastlines than from the open
oceans,132 a  particular  niche  could  be  filled  by  these  participants.  Satellite
remote sensing is often said to produce global oceanographic data, but land
masses are a main source of interference that makes signals close to coastlines
extremely difficult to interpret. Further, the ecosystems close to the coasts are
particularly  rich  in  biological  diversity  and  require  monitoring  at  higher
granularity than the open oceans (Brewin et al. 2015: 2). 
An intriguing aspect of citizen science in oceanography and other sciences is
the great  promise held by  the combination of  new technologies  with  citizen
science. Newman et al. (2012: 298) explain that emerging technologies such as
mobile phones and apps, wireless networks, and online games are ‘streamlining
data  collection’,  improve  data  management,  and  may  automate  the  quality
control of the data. The ‘future of citizen science will likely be inextricably linked
to emerging technologies’ (Newman et al. 2012: 298). The internet in particular
makes  the  ‘popularity  and  scope  of  citizen  science  appear  almost  limitless’
(Tulloch et al. 2013: 128). 
131 <https://www.microb3.eu/osd> [accessed 16 March 2017].
132 See for example the distribution of contributions to the SDS; 
<http://www.playingwithdata.com/secchi-disk-project/> [accessed 17 March 2017].
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Wood,  Moretzsohn,  and  Gibeaut  (2015:  16)  report  from  a  taxonomists’
workshop focused on data obtained from ‘non-traditional sources’ in order to
extend  existing  marine  species  distribution  maps.  They  pick  up  the
“crowdsourcing” term from Lauro et al. (2014) and conclude that citizen science
and crowdsourcing could increase the amount of available data ‘considerably’.
New technologies are also capable of increasing the quality of scientific data
created in collaborations with citizen scientists, Wood, Moretzsohn, and Gibeaut
(2015:  16)  argue:  ‘Auto-collection  of  geo-locations,  the  use of  autocomplete
functions and drop-down lists can substantially add to the accuracy of that data.’
These examples  illustrate  that  technological  progress and collaboration  with
non-scientists  are  seen  as  complementary  in  environmental  sciences.
Moreover, the contributions of citizen scientists can be optimised by means of
technological gadgets.
Despite alluding to positive effects for participants and society, the involvement
of  non-scientists  in  epistemic  processes  seems  to  be  perceived  by  many
scientists primarily as an additional  data source from which ocean scientists
could draw. The term “platform” used by Brewin et al.  (2015: 1) for the non-
scientific  participants  is  a  technical  expression  that  suggests  a  technical
understanding of  the collaboration.  A platform is  ‘a  vehicle  (as a satellite  or
aircraft)  used for a particular purpose or to carry a usually specified kind of
equipment’.133 In this sense, the non-scientists function similar to satellites, Argo
floats, CPRs or other sampling platforms that may be deployed as generators of
samples or data if equipped with appropriate technology.134
Scientists are certainly not ignorant of the human nature of citizen scientists.
Yet, citizen science is conceived by oceanographers primarily as a vehicle for
creating more  data  in  ways that  are  still  improvable  by  means of  emerging
technological innovations. Non-scientists capable of volunteering are seen as
an opportunity to fill niches left by existing sampling systems and to add another
platform to the scientists’ catalogue of sampling tools and practices.
133 <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/platform> [accessed 31 March 
2017].
134 In line with Hacking (1992: 48), ‘data generators’ can be human or non-human.
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7.1.2 Contribution or co-production?
As the  participation  of  non-scientists  in  epistemic  process  has  increased  in
many  sciences,  so  has  the  interest  of  scholars  in  the  specific  epistemic
practices employed in citizen science projects. Some scholars have used the
term  “participatory  turn”  to  describe  a  recent  development  in  the  relation
between  science  and  the  public  for  which  citizen  science  is  exemplary.  In
particular,  the  participatory  turn  encompasses  a  shift  from  away  the  public
merely trying to understand scientific knowledge towards members of the public
participating  in  practices  of  scientific  knowledge  creation.  The  former
configuration  is  characterised by  a  flow  of  knowledge from science to  non-
scientists  which  does  seem  like  an  adequate  description  of  collaborative
knowledge creation (Toogood 2013: 612).  Chilvers and Kearnes (2016b:  31)
point  out  that  the  ‘turn  toward public  participation’ is  only  one element  in  a
broader  re-configuration  of  the  relations  between  science,  the  market,  and
political practices.
A challenge that any attempt at conceptualising collaborative practices faces is
the  number  of  terms  that  have  been  used  to  refer  to  non-scientists  who
collaborate  with  scientists.  The  term “citizen  science”  has  gained  popularity
since Irwin (1995)  elaborated on the complex relationships between science
and  the  public.  Besides  “citizen  scientists”,  terms  such  as  “non-scientists”,
“volunteers”, “amateurs”, “lay people” or “lay participants”, or simply “the public”
have been used to refer to non-scientific collaborators.
Some of these terms are suggestive regarding the motivations or background of
non-scientists  and  regarding  the  specific  form  of  participation.  The  terms
“public” or “citizen”, for example, convey a sense of democratic participation and
equality  that  gives  every  member  of  the  public  with  an  opportunity  to  do
science. In case of ocean science, however, not every member of the public is
actually in a position to participate. One needs to be a surfer to participate in the
project studied by Brewin et al. (2015) and as I explain below, participants in the
SDS are required to own a boat and be capable of sailing the open oceans. In
these cases, certain skills are mandatory to become a citizen scientist.
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By the same token, ‘the assumption that volunteers are always non-experts can
be faulty’ (Wiggins and Crowston 2011). Collaborators are not always unskilled
or unfamiliar with research topics and methods, as terms like “amateur” or “lay
participant”  might  suggest.  As  Toogood  (2013:  614)  points  out,  the  non-
professional contributors to collaborative projects may pursue their activity with
high seriousness over a lifetime and thereby gain exceptional expertise in their
field.  Wiggins and Crowston (2011) point out that  ‘large-scale citizen science
projects  present  an  interesting  challenge  to  the  dominant  view  of  scientific
expertise’.
The  term  “amateur”  might  further  suggest  that  the  collaboration  is  not
mandatory and does not involve any type of compensation or payment. Indeed,
participants  of  a  wide  range  of  collaborative  projects  are  neither  forced  to
participate nor are they employed or hired by the research institution. The term
“volunteers” alludes to a general willingness of the participants to sacrifice their
free  time  and  energy  to  a  scientific  endeavour  without  being  formally
compensated. However, Bruyninckx (2015: 344) has studied a counterexample
and  highlights  the  complex  ‘micro-economics  of  data  exchange’  between
voluntary field collectors of natural sounds and the Cornell Library of Natural
Sounds.  In  this  case,  recorded  sounds  submitted  by  participants  become
‘copyrighted  commodities’,  which  has  been  instrumental  for  expanding  the
sound archive.
Some scholars have shown that the backgrounds as well as the motivations of
participants  to  collaborate  may  be  diverse.  Martin  et  al.  (2016),  who  have
studied the drivers and barriers of participation in a hypothetical marine citizen
science project, found that for many respondents, contribution to science was a
strong  reason  to  participate,  but  increasing  personal  knowledge  of  marine
species has also been found to be an important  driver. In fact,  participation
might be more or less likely depending on rather contingent factors that do not
apply  to  every  member  of  the  public:  Schnetzer  et  al.  (2016:  167)  have
conducted an anonymous survey with non-scientists participating in the OSD.
Only twenty-eight percent of the survey respondents have stated a pre-existing
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interest in the oceans as a motivation to participate but forty percent stated the
proximity of their home to the sea as the main reason for participating.
There is a great variety among collaborative projects regarding different modes
or degrees of non-scientists’ involvement in science. Several attempts to define
different types of cooperation take “citizen science” projects as the overarching
type of practice, which entails several modes of operation. Bonney et al. (2009)
distinguish  between  “contributory”,  “collaborative”,  and  “co-created”  public
participation in science. Contributory projects are defined as ‘researcher-driven
data-collection  projects’  and  most  projects  that  have  received  the  label  of
“citizen science” are of this type (Bonney et al. 2009: 18). Collaborative projects
also involve collection of data by non-scientists but additionally, non-scientists
are involved in analysing, developing research questions, drawing conclusions,
or presenting results. Co-created projects are initiated by members of the public
who  approach  scientists  to  solve  a  specific  problem  or  answer  a  specific
question they are concerned with. In these cases, participants are usually active
in all parts of the research process (Bonney et al. 2009: 18). 
Wiggins and Crowston (2011) criticise these kinds of  typologies for focusing
only on the structure of participation. Their own typology, for which they have
evaluated  various  collaborative  projects,  also  considers  explicitly  formulated
project  goals  and the  degree of  physical  interaction  of  participants  with  the
research object. Five different types of citizen science projects are distinguished
by Wiggins and Crowston (2011): ‘Action, Conservation, Investigation, Virtual,
and Education’.  Projects in which non-scientists primarily submit  data during
physical  interaction  with  the  environment  are  termed  “Investigation”:  These
projects are ‘focused on scientific research goals requiring data collection from
the physical environment’ (Wiggins and Crowston 2011). Additional benefits for
the participants such as education are secondary to the scientific motivation:
‘While education is not always an explicit goal, it is frequently a strongly valued
but  unstated  purpose’  (Wiggins  and  Crowston  2011).  The  majority  of
investigation-type projects  are  in  biology, meteorology, and climatology, with
professional researchers or conservation organizations as project initiators who
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organise the project “top-down”. Projects of the type “investigation” seem very
similar to the “contributory” projects of Bonney et al.’s (2009) typology.
Taking the discussion beyond exhaustive typologies,  Bruyninckx (2015:  362)
argues for a ‘more inclusive’ understanding of the heterogeneity of collaborative
practices and for a stronger focus on the specific ‘mechanisms of engagement
and  commitment’.  Toogood  (2013:  618)  emphasises  the  importance  of  how
such mechanisms of engagement are framed in the first  place,  arguing that
participation  ‘cannot  be  reduced  to  processes  defined  by  non-professionals
“doing”  science  or  taking  part  in  particular  forms  of  collaboration’  (Toogood
2013:  618).  Practices  featuring  participation  in  biodiversity  monitoring  have
primarily been conceived as  “win-win” situations with beneficial  outcomes for
the  researchers,  who  obtain  more  data,  for  the  participants,  who  may  get
educated and develop their attitude and behaviour towards the environment,
and for science, as collaboration is said to result  in more open and publicly
accountable scientific practice (Toogood 2013: 613–14). Toogood (2013: 618)
urges  scholars  to  consider  more  than  just  motivations  and  benefits  of
collaborations:
The democratisation of participatory science in biodiversity, for 
example, raises questions beyond motivation and benefits. It 
suggests questions about the definition of public engagement, about 
agenda setting, about what data is gathered, about the subjectivities 
of those involved and, most of all, about the connections between the
role of the on-the-ground volunteer scientist and decision-making 
processes concerning biodiversity, its protection and its future.
While  this  chapter  does  not  directly  respond  to  these  open  questions,
sociological  studies  such as  those offered  in  Chilvers  and Kearnes (2016c)
have moved beyond motivations and benefits by rethinking participation in a
‘relational and emergent’ sense (Chilvers and Kearnes 2016a: 5). The key point
of this view is that the elements of participation such as the research target, the
participants,  or  technological  devices  are  not  pre-determined,  but  held  in
tension through mediation and assemblage of participation. An example of this
tension is a case of citizen-driven air quality monitoring in an urban area studied
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by Ottinger (2010), who claims that standards of measuring possess a 'double-
edged' power, as they are simultaneously bridging and policing the boundary
between scientists  and citizens  (Ottinger  2010:  266).  The  effectiveness and
usefulness of citizen science often depend on the application of standards. At
the same time, regulated standards may also be used to dismiss data created
by citizens if scientists claim that the data were not produced in accordance with
regulations.  Measuring  standards  are  thus  capable  of  both  “bridging”  and
“policing” the boundary between science and citizens (Ottinger 2010: 246-47).
Further emphasising the dynamic potential of collaborative practices, Chilvers
and Kearnes (2016a: 13–14) contend that participation itself is continually being
‘made, unmade and remade’. According to this view, both assemblage and the
mediation  of  participation  proceed  without  central  coordinating  agencies  or
institutions and instead, the elements of participation co-produce and constitute
themselves in relation to each other. As an example, Macdonald (2002), who
has studied amateur  birdwatching in  the UK around the middle of  twentieth
century,  found  that  birdwatching  practices  have  contributed  to  shaping
ecological, national, as well as social identities.  A consequence of this shift of
perspective is the inability to understand participatory practices in isolation, but
rather as a practice ‘in the making’ and in relation to science and democracy
(Chilvers and Kearnes 2016a: 15). 
Cornwell and Campbell’s (2012) case study of sea turtle conservation involving
local volunteers analyses collaboration in environmental science in terms of co-
production. The collaborative monitoring of turtle nests along beaches and the
joint  discussion  of  potential  nest  relocations  constitutes  a  co-production  of
conservation rather an application of institutionalised scientific knowledge. The
participants’ local knowledge and strong emotional relationships with sea turtles
play a significant role in this process of co-production.
For  the  analysis  of  my  cases,  “contributory”  and  “investigation”-type  citizen
science projects as well as the idea of “co-production” serve as notions that
offer a conceptual lens: It is possible to consider only a collaboration’s structural
mode of operation or the explicit motivations and benefits of involved actors, if
possible.  However,  a  collaborative  practice  can  also  be  interpreted  as  co-
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productive in a sense that all elements of participation are held in tension and
constitute each other through practising science.
7.2 The Secchi Disk Study
The goal of the SDS is to encourage seafarers such as sailors or fishermen to
measure the so-called Secchi depth by lowering a plain white disk into the sea
water and recording the depth at which it disappears from sight. The amount of
biomass in the water affects water’s optical properties and perceived clarity. The
Secchi depth can be used to estimate the phytoplankton biomass in the upper
ocean. Measurements are stored on the participants’ mobile phones and are
subsequently transmitted into a central database. The project was conceived
and launched in  2013 by Richard Kirby, a  marine ecologist  based based in
Plymouth  (Seafarers,  2017).  This  empirical  section  first  describes  Kirby’s
motivation to start the project, its resources and infrastructure, before focusing
on the involvement of the non-scientists.
The SDS is concerned with the phytoplankton mass in the upper oceans. Kirby
explains that a controversial paper on this topic published in  Nature in 2010
motivated him to start the project. The paper suggested that the phytoplankton
mass in the world oceans had declined by forty percent since 1950 (Boyce,
Lewis, and Worm 2010; Schiermeier 2010). Boyce, Lewis, and Worm (2010)
had  aggregated  data  from  various  sources  dating  back  to  the  end  of  the
nineteenth century to calculate long-term regional and global trends. These data
included many Secchi Disk measurements, as the Secchi Disk had been the
standard method of measuring phytoplankton mass since around 1865, when
such a plain white disk was first used by Angelo Secchi, an Italian astronomer
working  at  the  Pontificial  Gregorian  University  (Wernand  2010).  As  Kirby
explains,  however,  Secchi  Disk  readings  have  become  much  less  frequent
since around 1950 and this decline might pose problems for the analysis of the
aggregated data:
“The hundred years broke down into two fifty year periods over which
phytoplankton was measured in different ways. For the first fifty 
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years, there was older technology used and around fifty years ago, 
with the advent of new technology, scientists switched to measuring 
phytoplankton in a different way. With no thought, it was just a 
change in technology, as all methods advance. So the old method 
declined in popularity and the new method took over. So when you 
take a hundred years you have to cross-calibrate and some 
scientists said that the science could be flawed, because you were 
measuring abundance, the amount of phytoplankton, in two different 
ways; and lo and behold, roughly at the point at which the methods 
changed the authors claimed to see a decline in abundance and 
perhaps your analysis is compromised.” (DR5834: 1)
Indeed,  the  findings  were  quickly  questioned  in  several  sceptical  replies.
Scientists from various oceanographic and marine biological institutes replied
jointly  and cited  CPR data  and other  long-term time series  which  show no
similarities  with  the  global  and  regional  declines  (McQuatters-Gollop  et  al.
2011). Other scientists argued that blending data generated from two different
methods of sampling introduced a strong negative bias (Mackas 2011) and that
the long-term decline in global  biomass  ‘is probably an artefact  of  sampling
methodology’ (Rykaczewski and Dunne 2011: E6). 
The controversy sparked by the paper in  Nature motivated Kirby to make an
attempt to ‘bring back the Secchi Disk in abundance’ by encouraging sailors to
measure the Secchi depth and submit the data to a centralised database. The
database is  hosted by a Plymouth-based independent  consultancy company
specialised on satellite and airborne earth observation data.135 The SDS was
launched in February 2013 without any official funding, as Kirby (DR5834: 6)
explains:
135 The company conducts ‘commercially focused scientific R&D’ and offers 
consultancy services and data in the field of earth observation. In particular, the 
company is specialised in water, marine, coastal, urban, and land management; 
<http://www.pixalytics.com/> [accessed 22 March 2017].
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“The project is run in our spare time. We fund the project out of our 
own pockets. We pay for the server time, we do not have any funding
for it, no university funding. We do it all in our spare time.”
The project had been maintained like this for the first three and a half years until
in September 2016, The Secchi Disk Foundation became registered as a charity
in order to collect sponsorship and donations.136 The study is supposed to go on
indefinitely  so  that  the  project’s  data  will  eventually  be  comparable  to  the
historical records. Kirby explains that this goal could be reached after “five to
ten years, … maybe longer” (DR5834: 1–3).
The Secchi  Disk is  a  fairly  simple mechanical  measuring device that  is  not
overly  complicated  to  use:  It  is  a  plain  white  disk  with  a  diameter  of  thirty
centimetres that is connected to a tape measure at the centre and has a little
weight attached to its bottom. From the beginning of the SDS, participants were
encouraged to build their own Secchi Disk from a piece of plywood or a lid of an
old bucket and a tape measure of at least fifty metres length (Kirby 2016: 10).137 
To measure the Secchi depth, participants lower the disk vertically from the side
of their boat into the sea water until it disappears from sight. At this point, they
need to record the length of the rope below the sea surface. The participants
need to subtract the distance between their hand holding the tape and the sea
surface from the  the  total  extension  of  the  tape.  The SDS primarily  targets
sailors and fishermen with small boats who will be standing only a few metres
above sea level when measuring the Secchi depth, so that the variation of this
distance will be relatively small. The participants are instructed to measure only
if  the following conditions are met:  The Secchi  Disk needs to  be clean, the
participants should measure only between ten o’clock in the morning and two in
the afternoon, the sky should not be all cloudy, the sun should be behind the
person  holding  the  disk,  and  the  participants  should  not  wear  sunglasses.
136 The Whirlwind Charitable Trust is the only sponsor mentioned on the foundation’s 
website at the time of writing; <http://www.secchidiskfoundation.org/> [accessed 4 
April 2017].
137 By now, participants can also purchase a Secchi Disk from the project website for 
₤25; <http://www.secchidisk.org/> [accessed 14 March 2017].
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Additionally, the Secchi Disk should only be used in places where the seabed is
not visible. Participants are further advised to carefully raise and lower the disk
several times at the approximate Secchi depth to increase confidence in the
reading. 
These instructions are downloadable from the project’s website and are also
integrated with illustrations into the project’s smartphone application.138 The free
Secchi app allows participants to store the recorded Secchi depth on the phone.
Besides providing a simple way of recording, storing, and transmitting data, the
Secchi app facilitates running the project and the database, as Kirby explains:
“With smart phones, you can collect the data and have it submitted to
a database with very little effort on the side of the scientist once the 
project is set up and running. You are not having to input data the 
whole time, you are not having to manage the database; it is self-
managing, essentially.” (DR5834: 1–2)
The database “literally does look like an Excel spreadsheet with latitude and
longitude”,  Kirby  explains  (DR5834:  2).  Every  Secchi  depth  record  that  is
submitted by a participant is automatically added to the previously submitted
data. The app also allows users to record and submit additional data such as
sea temperature in case their boat is equipped with a sea temperature sensor. If
the sea surface looks unusual or interesting, for example from dead remains of
phytoplankton drifting as foam on top of waves, users may submit pictures or
add notes. However, the main parameter of interest is the Secchi depth: 
“Whilst people are at sea, we thought, if they take the Secchi depth, 
they might want to do some other measurements as well. […] There 
are some additional things, but they don’t have to do those. To 
submit anything, they do have to take a Secchi Disk reading. We are 
not interested in the temperature without the Secchi depth. The 
Secchi depth is the one we are interested in.” (DR5834: 2)
138 <http://www.secchidisk.org/> [accessed 14 March 2017].
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The app thus provides additional opportunities for the participants to create data
even if these are not required for participation and it is rather unlikely that they
will be used. The geographic location at the time of entering the Secchi depth
into the app is obtained from the phone’s GPS receiver. The standardised GPS
formate facilitates managing the data but using GPS also increases the quality
of the data, as Kirby explains:
“With the smart phone technology you can also improve the quality of
the data and the provenance of the data. You can ensure that it was 
collected at sea, for example, because the smart phone can obtain 
the GPS location. The user does not input the latitude and longitude. 
That is obtained from satellite, so you know at least that the person 
was at sea and the data is not being submitted by someone sitting in 
their living room in Swindon who thinks I will just have a bit of fun 
with the scientists’ database and make up some data and spoil it. 
Although you cannot ensure that sailors do not make up the data, 
you do at least know that it was collected at sea. So if someone is 
going to the bother of collecting data at sea, then probably they are 
going to be doing it as well as they possibly can.” (DR5834: 1–2)
One of Kirby’s key concerns is proving that the quality of the data created and
submitted by SDS participants is not inferior to data created by scientists. He
feels that the quality of data created by non-scientists is often questioned by
professional researchers: 
“One of the questions that are often levelled at citizen science by 
scientists is ‘How good is the data?’ Can citizens be trusted to collect
scientific data? Can they do science? Or is it going to be rubbish?” 
(DR5834: 2)
Automation and standardisation as implemented with the GPS system is one
way to assure the quality and to prevent that the dataset may be corrupted. Any
data that has not been submitted from the oceans can easily be filtered. It is
further beneficial that the Secchi Disk is fairly simple to use. Nevertheless, the
collaboration is based on trusting that the participants perform their part as well
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as they can. Kirby is firmly convinced that their effort is sufficient for the data to
be usable:
“While citizens might not understand the scientific process or they 
might not know how to set up an experiment with regard to controls, 
for example, I don’t see why they should be any poorer at taking 
simple data measurements than a scientist. If it is explained to them 
how to do it properly and especially if the community taking the 
measurements is interested in doing so, they would do it well.” 
(DR5834: 3)
Encouraging seafarers to  build  their  own Secchi  Disk facilitates running the
project but is also a means to get people engaged with the project and its goals.
Kirby comments on the effort of building a Secchi Disk:
“If they go to that bother, we feel that it probably means they signed 
up and committed to the project and are likely to do it well. That 
brings a bit of loyalty, I guess, and intent to do it well.” (DR5834: 3)
Regarding  the  data  quality  and  the  reliability  of  the  seafarers,  Kirby  further
explains that many historical data which are now invaluable for climatologists
have been created by citizens and amateur naturalists. These data are far from
being ignored by scientists on the basis of the naturalists’ reliability (DR5834: 3).
The comparison  with  already  existing  data  from satellites,  and in  particular,
looking for potential differences between data made by sailors and data made
by scientists, will further increase the confidence:
“We had a look at that correlation for data collected by scientists 
using Secchi Disks and satellites, and data collected by sailors using 
Secchi Disks and satellites, and the relationships are very good. 
They hold up and sailors are doing it as well as scientists would do it,
which is not unsurprising because Secchi Disks are a very simple 
thing to use. It helps to give some confidence in the data.” (DR5834: 
3)
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Kirby expressed the intention to produce a scientific paper in the near future to
demonstrate that the participants’ engagement is worthwhile and that the data
can  be  used  by  scientists.  The  paper  would  also  benefit  the  participants’
understanding of the scientific and the publishing process. In 2017, PLoS ONE
published the research article with the “Secchi Disk Seafarers” credited as the
main authors. Secchi depth measurements from the first four years of the SDS
were assessed by comparing them to estimated chlorophyll data obtained from
satellites.  As  stated  in  the  paper,  the  comparison  demonstrates  the  data’s
‘potential usefulness for expanding the historical Secchi Disk data to understand
the effects of climate change on the oceans’ phytoplankton’ (Seafarers 2017).
With respect to potential benefits for the participating seafarers, Kirby explains
that  the  sailing  community  has  responded  to  the  SDS  with  “overwhelming
enthusiasm”  and  that  participants  are  “incredibly  appreciative  and  almost
desperate to get engaged with the sea in an environmental or scientific way”
(DR5834: 4). Although the project’s growth has been sporadic, with bursts of
new participants  following  coverage  of  the  SDS in  the  press  or  online,  the
project counted circa two thousand active participants roughly two years after
launch (DR5834: 4). 
Obviously, sailors can only measure the Secchi depth when they are out on
their boat. Seasonal behaviour or preferences for going to certain regions are
thus reflected in  the temporal  and spatial  distribution of  submitted data.  For
example, many people will not use their boats at all in the winter or they will not
sail to areas known for rough weather conditions at certain times of the year
(DR5834: 5).  As the project’s online data browser shows, a vast majority of
Secchi depths have been recorded in the Northern hemisphere and only few
have  been  recorded  in  the  open  oceans  during  the  first  four  years  of  the
study.139 
The  data  created  by  participating  seafarers  are  never  going  to  be  evenly
distributed, neither in space nor in time, nor are they going to be distributed
randomly around the globe. However, a global distribution of the data is less
139 <http://www.playingwithdata.com/secchi-disk-project/> [accessed 22 March 2017].
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important than the long-term outlook of the project. Additionally, the SDS may
support knowledge on a local scale:
“We encourage sailors, if they are not ocean going sailors but more 
day sailors, to set up a sampling location that they might go to every 
time they go out of their harbour and sail past a particular spot. They 
might set up a sampling location and take the Secchi depth there, 
because then if they can get weekly, or two-weekly, or monthly 
reading. Then those will build up over the year to give an indication 
of local changes as well.” (DR5834: 4)
Local  knowledge  may  be  useful  for  short-term  oriented  research  in  coastal
oceanography or fisheries as the phytoplankton underpin the entire marine food
chain  (DR5834: 4). Increased local knowledge of the environment is also an
educational  benefit  which  may  pass  on  from  participants  to  the  wider
community, as Kirby suggests:
“Knowing about your local environment also will hopefully bring in a 
sense of local knowledge. So people who are taking part in the 
project will start to understand their environment, they start talking 
about it amongst friends, it might get into schools … Who knows 
where the science might end up through outreach facility. It is difficult
to know where the project will go in its entirety, although there are 
specific goals for it.” (DR5834: 4)
Yet, the main purpose of the SDS is long-term ecological monitoring in order to
build a database that allows comparison with historical data. This long-term goal
poses a major challenge and a risk of failure, because the data will only become
relevant  if  the  project  is  sustainable  and if  participants  measure  the  Secchi
depth  for  years  and decades to  come.  This  is  why the  project  is  set  up  to
continue  indefinitely  and  not  as  a  one-off  event.  Kirby  comments  on  this
challenge and indicates that the long-term character of his project is in tension
with the attitude of many potential participants towards epistemic processes:
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“I guess one of the hurdles to overcome is people wanting immediate
justification for doing something. The main question that provoked 
the establishment of the project requires many years of data to 
collect. So you have to maintain interest in that time. You are not 
going to say, ‘Well, l would like to participate in that project for the 
next ten years’. It almost has got to be a hidden agenda of the 
project. Although all press articles about the project say what the 
goal of the project is to achieve, none of them explicitly say how long 
that will take to do.” (DR5834: 2–3)
Kirby has a strategy for initiating and maintaining interest which includes getting
the study regularly into the news and into media oriented towards the sailing
community.140 Kirby  further  uses social  media for  posting  updates about  the
project  and  informative  pictures  and  videos  of  plankton  research.141
Merchandise  such  as  shirts,  beanies,  and  flags  have  been  available  since
November 2016 and an “ambassador seafarer” participating in around-the-world
sailing races advocates and represents the SDS. The SDS also makes itself
known by providing marina and yacht clubs with free posters and leaflets.142 
The project has managed to reach beyond the recreational sailing community
as divers,  independent fishermen, as well  as school  children with access to
boats have contributed data (Kirby 2016: 11).  Upon download of the Secchi
app, a unique user ID is issued and participants may enter their boat’s name
and send it  along with  the  data  into  the  database.  Participants  are  thereby
enabled to track the data they have personally recorded online. All  data are
viewable on an interactive map with spatial and temporal filter functions, and
with the options to enter a user ID or a boat name.143 However, the Secchi depth
data are not downloadable as a whole set. Only participants of the project who
have contributed data are granted access to the database, as Kirby explains: “If
140 The SDS was featured on BBC News and in the sailing magazines Cruising 
Helmsman, California Diver Magazine, and YachtsandYachting.com. 
141 <https://twitter.com/SecchiApp> [accessed 16 March 2017], 
<https://www.facebook.com/SecchiDisk> [accessed 16 March 2017].
142 <http://www.secchidisk.org/> [accessed 16 March 2017].
143 <http://www.playingwithdata.com/secchi-disk-project/> [accessed 4 April 2017].
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you are a citizen scientist, a sailor, and you sent in one depth or ten depths, you
can ask for the whole dataset if you wish” (DR5834: 6). External scientists may
request the dataset but the SDS “reserves the right to charge for it”, due to the
project’s funding situation (DR5834: 6). 
At the time of interviewing Kirby, about two and a half years after the SDS had
launched,  there  had  been  no  data  requests  by  scientists.  However,  Kirby
explains that a number of scientists from a variety of oceanographic institutions
had decided to join the project as participants:
“We have quite a lot of institutes that have joined the project and are 
contributing their data. But that is not to get access to the whole 
dataset. We have got lots of institutes which see the value in the 
project and see that a database for Secchi depth data is a useful 
thing to have. It is their second store of their data they are collecting 
and if they are on board of their boat and have a smart phone they 
can send their data off and they can see the value of making the data
bigger than their individual data.” (DR5834: 7)
Scientists from a variety of institutions around the world have joined the SDS,144
not as users, but also as participants, enhancing the value of their own data and
increasing the heterogeneity among the Secchi Disk seafarers.
7.3 Collaboration in the CPR Survey
In contrast to the SDS, the CPR Survey is not known as a citizen science study
and does not promote itself with that label. However, this chapter is not strictly
about citizen science, it is about the involvement of non-scientists in epistemic
processes. The shipping crews of the commercial ships and employees of the
shipping companies and ports who are involved in realising a tow are indeed
non-scientists,  but  they  are  also  professionals  who  perform  activities  that
contribute to science while they are practising their profession at sea or at the
144 Kirby mentions reputable institutions such as the Swedish Institute of Marine 
Science, the Stazione Zoologica in Naples, and the Ifremer in France. Scientists in 
Chile, South Africa, and the United States have also joined the SDS (DR5834: 7).
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ports.  Although  being  part  of  the  global  shipping  industry,  the  CPR Survey
regards the participants not as business partners but as volunteers working on
ships  of  opportunity  or  ‘volunteer  ships’.145 This  terminology  resonates  with
collaborative epistemic practices in environmental sciences. 
My empirical account of collaboration in the CPR Survey is divided in two parts.
The first covers the process of “sourcing” a ship which encompasses finding
and setting up a ship for towing CPRs in close collaboration with the seafarers.
The second part  reconstructs  the  activities performed routinely  by  seafarers
after a ship has been sourced for regular towing. This includes the handling of
the CPR by the shipping crews and the way they are instructed by the CPR
Survey’s operations team.
7.3.1 “Sourcing” a ship of opportunity
The  CPR  Survey’s  website  and  the  2015  annual  report  from  SAHFOS  list
twenty-one ships that tow CPRs on a regular basis (SAHFOS 2016).146 Almost
250 different ships from more than thirty nations have been towing since the
beginning of the survey. Ships that have been involved are of diverse sizes and
purposes: ‘weather, naval, hydrographic and research ships, ferries and a wide
range of other merchant ships ranging in size from ~265 to 220,000 tonnes’
(Reid et al. 2003: 119). The survey seeks to continue its established routes to
assure the continuity of their existing time series. Thus, whenever a shipping
company or a ship owner decides to change a ship’s schedule, a new ship that
continues the route needs to be found. Seven ship changes are mentioned in
the annual report for 2015, which is considered a year with ‘many ship changes’
(SAHFOS 2016: 6). Two changes are just a switching of routes between two
ships of one company due to ‘fleet rotation’ by the company, but in five cases,
ships that have been towing CPRs for several years had to be replaced with
new ships. (SAHFOS 2016: 6). The Green Frost, for instance, had been towing
145 <https://www.sahfos.ac.uk/about-us/our-network-of-ships/> [accessed 20 March 
2017].
146 <https://www.sahfos.ac.uk/about-us/our-network-of-ships/> [accessed 20 March 
2017].
233
between Norway’s North Cape and Svalbard on the survey’s most  northerly
route since 2008, but came off charter because the cargo would be transported
by aircraft in the future (DR1960: 4, SAHFOS 2016: 6).
Finding ships to participate in the CPR Survey “is never the problem”, Camp
tells me; “there are lots and lots of ships and crews, who are more than happy
to do it for us” (DR2901: 11). This does not mean, however, that sourcing a new
ship is a small task. The survey’s operations team is responsible for maintaining
the network of ships. Thomas has been employed by SAHFOS for twenty years,
starting  as  an  engineer  and  now  coordinating  operations  and  the  survey’s
workshop. Thomas works alongside a recently hired Ships Liaison Officer and
both  have  professional  seafaring  experience  aboard  ships  of  the  Royal  Air
Force and the Royal Navy, respectively (DR1960: 1).147 Thomas describes his
responsibilities as follows:
“My responsibilities are to make sure that SAHFOS has a volunteer 
fleet that will tow for us, that anything we send to that ship will be 
compliant, safe, and legal, that each ship will be supported by a 
volunteer network at that port, by the port-handlers […].  We make 
sure that all the sister surveys are serviced and that any equipment 
that leaves this door is set up correctly, fit for purpose, and helps us 
keep our ninety percent success rate, which we are quite proud of.” 
(DR1960: 2)
Sourcing a ship begins with finding a ship that regularly travels on the route in
question.  The  approach  to  this  depends  on  the  desired  region,  since  the
operations team can often utilise one of their established contacts to people in
the shipping sector for finding ships in areas where the survey already operates,
such as the North Sea or the English Channel. Thomas keeps a multi-page list
of contacts to the shipping sector which he describes as one of the survey’s
“most valuable company assets” (DR1960: 8). 
If a new region needs to be sourced, the operations team may start with Lloyd’s
List or  the internet  and “you start  doing your research and you make some
147 <https://www.sahfos.ac.uk/about-us/staff/> [accessed 29 May 2017].
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phone calls”, Thomas explains (DR1960: 7–8).148 In case of a replacement for
the  Green Frost,  the company owning the  Green Frost suggested a logistics
firm which knew about a ship and provided the survey’s operations team with a
contact to the owner of the Norbjorn which later took over the route (DR1960:
8). When initiating contact, Thomas explains, it is important to “try and go as
high up as you can” (DR1960: 3), which means it is best to talk with a ship’s
owner directly to ask for permission to tow:
“We talk to someone as high as we can in that ship’s management 
chain and even that can be quite a convoluted thing, because you 
have things like owners, charterers, owner operators, management 
companies and you have to find the right thread to get the 
permissions.” (DR1960: 3)
The bigger and more complex the shipping company, the harder it can be to get
a hold of someone on the highest level (DR1960: 3). 
It is difficult to guess what the motivations of ship owners or companies are to
collaborate with the CPR Survey. Thomas explains that an owner very rarely
rejects a towing request. Some ships have taken the CPR as an opportunity for
social media engagement, posting photos of lowering and hauling the CPRs.
The installation of a CPR on the AAL Melbourne for towing in the Pacific was
reported  on  the  Shipping and Marine  Events website.  The ship’s  Managing
Director indicates that it is almost an imperative for the shipping community to
collaborate with ocean scientists:
The Sir Alister Hardy Foundation for Ocean Science is one of the 
world’s most respected marine science organisations and its work 
over the past eight decades has provided an irreplaceable resource 
and supply of information for ocean science. We are happy to 
support the Foundation’s work through the deployment of a plankton 
148 Lloyd’s List is one of the world’s leading and oldest maritime and shipping news 
journals providing information, analysis, and knowledge for the shipping 
community; <https://www.lloydslist.com/ll/static/about-us/> [accessed 1 June 
2017].
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recorder on the AAL Melbourne, which is certainly fulfilling her brief 
as a multi-purpose vessel! Fittingly, the CPR device was installed on 
the AAL Melbourne on 25 June, which is the International Day of 
Seafarer. We at AAL strongly believe that the shipping community 
should work together with the scientific community, including such 
leading organisations as SAHFOS, in order to better understand and 
protect the health of our oceans.149
Thomas explains that there is no stock answer regarding the motivations of the
participants in the CPR Survey:
“We are talking about a hundred different individuals. Some of them 
do it because they are told to by their boss, some of them do it 
because they are really enthused.” (DR1960: 14)
Convincing people on the highest possible level is thus also important because
owners and managers have the power to command their employees to help
making the collaboration work (DR1960: 3). 
As soon as the owner of a ship is convinced of the scientific importance of the
survey, that towing a CPR is safe and does not interfere with the normal ship’s
business, the survey’s operations team receives permission to set the ship up
for  towing.  At  that  moment,  Thomas  explains,  it  is  important  to  keep  the
momentum and get in touch with the ship as quickly as possible:
“Once you have made that contact and they say yes and give you 
permission, you have got to be enthusiastic all the time. […] The 
worst thing you could do is, ‘yeah, we give you permission’ and then 
you don’t get back to them for about three weeks.” (DR1960: 8)
In  this  regard,  Thomas  benefits  from  personal  experience  in  working  with
volunteers alongside his employment at SAHFOS. This engagement was not
related to science but has taught him that “enthusiasm is infectious” and that
“talking to people with respect, understanding the demands on their time and
149 <http://snmevents.com/aal-melbourne-installs-cpr-onboard/> [accessed 2 June 
2017].
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how they can fit what you want them to do alongside” is a crucial element of
working  successfully  with  volunteers (DR1960:  1).  Throughout  our  interview,
Thomas emphasises how important it is to thank the volunteers for what they do
and to not take anything for granted. This attitude remains crucial even after a
shipping  company  or  owner  has  given  permission  for  a  tow,  because
permissions and goodwill are still required from a wide range of other people for
the tow to be realised. The ship’s Captain is just as important as the owner,
Thomas explains:
“Don’t forget the Captain. The Captain of these ships are kings of 
their ship. So the owner may give permission, the management 
companies, the charterers may give permission, but if the Captain 
says ‘No, we can’t do this’, it can’t happen.”
The operations team needs permission from the Captain to bring any equipment
on board, but in order to start towing, it also needs to figure out how the ship is
going to tow, as Thomas explains:
“None of the ships we use, apart from the research ships, are 
designed for towing at sea. Every type of ship you can imagine, big 
sailing ships, oil tankers, ferries, ROROs, the list goes on … So what
we have to do is work out how they are going to tow.” (DR1960: 3)
Thomas and his colleagues can only work out how a ship is going to tow on a
personal visit to the ship. Each ship is different and requires a unique solution,
Thomas  emphasises.  On  some  ships,  even  a  custom  davit  needs  to  be
installed, a crane-like device that holds the steel wire that is attached to the
CPR. Alternatively, pulleys or blocks may be installed to hold the CPR. Whether
the CPR is lowered over the back or one of the sides of the ship is not really
important for the scientific use of the samples. As Thomas explains, the CPRs
are normally pulled towards a low-pressure area in the wake of the ship, even if
they are lowered into the water from the side. In this case, the crew must be
particularly careful when hauling the CPR, as it can easily smash against the
ship’s hull  and be damaged (DR1960: 11).  The most important issues when
searching for a suitable spot for the davit is to be sure that it provides enough
237
clearance over the side of the ship,150 that operating the CPR does not interfere
with the ship’s normal working procedures, and most importantly, that the towing
does not  interfere with  any of  the life  boats  or  other  safety-related devices.
Thomas explains:
“We have to be really really careful not to interfere with any of the 
safety gear. So when you go on board you have got to be 
knowledgable about this.” (DR1960: 4)
Thomas goes on to explain that the best way to find a solution is to get the
Captain or the Chief Officer of the ship involved in the decision-making:
“What you are trying to do is get the Captain, or the Chief Officer if 
he delegates it to the Chief Officer. You are trying to say ‘This is a 
good place for the davit’, but you want those words to come out of 
their mouth. That is the psychology. So once they think it is their idea 
or they are involved with the decision-making, they are far more 
comfortable with it.” (DR1960: 4–5).
Working out how a ship is going to tow is “one of those decisions that you don’t
want to make wholly on your own”, says Thomas (DR1960: 10). The goal is to
find a solution that satisfies the participants in particular: “If the ship’s officer is
happy, every one is happy” (DR1960: 10). 
Again, seafaring experience and knowledge of maritime culture, conventions,
and hierarchies aboard ships are favourable for the operations team when it
comes  to  joint  decision-making.  Camp  explains  that  the  operations  team’s
experience of working aboard ships “has been very beneficial” for the survey,
because a person like Thomas “knows what it is like at sea” and “what [the crew
members] go through”, which makes it “easy to convince them that it is safe and
it will all be fine” (DR2901: 11). Thomas explains another of his strategies:
“The trick is to get the bosun involved, who is like the senior non-
officer guy. He is in charge of the guys, he is like the foreman on 
150 This can be an issue if a ship has a large sponson, an outward extension on the 
ship’s hull to increase floating stability.
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board. He will have a good working relationship with the Captain. So 
if you get him on board, you know you are on a winner.” (DR1960: 3)
Thomas recalls from his work with volunteers what  helps him to  get people
enthused: 
“That is all down to people skills and a little bit of grey hair helps 
when you speak to people, because you have a little bit of … a 
sense of maturity, you know. (DR1960: 1)
Thomas remembers his visit to the Norbjorn, which replaced the Green Frost for
towing to Svalbard, and how shared interests with the Captain have helped him:
“I went to Tromsø, I went to see the Captain and I hit it off with the 
Captain quite well. He was a similar age, I am into sailing and he is 
into sailing, so we had plenty to talk about. And we did all that sort of 
bantering and the normal stuff.” (DR1960: 8)
Installation of the davit or blocks requires cooperation with a local engineering
company that is further requested to produce a risk assessment, save working
practice,  and  methods  statement  (DR1960:  8).  Engineers  of  the  “friendly
engineering  companies”,  as  Thomas  likes  to  call  them  (DR1960:  6),  also
examine the tow point on the ship every twelve months to certify it is still fit to be
operated  safely  (DR1960:  9).  SAHFOS’  status  as  a  registered  charity
sometimes helped in negotiating the price of commissions such as welding a
davit onto the deck of a ship (DR1960: 8).
The final important step of sourcing a ship is figuring out what Thomas calls the
“final five hundred” (DR1960: 3). The CPRs are transported from the Laboratory
in Plymouth to various ports by couriers or logistics companies. With the “final
five hundred”,  Thomas refers to  the few hundred metres between the port’s
security gates and the actual ship. He explains:
“If you go to these big terminals, the big container ports, it is amazing
that our yellow box gets moved free of charge from the security gate 
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to arrive at the right ship at the right time and vice versa.” (DR1960: 
3)
The CPR Survey relies on people to volunteer for transporting and looking after
the yellow boxes containing CPRs which  “pale into  insignificance when you
drive them around, compared to those masses of containers” (DR1960: 10).
Thomas describes the setting at one port  where several of the survey’s tow
routes begin:
“That’s Seaforth Docks at Liverpool and […] it is massive. […] And 
these containers — you drive around here in our little blue van and it 
is just like container city — it is scary stuff and the forklifts are 
whizzing by and it is a very, very busy place.” (DR1960: 5)
In Liverpool, the operations team is helped by two heavy cargo operators to
whom the yellow boxes containing CPRs are personally addressed. The heavy
cargo operators have made sure that SAHFOS as a charity is not charged for
the transportation of the boxes inside the port’s security gates. They look after
the boxes and delegate a forklift driver to bring them to the desired ship at the
right time. Upon each visit to Liverpool, the operations team brings flowers or
chocolate as a sign of gratitude for the cooperation (DR1960: 5). According to
Thomas, the two heavy cargo operators deserve “a medal for citizen science,
[…] because they really do make it work for us up in Liverpool” (DR1960: 9). 
The arrangements regarding the exact whereabouts of the yellow box at the
ports are made when the operations team and the volunteers walk through the
final five hundred, as Thomas explains:
“Before we leave that port, it is actually walking back the final five 
hundred. ‘Okay, we can leave it here? […] Is it okay if the boxes get 
left here?’ ‘Yeah, that’s no problem.’ And actually, the boxes in 
Liverpool, when they come off the ship, it works like a well-oiled 
machine there. The forklift driver now detects these yellow boxes 
because they are quite easy to identify and they leave them by the 
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public toilet in the docks. So all this world-class science, the meeting 
place is at the back of the public toilets.” (DR1960: 8–9) 
Thomas clarifies that there is a unique story like the one of Seaforth Docks for
each  port  from which  the  survey  operates.  Every  port,  whether  in  the  UK,
across  Europe,  or  on  a  different  continent,  has  its  own  characteristics  and
features a group of people with whom the operations team is usually on first-
name terms and keeps social relationships (DR1960: 5). Thomas emphasises
that the CPR Survey does not take any of the cooperation for granted and that it
is a circular chain of interactions that can break at any point:
“What we are actually doing is managing this big volunteer army, or 
navy because we are seaborne. And we have got the ship’s agents, 
we have got the owners, we have got the charterers, we have got 
stevedores, ship managers, forklift operators, terminal managers, 
heavy cargo operators, shipping line admin staff, friendly engineering
companies, shore side fitters, and then of course the crew and all the
chain of command on board. And it is a constant thing. If we go back 
to Liverpool, […] we have got the heavy cargo operators, who are on 
first-name terms with our friendly engineering company, who all know
the terminal manager. So what I am trying to say is, if you upset that 
relationship with one, you have upset it with all three. So if that link, if
that circle, is broken, it is broken.” (DR1960: 6)
Thomas says that the team’s success rate in sourcing ships is “good”, but if a
link to a specific company or ship gets actually broken, it is extremely difficult to
get these people back into cooperating (DR1960: 7). Thomas remembers that
SAHFOS happened to be rejected once after sending a person to source a ship
in an overseas port who was more “scientific-based” than the members of the
operations team:
“He didn’t take into account the safety gear aboard the ship and it got
all out of hand and we were told to leave. And once that is gone, it is 
very difficult to get back into that company.” (DR1960: 7)
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Thomas describes the operations team as “the portal between the real world
and the science world” and the team’s job often comes down to  “managing
scientists’  expectations”  (DR1960:  7).  SAHFOS  has  been  running  training
courses for scientists who want to use a CPR or start their own CPR Survey. At
these courses, Thomas feels that the scientists’ “number one aim is to collect
plankton data in a specific area”. The operations team meets them with their
own “working ethos”: “Our number one aim:  ‘Don’t injure or kill anyone. Don’t
lose  the  equipment.  Collect  the  data.’  That’s  our  working  ethos down here”
(DR1960: 15–16).
7.3.2 Monthly towing and handling of CPRs
When sourcing a ship, a towing schedule needs to be worked out together with
the ship. Naturally, the schedule for each ship depends on the schedules and
business plans of the respective owner or shipping company. The operations
team can thus plan and foresee the sampling dates and times only to a certain
degree  and  short-term  changes  may  occur.  The  CPR  Survey  manages  to
schedule one tow per month on most of  its routes,  but  it  is  not  possible  to
stipulate whether a sample will be taken during the day or at night. Day or night
sampling has a profound impact on the types of organisms that will be retained
by the silk.  Some plankton species migrate vertically in the water in a daily
cycle, as senior taxonomist Taylor explains:
“We can see when things are in the night and when they are in the 
day. There are certain species that are night-time. […] It is called diel 
migration when they move up the column at night time. So in the 
night time you can get completely different species than in the 
daytime.” (DR8112: 8)
The Pharos SG completed six tows for more than two thousand nautical miles
in 2015 in the South Atlantic Ocean (SAHFOS 2016: 13). The ship is a special
case when it comes to scheduling tows, as Thomas explains:
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“This is the Pharos SG […] that tows for us from Falklands to South 
Georgia. It is a fisheries protection vessel, so they do it on their 
normal transits out to their patrol area and we are less able to 
request times because of the nature of its job, you know. It will have 
to go off and do patrolling work. They don’t publicise that because 
obviously people they are trying to catch would go somewhere else.” 
(DR1960: 4)
For each scheduled tow, the operations team sends out a tow request via email
to the ship’s Captain with a copy addressed to the Chief Officer who is running
the ship’s day-to-day business. Thomas emphasises here, too, that “you have
got to get the language correct” (DR1960: 6). The letter is a polite request but
English is often not the first language of the recipients, so it  “cannot be too
waffly, otherwise it gets lost” (DR1960: 6). The following is the wording from a
letter for the Brittany Ferries ship Armorique, requesting a tow between Roscoff
and Plymouth:
Dear Commandant, Second Capitaine and Crew of ARMORIQUE,
We ask please that we can place Plankton recorder 192 on 
board the Armorique Tuesday 22nd September prior to your 
22:00 departure. 
May we take our blue van aboard to the stern mooring deck to do 
this, please?
If this is agreeable:
On Wednesday 23rd Sept please tow plankton recorder 192 north
bound, once only on the sailing from Roscoff to Plymouth.151
Depending on the port, additional people whose cooperation is required will be
notified for  each upcoming tow. In  a  setting like Liverpool’s Seaforth  docks,
151 I received a copy of this request following one of my interviews (DR2901). 
Emphasis in original. It seems that for this tow, the operations team planned to 
come aboard with their van in order to bring the CPR aboard personally.
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these are the terminal managers and heavy cargo operators who are involved in
transporting and overseeing the CPR box inside the port’s security areas. 
For the transportation from Plymouth to the respective port, the operations team
further needs to make sure that all the documentation is correct, especially if the
CPR is going to a port outside of the UK. Thomas calls this aspect of his job
“another part of our skill set, if you like. It is how to talk to customs people, how
to make sure the customs documentation is correct the first time” (DR1960: 16).
This can be more work depending on additional equipment being attached to
the CPR, which may contain lithium ion batteries or specific chemicals. Thomas
continues:
“We will make sure that all the paperwork is right for the transport 
companies. And the goal is to get all that transport documentation 
right the first time, then there isn’t a glitch. If there is a glitch in it, it 
holds things up. If it holds things up, you are screwed, because the 
ship won’t wait for you.” (DR1960: 17)
The logistics and the “well-oiled machine” (DR1960: 8) that brings yellow boxes
to the right ship at the right time and back to Plymouth are running quite well.
Thomas can remember only one instance where a yellow box got lost in the
logistics chain. The box was loaded onto the wrong ship by a courier company,
but as the ship subsequently sunk together with the CPR, there was no attempt
at getting it back. Yet, Thomas keeps a tracking list of the location of each CPR
at any one time and is  prepared to  “track [a  CPR]  down with  a fever  of  a
bloodhound, if you like, to keep on top of it” (DR1960: 16).
The tow request sent out to the Captain contains the desired date and location
of the tow and in case of the exemplary letter to the Armorique, brief instructions
to the crew about the handling of the CPR: 
The 90kgs recorder is lifted up by the winch drum then the wire paid 
out until the yellow tow mark settles in the sea. This gives the correct
tow depth of 6 to 10 metres at your 19 knots.
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Please avoid landing the tail on the bulwark. After towing please 
place the recorder upright on the deck.152
As explained in chapter five, the towing speed and depth are important for the
CPR’s internal sampling mechanism and for the sample analysis. A steel wire
marked for a certain speed is thus selected by the operations team and put into
the yellow box with the CPR in order to have the CPR float at the right depth. 
Together with the tow request, the Captain or Chief Officer also receive a tow
log which they are requested to fill in during the tow.153 The tow logs are usually
filled in by whoever is the officer on the bridge during the tow. The logs are
completed either on the computer or by hand and returned via email or printed
and put into the yellow box with the CPR (DR1960: 13). Besides the name of
the ship, its master, the route, the writer of the log and his or her rank, the log
contains the internal cassette’s number and information on the ship’s position,
which is to be logged by the officer at hourly intervals and if the ship changes
course by more than five degrees. The log provides additional space for any
other information or remarks regarding sea state or weather conditions that the
officer might want to record (DR2901: 5). 
As explained in chapter five, errors on the tow log are problematic to locate a
tow geographically. In such cases, Thomas may have to reach out to the ship to
clarify the ship’s actual track:
“If they forgot to put in an altered course and there is an island in 
between, it looks like we are collecting plankton up the High Street. 
So that is an obvious one and we would address that and get the 
accurate data back.” (DR1960: 13)
Each ship of opportunity is provided with a twenty-page “Ship’s Briefing Book”
by which contains some background information on the purpose of the CPR
Survey, how the recorders work, and what happens with the samples after they
152 Emphasis in original.
153 I received a copy of an empty tow log after one of my interviews (DR2901).
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return to Plymouth.154 Most  importantly, the briefing book contains a method
statement  and risk  assessment  regarding operation of  the  CPR by a ship’s
crew.  The  task  of  deploying  and  hauling  a  CPR  is  “relatively  simple”  and
“relatively  straightforward”  (DR2901:  4)  says Camp.  The crew members  are
instructed to  use,  if  possible,  the ship’s winch for lifting the CPR out  of  the
yellow box. The steel wire that comes with the CPR has a yellow mark that
needs to float on the sea surface. 
The briefing book clarifies that  ‘deploying the CPR will  not interfere with the
normal ship’s business’ (DR1960). This means that the ship does not stop or
slow  down  for  the  deployment  or  hauling  of  the  CPR.  The  book  further
emphasises that the safety of the crew members is the “number one priority”
during the tow. In case of rough weather that makes operating on deck unsafe,
the CPR should not be deployed or hauled. Also, if fog or other circumstances
require the ship to sail slower than five knots, the CPR should be hauled, as the
CPR mechanism is not designed for towing speeds in that range. 
The briefing book further contains instructions for changing the CPR’s internal
cassette,  which  is  requested  from crew  members  on  some  of  the  survey’s
longer routes. In these cases, the yellow box contains an additional case with a
prepared internal. Crew members may also be asked to add extra preservative
to the internal’s storage tank after a tow has been completed. This is to make
sure that the samples return in the best possible conditions, especially if the
CPRs need to be shipped long ways from overseas ports. To add more formalin
solution, crew members have to carefully remove the internal  from the CPR
body, open the tank lid,  and empty  a bottle  with  extra  preservative into  the
chamber holding the silk roll (DR1960). 
The crews are usually not instructed in these tasks directly by the operations
team, as only the Captain or Chief Officer and the bosun are present when the
ship is sourced. The briefing book is thus very clear and shows photographs for
each step.  It  would hardly be possible to instruct  all  crew members directly,
because almost every ship has at least two crews, as Thomas explains:
154 I have received an electronic version of the briefing book at one of my interview 
visits (DR1960).
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“There is always a watering down and that is just a fact of life. And 
every ship almost will have an A crew and a B crew, and certainly the
officers are so many months on and so many months off. You are 
only going to see one on that initial visit. So that is why this has to be
well detailed.” (DR1960: 12)
Thomas further explains that the personal communication via email is also kept
up to maintain the relationships and be able to solve any concerns or questions
quickly. However, the operations team occasionally travels to the ships for what
Thomas calls “good will visits” (DR1960: 9). A team member tries to visit each
ship at least once every three years to express gratitude and to keep the crew
up to date. Camp says that the survey’s representative “would chat to them and
check if there have been any updates or new information they need” (DR2901:
4). On these visits, the operations team also brings little presents like a box of
chocolates  and  is  determined  to  “never  turn  down  hospitality”,  as  Thomas
explains, even if that means being invited to multiple meals in the course of one
morning (DR1960: 15). 
Neither  the shipping companies nor  ship  owners are paid for  towing CPRs.
However, ₤60 per tow are awarded directly to the bosun and the crew. Camp
says “it  is only like either beer money, or maybe for their television fund, or
whatever else they might want to spend it on” (DR2901: 11). Thomas tells me
that one ship decided to save the money all up and take the crew on a skiing
trip at the end of the year. Each ship is an individual case, even when it comes
to transferring the ₤60 for the crew, as Thomas explains:
“There is no one answer to [how the money is transferred]. Some 
shipping companies would not even accept it. They would donate to 
charity. For some, once you have made the offer, it is very important 
to them, depending on the parts of the world and the nationality of 
the crews it is more important or less important. Some want it every 
time, so you pay every month. Some will set it up with their shore 
side admin staff, so they send us an invoice every quarter, or every 
six months, and they do it that way to keep the admin down.” 
(DR1960: 6)
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I could not research the specific motivations of shipping companies and ships of
opportunity for collaborating with the CPR Survey. The above quote indicates,
however, that the motivations to collaborate might be as diverse and culturally
shaped  as  the  ways  in  which  the  companies  and  ships  handle  the  small
monetary compensation.
Thomas says that the good will visits, as well as the initial visits for sourcing a
ship, are a fun part of his job, although they “can be really late night working”
with “a lot of hanging around, if  you like” (DR1960: 10). The trips to various
ports and ships are crucial to maintain the network of volunteer ships, even if a
visit may not be very long:
“You go and see people and I am always conscious that I am taking 
up their time. So I will be ‘Thank you very much for the work you do. 
You want to come out for lunch with us?’ ‘No I am a bit busy today.’ 
‘Okay mate, if you are ever down in Plymouth, come and look us up.’ 
And then you get out of his way. […] But that short conversation, it 
will be a little bit longer than that, is invaluable.” (DR1960: 10)
Maintaining social relationships, visiting various ports, ships, and people, and
finding  unique  solutions  for  each  ship  make  the  job  of  the  operations  and
workshop team quite diverse. Additionally, the team runs training courses, writes
tow schedules, it maintains, repairs, and prepares CPRs for deployment, and
supports the sister CPR surveys around the world. Thomas explains:
“That is one of the reasons I stayed here for twenty years, because 
even though you think running the CPR Survey is much of the same 
… There is so much variation, to be honest.” (DR1960: 2)
The variation in Thomas’ job reflects the previous chapters’ finding regarding the
dynamics  of  long-term  practices:  The  CPR  Survey  is  not  repetitious,  but
permanently adjusts to changing conditions. The conditions set by the shipping
sector and maritime culture were left out of chapter six, but have a profound
influence on the ways in which the CPR Survey is conducted.
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7.4 The agency and epistemic contributions of non-scientists
My description of the involvement of non-scientists in the SDS and the CPR
Survey  has  revealed  a  variety  of  relationships  and  interactions  between
scientists, staff of scientific institutions, and non-scientists. In my analysis, I first
compare some of the characteristics of  the two cases and discuss them as
“contributory”  or  “investigation”  type  projects.  I  call  this  a  “mechanistic”
understanding of participation in order to emphasise the role of participants as
deployable tools for the collection of objects or data which are subsequently
analysed by scientists. I then provide strong arguments for an alternative view
that is intended to emphasise the individual agency of volunteer participants in
collaborative scientific projects.
7.4.1 Non-scientists as a platform for data collection?
The two cases presented in this chapter have several aspects in common: For a
start, both are rooted in specific research problems and were conceived and
designed by scientists. The CPR Survey was initiated by a fisheries ecologist
and has expanded over decades into a multi-purpose measuring platform to
address the research interests of scientists and alleviate data scarcity. The idea
for the SDS arose in response to a controversy regarding the comparability of
data obtained by different sampling methods and multiple decades apart. Both
projects were initiated and are managed by scientists or scientific institutions
and can thus be regarded as structured “top down”. Further, in both cases the
participants need to follow tight instructions for the projects to be successful.
These  instructions  are  not  designed  or  developed  in  cooperation  with  the
participants.
A way to understand this type of participation is what I call a “mechanistic” view
of  collaborative  practice:  The  participants  appear  to  be  the  executing
component  of  a  sampling system or  machinery. Once acquired,  set  up with
equipment, and instructed, they follow instructions like a programmed device,
albeit  with slightly different tasks. In the SDS, participants perform sampling,
quantification, data creation, and activate transmission to a central database,
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while the metadata for each measurement are produced automatically via GPS
reading. In the CPR Survey, participants handle the sampling device, provide for
the  transportation  of  the  device  in  certain  areas  like  a  “well-oiled  machine”
(DR1960:  8),  begin and end the sampling process,  and record  metadata in
prepared sheets. The scientific product of the SDS is a quantity that becomes
part of a growing dataset which scientists can analyse. In the CPR study, the
product is a material object that is analysed by scientists under microscopes.
The participants’ epistemic contribution appears to amount to the production of
objects or data while the interpretation happens elsewhere. The projects share
these characteristics with “contributory” or “investigation” type projects specified
by Bonney et al. (2009) and Wiggins and Crowston (2011) who emphasise the
role of participants as data collectors for projects structured and managed “top
down”. The mechanistic view of participation is based on an understanding of
participants’ involvement in a technical sense. They serve as an observation or
sampling platform that can be deployed by scientists to produce or collect data
or  samples  which  scientists  subsequently  analyse  and  interpret.  The  term
“platform” used by Brewin et al. (2015: 1) to refer to collaborative projects fits
well with this mechanistic understanding of participation.
One could argue that the silk rolls and the transmitted Secchi depth data are the
primary outputs of the respective collaborative practices. From the scientists’
perspective and with respect to the respective epistemic process they certainly
are the most relevant result. The silk rolls and Secchi depth data have neither
integrated nor contain any personal or local knowledge of the participants, in
contrast to the sea turtle monitoring case studied Cornwell and Campbell (2012)
where the volunteers’ local knowledge of the beaches is crucial for decisions
taken by the scientists. In my cases, data or the objects that become interesting
for  the  scientists  are  not  derived  directly  from  the  participants’  personal
knowledge or experience related to their local environment. This does not mean
that local knowledge is unimportant, as the CPR Survey clearly demonstrates:
As each ship and each port  has unique characteristics and calls  for  unique
solutions, local knowledge of these places and their characteristics is crucial.
Yet,  this  knowledge is  not  what  the scientists  are interested in.  The lack of
contributed personal or local knowledge to the actual object of interest may be
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regarded as another argument for a mechanistic view of participation in which
the participants  only  need to  function well  enough to  collect  usable  data  or
samples for the scientists. 
Another argument could be made in relation to the educational benefit for the
participants.  Besides  limited  background  information  on  plankton  and  the
research processes provided through the Secchi app and the CPR Survey’s
briefing book,  education of participants is not formally  embedded in the two
projects. The participation might increase environmental awareness and make
non-scientists  familiar  with  scientific  equipment,  but  the  overall  educational
dimension of collaboration in science is an empirical question that is difficult to
assess and goes beyond the purpose of this study.155 Yet, resonating with the
division of labour in data-intensive sciences, it appears that seafarers assume
the role of  data producers or sample producers, while the actual knowledge
inferred from data or sample analysis is generated and stays within the scientific
domain.
The  mechanistic  view  of  seafarers  and  volunteers  as  a  platform  for  data
collection  situates  the  SDS  and  the  CPR  Survey  closely  to  collaborative
practices of the environmental sciences which have been described as primarily
contributory or investigative. In these, the participants function as collectors of
materials  or  data and as  a platform scientists  can utilise  for  their  epistemic
purposes.  Lacking  individual  agency,  the  participants  are  instructed  and
directed “from the top” and perform their tasks solely on the scientists’ terms. 
7.4.2 Enabling sampling conditions on the participants’ terms
In the previous section, I applied an interpretive lens that slightly overreaches.
In light of  my empirical  research and in contrast  to  the mechanistic view of
participation, I  argue for a view that  recognises and highlights the individual
155 An ethnographic study by Crall et al. (2013) shows how difficult it is to measure the
science education effect, despite registering a ‘modest change in knowledge and 
attitudes’ among participants of an invasive species citizen project (Crall et al. 
2013: 1). 
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agency and epistemic contributions of the seafarers and volunteers. This view is
grounded  in  the  discovery  of  strong  social  dimensions  in  my  case  studies.
These are most evident in the CPR Survey, where personal communication, an
understanding of maritime culture, regular good will visits, and signs of gratitude
through small gifts are required to be able to conduct the survey at all. Even if
the communication happens electronically via email and not face-to-face, the
communication remains personally addressed and on first name terms. While
these almost intimate terms cannot be found in the SDS, much of the project’s
regular activities appeal to the social side of participation. The project is active
on social media, sells merchandise, and has involved an ambassador in order
to build a global movement in support of plankton science that seafarers can
identify  with.  The  fact  that  collaborations  between  human  beings  feature  a
social  dimension may sound like a truism. However, the significance of  this
dimension and the reliance on trust between scientists and non-scientists for a
successful  cooperation in  both cases can hardly  be overstated and strongly
contradict  with the view of participants as mechanical  collectors who merely
follow instructions.
Whereas local knowledge of the participants is not integrated into the objects
resulting  from the  collaboration,  the  significance  of  local  knowledge  and  its
social aspects in the CPR Survey cannot be denied. To figure out how a tow
may be realised, local knowledge of individual ships and port sites is required
and generated together by the operations team and various participants. This
joint  generation  and  exchange  of  knowledge,  concluded  by  joint  decision-
making, is where non-scientists make crucial individual contributions that enable
the sampling process. These contributions are not material samples or data, but
personal arrangements, local knowledge, and practical solutions, which enable
the creation of samples in the first place.
Another contribution by the non-scientists becomes visible when considering
knowledge  as  either  propositional  or  embodied:156 While  propositional
knowledge of the oceans or specific regions of the sea plays a minor role, the
156 Propositional knowledge is here understood as “knowledge-that”, referring to 
knowing that a proposition is true. Embodied knowledge is understood as 
“knowledge-how”, referring to knowing how to do something (Fantl 2016).
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participants make use of their embodied knowledge related to seafaring when
interacting  with  the  sea  and  when  performing  their  volunteer  task  for  the
scientific project. They manage to navigate their vessels on the oceans and are
capable of handling heavy steel devices like the CPR routinely. They do this in
unique settings either on their personal ships or on container ships and ferries
which have been customised for towing CPRs. Non-scientists thus contribute to
science  their  very  specific  embodied  knowledge  related  to  seafaring,  which
encompasses skills and knowledge that the majority of citizens and the public,
and probably most ocean scientists, lack.
The motivations of the participants have not been studied empirically for this
project but the scientists I have interviewed insinuated that most participants
take  pleasure  in  sampling,  as  it  may  come  as  a  welcome relief  from daily
routines  aboard  ships.  Additionally,  many  seafarers  have  a  passionate
relationship  to  the  sea  and  experience  a  lifelong  connectedness  to  it.  This
connection is expressed in recreational sailing or surfing but may also originate
in  a  profession  as  fisherman  or  aboard  commercial  ships.  Cornwell  and
Campbell (2012: 112) explain in relation to their case of co-productive sea turtle
conservation that  ‘an emotional bond’ between participants and the research
target  underpins  the  participants’  goals and agency. Such relationships  may
serve  as  motivation  and likely  affect  the  effort  of  volunteers  to  perform the
sampling as well as they can. 
Both the SDS and the CPR Survey show that human agency introduces certain
degrees of unpredictability and an inability to fully control the sampling. This
also  speaks  against  a  mechanistic  view  of  participation  in  which  tasks  are
performed reliably in the exact same way each and every time.157 In the SDS,
due to the seasonal behaviour and regional preferences of the participants, the
scientists cannot plan or predict when and where participants will measure the
Secchi depth. Sailors and fishermen decide when they want to go where based
on numerous variables and even if a seafarer is out on the oceans at the right
157 Machines are certainly not exempt from making mistakes or being imprecise but I 
am thinking here of machines used in mass production of goods on industrial 
scales which requires the repeated performance of tasks with very little or no 
variation at all.
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time of the day, weather conditions, other activities on board, or personal mood
might prevent a participant from sampling or cause him or her to forget about it.
In the CPR Survey, deployments are pre-arranged and communicated between
the operations team and the ships of opportunity, but the ship’s normal business
always takes priority. A ship of opportunity will not wait for a CPR or may not
even disclose its schedule, as in case of the Pharos SG. Additionally, there can
always be unplanned course alterations, rough weather that may slow down a
ship or obstruct  sampling altogether. The CPR Survey can neither control  if
sampling happens at day or at night, which affects the outcome of the sampling
significantly. Moreover, CPRs can only be towed in regions frequented regularly
by commercial  ships. In both the CPR Survey and the SDS, the spatial and
temporal distribution of the sampling is far from random or homogeneous: The
distribution  depends  on  the  agency  of  the  sailors,  fishermen,  divers,  and
commercial shipping companies, as well as on environmental and economical
factors. I thus argue that the individual agency of participants is fundamental for
making  sampling  possible  and  that  the  volunteers’  embeddedness  in  their
environment shapes how, when, and where sampling may be performed.
To be clear, the unpredictability and limited control in both cases do not make
this practice illegitimate or less scientific than any non-collaborative scientific
endeavours. Nothing indicates in the SDS that the sailors perform the sampling
worse or less reliably than scientists.  Potential  mistakes and variation in the
consistency of performing a task are normal for non-scientists as well as for
scientists.  Both  projects  have  implemented  or  experiment  with  the
implementation of functions such as automated GPS reading to lower the risk of
errors. These developments reflect the belief that new technologies may play an
important  role  in  participatory  practices  with  respect  to  the  quality  of  the
outcome. 
Yet, many tasks are still performed without the possibility to control what the
participants are doing exactly and under which conditions. In case of the SDS, it
is  not possible to know how consistent the participants are in judging when
exactly they lose sight of the disk, which may also depend on the participants’
vision, their ability to distinguish colours or whether or not they remember to
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remove their  sunglasses.  Both of  my cases mainly  rely  on trusting  that  the
participants follow the instructions faithfully as well as they can and that they
perform their task well enough so that the data and samples are usable. This is
one reason why building trust through social relationships is so important; the
relationships  also  function  as  feedback  loops  through  which  issues  and
questions  can  be  resolved  so  that  the  sampling  can  be  performed  more
consistently. On the one hand, individual agency is a source of the “watering
down”  when  it  comes  to  instructing  people  to  follow  a  certain  method.  As
Thomas remarked, the watering down is a “fact of life” which happens in any
scientific and non-scientific context (DR1960: 12). On the other hand, individual
agency  is  the  source  of  embodied  knowledge,  local  expertise,  social
relationships  and  trust,  which  are  crucial  in  the  two  cases  studied  for  this
chapter.
Individual agency implies individual relations to a local context which constitute
an embeddedness of the participants in their environment. This embeddedness
entails their specific relations to certain regions of the oceans, their nationalities,
their passion for the seas or its organisms, as well as seasonal and economical
fluctuations of their interaction with the research target. The activities performed
by recreational and professional seafarers, as well as by employees of ports
and shipping companies, are always subordinate to their regular duties and to
their  profession’s  structure  and  hierarchies.  The  volunteers  remain  firmly
embedded in their local context, even while performing an activity that is part of
a research process. Neither SDS nor CPR Survey participants are likely to take
their boats or commercial ships and sail the seas just to measure the Secchi
depth or tow a CPR through the ocean. It may sound trivial but the fact that the
volunteers only sample when interacting with the oceans anyway reflects their
embeddedness in their local environment.
Rather than “collecting” objects or data, I characterise the contribution of the
volunteers as the “enabling of sampling conditions” and as an epistemic activity
in its own right. Sampling of the oceans is only possible because of the fact that
seafarers are out on the oceans on a more or less regular basis. My research
illustrates how the enabling is achieved: As I have discussed here, much of this
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epistemic  activity  is  rooted  in  the  individual  agency  of  the  participants  who
scientists or staff of scientific institutions need to get involved with. Rather than
being sampling tools that are deployed and function in the name of science, the
seafarers are part of the setting or the environment that scientists need to reach
out to in order to create knowledge. I discussed in chapter three that ocean
scientists are required to reach out and explore the oceans. Surfers, seafarers,
and the shipping sector are inextricable part of this environment. Considering
the seafarers as part of the setting is not to degrade them or assign them a
passive role in the epistemic process but to emphasises their embeddedness in
the local context to which any scientific activity is subordinate. The CPR Survey
needs employees with seafaring experience and certain “people skills” in order
to  approach  the  maritime  world  and  culture  and  make  the  collaboration
successful. The operations team frequently embarks on field expeditions into
this world to explore, establish, and maintain unique solutions for each ship and
port,  not  to  despatch  participants  as  parts  of  a  standardised  collecting
machinery.
The  enabling  of  sampling  conditions  happens  on  the  participants’  terms
because  their  specific  embeddedness  determines  when,  where,  and  how
sampling is made possible. By contrast, the sampling itself is performed partly
on  the  scientists’  terms,  because  scientists  conceive  the  collaboration  and
provide the instructions and equipment, and partly on the participants’ terms,
because  they  are  the  ones  who  interpret  and  follow  the  instructions.  Their
individual  agency  introduces  natural  variability  and  unpredictability  into  the
sampling process.
My view of collaboration between scientists and non-scientists resonates with
the co-productive view of participation as an “emergent” practice (Chilvers and
Kearnes  2016a).  Several  crucial  elements  of  collaborative  practice  are  not
determined solely by either of the involved groups of actors. Both the scientific
products  and  any  non-scientific  outcome  emerge  in  jointly  delineated  but
unpredictable  ways.  Their  emergence  may  be  likened  to  the  integration  of
materials  at  the  intersections  between  sampling  technology  and  the  natural
world that  I  conceptualised as material  integration in  chapter  four. Samples,
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data, and the various ways in which they may figure in epistemic processes
constitute the scientific products of collaboration. The non-scientific outcomes
encompass  local  knowledge,  personal  relationships,  educational  benefits  for
society, or pleasure. The identities of those who are involved in the collaborative
practices  are  shaped  by  all  of  these  outcomes  —  the  seafarers’  by  the
outcomes I  have described as non-scientific,  the scientists’  primarily  but not
exclusively by the scientific products.
7.5 Conclusion
The  involvement  of  people  without  scientific  credentials  or  affiliations  in
epistemic processes, in particular in the environmental sciences, has often been
thought  and conceptualised as  that  of  collectors  of  materials  or  data  which
scientists can analyse. This understanding suggests a picture of participants in
such projects as mechanical parts or extensions of a sampling system that is
conceived,  directed,  and  despatched  by  scientists.  My  empirical  study  of
practices in ocean sciences suggests a contrasting view that is grounded in an
understanding of science as a social endeavour. This understanding is firmly
substantiated by this chapter’s empirical accounts of collaborative practices in
ocean sciences.
My  view  accounts  for  the  non-scientists’  individual  agency  and  their
epistemological contribution in the enabling of sampling conditions on their own
terms.  The  contribution  manifests  itself  to  a  lesser  extent  in  propositional
knowledge  but  rather  in  using  embodied  knowledge  and  skills  related  to
seafaring, local knowledge of ports and ships, and the application of scientific
equipment. When volunteers participate in science, they remain embedded in
their local context and in their roles as recreational or professional seafarers.
The outcomes of collaborations are not pre-determined by scientists by virtue of
designing  equipment,  methodologies,  and  research  questions.  Instead  of
merely collecting and supplying science with materials or data, volunteers and
scientists co-produce scientific products such as samples and data as well as
outcomes related to the non-scientific domain which have the potential to shape
the identities of every individual involved. 
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In  both  cases  that  I  have  studied,  a  layer  of  social  relationships  and
correspondence is required to maintain the network of volunteers and to ensure
that  the  sampling  maintains  its  spatial  and temporal  regularity  over  multiple
decades. In case of the CPR Survey, the social continuity is an indispensable
part  of  these  data  practices  and  underpins  the  practices’  material  and
methodological continuity. Similar to the methodological continuity discussed in
the previous chapter and the material interactions discussed in chapter four, a
variety of factors and changing conditions are beyond the researcher’s control
but decisively shape the actual outcomes of collaborations. 
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Chapter Eight – Conclusion: Continuities, change, and 
agency in oceanographic data practices
This thesis set out to study the genesis of oceanographic data in an empirical
case study of scientific practices, their conditions, and their outcomes. The four
empirical  chapters  that  are  based  on  ethnographic  interviews  and  visits  of
research sites converge towards a complex picture of activities,  people, and
processes  that  constitute  dynamic  changes  and  continuities  in-between  a
natural  system  and  science.  This  assemblage  extends  to  various  domains
beyond the control and the traditional boundaries of scientific institutions.
Chapter four highlighted a variety of physical interactions between the sampling
technology  and  the  oceanic  ecosystem  and  reveals  how  these  processes
beyond the scientists’ grasp shape the characteristics of the research samples.
While chapter five focused on the manipulation of samples and the implications
of  certain  counting procedures that  are involved in  creating data in  the lab,
chapter six exposed how external conditions and historical change influence the
practices of sampling and data creation. Chapter seven discussed how scientific
and maritime cultures meet in research collaborations in which the agencies of
both scientists and non-scientists contribute to the research outcome. 
In my introduction, I created room for a philosophical account of the practices,
processes,  and  people  in-between  science  and  the  natural  world.  This
conceptual  space  gradually  filled  in  the  course  of  this  thesis  with  material,
methodological,  and  social  continuities,  but  also  with  series  of  traceable
transformations performed on newly generated scientific  data.  I  have shown
how these continuities interweave: The material continuity that connects data
and  samples  with  the  ocean  ecosystems  is  crossed  by  methodological
continuity between newly generated data and data of the past. Both of these
continuities are underpinned by the social  continuities between the scientific
and the maritime world.  Within  this  layer  of  practices and people,  traceable
journeys of data from hand-written records to digital databases and beyond are
securely embedded. Like the silk that is used for sampling, the data practices of
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the CPR Survey are flexible, but strong enough not to distort too much or come
apart.  The  survey  assimilates  historical  changes  of  context,  technological
innovations, shifting interests of scientists, funders, and the public, and a host of
uncertainties  and  foibles  due  to  the  survey’s  material  sampling  and  semi-
quantitative  counting  procedures.  By  virtue  of  these  continuities  and  their
flexibility,  the  survey’s  data  practices  are  consistent  and  have  generated
continuously for multiple decades a consistent body of meaningful data relating
to a natural system as vast and inaccessible as the ocean’s ecosystems. This is
how continuity, an absence of jumps, and change, an alteration of a thing in
time, coexist in scientific practices and mesh in a generative way. 
A key to this picture emerged in chapter six, where it became clear in relation to
Caporael,  Griesemer,  and  Wimsatt’s  (2014a)  scaffolding  framework  that
development and maintenance are two sides of the same coin.  One cannot
exist  without  the  other  in  certain  cultural  practices,  including  scientific
enterprises  with  relatively  long  timelines,  as  my  thesis  has  revealed.  The
material, methodological, and social continuities neither constitute an absence
of  change  nor  relate  to  nostalgia  or  traditionalism.  They  are  the  result  of
dynamic activity, change, and innovation. 
This integrated picture drawn from my thesis’ main chapters converges with
existing  philosophical  and  sociological  scholarship  by  demonstrating  that
research practices are performed in specific technological, historical, and socio-
economic settings. My thesis spells out what that means: Neither are scientists
able  to  freely  design  their  research  practices  nor  are  they  in  a  position  to
independently decide on the context and content of their research. As explained
in chapter seven, the CPR Survey has to accommodate and actively reach out
to the seafaring culture, maritime conventions, and the shipping business. The
cooperation  with  volunteers  constitutes  a  co-production  in  which  both  sides
perform epistemic activities on their own terms. In chapter six, I explained how
the survey accommodates the interests of other researchers, funding agencies,
and the public by expanding their scientific repertoire and modifying their data
ontology. The  chapter  also  discussed  how  the  survey  is  forced  to  react  to
technological  progress and innovations by conducting experimental  research
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and at times even modifying the designs of research instruments. This shows
that the agency of researchers in creating knowledge of a natural system like
the  oceans  is  limited  and  constrained  by  a  variety  of  external  factors  and
processes that can be unpredictable. A good example of this is how funding for
long-standing marine ecological practices was phased down in the 1980s, yet
not  much  later,  climate  change  made  these  rather  “old-fashioned”,  manual
practices highly relevant again and pushed researchers towards developing a
shared scientific repertoire. 
Another quite obvious example of the researcher’s limited agency in the data
practices I have researched is the fact that scientists hand over the control of
research  technologies  and  the  entire  sampling  procedure  to  non-scientific
actors,  as  explained  in  chapters  four  and  seven.  This  is  a  significant  fact
considering  the  epistemological  implications  of  the  material  integration  that
takes place during sampling. After all, the silk samples that result from material
integration  and  continuity  are  the  foundation  of  the  CPR  Survey’s  entire
research programme. As in other examples of data-intensive science, this is an
instance of collaborative knowledge production and division of labour in which
epistemologically relevant actions and agency are spread among many different
actors, including scientists and a variety of non-scientists. 
It seems that the laboratory, where in my case taxonomists create the plankton
data by microscopic analysis, is the environment where scientists can fully exert
their agency. As explained in chapter five, the sample analysis and data creation
are a series of intended and largely controlled changes or transformations that
gradually expand the scope of data. However, even in this setting, constraints
are ubiquitous: Taxonomists have to deal with the result of a material integration
that can be surprising or difficult to analyse. The identification of species can
only be performed to certain levels of detail due to the flow of returning samples
and  the  limited  capacities  of  the  lab.  Further,  the  sample  analysts  rely  on
instruments and lists of taxonomic entities that set limits to the scope and depth
of the analysis. Most importantly, these limits are deeply entrenched due to the
legacy of the survey and the high value of methodological continuity. 
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Limited  agency  does  not  mean  passivity.  To  the  contrary,  my  account  of
oceanographic data in the making emphasises the interventionist character of
data practices. The data of the CPR Survey, as well as the material samples,
are  the  result  of  formation  processes  that  are  induced  by  intentional
intervention: by reaching out to actors that already frequent the object of study,
by  lowering  sampling  devices  into  the  ocean,  and  by  applying  microscopic
analysis  practices,  semi-quantitative  counting  procedures,  and  spatial  and
temporal  averaging.  Tracking  these  interventions  in  the  course  of  making
scientific data reinforces the notion of artificiality that I  introduced in chapter
one. In this view, data are not collected. The view of data as a resource from
which scientists can collect items effortlessly is a partial perspective centred on
databases that are already filled with data. As I argued in chapter seven, even
the seafarers who volunteer to create data contribute their skills and knowledge
and  engage  in  co-producing  novel  research  objects  together  with  scientists
rather  than  “collecting  nature”  (Strasser  2012a)  only  by  using  research
instruments. 
The notion of “collecting” data is not the only concept that my thesis puts into a
critical perspective. Chapters four and five contribute to a deeper philosophical
understanding  of  materiality  and  scientific  representation.  My  account  of
sampling in chapter  four exemplifies materiality  as an ongoing process — a
duality  of  integration  and  continuity  —  that  results  in  an  effect  of  physical
boundaries and tangibility that is maintained and traceable in order to be useful
for the creation of data. The attribution “material” indicates more than just an
ontological state. It encompasses, as  Woolgar and Lezaun (2013: 326)  have
pointed  out,  an  “upshot”  of  certain  practices.  In  these  practices  and  in  the
materiality they constitute, I locate the epistemic value of samples. 
Today’s primacy of data, which is often reflected in scholarship on data-centric
sciences and tends to take the global availability of data in digital databases as
a starting point, might obscure the material origins and the genesis of data. In
particular,  conceiving  data  as  direct  representations  of  natural  phenomena
bypasses the material practices and the actual reason for the data’s epistemic
value. Chapter five argues for a view of scientific representing that unties data
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from natural phenomena and makes room for a context-dependent conception
of  data  and  representation.  My  account  emphasises  the  intentionality  of
representing which is often aimed at increasing the scope of data by making
them  computable,  comparable,  and  integrable  with  already  existing
representations. In this view, masses of data aggregated in digital databases
are  anything  but  pure  and  uninterpreted  representations  of  real-world
phenomena.  Digital  data  are  objects  that  are  forged  intentionally  in  specific
ways in order to fit with already existing standards and views of the world. 
My  thesis’  re-framing  of  materiality  and  representing  points  to  philosophical
issues  that  have  not  disappeared  in  the  course  of  the  data-centric
reconfigurations of research practices. As I suggested in my introduction, how to
observe,  represent,  and  understand  the  natural  world  are  still  fundamental
questions in all environmental sciences. The ways in which ocean scientists in
my case study create samples and useful scientific data reinforces Bogen and
Woodward’s  (1988)  argument  that  scientists  cannot  observe  natural
phenomena in a straightforward sense. The ecosystems of the world’s oceans
are  unobservable  to  humans,  but  researchers  have  developed  ways  of
implementing and sustaining material, methodological, and social continuities in
order to create objects that researchers can use as starting points for scientific
reasoning.
The question if data will eventually represent real-world systems or not relates
— as almost everything else in philosophy of science (Chakravartty 2017) — to
debates  about  scientific  realism.  Books  could  be  filled  with  philosophical
discussions  on  the  realism  of  the  phenomena  and  processes  that
oceanographers describe and explain with their data. To say that the oceans’
ecosystems are  unobservable  would  probably  irritate  many ocean  scientists
who might spend entire careers trying to record data relating to the oceans. To a
marine ecologist, a bucket of sea floor mud and organisms under a microscope
are certainly real. On the basis of my thesis, and in relation to Hacking’s (1983)
realism about practices of intervention and manipulation, I can only suggest that
the  reality  of  the  oceans  is  manifest  in  the  material  practices  of  the  ocean
scientists, regardless of the relation between the outcome of these practices
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and  the  real-world  system.  In  the  picture  outlined  above,  the  material,
methodological,  and social  continuities  that  interweave in  the layer  between
science and the world are real. They consist of interactions with the oceans,
research  instruments,  and  people.  Scientific  knowledge  and  human
understanding of the natural world grows by sustaining and developing these
continuities that are the reality of oceanographic practices. 
In  my main  case study, the  CPR Survey, the  material,  methodological,  and
social dimensions of data practices are particularly pronounced: The survey’s
various manual practices, the individual handling and storage of samples, the
mechanical functioning of the plankton recorder, and the close relationships to
seafarers expose the continuities of the survey’s data practices. In many other
oceanographic practices, especially those with high levels of automation, these
practices  and  relations  might  be  hidden  in  black  boxes,  obscured  by  high-
volume technologies and autonomously working systems. I do not claim that my
thesis’  picture  of  the  genesis  of  oceanographic  data  reflects  the  entirety  of
oceanographic research practices. Yet, the practices in my case study exemplify
the  data  scarcity,  data-centrism,  collaborative  research,  and  the  ties  with
maritime culture that I found characteristic of ocean sciences in chapter three. 
However, a specific terminology and self-perception associated with exploration
and discovery seems to  be  at  odds with  my account  of  data practices  that
emphasises  the  creation  of  novel  objects  upon  intervention  and  interaction.
Sociological and historical research could shed more light on this question. My
own research suggests that scientists are less free to explore and discover, but
rather bound in the context of their research where they balance the constraints
related to continuities and change. Yet, I have argued that oceanographers are
required to actively reach out beyond the scientific domain and induce various
interactions between materials and people. Figuring out the material details of
the  sampling  and finding  ways to  make huge container  ships  tow sampling
devices requires active exploration not  of  the natural  world,  but  of  research
settings involving marine organisms, technologies, and people.
Even  in  doing  a  detailed  local  case  study  of  research  practices,  my  thesis
reached  certain  limits.  These,  however,  offer  some  promising  research
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opportunities. As this thesis is about the genesis of oceanographic data, I have
hardly considered concrete use cases of CPR data. In relation to the portability
of data and Leonelli’s (2016) notion of data journeys, finding out how and in
which  research contexts  the  plankton data  are  used for  scientific  reasoning
would be an obvious way to follow up my research. How and why some data
are  integrated  or  compared  with  certain  other  data  becomes  easier  to
understand  with  knowledge  of  the  data’s  genesis,  of  their  semi-quantitative
nature,  and  their  respective  relations  to  real-world  systems  and  material
samples. Additionally, the notion of continuities, which underpin the creation and
transformations of data as they are moved between different contexts, could
add  an interesting  perspective  on data  journeys and  further  illuminate  what
factors facilitate or impede such journeys.
The CPR Survey is also an intriguing case for empirical research with respect to
the ability or inability to automate epistemic processes. I was not able to discuss
the  potential  to  automate  practices  of  the  CPR  Survey  within  this  thesis,
although I talked about this topic with some of my interviewees. Leonelli (2014b)
expresses  scepticism  regarding  the  ability  to  fully  automate  epistemic
processes, in particular with respect to data analysis and scientific discovery.
Ribes and Jackson (2013) emphasise that automated data technologies tend to
obscure the care and labour by humans that are required to build and sustain
functioning  data  infrastructures.  My  case  study  exemplifies  how  important
personal  experience,  local  expertise,  social  relations,  and manual,  hands-on
practices are in the creation of scientific data. It seems unlikely that any of these
capacities could be replaced by robots in the foreseeable future. Yet, as other
data-intensive  sciences,  ocean  sciences  embrace  highly  automated,  remote
technologies (Lehman 2017). My case indicates that some ocean scientists are
actually  caught  in  a  tension between manual  practices with  a historical  and
methodological legacy and the pressure to use new technologies and produce
more data at lower costs. In this scenario, new technologies complement rather
than replace long-standing practices.  
Another promising avenue for further philosophical research relates to the way
that  the  CPR  Survey  has  incorporated  microplastics  into  its  taxonomic
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identification practice. As already suggested in chapter six, this inclusion of a
non-biological entity in the survey’s list of taxonomic entities can be seen as a
bold  move.  Yet,  it  is  reasonable  from  the  perspective  of  the  survey’s  data
practices and illustrates how anthropogenic impacts on natural systems become
inscribed in scientists’ ontologies and thereby shape our understanding of the
world. Oceanographers, climatologists, and researchers of biodiversity already
know  that  their  scientific  objects  are  subject  to  anthropogenic  change.  For
ocean scientists, distinguishing between natural and anthropogenic processes
has become a recurring challenge. Yet, the role and practices of environmental
sciences while truly “natural” systems and entities continue to disappear require
more philosophical thinking. My case study demonstrates how difficult it is for
scientists to grasp an entity like the ocean ecosystem or any features thereof in
a  way  that  allows  scientific  reasoning.  More  often  than  researchers  and
philosophers  of  science  might  think,  scientists  actually  deal  with  integrated
entities or hybrids — deformed organisms fused with silk in a constellation that
formed in a container ship’s turbulent wake, or a plankton organism that has
incorporated a tiny piece of tyre rubber. Like Griesemer (2014), philosophers
need to discuss the objects that scientists regard as individuals or hybrids and
how these objects guide researchers’ practices and their understanding of the
world. The empirical study of research practices and materiality can disclose
these entities’ complex formation processes and the motivations for scientists to
adopt certain perspectives. 
Building on my emphasis on material  integration and continuity, a promising
follow-up  project  from  this  thesis  would  be  an  empirical  study  even  more
explicitly dedicated to materiality in data-intensive sciences. Given the variety of
material objects that are part of epistemic processes in today’s sciences, it is
not certain if the notions of material integration and continuity could apply to
other research settings in a similar way. This question has to be answered by
more empirical research. As Morgan (2014) points out, knowledge related to
local contexts travels from local to local before it might become generalised.
The implications  of  material  interactions  at  different  stages of  the  epistemic
process are spelled out in my thesis in relation to only one specific research
setting. Further case studies could also evaluate if implications of materiality are
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overlooked in scholarship on data-intensive sciences that focuses primarily on
digital databases and not on the genesis of scientific data.
Besides specifying the notion of materiality, my research has shifted the focus to
materialisation processes, to the efforts required to maintain and trace them,
and to the epistemic value of material continuity. My thesis demonstrates the
benefits of tracking the genesis and transformations of research objects in time,
as things that seem stable quite often change or assimilate changes in their
environment.  This  line  of  thought  could  be  linked  to  process  ontology,  a
metaphysical  stance dating back to  ancient  philosophers that  is  put  forward
today by philosophers of science to argue for a metaphysical view that assumes
processes instead of substances or things as the basic building blocks of reality
(Seibt 2017). An analysis of processes requires the tracking of materialisation
and stabilising processes not unlike what I have attempted in this thesis.
Finally, this thesis could serve as a platform for more collaborations and deeper
mutual understanding between philosophers of science and oceanographers.
The oceans crucially influence the most basic conditions for life on our planet
and philosophers of science should be interested in research practices related
to these still “alien” (Helmreich 2009) and widely unknown habitats for myriads
of  creatures.  From  a  distance,  ocean  sciences  may  appear  uncomplicated
regarding the relation between science and the world. Knowing about marine
organisms  and  tracking  their  development  make  a  generally  intelligible,
perfectly  legitimate,  and  graspable  research  enterprise  that  only  seems  to
require somebody to go out there and take stock on a regular basis. Drawing on
my research,  it  turns  out  that  oceanographers  have  a  lot  to  say  about  the
challenges  and  balancing  acts  that  lead  to  the  generation  of  meaningful
scientific  data  and  knowledge  of  our  environment.  The  kind  of  empirical
research carried out for this thesis opens these experiences and narratives for
productive rethinking and refinement of a variety of philosophical concepts.
267
Appendices
Appendix A: Criteria for selecting fieldwork sites
Criteria for selecting fieldwork, DATA_SCIENCE
Key  question  for  us:  given  characteristics  of  field  of  interest,  which
characteristics  of  databases  and  data  do  we  want  to  focus  on?  What
makes for most interesting comparators?
Characteristics of field
Practical criteria
 Location of project coordination
 Ease of access
 Geographical locations of users and donors
 Degree of complexity
 History (how far back does it stretch, how easy is it to reconstruct, how rich for
our purposes?)
 Success to date (measured in users, reputation, relation to journals and learned
societies, and/or financial support)
Characteristics of database
 Field (by self-description)
 Covered sub-disciplines
 Aim/purpose/scope
 Prospective users (academics/government/others)
 Prospective data donors
 Relation to specific projects
 Methods used to collect and mine data
 Software used
 Statistical and visualisation tools used
 Location of data storage
 International involvement
 Sponsorship (private/public, national/international, consortium)
 UK involvement
 Languages involved
 Timescale 
Characteristics of data involved
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 Types of data and meta-data
 Types of research covered
 Types of ontologies
 Variety of parameters considered
 Geographic coverage of data
 Timescale of data
 Material form of data (format)
Appendix B: Interview questions
Interview Protocol – Data Users 
Theme Keywords Questions
Personal 
history 
biography, type of 
work, research 
interests
disciplinary affiliations,
research communities
 
specific projects: with 
whom, funded by 
whom, to do what, 
with which materials
What is your background?
Where are you affiliated? 
What research community do you 
belong to?
What are your research interests?
What type of work do you do? 
How did you get to your current position
and interests?
What are the kinds of people you work 
with and what are their roles? 
What projects are you working on? 
Who are the funders? What are the 
aims of the project? Who are you 
working with? What materials/things 
are you working on?
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Practices of 
data 
handling 
types of data 
produced/used
instruments/IT/materia
ls of data production/
storage/analysis/mod
elling
strategies of data 
storage
strategies of data 
dissemination (if any)
What types of data do you work with? 
What instruments/IT/methods/protocols
do you use to produce data?
What are the materials in your scientific
research and are you working with any 
kinds of specimens specifically?
How do you store the data?
How do you disseminate the data? 
What instruments/IT do you use to 
disseminate the data?
Do you prefer working with specific 
kinds (types, formats) of data? How do 
you choose if several sources provide 
similar or the same data (if there are 
such cases)?
Can you explain your 
methods/protocols/instruments/models 
for data analysis?
Do you handle data differently when 
you collected it yourself compared to 
data you obtained from other sources?
Do you keep a lot of data on your work 
or personal computers? If yes, why and
which data? If no, why not?
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Can you recall specific cases where 
you reused data many times for 
different purposes? Did the reuse 
cause specific kinds of problems? Were
the data easily transferable or did this 
require a lot of additional work?
Experience
with 
database 
use
databases of interest 
examples of using 
databases for data 
dissemination
examples of 
consulting databases 
for further research
examples of 
successful data re-
use and failure to re-
use
meta-data
What sources of data do you use? 
Where do you look when you are 
interested in finding out what data are 
available on a given topic?
Which databases are you interested in?
Have you used databases for 
disseminating data? Why/ why not? (if 
yes) Why did you choose these 
databases? What problems/issues did 
you encounter?
What databases have you consulted for
further research? Why did you choose 
these databases? For what purposes?
Have you re-used data? Where were 
the data originally from?
What did you have to do in order to re-
use data? Was it harder to work with re-
used data?
Do you handle/store data that you 
sourced elsewhere differently from the 
data that you produced yourself?
271
What were the key meta-data (and/or 
features) that made work with database
X possible?
Have you ever failed to access or re-
use data? Why?
What are the most urgent features or 
improvements you would like to see to 
database X or Y and why? Would those
changes impact the adoption of the 
database by the community or 
yourself?
Are you aware of citizen science and 
crowdsourcing efforts? What do you 
think of them?
Disciplinary 
and social 
context
How have data production and 
dissemination methods changed since 
you have entered your field? Can you 
name significant technological or 
methodological innovations?
Can you name typical or recurring 
problems your field faces in work with 
data? Are there particular challenges? 
How could issues perhaps be improved
or overcome?
Do you see changes in funding 
agencies, industrial partners and/or 
research institutions with regard to 
data?
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How is open access to data being 
discussed in your field? Can you name 
examples of successful open access 
implementation?
Do you know of commercial 
initiatives/services that have emerged 
because of the possibilities offered by 
data sharing, re-use, open data?
How are relationships with peers in the 
field? How competitive is the field’s 
culture? Describe research ethos in the
fields of interest. 
How global are the research 
communities in your field? How 
big/global are the field’s professional 
organizations? Small and local or big 
and global conferences?
Meaning of 
term data
What do you mean by data? What do 
your colleagues mean by data?
What are the prerequisites for you to 
consider something to be data for 
research?
Do data need to be computable? 
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Appendix C: Ethics consent form
GUIDE INFORMATION/CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWS
Title of Research Project: The Epistemology of Data-Intensive Science
Sabina  Leonelli,  Principal  Investigator;  Niccolo  Tempini,  Research  Fellow;  Gregor
Halfmann, PhD Student
The  purpose  of  the  research is  to  systematically  analyze  whether  and  how  the
epistemology of science is changing in the digital age, through a comparative study of
data-intensive research practices and their  results  across  scientific  areas.  In order  to
document  the  practices  surrounding  the  production,  dissemination  and  use  of  data,
recorded interviews are being conducted with relevant scientists and practitioners. The
interviews will inform publications intended for academic audiences. More information
can be found on the project website http://www.datastudies.eu .
What is  involved in  participating:  you  will  be  invited  to  describe  your  everyday
research practices and will be asked questions focused on your experiences with data
handling, dissemination and interpretation. You will also be asked about the databases
used in  that  work.  The scheduling and length of the interview will  be at  your own
convenience. Typically interviews last between one and two hours, however you may
choose to have a shorter interview, or offer a in-depth account of your everyday work.
The interview will be conducted at a mutually agreeable location, or over the phone. 
Participation is entirely voluntary: You are free to decline to answer any question and
to end the interview at any point. For a month after the interview, you may choose to
withdraw  from  the  study;  simply  contact  the  researchers  to  say  so,  and  they  will
immediately destroy your contributions.
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Recordings and data: Recording interviews is a practical and common data collection
technique, but if you are uncomfortable with it, we can conduct the interview without
audio  recording.  The  interview  materials  will  be  de-identified,  labeled  with  a
pseudonym, stored on a password-protected computer, and kept in accordance with the
Data Protection Act for ten years and then destroyed. Other than the research team, the
only person with temporary access to the recordings will be a professional transcriber,
conditional to signing a confidentiality agreement.
Confidentiality: The information you share with us will be kept confidential and will be
attributed to you only with your permission. While in our work we will refer to the
project or institutional context you belong to, the information will be used and reported
in anonymous form, with the aim to make direct identification of yourself impossible.
We will  also ask you whether you are happy for us to make the eventual interview
transcript available as open access research data. This is optional and disconnected from
the question of anonymity. You can choose to be identifiable and at the same time for
the transcripts not to be shared, or conversely, to not be identifiable but for anonymised
versions of the transcripts to be made available. In any case, your contact details will be
kept separately from your interview data. 
Use of  non-confidential  data in future related projects: Upon completion of  this
project, researchers may keep non-confidential interview data for use in related research
projects. At the end of any related research project, the data will be destroyed, unless
you opted for making the interview transcript available online.
Risks and benefits: Based upon the information available to us, we believe that there
are no special risks nor benefits associated to your participation in our research. If you
choose to be named and/or have your contributions identifiable, the potential risks and
benefits depend on your circumstances. 
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Research findings: You may request a copy of publications resulting from this study
from the researchers.
Independence of project: The work is funded by the European Research Council via
Starting Grant DATA_SCIENCE. The researchers involved have no conflict of interest
relating to the subject matter, the individuals or the institutions involved in the research.
This  project  was  reviewed  by  the  Exeter  University  Research  Ethics  Board,  which
provided clearance from February 2015 to December 2018. 
Contact  details: For  further  information  about  the  research  or  your  interview data,
please  contact  Professor  Sabina  Leonelli,  Department  of  Sociology and Philosophy,
Exeter  University,  Devon  UK.  Email:  s.leonelli@exeter.ac.uk .  If  you  have
concerns/questions about the research you would like to discuss with someone else at
the University, please contact Professor John Dupre, j.a.dupre@exeter.ac.uk .
Your signature below serves to signify that you agree to participate in this study.
Participant’s  consent:  I  have  read  the  above  information  and  I  choose  to
participate  in  an  interview  for  research  towards  “The  Epistemology  of  Data-
Intensive Science”.
I agree to be audio-recorded: Yes ____ No ____
Name of participant: ________________________________________________
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Signature of participant: __________________________ Date:_______________
Signature of researcher: __________________________ Date: ______________
[2 copies to be signed by both interviewee and researcher, one kept by each]
To be completed after the interview, only if desired by the participant:
I,                  , give permission to be identified and have my contributions attributed to
me. Yes ____ No ____
I agree for the interview transcripts to be edited and shared as open access research data.
Yes ____ No ____
Signature of participant: __________________________ Date:_________________
Signature of researcher: __________________________ Date: _________________
Appendix D: Data re-use and archiving agreement
INTERVIEW RE-USE/ARCHIVING AGREEMENT FOR
Project: The Epistemology of Data-Intensive Science
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This agreement is entered into by _____________________________________,
interviewee, and the research team of the project, which consists of Sabina Leonelli,
Niccolo Tempini and Gregor Halfmann. Both parties enter into this agreement in order
to  facilitate  the  future  use  of  the  interview  conducted  on  this  date,
_______________________________,  for  research,  historical,  and  educational
purposes. 
A member of the research team conducted this interview as part of a research
project on the practices underlying data handling and dissemination across scientific
fields. The purpose of this agreement is so the transcripts from the interview can be
shared with other researchers and the public. This agreement would allow the transcripts
of  the interview to be made accessible  on a  website  created for  the  project,  and/or
deposited  at  an archive or  other  repository. It  would also permit  future  uses  of  the
transcript  such  as  presentations,  web  sites,  publications,  audiovisual  works,  public
exhibits, online venues, and other media deemed appropriate. The transcripts will be
shared in edited format. This is to maintain the original meaning and tone of your words
while at the same time omitting fillers, grammatical errors and rough expressions, with
the aim of improving readability and reporting. Also, the research team will never use
information from your interview that may lead to the identification of somebody else.
Interviewee:
1. Consented to voluntarily participate in this interview. 
2. Authorizes the research team to record, transcribe, and edit the interview,
and to use and re-use the interview transcript in whole or in part. The original
recording will never be disseminated further than the research team.
3. Understands that the research team shall have no obligation to use the
interview, and may dispose of the transcript if no suitable archive or repository is
found.
4. Has no expectation of  financial  compensation  for  participation  in  this
project.
5. Agrees  to  give  and  assign  all  rights,  title,  and  interest,  including
copyright, of whatever kind from this information and interview to the research
team and, if a suitable archive or historical repository at which to deposit the
project’s transcripts is found, to that archive or repository.
6. Understands that even if a suitable archive or repository is found, in the
future, the archive or repository may dispose of part or all of the transcripts.
Date of interview: _________________________
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___________________________________ ______
_______________________
Full Name of Interviewee (print) Full Name of Interviewer
(print)
______________________________________
_________________________________
Signature Signature
______________________________________
_________________________________
Address Address
_______________________________________
_________________________________
City Province Postal Code City
Province     Postal Code
___________________________________
______________________________
Date Date
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Glossary
AIS: Automatic Identification System for marine entities
Argo: The International Argo Project, coordinates a global array of autonomous 
temperature and salinity profiling floats
AUV: autonomous underwater vehicle, a robot that travels and operates without 
requiring input
BODC: British Oceanographic Data Centre, Liverpool
CoML: Census of Marine Life, 2000s
CPR: Continuous Plankton Recorder
CTD: measurement unit with conductivity, temperature, and depth sensors
DAC: Data Assembly Centres, introduced with WOCE
DASSH: Data Archive for Seabed Species and Habitats, Plymouth
Defra: UK Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs
EGU: European Geosciences Union
GACS: Global Alliance of CPR Surveys
GEOSS: Global Earth Observing System of Systems
GEOTRACES: An international study of marine biogeochemical cycles of trace 
elements and their isotopes
GODAE: Global Ocean Data Assimilation Experiment
GOOS: Global Ocean Observing System, oceanographic component of GEOSS
GPS: Global Positioning System
IAS: American Institute of Advanced Study
ICES: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
ICSU: International Council for Science
IDOE: International Decade of Ocean Exploration, 1970s
IGY: International Geophysical Year 1957–58
IMO: International Maritime Organisation
IOC: Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, UNESCO
IPY: International Polar Year 2007–08
MBA: Marine Biological Association of the UK, Plymouth
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MECN: Marine Environmental Change Network, an effort to coordinate and 
sustain the practices of long-term marine ecological monitoring programmes 
in the UK
MODE: Mid-Ocean Dynamics Experiment, 1970s
MVZ: Museum of Vertebrate Zoology in Berkeley, CA
NCAR: United States National Center for Atmospheric Research
NERC: National Environmental Research Council of the UK
NMBL: National Marine Biological Library, Plymouth
NOAA: United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOC: National Oceanography Centre, Southampton
NODC: United States National Oceanographic Data Centre
NSF: United States National Science Foundation
OBIS: Ocean Biogeographic Information System
OED: Oxford English Dictionary
OSD: Ocean Sampling Day 2014, EU-funded citizen science project
PCI: phytoplankton colour index, a four-category scale for assessment of a CPR
sample’s colour
phytoplankton: microscopic single-celled plants, protists, or bacteria drifting in 
the upper ocean; consume carbon dioxide by photosynthesis; foundation of 
the aquatic food web
PML: Plymouth Marine Laboratory
ROV: remotely operated vehicle, a multi-sensor submersible navigated from 
ships
SAHFOS: Sir Alister Hardy Foundation for Ocean Science, Plymouth, 
conducted the CPR Survey between 1990 and 2018
SAR: synthetic aperture radar, a technique that increases the resolution of earth
observing satellites
SCOR: Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research
SDS: Secchi Disk Study, citizen science project based in Plymouth
Secchi Disk: a plain white disk lowered into the water from ships to measure 
sea water turbidity
ship of opportunity: commercial ships that voluntarily contribute to the 
production of scientific data
SSH: sea surface height
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SST: sea surface temperature
STS: science and technology studies or science, technology, and society
TSG: thermosalinograph, an instrument measuring temperature and salinity 
mounted on ships of opportunity and research vessels
UNEP: United Nations Environment Programme
WCRP: World Climate Research Programme
WDC: World Data Centres, introduced with the IGY
WMO: World Meteorological Organisation
WOCE: World Ocean Circulation Experiment, 1990s
WoRMS: World Register of Marine Species
XBT:  expendable bathythermograph, temperature probe dropped from ships
zooplankton: animals living near the surface of the sea that drift with the 
currents, although some are weak swimmers; includes larvae of many fish 
species; a key component of the marine food web
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